

Lectures on the  
**Philosophy of Art**  
The Hotho Transcript of  
the 1823 Berlin Lectures

G. W. F. HEGEL

*Translated and edited by Robert F. Brown*

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL  
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF ART

THE HOTHO TRANSCRIPT OF THE  
1823 BERLIN LECTURES

TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTION  
BY ANNEMARIE GETHMANN-SIEFERT

Edited and Translated by  
Robert F. Brown

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# LECTURES on the PHILOSOPHY of ART

The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures

Hegel gave lecture series on aesthetics or the philosophy of art in various university terms, but never published a book of his own on this topic. His student, H. G. Hotho, compiled auditors' transcripts from these separate lecture series and produced from them the three volumes on aesthetics in the standard edition of Hegel's collected works. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert has now published one of these transcripts, the Hotho transcript of the 1823 lecture series, and accompanied it with a very extensive introductory essay treating many issues pertinent to a proper understanding of Hegel's views on art. She persuasively argues that the evidence shows Hegel never finalized his views on the philosophy of art, but modified them in significant ways from one lecture series to the next. In addition, she makes the case that Hotho's compilation not only concealed this circumstance, by the harmony he created out of diverse source materials, but also imposed some of his own views on aesthetics, views that differ from Hegel's, and that the ongoing interpretation of the aesthetics part of Hegel's philosophy has unfortunately been taken to be Hegel's own.

This translation of the German volume, which contains the first publication of the Hotho transcript and Gethmann-Siefert's essay, makes these important materials accessible to the English reader, materials that should put the *English-speaking world's future understanding and interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of art* on a sounder footing.

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## PREFACE

This volume in the *Hegel Lectures* series of Oxford University Press is an English translation and edition of G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst*. Berlin 1823. *Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Gustav Hotho*, edited, with an introduction, by Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (Hamburg, 1998). Acknowledgement of those contributing to the German edition appears at the conclusion of the appendix in this volume that is entitled 'The Constitution of the Text in the German Edition, and in this English edition'.

Herr Manfred Meiner of the Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, made possible the inclusion of this volume in our *Hegel Lectures* series. As always, the professionals of the Oxford University Press editorial staff were consistently reliable and helpful, as too were the suggestions by an anonymous reader for the Press. Peter C. Hodgson, with whom I have collaborated on a number of the volumes in this series, generously gave this work his meticulous criticism; I couldn't have done it without his advice and assistance, although of course any remaining flaws or inadequacies are entirely my responsibility.

A special thanks to Ms. Darlene Reynolds, who patiently and expertly typed what must have seemed like countless revisions of each part of the manuscript. Without her this project would never have seen the light of day. Finally, my wife Mary Ann has provided constant love and support not only in this but in all areas of my life.

Robert F. Brown



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## EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

### I. BACKGROUND ISSUES

Although Hegel included the topic of art in his early writings, usually in connection with religion, his first general treatment of the philosophy of art as such occurred in lectures given in Heidelberg in 1818. His notebook for these lectures has not survived. The main sources for his philosophy of art are transcripts made by students at his lecture series given in Berlin in 1820–1, in 1823, in 1826, and finally in 1828–9. Hegel did not publish a volume of his own on the philosophy of art. As with other topics on which he lectured but did not publish (including the philosophies of religion and of world history, and the history of philosophy), later scholars had to rely on edited versions of those lecture materials made by compiling existing student transcriptions and a few partial manuscripts. These edited versions were placed in the first collections of Hegel's *Werke* to represent these topics. The Meiner Verlag series of *Hegel Vorlesungen*, commencing in 1983, includes volumes that remedy drawbacks of the *Werke* volumes on these lectures-only topics; they distinguish the lecture series given on the same topics in different years, so that there is now a more faithful representation available of what Hegel himself actually said in a given series, and how his thought, albeit not finalized, had developed or changed over time.

Hotho's editing of the three-volume *Aesthetics* for inclusion in Hegel's *Werke* drew upon the transcript and manuscript materials from the Berlin lecture series that were available to him (including his own transcripts from 1823 and 1826). He wove all this material together into a single compilation, similar to what the editors of other *Werke* lecture topics volumes did. Unlike them, however, he went a step further. Hotho had his own theory of aesthetics that differed in some important respects from Hegel's and, in the judgment of Annemarie Gethmann-Siebert, he imposed these views on the materials in ways that made them appear to be Hegel's own.

She studied the evidence for Hegel's own evolving philosophy of art in the Berlin lecture series and has sought to rescue it from what she regards as the partly misleading construction that Hotho placed on it in the *Aesthetics*. The way to do this is to publish, independently, the various lecture transcripts from the Berlin series, so that one can see from them what Hegel actually said in a given series. The German edition began this process by presenting Hotho's own transcript from 1823.

Gethmann-Siefert's very thorough and substantial editorial introduction to the German volume presents not only a detailed orientation to the Hotho transcript (and to other Berlin transcripts too), but also a comprehensive survey of the larger issues surrounding Hegel's philosophy of art and the ongoing scholarly discussion about it. As such, her introduction is something of a tour de force. This English edition therefore gives it equal billing as part one of this two-part volume. There is no need to repeat its themes here in this introduction to the English edition.

## II. THE HOTHO TRANSCRIPT IN THE GERMAN EDITION

The German edition has two distinct arrangements for footnotes. The usual editorial footnotes that provide background information appear after the Hotho transcript and are keyed to it by indicating the page and line number to which a note applies (a line marked by an asterisk in the margin of the text). The second kind of footnote appears at the bottom of the page and shows what it refers to by the line number and wording on that page. This second kind of footnote indicates such things as minor corrections in the text made by Hotho at the time of transcribing, grammatical corrections made by the German editor, and alternative readings possible owing to difficulty in deciphering Hotho's handwriting. This second kind of footnote also includes some partial outlines Hotho wrote in his margins at an early stage of his revisions. (For a complete discussion of Hotho's procedures and stages in the revisions he made to his transcript, see the appendix at the end of this volume mentioned in the Preface.)

The German edition has another feature that this English edition does not include. Hotho also wrote in the margins of his transcript, at a third and final stage of its revision, and preparatory to using it among the materials he included in the *Aesthetics*, a great many notations, some in partial outline and the majority of them just repeating wording in the transcript itself. The German edition places these notations in its margins, adjacent to, and inset into, the edges of the text itself. This English edition omits the marginalia in this form in order to avoid the prohibitive expense of including what is largely superfluous content. Whoever wants to see all these third stage marginalia should consult the German edition. A digest of the main points in the series of notations appears in this English volume as an appendix entitled 'Hotho's Outline Organizing the Contents of His Transcript'; the German edition presents this same digest at its beginning, as in effect an abbreviated table of contents of these marginalia of Hotho's.

### III. THIS ENGLISH EDITION

The purpose of this English edition is not to duplicate exactly, or to replace, the German edition for those who wish to scrutinize the Hotho transcript in its minutest detail. Whoever wants to do that should certainly consult the German edition, if not the actual manuscript in Hotho's own handwriting. Our purpose here is to present the contents of Hotho's transcript as best we can in understandable and colloquial English, so that the reader can have at hand one version of Hegel's actual delivery of the lectures on the philosophy of art, as well as have a specific foothold for understanding and evaluating Gethmann-Siefert's contentions about the wider issues surrounding the reception and status of the *Aesthetics* volumes in the past and today. To accomplish this purpose, this English edition follows a number of the protocols established for previous volumes in this series of *Hegel Lectures*.

A single footnote sequence combines the two kinds of notes in the German volumes, and these English footnotes are all at the bottoms of the pages. There are four of these footnote series, each of which begins anew with the beginning of a major part of the book (one series for the Gethmann-Siefert introduction; three series for the three main divisions of the transcript). This edition omits the majority of the textual notes appearing at the bottoms of the German edition's pages, most of which involve quite minor features of the transcript that have no material significance for its translation into English. The English editor occasionally adds a footnote of his own to provide further background information, or adds material to an existing German footnote, in both cases where these additions would be helpful to an English reader. These footnotes added by the translator begin with the sign [Tr.]. Where feasible (and it is not always feasible), the same sign also precedes substantial material added within the translation of an existing German note. Citations of the literature in the notes also include, where appropriate, the relevant pagination in readily available English translations.

A suitable English style sometimes calls for variance from the punctuation in the German; for breaking up a single long sentence into several shorter ones; for combining obviously related short sentences into a longer one; for occasional changes in the paragraphing. The punctuation and paragraphing are in any event features of the transcriber's decisions and not necessarily features of Hegel's own intentions in his delivery. Also, proper names appear in their most common spelling, which is not always the way Hotho spells them. The titles of written works and other works of art, when these are familiar to the English reader, are also given in English, and usually only in

English when these works are mentioned again later by name. The general rule is to use the names and terms in forms most recognizable to the reader.

Gender-specific pronouns and subject terms that need not be exclusively masculine are, where possible, often rendered in plural terminology so as to be more inclusive, except in cases where a male figure is clearly the referent intended. This practice does not affect the substantial meaning of the text. Also, '*Mensch*' is routinely translated as 'human being' for the same reason.

Use of brackets to mark additions to the text, in the interests of clarity or accuracy, is sparing in this English edition. Brackets appear only around what are clearly material additions to the meaning of the text. Most bracketed words in the German edition serve the lesser purpose of finishing an *incomplete sentence or thought*, and so are translated here without brackets. Similarly, words added to the translation by the English editor to make it more readable are bracketed only when they materially add to the meaning. In the same vein, the few minor typos detected in the German volume are just corrected silently.

This English edition presents the Gethmann-Siefert editorial introduction without indicating its pagination in the German volume (which in any event is given there in Roman numerals). This English edition indicates the pagination of the Hotho transcript (as it is typeset in the German print version) by the same method used in other volumes in the *Hegel Lectures* series: by a vertical slash inserted into the text to show where a new page begins, with the number of the new page placed in the margin adjacent to that line. The German edition uses that method to indicate where a new page of the written Hotho transcript itself begins, except that it shows that manuscript pagination at the top of the page and placed toward the center. In this English edition, in contrast, the beginning of a new transcript page is shown by the page number set in brackets at the appropriate spot within the translation.

The Hotho transcript has few topic headings of its own. For the most part it is just a continuous text. The numerous subheadings of this volume have been created by the English editor in order that the reader can more readily see the organization of its topics and subtopics.

The Glossary near the end of the volume shows how many of the most pertinent German terms are usually (but not invariably) rendered in the translation. The Bibliography seeks to include all the written works cited with publication data in the notes of both parts of this volume.



# INTRODUCTION



# INTRODUCTION: THE SHAPE AND INFLUENCE OF HEGEL'S AESTHETICS

By Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert

The present volume contains a lecture transcript of Hegel's Berlin lectures on aesthetics, or the philosophy of art, and it is indeed the only transcript still preserved from Hegel's second lecture series on this topic, given in the summer semester of 1823. The transcript comes from Heinrich Gustav Hotho, who was later the editor of Hegel's *Aesthetics*.<sup>1</sup>

Heinrich Gustav Hotho<sup>2</sup> was born in Berlin on 22 May 1802. After studying jurisprudence in Breslau he returned to Berlin, where he became one of the most enthusiastic auditors of Hegel's lectures, and for the remainder of his life he remained a loyal disciple and defender of Hegel's philosophy. In typical fashion, he transcribed these lectures on aesthetics twice, in the years 1823 and 1826; the second notebook has not survived. In fact after his dissertation, *De philosophia cartesiana* (1826), and his appointment as a university lecturer (1828), he devoted himself wholly to aesthetics and to art history. Initially he taught the history of literature at the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule*, the general military academy. In 1829 he was appointed *Extraordinarius*, or supernumerary professor, at the University of Berlin, and from then on he gave lectures on art history and literature, but also lectures on philosophical aesthetics. Most of his published books resulted

1. When italicized in the German edition, the term '*Ästhetik*' refers to the three-volume edition of the lectures edited by Hotho and included in Hegel's *Werke*. This English edition renders it by *Aesthetics*, the title in existing English-language versions, except when it appears in German titles of secondary works of scholarship. When not italicized in the German, the term refers to the actual contents as such of the *Werke* volumes and sometimes includes other materials too (transcripts or notes not utilized by Hotho, contents from the *Encyclopedia*, etc.), and thus it refers to Hegel's aesthetics, or philosophy of art, as a topic; in these instances this English edition renders it in lower case, as 'aesthetics'. Avoided, unless the context specifically calls for it, is the term 'Hegelian aesthetics', so as not to suggest that the discussion of the content extends to any of Hegel's followers apart from Hegel himself, or from Hotho and his construction of Hegel's thought. The term 'Hegel's aesthetics' thus refers only to Hegel himself, or to various transcripts of the lectures, or to Hotho's construct of Hegel's thought in the *Werke*.

2. Hotho provides a sketch of his own life in his book, *Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1835). A more precise albeit brief biography is found in Wilhelm Waetzoldt, *Deutsche Kunsthistoriker, Von Passavant bis Justi* (Leipzig, 1924), 2:53 ff. See also Max Lenz, *Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität zu Berlin*, Vol. 2, first half: *Ministerium Altenstein* (Halle, 1910), pp. 310 ff.; *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, Vol. 8, p. 191 (written by Karl Prantl); *Unsere Zeit, neue Folge*, X, 66.2 (1874).

from his lectures on art history.<sup>3</sup> He labored over the decades on literature, giving lectures and talks about Goethe and Schiller.<sup>4</sup> Little has come down to us about his activities in philosophical aesthetics although, as one example, in summer 1833 he must have taken over Hegel's lectures on aesthetics at the university, as evidenced from a transcript by Immanuel Hegel, the youngest son of the philosopher.<sup>5</sup> At this time Hotho was also occupied with the editing for publication of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics. Another important area of Hotho's work was the aesthetics of music. He combined scholarly treatment with personal enthusiasm and art criticism here too, as he did in art history. His systematic, wide-ranging labors concerning the Berlin musical scene cannot be tracked down, to be sure, although evidence of their influence is found in the correspondent's reports for Cotta's *Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände* that he produced over the course of many years.

3. In addition to the *Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst*, which came out concurrently with Hegel's *Aesthetics*, Hotho also published the lectures that he gave at the university. These include the following five titles. *Geschichte der deutschen und niederländischen Malerei. Eine öffentliche Vorlesung, an der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität zu Berlin gehalten von H. G. Hotho* (Berlin, 1842-5). *Die Malerschule Hubert's van Eyck, nebst deutschen Vorgängern und Zeitgenossen. Öffentliche Vorlesung gehalten von H. G. Hotho* (Berlin, 1855-8). *Eyck-Album. Das Altarwerk Hubert's van Eyck in St. Bavo zu Gent, nebst Lebensskizze Johann's und Hubert's und Schilderung der Kunstart beider Brüder* (Berlin, 1862). *Dürer-Album: Albrecht Dürer's Kunstart, Leben und Kunstentwicklung. Als Erläuterung von 22 photographischen Abbildungen Dürer'scher Holzschnitte, Stiche und Oelgemälde* (Berlin, 1863). *Geschichte der christlichen Malerei in ihrem Entwicklungsgange dargestellt* (Stuttgart, 1867-72). One instance of numerous reports on art, from his travels, is *Reisestudien zur Geschichte der Malerei*, in *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart* (1844), 2: 871 ff. There is also a long series of further reports of travels and visits to exhibits, as well as a number of music reviews in Cotta's *Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände* that are no longer available for examination. (A few of these manuscripts are in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin as well as in the Collection of Engravings there although, as closer investigation reveals, many of those on music have passed into private ownership and been lost.) Also informative are his scholarly reviews, in particular the exchange with Friedrich Theodor Vischer, because they provide details about Hotho's conception of systematic aesthetics, ones normative for the preparation of Hegel's *Aesthetics*. See H. G. Hotho, 'Über Metaphysik des Schönen', *Deutsches Kunstblatt* (Berlin, 1834), pp. 279-80, 287-9, 290 ff., 303 ff., 310 ff., 339-40, 359 ff. See also Carl-Ludwig Michelet, 'Hotho gegen Vischer: Über Metaphysik des Schönen', *Der Gedanke* 2 (1861), 90 ff.

4. Hotho's extensive review of the *Wanderjahre* is preserved in manuscript form. (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe gave his novel, *Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre*—*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*—its final form in 1829.) In addition there exists a handwritten piece that stems from his oft-repeated lecture on Goethe: 'On Goethe as Poet, Lecture by Pr. Hotho 1832/33, transcribed by Friedrich Theodor Vischer' (a manuscript possessed by the University Library, Tübingen).

5. Immanuel Thomas Christian Hegel (1814-91) entitled this transcript 'Aesthetics: Lectures given by Hotho in summer 1833, transcribed and elaborated by Immanuel Hegel'. This series certainly played a role in the systematic framework of the published *Aesthetics*. See, in this context, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst. Die Nachschriften und Zeugnisse zu Hegels Berliner Vorlesungen', *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991), 92 ff., n. 11.

Hotho summarizes the chief interest of his labors in a letter of 18 March 1830, to Goethe. Over against 'the disorderly clamor of the aesthetic opinions of the day', Hotho seeks to present poetry in the way that art as such discloses itself to itself and to others, with an enthusiasm refined by knowledge—to present the 'spirit, cadence, and coherence' of the various 'works in their content and poetic form as this has become clear to me, as well as' to present 'it to others, for the clearer enjoyment of these works'. In a letter of application to the minister of culture, von Altenstein, with a view to the Hegel-succession, Hotho sets forth this conception as his program of a 'speculative art history'.<sup>6</sup> Enthusiasm for art, the history of art, scholarly lectures and popularized scholarly accounts in art publications and critical newspapers, synthesize the experience of art purely and simply into an educational experience. Hegel's philosophy remains the indispensable, systematic foundation for this purpose, historical labors become its field of application, and a firm artistic judgment—art criticism—accrues as its result.

In conjunction with his instructional activity as supernumerary professor at the University of Berlin, Hotho also dedicated himself continuously to the service of art, at first (from 1832) as assistant in the picture gallery of the Royal Museum and, from 1860 until his death in 1873, as director of the Collection of Engravings.

1 Hotho's scholarly work is hardly mentioned today. His 'speculative art history' continues to have an impact up to the present solely because of his editing of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics. In 1835, four years after Hegel's death, the first edition of the *Aesthetics* appeared in three extensive volumes that Hotho edited, basing them on the extant sources from Hegel's Berlin lectures. As an important part of his philosophical system, Hegel's aesthetics was made available to the public together with the other major lecture topics of the Berlin period. According to the introductory reflections of the editor, these lectures on aesthetics stand alongside other philosophical systems, in particular those of Schelling and Solger, as their equal.<sup>7</sup> From that time

6. The letter of 18 March 1830 is in the possession of the Goethe-Schiller Memorial in Weimar. In the collection of the Goethe-Museum in Düsseldorf there is the outline of a letter from Goethe replying to Hotho and dated 19 April 1830 (by Riemer, in a flowing hand and carefully written). On the conception of speculative art history, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'H. G. Hotho: Kunst als Bildungserlebnis und Kunsthistorie in systematischer Absicht—oder die entpolitisierte Version der ästhetischen Erziehung des Menschen', in *Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik im Berlin Hegels*, ed. Otto Pöggeler and Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (Bonn, 1983), pp. 229 ff., especially 239–40. Karl Sigmund . . . von Altenstein was the minister of culture from 1817 on, and played a key role in encouraging Hegel to come to Berlin.

7. [Tr.] See F. W. J. Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, ed. and trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis, 1989). Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of art, given at Jena in the winter

onward this text of the *Aesthetics* has passed for Hegel's authentic philosophy of art; furthermore, as a rule the aesthetics counts as the only part of Hegel's philosophy still of real importance today. Hence it is at least of interest, as a matter of historical curiosity, what may have provided the initial impetus for Hotho's life's work and for his editing of the voluminous *Aesthetics* of Hegel.

We must accept the fact that, because of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, Hotho still continues to influence discussion in philosophy, art history, and literary studies today, even if one supposes, like Wilhelm Waetzoldt, that, considered in light of contemporary research, Hotho's own work is of little value, or like Ernst H. Gombrich,<sup>8</sup> that one can attribute to the Hegelianism bearing this stamp nothing but fatal consequences for contemporary aesthetics. Debate about Hegel's *Aesthetics*, albeit for the most part unconsciously so, is always at the same time a controversy about the actual importance of the view of art that Hotho filled out as his own in the course of his activities and that, in a productive phase of his own development, he interlaced almost inextricably with Hegel's *Aesthetics*. Heinrich Gustav Hotho, the Berlin art historian, may have been forgotten; however, the advocate for 'speculative art history' continues to be influential under the name of his philosophical teacher, Hegel, right up to the contemporary discussion about the meaning, the possibility, and the actual importance of a philosophical aesthetics. His thoughts influence the topical layout of the history of art and of literature in Hegel's aesthetics.

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term 1802-3 and at Würzburg in 1804 and 1805, but not published until after his death, are in *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche Werke*, 14 vols., in two divisions, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856-61), 5:355-736. See also part six of his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, entitled 'Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or: Essentials of the Philosophy of Art according to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism', *Sämmtliche Werke* 3:612-34; F. W. J. Schelling: *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1978), pp. 219-36. Schelling also addressed the topic of art briefly in lecture fourteen ('The Science of Art') of his 1803 publication, *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan, ed. Norbert Guterman (Athens, Ohio, 1966), pp. 143-51 (*Sämmtliche Werke* 5:344-52). There are also several other, less well-known, works of Schelling dealing with the topic of art. Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819), a romantic philosopher who held that the artist reconciles the finite with the infinite by a beautiful creation, in a disclosure of the Idea in a phenomenal form, was a professor at the University of Berlin from 1811 to 1819. His writings include *Erwin, Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1815), and *Vorlesungen über Aesthetik*, ed. K. W. L. Heyse (Leipzig, 1829).

8. See Ernst H. Gombrich, 'Hegel und die Kunstgeschichte' an address on the occasion of the awarding of the Hegel Prize of the City of Stuttgart, 28 January 1977', *Neue Rundschau* 88 (1977), 202 ff.

In contrast to the text that is pertinent to how Hegel was on the whole received, namely, the *Aesthetics*, the direct transcript (*Mitschrift*) that Hotho made concurrently with Hegel's lectures on aesthetics in the summer semester of 1823, published in this volume, appears to be singularly unassuming. However, when we look at a few important basic issues and problems of the philosophy of art, there is evident in many parts of this transcript, as well as in other transcripts, the presence of an original 'Hegel', a conception of aesthetics often decidedly different from the published version. Hotho's lecture transcript from the summer semester of 1823 witnesses to Hegel's presentation of his philosophy of art to a university audience, a witness of interest still today for scholarly as well as philosophical debate about the significance of Hegel's *Aesthetics*. As one of the earliest witnesses to Hegel's Berlin lectures, the direct transcript provides information about the philosophy of art and the development of its conception, a philosophy of art that Hegel expounded to his Berlin students and that he himself was unable to bring to completion by the time of his death.

## I. THE CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE OF HEGEL'S AESTHETICS

Hegel's 'system of absolute knowledge' did indeed become questionable as a whole, although when people reject his philosophy as an outdated attempt to think everything as a totality, the *Aesthetics* is specifically excepted. So, the fathers of Marxism can commend his aesthetics as the best and most useful point of entry to Hegel's philosophy. The sociology of art, which is in principle hostile to philosophy, utilizes Hegel's *Aesthetics* as a most welcome means of conveying its own fundamental ideas on the relationship of art to commerce. Art scholarship and literary scholarship, often to their detriment, are marked by a covert Hegelianism, and almost every contemporary work on the theory of art or on literary theory decks itself out in Hegelian feathers, frequently in order to spare itself the otherwise necessary recourse to methodological reflections of its own.

This picture of the historical influence of Hegel's aesthetics outside of philosophy is complemented by the direct philosophical discussion about the aesthetics and with it. In philosophy too the aesthetics is subject to controversy; here too it must be challenged because the basic thesis, the much-discussed thesis of 'the end of art' and the 'classicism' of the *Aesthetics* seemingly bound up with it, as well as the systematic foundation of both—the dogmatic system of absolute knowledge—were already deemed unacceptable by Hegel's students. Nevertheless, right up to today, the disagreements time after time locate in the *Aesthetics* currently important insights into art, insights that are illuminating and worthy of discussion and, above all, insights for the specifically philosophical treatment of aesthetic problems.

In this situation it seems at first glance superfluous, even an unnecessary complication, to seek to complement the text of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, or perhaps even to replace it, by the publication of lecture transcripts. The text of the *Aesthetics* itself, in the way it has served for more than one hundred fifty years and is influential right up to the present, provides such ample fulcra for philosophical argument that an augmentation of historical information by new sources appears to be unnecessary rather than helpful. Nevertheless, more precise background information about the attestations to the lectures not only points to a 'new Hegel' but also, by reaching back to the historical sources, enables us to avoid a series of interpretive problems concerning the philosophy of art.



A. PHENOMENOLOGY OF ART, OR SYSTEM  
OF AESTHETICS?

Not for the first time today, but already in Hegel's day, his disciples, like the critics, were of the opinion that the thesis of 'the end of art' in particular is incompatible with the illuminating analysis of the historical significance of art; that this thesis is definitely incompatible with Hegel's art criticism and his characterizations of individual instances, which many today take to be hardly surpassable in their brilliance. The general view is that Hegel's strength lies in judgments about art that are refreshing and unerring in a revolutionary way. The systematic structure of his *Aesthetics* takes a back seat to the vitality of these discussions. For that reason it is natural indeed to see, from the text of the *Aesthetics*, that the actual accomplishment of Hegel is the philosophical illumination of the historicity of art. Sir Thomas Malcolm Knox, to whom we are indebted for the standard English translation of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, points to this dichotomy between the judgment about art and the systematic foundation of aesthetics, a dichotomy so striking and inexplicable that, after thorough study, Knox arrived at the view that in his *Aesthetics* Hegel often does not mean what he says.<sup>9</sup> Before this, about 1930, Georg Lasson maintained the opposite position, likewise based on competent and well-founded critical knowledge of the text.<sup>10</sup> Lasson regards Hegel's judgments about art as a disconcerting part of the *Aesthetics*, but not so the attempt at a philosophical mastery of the phenomenon of art, which Hegel sketches out authoritatively. Contemporary interest in Hegel, the defense of the 'current importance' of his aesthetics, nevertheless bases itself to a lesser degree on this systematic aspect of the lectures on the philosophy of art, and instead almost without exception on a discussion of the contents of the aesthetics. Guided by the supposition that Hegel, the great philosopher of reality and phenomenologist<sup>11</sup>, was able to expound art, and its historical significance, independently of his own predilection for developing a philosophical system, people turn to those contents dealing with judgments about art and the structural characteristics of art's

9. Thomas Malcolm Knox, 'The Puzzle of Hegel's Aesthetics', in *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz (New Jersey, U.S.A., and Sussex, England, 1980), pp. 1-10.

10. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Die Idee und das Ideal*. New edition, according to the received sources, ed. Georg Lasson (Leipzig, 1931), vol. Xa of *G. W. F. Hegel: Sämtliche Werke*, ed. G. Lasson.

11. See Odo Marquard, *Aesthetica und Anaesthetica. Philosophische Überlegungen* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zürich, 1989).

significance in action, for history. Hegel's *Aesthetics* is in fact so rich and multilayered in this respect, albeit also so contradictory in its details, that one can find evidence for whatever one likes.

About 1970, the two-hundred-year anniversary of the philosopher's birth, we can ascertain newly-awakened interest in Hegel's works, one stimulating a huge growth of literature on his philosophical work as a whole. With the newly-awakened interest in Hegel's philosophy as such, his *Aesthetics* also came back into the spotlight of philosophical discussion, although initially it was considered and presented in an extremely narrow way, under the constraint of 'demonstrating its current importance'. At the Stuttgart Hegel-Colloquium in 1970, Dieter Henrich posed the question, decisive for a series of further ground-breaking English and American publications on the *Aesthetics*, as to whether Hegel had not sought, in his lectures on aesthetics, to depart from the systematics of his philosophy of art—embedded there only in sparing indications—in the interest of an unbiased treatment of art, one astonishingly rich in information and strictly oriented to the phenomena.<sup>12</sup> Doubtless it can be shown that Hegel, in constant, intensive engagement with the artistic events of his time, filled out his information in many areas. The art-travels he undertook himself brought him in contact with collections of ancient art, but at the same time with contemporary artistic events in the theater, the opera, and the concert hall. Enthusiastic letters and reports about these experiences attest to an unbiased endeavor—as Hegel himself says—to acquaint himself as much as possible with all there is to know and to experience. A 'different Hegel' appears in these reports, a philosopher gifted with an exceptional visual memory who reports about the old masterworks of painting, a musically-enthusiastic operagoer, a friend of the theater, someone conversant with the significant artists of his day. For this reason it seems scarcely conceivable that, in his philosophical efforts concerning art, the very same Hegel is supposed to have forgotten all this and could only affirm art as being 'at an end'. There are dissenters from this view of Hegel, indeed in two ways. Among the adherents of Hegel's philosophy at the present time there is the attempt to follow Hegel even in the thesis of the end of art and to defend it.

12. See Dieter Henrich, 'Zur Aktualität von Hegels Ästhetik', Reflections at the conclusion of the colloquium on Hegel's philosophy of art, in *Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970*, ed. Hans-Georg Gadamer (Bonn, 1974), as *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 11, pp. 295 ff. Also see Dieter Henrich, 'Kunst und Kunstphilosophie der Gegenwart'. Reflections with regard to Hegel, in *Immanente Ästhetik, Ästhetische Reflexion*, ed. Wolfgang Iser (Munich, 1966) (*Poetic und Hermeneutik*, 2), pp. 11 ff. See also the essay by Martin Donougho, 'Remarks on: "Humanus heißt der Heilige" ...', *Hegel-Studien* 17 (1982), 214 ff.

On the contrary, already in the first debates about Hegel's aesthetics we find the effort not to criticize the unfortunate thesis of the end of art, but instead silently to set it aside while retaining the system.

Karsten Harries, a prominent interpreter of the *Aesthetics*, opposes the skeptics who, in basing themselves precisely on the thesis of the end of art, no longer expect from Hegel's systematically-grounded aesthetics any meaningful statements about art and the understanding of art. Unexpectedly, the thesis of the end of art is what backs up his opinion about the current importance of Hegel's *Aesthetics*.<sup>13</sup> In fact it proves to be a prophetically shrewd prognosis about the fate of contemporary art. Art that achieves ever more abstract portrayals, ever more deficient forms of presentation, is at an end, and Hegel was one of the few philosophers to recognize this. In his *Aesthetics*, therefore, before the fateful day, he presented this inevitable outcome of art's modern development, and he was able to do this on the basis of his systematic stance.

To be sure, Hegel himself clearly assigned a different sense to his thesis of the end of art; he did not call for abandoning engagement with the arts, nor did he seek to establish their definitive 'worthlessness'. His concern was simply to distinguish the orientation of artistic achievement in the modern world from the significance art had in antiquity. Nevertheless, in his own lifetime Hegel had to confront the reproach that his systematically articulated philosophy of art leaves insufficient room for a new development of the arts; that in virtue of a dogmatically distorted concept of art it unjustifiably curtails and constricts the 'future of art'. Hegel's students and critics, those who received his lectures on the philosophy of art at first hand, already attempted to solve this problem in their own approaches to aesthetics. They sought to overcome the difficulties of Hegel's *Aesthetics* in such a way that the thesis of the end of art could be transposed into a thesis of the 'interminable future' of art. Hegel's followers and his critics are united in this

13. See Karsten Harries, 'Hegel on the Future of Art', *Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1973-4), 677 ff. On the following statements in the text, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Hegels These vom Ende der Kunst und der Klassizismus der Ästhetik', *Hegel-Studien* 19 (1984), 205 ff. More recent investigations, supported in part upon Harries, do not of course rely unconditionally on the substance of this conclusion but do indeed defend the systematic aesthetics. See in particular John McCumber, *Poetic Interaction: Language, Freedom, Reason* (Chicago and London, 1989). McCumber sees in the *Aesthetics* a liberation from Hegel's conception of the state. But aesthetic experience is understood, in the sense inserted into the aesthetics by Hötho, as a completion of the individual. McCumber's investigation bases itself on the published version of the *Aesthetics*, as does the endeavor of Gérard Bras in *Hegel et l'art* (Paris, 1989) (*Philosophies* 19), which characterizes the aesthetics as philosophical art history. See the review of the latter by Paolo D'Angelo, 'Hegels Ästhetik zwischen System und Emanzipation', *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991), 275 ff., esp. 280-1.

intention. Both Heinrich Gustav Hotho and the aforementioned Friedrich Theodor Vischer, through his lectures on Hegel's aesthetics, seek in their own way to provide a grounding for the future of art in the modern world. In his own publications Hotho characterizes the efficacy of art as a unity of inspiration and concept, and correspondingly sketches out his own systematic aesthetics, his 'speculative art history'. Vischer seeks to radicalize this approach even more and, going beyond Hotho, to link art's 'future' to the 'waning of its religious interests', therefore to the beginning of its restrictive repositioning in the modern state.<sup>14</sup> Alongside these attempts at a seemingly faithful restoration of Hegel's aesthetics—attempts not without their difficulties and in fact in my opinion by no means restoring its import—stand other ways of dealing with Hegel, certainly critical but ultimately more fruitful ones. The endeavor of Theodor Mundt is typical of them. He takes over from Hegel the interest in a systematic aesthetics, although, especially in debating with Hotho, he endeavors to so transform this systematics that it provides the foundation for a theory of the 'interminable future' of art. Mundt even dedicates himself to this theory of art not only philosophically but at the same time also with a view to expounding a history of literature.<sup>15</sup>

Redirecting the systematic aesthetics into a theory of historical relevance, that is, into a theory of the interminable developmental power of art, quietly remedies another alleged deficiency of Hegel's aesthetics. Keeping art also

14. The difficulties with this conception are obvious. Hotho not only intervenes in the text of Hegel's *Aesthetics* with the intention of mitigating the thesis of the end of art; he interpolates artistic judgments abundantly and so skillfully that he creates the impression that Hegel himself largely abandoned his thesis of the end of art. But in fact in the *Aesthetics* it is stated and considered at the outset. The Hegelian Friedrich Theodor Vischer follows Hotho in the interpretation and restructuring of the *Aesthetics*. With the dissolution of its ties to religion, art can flourish anew. Differently than Hegel, however, Vischer confines art to its 'national interests', with the result that he carries over to art Hegel's thought about a conflict of individual peoples, seeing the struggle for the hegemony of German culture ultimately decided on the soil of art. So the future of art hinges not only on its ability to exclude from itself all foreign influences, but on its assertion of a 'Germanic' culture of its own over against the hostile 'Romantic' culture that surrounds it and threatens to overwhelm it with foreign influence. No such ideological hardening of art is to be found anywhere in Hegel. On this point, see Gethmann-Siefert, 'H. G. Hotho: Kunst als Bildungserlebnis...' See also Friedrich Theodor Vischer, 'Der große Repentant deutscher Nation für alles Schöne, Gute, Rechte und Wahre,' in 'O Fürstin der Heimath! Glückliches Stutgard.' *Politik, Kultur und Gesellschaft im Deutschen Südwesten um 1800*, ed. Christoph Jamme and Otto Pöggeler (Stuttgart, 1988), 329 ff.

15. See Theodor Mundt, *Aesthetik. Die Idee der Schönheit und des Kunstwerks im Licht unserer Zeit*, a facsimile reprint of the first edition of 1845, with a postscript by Hans Düwel (Göttingen, 1966). Also by Mundt, *Die Kunst der deutschen Prosa: Ästhetisch, literargeschichtlich, gesellschaftlich*, a facsimile reprint of the first edition of 1837, with a postscript by Hans Düwel (Göttingen, 1969).

under the control of the concept of its 'future' avoids the second perplexity, namely, the 'classicism' of Hegel's aesthetics. That is because, in the eyes of most people, this classicism rests on the orientation of contemporary art to the past perfection of beautiful (Greek) art. So, in principle, for a philosophical aesthetic in Hegel's sense to be thought possible, one must, in getting beyond this systematic conception, simply give the history of art its due. This early engagement with Hegel's *Aesthetics* seems to be more interesting in many points and more fruitful in what it yields than are more recent critiques. Hegel criticism today draws an unnecessarily and unsuitably harsh conclusion from the problem of the thesis of the 'end of art' and of the 'classicism' of aesthetics linked to it. Philosophical aesthetics as a whole, but at least the content-aesthetics of German idealism, becomes suspect. Since Hegel's aesthetics counts as the culmination of this content-aesthetics, since his conception of it, beginning with its delivery in Berlin, has led to impassioned discussions, to perplexities not dealt with up to now, people beg to be over and done with Hegel and to put a stop to discussing content-aesthetics as such, and instead to seek the foundations of aesthetics with Kant<sup>16</sup> or wholly in a linking of Kant with Marx. The editing of the sources for Hegel's Berlin lectures makes possible a more discriminating debate, in contrast to such a categorical rejection of his aesthetics, because numerous new aspects enrich the discussion. A decision for or against Hegel is in fact ultimately so closely linked to the choice as to the possibility of a philosophical aesthetics that hasty verdicts reached about the issue have been retracted.

## B. THE SHARED BASIS FOR ENGAGING WITH HEGEL'S AESTHETICS

Controversy about the current importance of Hegel's aesthetics survives even the 'overcoming' of Hegel in the return to a formal (Kantian) or a concrete (Marxist) aesthetics. Viewed as a whole, the discussion proves to be at least as many-layered, richly-faceted, and contradictory as Hegel's

16. See Rüdiger Bubner, 'Hegel's Aesthetics: Yesterday and Today', in *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, pp. 15-33. Also by Bubner, 'Gibt es ästhetische Erfahrung bei Hegel?', in: *Hegel und die 'Kritik der Urteilskraft'*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 69 ff. For a critique of this interpretation, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Phänomen versus System,' in *Phänomen versus System. Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer Systematik und Kunsturteil in Hegels Berliner Vorlesungen über Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst*, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert (Bonn, 1992), published as *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft* 34, pp. 9 ff.

aesthetics itself. All the interpretations and critiques, the affirmative as well as the negative ones, could until the last few years be supported, as their shared basis, by the conviction that the foundation of this discussion, the three-volume *Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst*, is Hegel's very own work; that it reproduces his systematic aesthetics in finished form.

For more than one hundred fifty years Hegel's aesthetics has been known and passed down in the form that Hegel's student, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, gave to it after Hegel's death. The text appeared in its first edition beginning with the year 1835, and with minor alterations in a second edition of 1842. Ever since then it has passed for the authentic aesthetics of Hegel.<sup>17</sup> Of course people remain aware of the fact that, like the other Berlin lectures volumes, the *Aesthetics* was published posthumously within the framework of the edition of Hegel's works by an 'association of friends of the deceased' and had been edited thoroughly for that purpose. Knowing this, people nevertheless ignored it. They saw Hegel's failure to publish his aesthetics himself as caused by his untimely death rather than by an essential inability or unwillingness to complete this work. That is because, at the beginning of his Berlin lectures on aesthetics, in conjunction with the first lecture series (1820-1), Hegel already expressed the hope of being able soon to commit the aesthetics to print as a book.<sup>18</sup> So it must have seemed that he had largely completed his aesthetics and that, owing to contingent circumstances, only the final step to printing remained. This complete version, as part of the comprehensive system of Hegel's philosophy, only had then to be furnished by the posthumous edition, in order to provide the *Aesthetics* to the public in the form known until today. Nevertheless, editor Hotho required four years

17. G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, in the 'complete edition' of 18 volumes 'by an association of friends of the deceased' (Berlin, 1832 ff), consists of vol. 10 in three parts, ed. Heinrich Gustav Hotho (Berlin, 1835-7); 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1842). Where the pagination of the original German given in the footnotes is that of one of the editions only, that is indicated as such; otherwise the pagination is presumably the same in both editions. Hotho wrote a foreword to this three-part volume. The standard English translation of the *Aesthetics* is by T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1975). It translates the second edition of 1842, and does not include the 1835 edition's preface by Hotho, from which the statements quoted below in our text are taken.

18. See the draft of a letter to Friedrich Creuzer of May 1821, in *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Friedhelm Nicolai, 4 vols. (Hamburg, 1969-81), 2: 266, which reads: 'I propose to lecture on aesthetics in the winter. Your work enables me to go more deeply into the subject, and probably in time to have something to publish on it.' (Quoted from Hegel: *The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington, Indiana, 1984), p. 466. Subsequent references to the *Briefe* will also be cited in *The Letters* when the material is included in the latter volume; not every letter is so included.) In fact Hegel had already concluded his first series on aesthetics when this letter was written. He did not lecture again on aesthetics until 1823.

of intensive labor to accomplish the awaited complete version. When people considered the comprehensive three-volume work, any impatience at the delay seemed amply compensated. Hegel's students and followers proved to be unanimously enthusiastic about the published edition of the *Aesthetics* and full of praise for Hotho's accomplishment.<sup>19</sup> However, confidence in the authenticity and originality of the *Aesthetics*, a confidence unbroken until today, already at that time had no basis in fact. The text of the *Aesthetics* that Heinrich Gustav Hotho worked up from Hegel's manuscripts and notes, as well as from the lecture transcripts of his students, is the foundation of all the editions of Hegel's *Aesthetics* ever since then. Put more precisely, all editions of Hegel's aesthetics known to us base themselves on the minimally-revised second printing of the initial published text.

Since Hegel's *Aesthetics* itself is praised by its critics, indeed even in Marxism, as the work that allows the best possible access to his thought, and since, moreover, right up to the present this *Aesthetics* receives attention, is affirmed, is criticized, but at the very least is utilized as a quarry of ideas, it appears superfluous or at least questionable to want to replace this text with an edition of lecture transcripts. An edition of transcripts would of course provide a direct impression of the oral delivery, in place of the polished work. Possibly Hegel's thoughts—mirrored in the testimonies of their direct recipients—would convey to the reader a more lively impression than does the complex *Aesthetics*. However, it remains in fact questionable whether a student rendition, perhaps an inadequate one, would successfully and completely capture the position. For that reason people not only are deterred from the immense effort of a new, historical-critical editing of the aesthetics, but also often regard the undertaking as clearly superfluous.

19. Even Georg Lasson, in the introductory remarks to his critical edition (*Die Idee und die Ideal*, p. xii), acknowledged the completion of the aesthetics as an inherently independent part of Hegel's system to be a 'meritorious service' on Hotho's part, something that for him will 'remain forever undiminished in the history of scholarship'. Despite the skepticism that had to ensue from Lasson's labors, Rüdiger Bubner stands behind Hotho in all its details: 'The amazing thing about this editorial accomplishment is not only the harmonious and readable final text but also the sequence of thought, maintained without superficiality, and the substance of Hegel's speculation, which emerges clearly.' See Bubner, 'Zum Text', in G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, parts one and two, with an introduction, ed. R. Bubner (Stuttgart, 1971), p. 31. In referring to 'authentic Hegel texts that are found in no transcript', Helmut Schneider too, stresses that one must, 'as regards an edition of the preserved transcripts, henceforth count Hotho's edition too as source for Hegel's aesthetics'. See Schneider, 'Nachwort des Herausgebers' in vol. 2, ed. Schneider, pp. XXI-XXII of the reprint edition of the 1821 *Neue Berliner Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Kunst* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1988).

## C. THE GENESIS OF THE AESTHETICS: FROM SKETCH TO SYSTEM

Despite its enduring influence, we must regard Hegel's *Aesthetics* as an extraordinarily problematic textual foundation for a historically and philologically precise access to his philosophy of art, but also for an intellectually accurate access to it.

When, after Hegel's death, there fell to one of his most faithful students the task of preparing, within the framework of the edition of the major lecture series, the lectures on 'Aesthetics, or Philosophy of Art' given by Hegel four times in Berlin, the scholarly and political intention of the undertaking was already set. That intention was to pass Hegel's philosophy on to posterity as a comprehensive philosophical system; to secure for it a fitting cultural-political relevance over against the ascendancy of Schellingian thought. Hotho, who continued the lectures on aesthetics at the University of Berlin after Hegel's death, quite understandably made this interest his own. He even expressly subordinated his personal cultural-political ambitions and scholarly plans, which he formulated in his conception of a 'speculative art history',<sup>20</sup> to the concern for a dissemination and defense of Hegelianism.

In his Preface to Hegel's *Aesthetics*, Hotho indicates the sources and materials from which he reconstructed the text of the *Aesthetics*, systematically and with regard to its contents. Most interesting is the allusion to Hegel's two notebooks on aesthetics, which stem from his time in Heidelberg and the beginning of his time in Berlin, and are no longer available today although they were still accessible for Hotho in his editing of the *Aesthetics*. According to Hotho's report, Hegel must have composed a notebook as the foundation for his first lectures on aesthetics at Heidelberg in 1818, as well as soon afterward composing a new and essentially reworked notebook for his first Berlin lectures of 1820-1. In the lectures of 1820-1, Hegel departs from his original plan to lecture on aesthetics in conjunction with the philosophy of religion.<sup>21</sup>

20. In a letter to Minister of Culture von Altenstein, Hotho made his conception explicit: 'For I have set myself the task, as the highest scholarly goal, of treating aesthetics exclusively in the most intimate connection with art history, in order in this manner, through the historical explication of the arts, to provide justification and confirmation for universal aesthetic principles.' See Waetzoldt, *Deutsche Kunsthistoriker* 2:54; also Gethmann-Siefert, 'H. G. Hotho: Kunst als Bildungserlebnis...', pp. 239-40.

21. In a communication of 5 May 1820 to the rector of the University of Berlin, concerning the totality of the instructional offerings in philosophy, Hegel did not include the philosophy of religion as a discipline in its own right. As an element of the philosophy of spirit, in addition to



Hotho describes the Berlin Notebook, which was the basis of Hegel's four lecture series of 1820–1, 1823, 1826, and 1828–9, as fully formulated and stylistically polished only in a few passages. Hegel carefully worked out the introduction and a few individual segments. Hotho says (p. viii in his Preface) that the rest of the manuscript consists of key-words, 'short, unconnected sentences' or 'individual isolated words', as well as numerous cross-references between these 'laconic core expressions' and 'marginal notations disconcertingly accumulated from one year to the next and written in disorderly fashion,' so that it appears astonishing how Hegel could find his way in his oral delivery. In addition to this, in the course of the lectures Hegel must have inserted into his Berlin Notebook on aesthetics a large number of loose memoranda, excerpted materials, new organizational outlines, and the like, many of which Hotho passed on to friends and interested parties after concluding his labors on the *Aesthetics*. By roundabout routes a few of these fragments have in turn come into our hands today. They too provide only a partial and, in themselves, minimally informative picture of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics.<sup>22</sup>

Based on the characteristics of these authentic materials, in virtue of the information in Hegel's two handwritten notebooks, the hope that Hotho was able to have a far better insight into Hegel's aesthetics than is possible for us today comes to naught right from the start. Hotho in fact states that the two manuscripts by Hegel of course provide 'the most reliable material' (Preface, p. vii; cf. p. xi), but by no means sufficient information for publication.

Even the plan to issue the aesthetics as a book—a plan already expressed by Hegel in connection with the 1820–1 lectures—seems in any case extraordinarily optimistic, in light of Hotho's report and information today from rediscovered textual fragments from this material for the original lectures on aesthetics. Even though the Berlin Notebook on aesthetics may have contained relatively well-formulated segments, these nevertheless constitute the exception. In the case of the aesthetics, the relationship of the manuscripts to the oral delivery can of course no longer be reconstructed

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anthropology and psychology, he mentions aesthetics, which at the same time has reference to the philosophy of religion. However, already at Nuremberg he had his eye on the possibility of separating the two disciplines, since in the conceptual structure of the *Nürnbergischen Schriften* (1808–16) he prepared the way for the later separation of art from the ethical life of the modern era, by paralleling the genesis of the individual and the history of spirit. See the *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 21, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1938), p. XXIII, n. 1.

22. On this issue, see below, pp. 47–9.

adequately; but this relationship would hardly be able to provide a more favorable picture than is the case with many others of Hegel's notebooks for his lectures. As is evident from manuscripts of other lecture topics still extant today, Hegel customarily formulated the introduction very carefully but then, in the course of the lectures, he spoke extemporaneously from outlines and rough drafts at hand. The fragments of Hegel's aesthetics rediscovered today confirm this picture. What is still preserved has for the most part the character of sketchily written reflections or excerpts that do not offer any advantage over the published aesthetics. Rather, all we still possess of Hegel's handwritten evidence creates the impression that, in the case of the aesthetics, we are dealing ultimately with a 'work in progress'. In reconstructing the aesthetics, Hegel's own notebooks can of course no longer be drawn upon to verify this thesis, in the way that is possible in the case of the other lectures from the Berlin period. However, the sources for Hegel's lectures on aesthetics that are still preserved, namely, the direct transcripts and the other transcripts, as well as the versions carefully worked up by his students, confirm this impression. In Berlin Hegel gave four-hour lectures on aesthetics in the winter semester of 1820-1 and in the summers of 1823 and 1826, and even five-hour lectures in the final series in the winter semester of 1828-9. The transcripts of these lecture series point to important alterations and variations, to shifts in emphasis with respect to content and form, and finally to the changeover from an initial bipartite division into 'general' and 'particular' parts, to a tripartite division (with an 'individual' part included) that gives more room for, hence greater significance to, the treatment of the individual arts.

For that reason Hotho sees himself forced to compose the text of the *Aesthetics* by comparing Hegel's manuscripts 'with the most carefully transcribed [student] notebooks', and under the supposition that Hegel's manuscript and [a] lecture transcript are related 'like an outline and its exposition' (Preface, p. viii). As evidence from all four Berlin series, the lecture transcripts provide Hotho with the variations in Hegel's reflections. But he is not predisposed to introduce all of this material. In his opinion the Heidelberg Notebook is of little significance for the later aesthetics, since Hegel incorporated only a few examples from this notebook into the Berlin lectures. Hotho likewise declines to consider transcripts from the first Berlin lecture series, the winter semester of 1820-1. That is because, as Hotho contends, Hegel so 'essentially revised' the lectures in 1823 that it would be futile to utilize these two early sets of evidence, the idiosyncratic (*eigenständige*) sources, on a par with the direct lecture transcripts. The final shape of the aesthetics can be seen only from the 1823 lectures onward, and for these

lectures Hotho can rely on his own notebook, which has survived until today and is published in the present volume. For the lectures of 1826 Hotho indicates he was able, as for 1823, to draw upon a transcript of his own, together with a notebook of captain [Major] von Griesheim, and then on the notebook of M. Wolf, a junior barrister, as well as that of Heinrich Wilhelm August Stieglitz, a student of Hegel's. From these last three, only the Griesheim notebook has come down to us today. For the lectures of the winter semester of 1828-9, Hotho relied on a transcript that has likewise been rediscovered, namely, a notebook of von Heimann, together with the notebooks of L. Geyer and Johann Gustav Droysen, which are no longer available, as well as on transcripts by two theology licentiates, Bruno Bauer and Johann Karl Wilhelm Vatke.

With the 1835 publication of the *Aesthetics*, Hotho claimed to offer to the public 'for the first time' the lectures on Hegel's aesthetics. This claim involves more than it may seem to at first. For of course Hegel had presented the aesthetics four times altogether in Berlin; one of his listeners, however, would scarcely have been able to come to know them in the way they are set forth for us in the published version.

In the Preface Hotho even gives the reason for this. With Hegel's lectures on aesthetics Hotho aims to overshadow Schelling's 'Beginnings of a Speculative Aesthetics', as well as the indubitably meritorious efforts of Solger, by means of a 'surpassing' work of Hegel.<sup>23</sup> But this is achieved only if the systematic character of aesthetics in Hegel's sense is construed, with interpolations, as going far beyond Hegel's own deliberations. With Hegel himself Hotho finds little support for this task, as he expressly emphasizes. Hotho had to integrate, indeed reconstruct from within, the 'system' of the aesthetics, using both Hegel's own expressions and their reflected image in the various student attestations to them. In Hotho's view, Hegel himself indeed achieved a 'progressive working-out' of his lectures during the years 1823 to 1827, one different from the earlier lecture series, but he was unable to realize in the aesthetics the 'full power and clarity of his speculation'. Hotho surmises that bitter pedagogical experience forced Hegel into 'ever more-popularized presentations', in which he did develop difficult points succinctly, but in which he had 'to relax appreciably the strictness of the scientific method' (Preface, p. x). This problem intensifies over the course of the lectures, becoming especially noticeable, as Hotho says, in an undesirable way in the lectures of 1828-9.

23. See n. 7, p. 9 above, on Schelling and Solger. 'Beginnings' alludes to the last part of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*, which he published in 1800.

This deficiency of the lectures makes it compulsory to improve what Hegel in his own words calls a merely 'thematic' introduction to aesthetics, by a fully articulated system of aesthetics, that is, by essentially altering the argumentative procedure of the lectures. In the introduction to his lectures, Hegel had indeed foregone a reiteration of the discussion of the systematic structure of aesthetics that he had already published in the *Encyclopedia*. However, he put forward the systematic claim to launch the philosophical treatment of art in such a way that the phenomenon would retain a conceptual, thematic structure adequate for his purposes, one that permitted a claim for its necessity on its own account, in the sense of 'scientific philosophy'. This kind of implicit systematics obviously did not satisfy the interests of Hegel's students when they wished to transmit Hegel's system to posterity in finished form. The manner of the editing corroborates the suspicion that the pronounced intervention into Hegel's aesthetics is linked to this scientific-political concern for the transmission of the philosophical system. The wish to complete in a single system the reflections Hegel linked, more or less successfully, to art, in order to lend the various materials 'the character and cohesiveness of a book', forced Hotho in fact into a thorough reconstruction of the aesthetics, one deviating from Hegel even in its details.<sup>24</sup>

24. It must remain an open question to what extent Hegel himself could have concurred with a reworking of this sort. Possibly—and Otto Pöggeler points in this direction—Hegel himself could have awakened this systematic interest in Hotho and supported it. In a few publications Hegel seems to have led Hotho consciously to carry out his thought systematically and to apply himself to its further aspects. That holds good, for instance, for Hotho's critique of Tieck's edition of Kleist—*Heinrich von Kleist's gesammelte Schriften*, ed. L. Tieck, 3 vols. (Berlin 1826)—which Hotho published in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (May 1827), No. 85 ff., pp. 685 ff. It bases itself on Hegel's critique of Tieck's edition of Solger and the criticism of Romanticism Hegel developed in it (Hegel, on: *Solgers Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel*, ed. L. Tieck and Friedrich von Raumer, also in the *Jahrbücher*..., No. 51 ff., pp. 105 ff.) This is also the case with the critique of the 1828 Berlin performance of Kleist's drama *Prince Friedrich of Homburg*, published in the morning newspaper. In my opinion, however, these instances still do not allow us to conclude that Hegel entrusted to Hotho also the systematic revision of his aesthetics in a completed sense, and that he would have accepted Hotho's version of the discussion of the problems of aesthetics. That is because, in the *Encyclopedia* (1817) and its revised editions in 1827 and 1830, Hegel himself put forth the systematic character of aesthetics. Hotho's systematic aesthetics is, already in its basic conception, not in agreement with that of the *Encyclopedia*, for Hegel refines the thesis regarding art as a thing of the past, by a cultural-philosophical differentiating of art's relationship to religion from its relationship to the state. In contrast, in the *Aesthetics* Hotho persistently and permanently softened this thesis by emphatic artistic judgments, and constructed a dialectical framework of transitions between the various art forms and arts, one Hegel did not require either in the *Encyclopedia* or in the lectures on aesthetics. In addition, according to all the information to be gathered from the transcripts, Hegel could not in any case have been able to accept the modifications in the content of the aesthetics. On this issue, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert,

This fact is already evident in the formal configuration of the aesthetics, in the structural features of the different lectures. As we mentioned, up to and including 1826 Hegel organized his lectures into a General Part and a Particular Part. In his last lecture series he differentiated his material anew, dividing the treatment into a General Part, a Particular Part, and an Individual Part. Whereas the first two parts contain the characterization of the ideal and forms of beauty, according to form and content structured respectively into symbolic, classical, and romantic art forms, the Individual Part follows with a history of individual arts. This means that the examples that found their setting in the structuring of the individual art forms in the earlier lectures Hegel now expounds separately from these first two parts. The majority of the examples are discussed in the Individual Part dealing with the history of the individual arts.

Hotho chose the arrangement of the last lecture series for the published version of the *Aesthetics*. That posed two problems for him, a systematic one, and a technical one involving the presentation. First of all Hotho offers a few material arguments for why, in the editing, he can confine himself to the lectures of 1823 and 1826, which in his view are the best-constructed ones.<sup>25</sup> Whereas Hegel's initial lectures are said to have not yet attained the speculative level of this subsequent investigation, in the lectures after 1826 Hegel cannot sustain the 'progressive elaboration' of the level attained in 1826. That is why, in the Preface, Hotho criticizes the final lecture series of 1828-9 with polemical severity. In light of this polemic it is surprising that Hotho adopts the exact arrangement of this final lecture series for the published version of the *Aesthetics*. Coupled with the polemic, the circumstance that for purely pedagogical reasons Hegel was at fault for neglecting the speculative investigation is not without its problematic consequences for the *Aesthetics*.

Since Hotho adopted the organization of the last lecture series as the organization of the *Aesthetics*, he sees himself moved by the aforementioned circumstances to draw extensively on the two preceding lecture series for configuring the content, indeed to give preference to them. That is, his

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'Hegel über Kunst und Alltäglichkeit,' *Hegel-Studien* 28 (1993), 215 ff., as well as *Ist die Kunst tot und zu Ende?, Überlegungen zu Hegels Ästhetik* (Jena and Erlangen, 1993), vol. 7 of *Jenaer philosophische Vorträge und Studien*, ed. Wolfram Hogrebe.

25. Theodor Mundt, Hotho's later adversary on aesthetics issues, shares this assumption with Hotho. Mundt too emphasizes that Hegel's aesthetics has been formulated best in these lectures, and in his own *Ästhetik*, which he published in 1845, Mundt obviously bases himself on Hegel's lectures of 1826. See *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, ed. Günther Nicolai (Hamburg, 1970), no. 460, pp. 300-1 (hereafter: *Berichten*).

systematic and material reservations about the last lecture series make it necessary for him to combine the final organizational setting of the aesthetics with the exposition of content from the preceding series, in order (contrary to Hegel's own configuration) to keep intact the sufficiently 'speculative examination.' Due to his own reweighting of the lectures, Hegel undertook considerable rearrangement of his material. For instance, at times he moved various reflections—in particular the descriptions of individual works of art—to other spots. Yet Hotho discusses all the examples from the arts, the descriptions of content that he found in Hegel's manuscript and in the transcripts to the various lecture series, now restored respectively to the places where Hegel mentioned them in the earlier lectures as well as in the later lectures. In addition, he incorporates texts on individual aesthetic problems—texts Hegel did not utilize in the lectures but sought to employ for other purposes—into the text of the *Aesthetics*.<sup>26</sup> In this fashion the aesthetics is expanded not only in content, but also structurally. That becomes especially clear in the parts of the aesthetics that Hegel continually developed and further improved in the course of his lectures, such as the symbolic and romantic art forms. But the weighting of the classical art form was affected by this too. In the earlier lectures, up to and including 1826, Hegel in fact treated all three art forms in about the same compass, via the twofold division. In the final lectures he gathers together the structural characterization of symbolic, classical, and romantic art forms, once again in approximately equal measure,<sup>27</sup> in order then in the third or Individual Part of the aesthetics to examine and discuss anew the conception of the symbolic art form in particular, but also the conception of modern art (presented in the romantic art form), with an abundance of examples. This reweighting gets lost in the published version of the *Aesthetics*. In it the examples that Hegel introduced as more specific features of symbolic, classical, and romantic art forms Hotho in fact sometimes assigns to the Particular Part. In addition, however, he introduces them once again in the Individual Part. This means that Hotho obviously draws from the earlier lecture series (as he himself states, from the notebooks of 1823 and 1826) the examples that are

26. One such example is Hegel's review of von K gelgen, ' ber von K gelgens Bilder'. See *Berliner Schriften, 1818–1831*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956), pp. 531 ff. (in *S mmtliche Werke*, vol. 11). It is also in G. W. F. Hegel: *Schriften und Entw rfe I (1817–1825)*, ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Chr. Jamme (Hamburg, 1990), pp. 204 ff. (in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 15). Also see Gregor Stemmrich and Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Hegels K gelgen-Rezension und die Auseinandersetzung um den "eigentlichen historischen Stil" in der Malerei', in *Welt und Wirkung von Hegels  sthetik*, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. P ggeler (Bonn, 1986), pp. 139 ff. (*Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 27*).

treated in the Particular Part of the aesthetics. In the last or Individual Part, Hotho presumably bases himself on the transcripts of the last lecture series, and brings in once again at this location the material that Hegel shifted from the first two parts into the third. Because of such duplication, the text of the published version becomes considerably more voluminous than Hegel's original exposition in the lectures.<sup>27</sup>

This procedure of editorial reworking of course has its origin in Hegel's lectures, arising, strictly speaking, from a difficulty in principle that every future edition must face too. The fact is that the various crucial points of the aesthetics' oral delivery can hardly be taken into account adequately within a *single* unified framework. This consideration leads today to presenting the philosophy of art, according to Hegel's different versions, in 'texts from different years'. But that too requires considerable editorial intervention into the extant lecture material, as well as giving up all claim to the completeness or unitary character of the aesthetics. Hotho interprets this editorial difficulty as 'testing the mettle' of the editor. As he stresses (in the Preface, p. xiii), 'it has been a struggle . . . to replicate fully, with complete fidelity, Hegel's specific expressions of thoughts and intuitions in their very own coloration and, to the best of one's abilities, to preserve the nuances of his diction with its lively impression on each point, an impression made known in a lasting way by Hegel's writings and lecture presentations.'

That reassures even the present-day reader with respect to the authenticity of Hegel's aesthetics. On the other hand, however, a further basic principle of such editorial labor 'faithful to Hegel', one appearing to be definitely questionable, is a principle scarcely compatible with the historical-critical consciousness of our time. Hotho in fact declares (Preface, p. vi) about his editorial activity that one may discreetly make up for gaps in the essentials, 'but what is added has endeavored, when good fortune permits it, to enhance, agreeably and throughout, the prospective value of what is preserved and respected'. So, as we can conclude from these explanations, based on his own principles Hotho saw himself as making a strict selection from the available materials, a selection not sufficiently legitimated—in any event not for our understanding today. He not only leaves aside the Heidelberg Notebook and the transcripts of the first Berlin lecture series, combining the final organization of the last lecture series with the elaboration of

27. Hotho's subsequent entries to the arrangement in his own notebook of 1823, entries obviously originating in conjunction with his work on the *Aesthetics*, constitute one example of this procedure. In the flow of their handwriting and in their ink, these marginal notations clearly differ from the manuscript of the 1823 transcript, and they present the attempt to establish, in material outline, the organization of the later lectures for the published version.

content in the two intermediate series; he also revises and supplements the lecture testimonies. Since from our perspective today the selection procedure appears to be arbitrary and unjustified, the natural suspicion is that Hotho locates the material culmination of the lectures on aesthetics in the years 1823 and 1826 because he attended these two series himself and committed them to written form.

Nevertheless he does not exempt even his own notes from the scathing verdict about the lecture transcripts. The nature of the available materials on the aesthetics—the sketchy manuscript by Hegel, and the external features of Hegel's delivery as being mainly an obstacle to an elegant presentation, features in Hotho's judgment reflected in all the testimonies to the lectures—makes it appear pointless and impractical to look upon these undeniable sources as sufficiently authentic, and truly allowing them to speak. 'To preserve the actual oral delivery as much as is at all possible' (Preface, p. xii) means to let the 'obstructive external features' occupy the foreground, 'from which has slipped away that refreshing inner life' of spiritual penetration, of his own ingenious discourse, which, according to Hotho, is what sets Hegel's aesthetics apart (Preface, p. xiii). Its essential element, comprehensible only to the initiated among the auditors, consists of the 'unsettling, electrifying stroke of genius in which, quite unexpectedly, Hegel's most wide-ranging self came to a focus' (p. xiii). For this reason the editor undertook to reinstate this inner vitality of the philosophy of art.

Although he not only admits to drastic interventions in the construction of Hegel's aesthetics but also justifies them as necessary—and of course *necessary in Hegel's sense*, for his thinking possessed this 'inner vitality' of its own accord—Hotho at the same time emphasizes that in no passage has he engaged in reworking Hegel's remarks imprudently. Unlike what supposedly took place in the editing of the lecture series on other topics, Hotho did not seek to remove the 'inner defects', to redo the 'arrangement of the whole' when it 'lacked a scientific justification', or to insert 'missing dialectical transitions'; nor did he seek to eliminate gaps by a philosophically firmer linkage of 'loose connections', or by increasing the 'references to examples from art' (Preface, p. xiv). Nevertheless, because the state of the sources requires it, certain interventions prove to be unavoidable, by combining manuscripts in Hegel's own hand with insufficient lecture testimonies and, 'with the greatest caution and forbearance in the emendation process, by merging the most varied and often conflicting materials, wherever possible, into a well-rounded whole' (Preface, p. vii). So, as Hotho thinks fitting, the editor may not forego making 'frequent' alterations in the transcripts (Preface, p. xiii). Except these alterations must come off in such a way that the



labor on the text ought, right up 'to the peak' of its 'completion, to be completely undetectable'. Hotho in fact achieved, fully and completely, this undetectability of all the embellishments, because his principal obligation to the vitality of Hegel's thought has left the readers and critics of the *Aesthetics* believing, for more than one hundred fifty years, that with Hegel's three-volume work they possess not only a formally complete system of the philosophy of art, thus indeed its irreplaceably compact presentation, but at the same time also the authentic aesthetics of Hegel.

So, as can presently be shown from comparison of the published version of the *Aesthetics* with the direct and fair copy transcripts of the lectures that are known today, Hotho carried out the task of emendation in grand style and to a degree startling to our contemporary standards of accuracy. He makes changes in the contents of the aesthetics, ones in which he endeavors faithfully to make the aesthetics complete, and this is evident also when he emphasizes that the editor of the *Aesthetics*, it goes without saying, has 'to seek out the best ones' from all the extant materials, that is, from Hegel's notebook as well as from all the lecture transcripts of the different lecture series on aesthetics that are available to him—indeed without considering their temporal evolution—'and to harmonize them' (Preface, p. x). The interval within which 'the best materials' are to be found is arbitrarily restricted to the years of 1823 to 1827, with the result that the interval for the materials in question commences with Hotho's own transcript but ends prior to the last lecture series. When in addition, as Hotho already concedes in the Preface, in moderating his principle of fidelity to Hegel, he admittedly undertakes 'a frequent alteration' in the source material, this is done solely for the purpose of working out more rigorously, through these alterations, the testimony of the transcripts as to Hegel's own thought. Consequently Hotho knows how to counter a possible critic who 'will find fault with this too', by the 'assurance of none other than a thirty-year familiarity with Hegel's philosophy, an ongoing friendly association with its author, and a recollection, in no way diminished, of all the nuances of his delivery' (Preface, p. xv). So his procedure seems to him unproblematic and—as astonishing as it appears based on the circumstances—even today some interpreters of the *Aesthetics* still follow his lead with confidence in his 'like-minded divination'.<sup>28</sup>

28. Foremost is Rüdiger Bubner who, in the introduction to an anthology on Hegel's aesthetics, calls for confidence in the authenticity of Hotho's edition, and still today proceeds from the view that Hotho's interventions in the aesthetics are of no consequence. 'To be sure, then, so far as one can see, Hotho's originality is so slight in comparison with the teacher that the reflection in the student is not decisively distorting the teacher.' See 'Gibt es eine ästhetische Erfahrung bei Hegel?', p. 70, n. 1.

Nevertheless, in virtue of Hotho's interventions the text of the *Aesthetics* as a whole becomes dubious. In fact Hotho candidly maintains that, taking Hegel's outlines as the basis, the vitality of the spiritual penetration is due not to study of the sources but to the like-mindedness of the editor.

The Preface to the *Aesthetics* had to give rise already to the well-founded suspicion that Hotho (as editor of the lectures as a whole) transformed Hegel's thought to a degree no longer defensible at the time, and indeed indefensible based not solely on historical-critical purism but preeminently on material grounds. The fact that Hotho defended himself from the outset against critics of his undertaking must have caught people's attention. If those who heard Hegel in person, and prepared their own lecture notes, fail to recognize their own notes from the lectures in the printed text of the *Aesthetics*, Hotho does not perchance claim to enrich a new edition of Hegel's lectures by constructive criticism. Instead he claims confidently that a 'better' Hegel has to emerge from an overview of all the materials. He also proclaims for the second edition a precise classification of all the sources he utilized in editing the lectures on aesthetics, one that should justify this confidence. Based on the reception of the aesthetics, it seems as though it became unnecessary to render an account of the growth of the text from outline, through delivery, to completion. In any case, the promised statement of the exact sources for the text and its features is not to be found in the Preface to the second edition, nor is there an indication as to why this promise is not fulfilled. Apparently in this brief time span Hotho's reworked text of Hegel's *Aesthetics* was already generally accepted, as opposed to any recollection of his lectures.

In fact to each person who heard one of the four lecture series on the philosophy of art, transcribed it directly, or at least worked up a manuscript copy of his own, the discrepancy between the lectures and the published text would have had to be noticeable. The fact that Hotho pointed to uncertainty about his own presentation of Hegel's thought remains therefore a first and important sign that the *Aesthetics* was not received by all with the serene enthusiasm Hegel's faithful students manifested. Contemporary criticism, which Hotho forestalled in his defense, was ineffective indeed, although today it seems hardly sensible to accept Hotho's contention that he developed and handed down to posterity an authentic text in the spirit of Hegel.

About one hundred years after the initial appearance of the *Aesthetics*, Georg Lasson, on the basis of demonstrably mandatory skepticism directed at the text reworked by Hotho, undertook for the first time a critical edition. The difficult undertaking is based on rediscovered transcripts of the lectures from 1823 and 1826. Lasson did not discover any new sources for the two

outlying lecture series, the first Berlin lectures of 1820-1 and the final lectures of 1828-9, completed shortly before Hegel's death. Also, his new edition extended only as far as the conclusion of the first or General Part and ended with the determination of the idea and the ideal. Nevertheless its explosive result is that Hotho's edition contains extraordinarily wide-ranging 'other material (*Sondergut*)' beyond what is evidently the body of thought (*Gedankengut*) in the sources. Lasson did not eliminate this 'other material' but he did enclose it in brackets, so that the discrepancy between the published text of the *Aesthetics* and the text that can be corroborated by the lecture transcripts as authentic is apparent. Still, this discrepancy could have arisen from Lasson having insufficient material at his disposal. The threefold division of the lectures into a General Part, a Particular Part, and an Individual Part, a division controlling Hotho's arrangement of the aesthetics, is one Hegel first proposed in the final lectures of 1828-9. Furthermore, Hotho was able to base himself on Hegel's own manuscript, so one may still accept that the considerable differences (indeed in length, all the more so in content) between the original 1835 and 1842 published texts of the *Aesthetics* respectively, and Lasson's critical edition, could have been subject to elimination by an integration of further sources. Lasson's source material in any event seems to be insufficient to cast doubt on the authenticity of the 'other material'.

Based on our contemporary situation as to the sources, we must take up anew the problem of the authenticity of the text of the *Aesthetics*, for the additional testimonies to the lectures of 1820-1 and 1828-9 come to be known since Lasson's work essentially confirm Lasson's hypothesis that much of 'Hegel's' *Aesthetics* is Hotho's body of thought. Of course even today a few of the lecture transcripts utilized by Hotho and by Lasson are missing or even certainly lost. The hope of rediscovering Hegel's manuscript can hardly be entertained. However, today the situation of the sources as a whole is considerably improved. The twelve transcripts known at the present time provide a lively, and for the most part accurate, picture of Hegel's philosophy of art in its development, in its progression. They confirm in essentials Lasson's demonstration of considerable 'other material' in the published *Aesthetics*, and in their totality they surely provide reliable information about Hegel's own conception of the philosophy of art. How much the transcribers themselves had thought to provide suitable documentation for their own use or that of others is evident, for example, in the fact that these transcripts continued to exist in private libraries mostly as (often very expensively) bound books, and even years later they served on occasion as

models for the transcribers' own publications.<sup>29</sup> So, however desirable it would be to have at our disposal a manuscript in Hegel's own hand, nevertheless one ought not to pin excessively great hopes on finding considerably more information in it. Hotho's report in the Preface to the *Aesthetics* at the very least contravenes this assumption. We cannot rightly appeal to his unambiguous description of the manuscript in Hegel's own hand as 'sketchy', in support of the supposition that the rest of the textual contents of the *Aesthetics*, above and beyond the [transcript] testimonies to the lectures, could be confirmed as authentic by recourse to the manuscript.

Seen against the background of our considerably expanded information about Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, the discontinuation of the first critical edition turns out to be extraordinarily unfortunate. Lasson's efforts within the framework of a historical-critical edition of Hegel's works must be continued, and presumably even be replaced by an alternative conception. Principal problems of securing the text are possibly resolvable in this way, although not the very real problem of how Hegel has been received. The influence of the critical version of Hegel's aesthetics that Lasson published some time ago takes a distant back seat to the influence of the first version by Hotho. Even in the most recent publications on Hegel's aesthetics we hardly ever find people turning to Lasson's text, let alone to the sources for the lectures themselves. With this point we address what is actually the more serious issue of the aesthetics' reception. One fears with some justification that a work in the style, and with the completeness, of the existing, published *Aesthetics*, cannot be reconstructed, either by a critical editing of Hegel's aesthetics or by recourse to the source materials for the various aesthetics lecture series. The critics of the Lasson edition as well as of any further historical-critical edition of the aesthetics justifiably hold that a newly reworked text is incapable of replacing Hotho's heretofore foundational text, because it must fall far short of the completeness of this first published text. Georg Lasson himself already indicated as much. The systematic inclusiveness of the philosophy of art cannot be attained again by the route of historical-critical research and presentation. For that reason, is it not the better course to stick to the successful systematic framework and dispense with philological fastidiousness, than it would be to demolish the completed

29. The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies. In their totality they convey a picture of the philosophy of art that replicates Hegel's own thought with considerably greater exactitude and fidelity than the homogeneous shape of the text into which Hotho blended the sources and manuscripts for Hegel's aesthetics.

shape of Hegel's *Aesthetics*? Certainly what has emerged in the decades since Lasson's effort is an instinctive decision in favor of systematic integrity and opposed to destructive historical exactitude.

So, as regards the reception of the *Aesthetics*, we have a curious picture in which people adhere to the authenticity of the original published text, preferring the 'completed shape' of Hegel's philosophy of art over a more accurate insight into the relationships of the subject matter.<sup>30</sup> Such confidence about the authenticity of the published text persists, even though the philological criticism of the first edition of Hegel's *Werke*, prepared by the 'friends of the departed', has long been established for the lectures on other topics, particularly for the lectures on the philosophy of religion and the lectures on the philosophy of right—namely, the criticism that the published version of Hegel's lectures has been considerably reformulated by editorial interventions, ones at odds with today's historical-critical consciousness.

Paradoxically, the substantial controversies about Hegel's aesthetics, controversies that have intensified, becoming ever more divergent and irreconcilable regarding the positions attributed to Hegel, give renewed strength to the opposition to historical-critical engagement with the *Aesthetics*. Confronting the legitimate doubt as to whether we can even speak of a contemporary importance of Hegel's aesthetics as such, Dieter Henrich, some twenty years ago, gave hope to the interpreters and critics by pointing out that more detailed engagement with the Berlin lectures on aesthetics, a more thorough examination of the sources, would pave the reader's way for the hoped-for liberation of the aesthetics from dogmatism, as well as from the thesis of the end of art.<sup>31</sup> Henrich states that Hegel, whose information about art was clearly and demonstrably enriched over the years, cannot possibly disavow this information in his lectures on the philosophy of art, and must set aside his own restrictive conception, along the lines of the system, as to the historical status of art. Henrich accordingly expresses the continuing hope of many Hegel interpreters that, in historical-critical research, Hegel the great historical thinker will prevail over against Hegel the dogmatist of absolute knowing. Of course as is so often the case, the

30. This point holds good not only for the *Aesthetics* but for all Hegel's lectures that appeared posthumously. For that reason alone the situation with the *Aesthetics* is especially problematic, because neither did Hegel submit a version of this part of the system prepared for publication, nor does there exist even a manuscript to serve for critical comparison and for the reconstruction of an authentic text. The contributions to *Hegel-Studien* 26 (1991), 92 ff. provide information about the overall situation of work on the lectures.

31. Henrich, 'Zur Aktualität von Hegels Ästhetik'.

history wrested from historical research does not hold the solution expected beforehand. To make his thesis plausible, Henrich must disregard, for instance, the fact that right in the 1827 *Encyclopedia* Hegel outlined more sharply the systematic framework of his philosophy of art. The precise formulation of the thesis of the end of art, already essentially prepared for in the lectures of 1826, is then seized upon once again with more precision in the *Encyclopedia* revision of 1827 and is repeated in the lectures of 1828–9. In these lectures Hegel states unambiguously that art in the modern world can have only partial relevance, because art is surpassed on the one hand by the revealed religion of Christianity and on the other hand by the complexity of the modern state, and art finds its ‘future’ in them. A reflection of this sort is understandable against the background of Hegel’s assumption that in Greece art established the religion of a people and, together with the religion—the foundation of ethical orientation—art also established the people’s state. Hegel relates this conception both to the symbolic art form and to the characterization of the modern world and the romantic art form associated with it. In his view, the all-embracing function of art is discharged in modernity by revealed religion and by the state; that is, for us the highest possibilities of art are something in the past. Hence it is inconsistent to suppose that in the lectures Hegel has forgotten his own systematic determination of the significance of the first form of absolute spirit, that of art.

To ‘rescue’ the contemporary importance of Hegel’s aesthetics, we must therefore proceed in a different way. Instead of expecting from the lecture sources a deliverance from the system, we should take the philosophy of art in the way that Hegel developed it, namely, as the historical discussion of that basic thesis regarding art, of it being ‘ideal’, consequently a form of absolute spirit. In the discussions of the lectures this basic thesis is examined in the various versions and historical constellations, and it is called into question. This procedure of critically examining one’s own basic assumption—not the deliverance from the thesis of the end of art—permits the sources for Hegel’s lectures to appear as being actually of interest. At least it is evident, in the controversial discussion about the aesthetics, that a scrupulous editing and weighting of the sources becomes necessary.

## II. THE SOURCES FOR HEGEL'S AESTHETICS

With the testimonies to Hegel's Berlin aesthetics that are presently available, we can reconstruct clearly the material conception of the philosophy of art, the reflections about it that Hegel provided in exemplifying his systematic conception, as well as his characteristic arguments for connecting phenomenon, history, and system. Not only does Hegel in fact alter his method of presentation in the progression of the lecture series, along the lines of an intensive consideration of the arts and their history, one best grasped in the organization of the lectures. He also just as significantly sticks firmly to previously treated themes, from time to time returning to fundamental thoughts, even reiterating, with substantial persistence and often consistent formulation, reflections he had already developed in part in the Frankfurt period or the Jena period.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, Hegel's lectures developed over the course of the years, as we can gather from Hotho's indications in his Preface and as the transcripts confirm. Hegel's plan to publish the lectures on aesthetics as a book led not to winding up the work but instead to an ongoing process of amplifying and testing his thoughts as delivered. The lecture transcripts known today disclose quite precisely this development in the subject matter as well as in its presentation. For that reason the individual notebooks for the different lecture series assume great importance, because the lack of an authentic source, such as a fully complete manuscript by Hegel, or one committed to print as the ultimately valid, authorized state of his reflections, is not the issue. In place of the completed work what emerges is a 'work in progress', one constantly reiterating, and persistently testing, reflections on the philosophy of art, on its significance, on its field of objects, and on its relation to other knowledge about art, whether that be everyday knowledge or scholarly knowledge.

If we want to convey Hegel's philosophy of art in this way, a fundamental decision is necessary as to how we can work up the material on aesthetics, and can reconstruct Hegel's thought or mode of presentation, in a way that makes a meaningful philosophical engagement with the philosophy of art possible for the contemporary reader. A historical-critical edition of the

32. On this point see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert's presentation of the development of the systematic aesthetics, *Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Ästhetik* (Bonn, 1984) esp. pp. 17 ff., 90 ff. (*Hegel-Studien, Beiheft* 25). Also see her 'Die geschichtliche Funktion der "Mythologie der Vernunft" und die Bestimmung des Kunstwerks in der Ästhetik', in *Mythologie der Vernunft. Hegels 'ältestes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus'*, ed. Chr. Jamme and H. Schneider (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), pp. 226 ff.

aesthetics based on all the known sources is not to be expected in the near future. The status of the sources is too problematic for that.<sup>33</sup> After all, for the aesthetics we no longer have available Hegel's own handwritten notebook for the lectures, in the way we do for others of the Berlin lecture topics, a notebook that only has to be supplemented by the amplification in the fair copies and direct transcripts. The only materials that we have for these aesthetics lectures, in addition to the scanty and barely informative fragments, are the various transcripts and elaborations by students that had their origins in Hegel's lectures or in connection with them.

It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt—and not everyone does—that Hegel's lectures on aesthetics are actually reproduced authentically in the published edition. However, perhaps temporal distance and the unresolvable issues of interpretation of the *Ästhetik* were necessary to undergird a skepticism that must have arisen at the very time of its publication, but that did not become full-blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine all of the reasons for this circumstance. But one motive surely lies in the reticence to call into question again an accomplishment or a labor once it had been carried out. The risk of losing the completed shape of the aesthetics in fact confronts the sceptic, back then as well as today, with the toil of reconstructing Hegel's thought from a profusion of testimonies to the lectures. But a glance at the presently-known sources and testimonies for Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art shows that labor on the new sources for Hegel's *Ästhetik* will be materially fruitful, that it is worth the trouble.

#### A. TEXTUAL FRAGMENTS AND FRAGMENTARY THOUGHTS FOR THE AESTHETICS

We find Hegel engaged, from his earliest philosophical efforts, with the issue of the significance of art 'for us', that is, with reflections on determining art's function in history. Initially, in the context of his program of a critique of religion going beyond the Enlightenment, above all in conversation with Hölderlin, but also with Schelling and in explicit engagement with Schiller's *Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*,<sup>34</sup> Hegel sketches out an ideal of a people's cultivation, the concept of a folk religion having art (in

33. See Gethmann-Siebert, 'Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst'.

34. English translation by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, *Friedrich Schiller: On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters* (Oxford, 1967).



particular, poetry) as its integrating element. In this connection Hegel develops a characterization of the 'ideal', a characterization that remains in effect right up to the introductory definition of the ideal in the lectures on aesthetics, as the 'determinate being' or 'existence' of the idea in the work of art. In his early writings critiquing religion, the ideal is characterized as the rational idea realized in the beautiful action of the historical person (the religious founder, who is at the same time a teacher of virtue), an idea that remains vital as it is subsequently understood.<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately Hegel interpretation for the most part sees a revival of Platonism in this early effort at characterizing art in the context of philosophy's function as guiding historical action and life. The so-called 'aesthetic Platonism' of Holderlin and Hegel<sup>36</sup> acquires its descriptive significance, one still relevant for Hegel's later systematic aesthetics, in the characterization of beauty as the 'vitality' of the idea and in a correlative assessment of the exemplary 'phenomenon' of beauty—of art, or of the arts—but only acquires it through the integration of the idea of the beautiful into the world of appearance, by the specific connection, at any one time, of idea and history. In their historical, epoch-making, and culturally varying appearance, the arts constitute this vitality of the idea. In the so-called 'Oldest System-Program of German Idealism', from the year 1797, Hegel takes up both strands of thought, the characterization of religion as well as that of beauty, in their relevance for historical action.<sup>37</sup>

35. These texts are found in *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, according to the manuscripts in the Royal Library in Berlin, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen, 1907; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966), pp. 142–3; see G. W. F. Hegel: *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox and Richard Kroner (Chicago, 1948; repr. Philadelphia, 1971). See their detailed description in Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 87 ff.

36. In the discussions of this 'Platonism', its specific application is mostly overlooked, an application growing from the integration of the issue of the beautiful within the context of historical action, therefore into the program of a folk religion or the 'ideal of a people's cultivation'. See, for example, Klaus Düsing, 'Ästhetischer Platonismus bei Hölderlin und Hegel', in *Homburg vor der Höhe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte. Studien zum Freundeskreis um Hegel und Hölderlin*, ed. Chr. Jamme and Otto Pöggeler (Stuttgart, 1981) (*Deutscher Idealismus. Philosophie und Wirkungsgeschichte in Quellen und Studien*, 4), pp. 101 ff. An example of a more recent investigation that makes this connection explicit is Chr. Jamme, 'Ist denn Judäa der Tuiskonen Vaterland?'. Die Mythos-Auffassung des jungen Hegel (1787–1807)', in *Früher Idealismus und Frühromantik. Der Streit um die Grundlage der Ästhetik (1795–1805)*, ed. Walter Jaeschke and Helmut Holzhey (Hamburg, 1990), pp. 137 ff.

37. This brief document, once in dispute as to its author (and by some ascribed to Schelling and to others), is now widely regarded as having been written by Hegel. The text appears in *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Stuttgart, 1936), pp. 219–21; also in Franz Rosenzweig, 'Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handschriftlicher Fund', in *Mythologie der Vernunft*, pp. 79 ff. The text, in English translation by H. S. Harris, can be found in *Miscellaneous Writings of G. W. F. Hegel*, ed. Jon Stewart

He characterizes the historical necessity of religion, as well as that of art, by pointing to the fact that the (reason-) idea can then only become historically significant and effective when it becomes 'aesthetic' and 'mythological', that is, when it realizes itself in a religion/mythology, one founded by creative fantasy that proceeds to the intuition and pictorial nature of art.

Along with the 'System-Program', in the *Early Theological Writings* Hegel established his basic conception of the 'beautiful religion' and with it the systematic core of the aesthetics, the characterization of the classical art form. Beauty, which is vital in art, in the ideal, appears in the 'work'. Art establishes the religion of a historical community; art is the creation and tradition of the people's ethical life. With this theme Hegel at the same time has created the ongoing framework holding good for his final concept of art in the Berlin lectures. Reason becomes universally accessible only in aesthetically and mythologically concrete form—as works of art, always with specific content, the divine in culturally varying shapes that range from the endless number of natural shapes to the spiritual shape of the human being, to the historical God, on up to the 'Humanus' as the new Holy One of art.<sup>38</sup>

Directly in the time of his transition from the 'ideal of the age of youthfulness' to the system of philosophy—as Hegel writes to Schelling<sup>39</sup>—comes

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(Evanston, Illinois, 2002), pp. 110–12. See also n. 32 above. The contributions to *Mythologie der Vernunft* all relate to aspects of the 'Systemprogramm', the text of which is on pp. 11–17. Earlier discussions about the ascription and philosophical significance of this text are reevaluated in *Das älteste Systemprogramm: Hegel-Tage in Villigst 1969*, ed. Rudiger Bubner (Bonn, 1973) (*Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 9*). An investigation of new information reflecting back in part on those results is Frank-Peter Hansen, *Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus: Rezeptionsgeschichte und Interpretation* (Berlin and New York, 1989) (*Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie*, 23). See also Hans-Jürgen Gawoll, 'Das Verschwinden des Originals—Apropos neuerer Forschungen zum sogenannten "ältesten Systemprogramm" des deutschen Idealismus', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* (1992), 46:413 ff., esp. 419 ff. Gawoll assigns to this document only the status of notes for discussion. Evidence to the contrary is the fact that Hegel himself not only takes these deliberations into account in his earlier reflections, but also carries them over especially into the discussion about the philosophy of art, through intentional modifications in the final conception of the Berlin lectures on aesthetics or philosophy of art. For the characterization of the relationship of the 'System-Program' to the *Ästhetik*, see Gethmann-Siebert, 'Die geschichtliche Funktion der Mythologie . . .', pp. 226 ff.

38. Otto Pöggeler discusses the context of this conception of art linked to religion, proceeding from the 'Oldest System-program', in his 'Das Menschenwerk des Staates', in *Mythologie der Vernunft*, pp. 195 ff. The *humanus*, a term taken from the Latin adjective meaning 'human, relating to human beings', is an important concept in these lectures and in this introductory essay. Where it occurs, it is put within quotes or in italics, as appropriate, and without further explanation at that point.

39. Hegel's letter of 2 November 1800 to Schelling. See *Briefe*, 1:59. *The Letters*, pp. 63–5. 'In my scientific development, which started from [the] more subordinate needs of man, I was inevitably driven toward science, and the ideal of [my] youth had to take the form of reflection

the establishment of a text that sets forth a few thoughts on the romantic art form. In September of 1800 Hegel completed a wide-ranging manuscript, the so-called 'Fragment of a System (1800)', two sheets of which have survived. According to Dilthey, this manuscript deals with the prospectus for a system in opposition to Schelling, and in the surviving part of it we find a few reflections that Hegel intends to work out still further, namely, 'how to find the way back to engaging in the life of a human being', and in what way the 'ideal as an age of youthfulness' is to be integrated into the system. These reflections involve a characterization of religion and of art.

Here, in the definition of religion as the elevation of the human being 'from finite life to the infinite life', Hegel at the same time develops a characterization of art, or of specific art forms.<sup>40</sup> Since, in this connection, for Hegel 'philosophy' must 'stop short of religion,' must enter into the infinite life through religion (a task soon to be ascribed to philosophy itself in the *Differenzschrift*), the significance of the different arts gets integrated with this characterization of religion. The arts become more or less adequate illustrations of infinite life—formally perhaps in the way that in the aesthetics Hegel characterizes painting, the first of the romantic arts, as the vivid presentation of Christianity's representation of God.

In the temple, for instance, what is living is made 'objective', but in such a way 'that this objectification must be only for the [physical] element,' with the result that the religious achievement in turn finds its way beyond its objectification in the architectural work of art and back to itself, to subjectivity and absolute vitality. This subjectivity, mediated through the objective shape, does not remain mere feeling but instead grows into the union of feeling and reflection. So, already here, as also later on in the aesthetics, Hegel characterizes the temple as: 'the pure, spatial objectivity, providing the unifying center for many'; however, it is no static point of unity but instead, as shaped objectivity, in the dynamic of completing it, the temple is at the

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and thus at once of a system.' (*The Letters*, p. 64). See also, on the statements that follow in the text, Wilhelm Dilthey's reflections, to which Herman Nohl directs attention in *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, p. 345, n. 1. The English edition, which does not include all of Nohl's materials, apparently omits this footnote pertaining to Dilthey. In fact Richard Kroner, the translator, disagrees with Nohl, holding that this 'Fragment of a System' may be from a theological essay rather than from a sketch of a system; see *Early Theological Writings*, p. 309, n. 1. The Kroner translation of it also appears in *Miscellaneous Writings*..., pp. 151-60.

40. See the 'Fragment of a System' in Nohl, pp. 345-51, for this quotation and the others from it in the next few pages; the wording of these quotations in some instances, but not all, conforms to that in the *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 309-19. On the *Differenzschrift*, soon to follow in 1801, and mentioned in the following sentence, see n. 41 below.

same time an objectification imbued with subjectivity and established for the purpose of giving the religion its configuration, an objectification that can and must make secondary the many equally significant but differently configured shapes.

At this point of course Hegel did not develop, though he did prepare the way structurally for, his consequent thoughts concerning the 'objectification' of absolute vitality, of the divine, differentiated by epoch and culture. Something similar is evident in the related characterization of statues of gods, or in that of hymns. Here too it can, indeed must, be the case that making the divine objective in the shape that art brings about 'would last only for a moment, and that life would withdraw again from the object, free itself from it', until we come to that religion in which the juxtaposition of the infinite and the finite 'in beautiful union' is no longer 'superseded'. 'This religion can be sublime and awe-inspiring, but it cannot be beautifully human.' This terminus of the 'beautiful religion' provides the structural point of departure for detaching art from its traditional content, from the divine, and for art passing over to the 'Humanus' as the new Holy One, a point Hegel develops in this precise sense in the chapter of the aesthetics on painting. The divine in the revealed representation of Christianity points beyond the revelatory possibilities of objectification in the beautiful figure as they exist in nature (right up to the human figure as the natural shape of the spiritual). The beautiful shape as objectification of living, historical spirit, acquires a life of its own—something Hegel did not yet consider in the 'Fragment of a System', based on linking art and philosophy back to religion, but which he did present explicitly at the next step (in the writings of the Jena period).

The description of the hymn, that is, of the song, the hymn that can become the dance, presents itself as structurally similar to, as forerunner of, the characterization of poetry. Hegel points first of all to the fact that, by being tied in with religion, art remains confined to being produced within the cultus. Art may 'not just as well occupy itself with purposeless beauty' but instead has rather 'by purposive embellishment, to point to something other than itself'. Hegel takes up this point again later in the characterization of Christian painting, when he criticizes the continued existence of purely aesthetic, muse-like art as insufficiently appreciative of art's historical significance. In the setting of worship it is incumbent on art to become sensuously-graphic in a quite specific way, namely, 'to do away with the contemplative or intellectual consideration of the objective God, or rather, to joyfully blend it with the subjectivity of living beings.' In this way there arise 'shapes' or objectifications in a subjective execution that receive their meaning from

religion, namely, song and dance as well as solemn orations that, in their subjective expression, become 'objective and beautiful according to set rules' and receive their overall meaning by being embedded in the cultus.

Soon after this Hegel completed the step to the system of philosophy as a more rigorous science, one more adequate to reason's demands for rationality. When he did so, by philosophy he also supported the religion of reflection, and these reflections gave rise to the preliminary characterization of the role of art in a religion that is no longer art-religion in the sense of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. By doing this Hegel expanded art's role to include the characterization of the romantic art form, by outlining the role of art as being, above all, the illustration of the divine, and surely of the divine as absolute vitality. However, as Hegel at this point is already given to think, religion grew beyond this mediation by 'a purposive embellishment' [that] has 'to point to something other than itself', and so art as well freely gained a new historical content. Of course Hegel does not yet develop this thought in his initial systematic concept in the 'Fragment of a System', but it does inevitably follow from modifications of the systematic conception in the subsequent writings.

Nevertheless, even in the reflections of the 'Fragment of a System' Hegel consequently takes the next step toward his later characterization of art in the lectures on aesthetics. In it too he in fact already expresses thematically the distinction between an art that establishes for human beings their representation of God or of gods, and with it the ethical life of their communal activity, and an art that must presuppose as a given the religion that establishes its further historical meaningfulness. This difference between establishing religion, and the setting-forth of religious and other sensible significations, is then expressly formulated under the heading of religion in the *Phenomenology*, and is reconstructed systematically in the *Encyclopedia*.

This distinction becomes normative for the characterization of art's function in the modern world, therefore in art's possibilities in the romantic art form that goes beyond Christian art, a romantic art form that, as will become evident and is consistent with his earlier structural supposition, Hegel situates in the spectrum extending from 'beauty without purpose' to 'purposive embellishment'. However, even in his later analysis with its substantially enriched distinctions, Hegel links both—emancipated art, the 'autonomy' of beauty without purpose, much endorsed still today, and the placing of beauty in the service of a purpose—to a characterization of art 'for us'. But then religion no longer provides the framework for art's significance for human beings; instead the historical culture as a whole does it.

The philosophy of art presents the spectrum of the intuitive meaning of the world provided by art, the spectrum of the objectification of infinite vitality or,

as Hegel already emphasizes in the 'Fragment of a System', the spectrum of spirit, in the various arts—in architecture, in sculpture, in the gradation from sculpture to the 'purposive embellishment' of the cultic space in painting, and in music and poetry the detachment from painting, as well as from 'solemn oration', in moving from divine content to spiritual content.

The rational idea, grasped as 'spirit' or 'infinite vitality', finds its expression both in the possible configurations that are allowed to it within religion and also—as the further elaboration of the philosophical system shows—in shapes or objectifications of historical spirit to which art can progress after being cut loose from religion.

The aforementioned differentiations, which lead to the characterization of the symbolic and romantic art forms, arise in the course of elaborating the philosophical system (above all in the Jena period), by engaging with Schelling's conception of art as 'organon of philosophy' and his correlative philosophical systematics grounded in 'intellectual intuition'. Thus in Hegel's Jena writings and aphorisms we find a series of reflections on aesthetics and on art that, taken as a whole, gain their full significance only against the background of an examination of Schelling's already-elaborated system of philosophy, and in particular his aesthetics.

In the *Differenzschrift*, seemingly in rejection of Schelling's position, Hegel lays out the sketch of a system that locates art principally as the comprehensive unity of philosophical reflection.<sup>41</sup> Unlike for Schelling, art is certainly not located in the realm of intellectual intuition, thus as the knowing of the idea; instead it belongs to the 'being' of the idea. Hegel's scattered reflections on art bear the stamp of the *Differenzschrift* and that of the preceding sketch 'Ueber Wallenstein', reflections in which, by distancing himself from Schelling, Hegel outlines the character of works [of art], of nature poetry, as well as a modification in the concept of mythology.<sup>42</sup> These

41. *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*, in G. W. F. Hegel: *Jenaer Kritische Schriften*, ed. Hartmut Bucher and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg, 1968) = *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 4. On this issue, see pp. 71 ff. English trans. as: Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, N. Y., 1977), pp. 171–2.

42. The essay 'Ueber Wallenstein' of 1801 was for a long time placed in the writings of the Berlin period. It is found in G. W. F. Hegel: *Vermischte Schriften*, ed. Friedrich Förster and Ludwig Boumann (Berlin, 1835), as vol. 17 of the *Werke*, pp. 411 ff. [Tr.] *Wallenstein* is a dramatic trilogy, written in 1796–9, by Friedrich Schiller. The third of the plays, *Wallenstein's Death*, is one of the greatest historical dramas written in German. Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Wallenstein was commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces during the Thirty Years War. On the interpretation of the development of aesthetics in the Jena period writings, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 235 ff.

texts provide a glimpse into the characterization of art's function in the modern world, one by which Hegel deviated from his original sketch in the 'System-Program', where he confined himself to characterizing art in antiquity.

Analogous to the sketch of a system in the *Differenzschrift*, in his early lecture 'Introductio in philosophiam' Hegel developed a discussion of art in the draft of the system of his speculative philosophy. Here too he does not yet draw out the consequence of his skepticism regarding Schelling's conception of 'intellectual intuition'; and he defines religion and art as 'intuition of spirit' in such a way that 'genuine knowledge and art' belong to reason, 'to what is universal and absolute'.<sup>43</sup> In his criticism of 'intuition', Hegel accentuates his distance from Schelling's assessment of art. Like intuition, in the end art belongs to the being of consciousness. Later on Hegel transfers the characteristic features of intuition to art, and indeed in characterizing the symbolic art form, because art bearing that cultural stamp counts, like sheer intuition, as 'empty dreaming, devoid of truth, whether in a waking or a sleeping state... since consciousness recedes into the animal organism... This mute consciousness is what is formal being in its universal element of infinity...'.<sup>44</sup>

The systematic conception of aesthetics is finally sketched out in the *Realphilosophie* of 1805-6 and, to augment this modification of the system, Hegel develops a renewed interpretation of Schiller that is to a certain extent transformative for the later characterization of art in the modern world, an interpretation of Schiller that he carries through into the Berlin lectures on aesthetics. In the *Realphilosophie* of 1805-6, together with discussing art within the history of spirit—spirit, which, as 'self-knowing', engenders its own historical content, is 'immediately art' (GW 8:286-7)—Hegel gains the criterion for classifying the various historical shapes of art and the arts. In

43. See pp. 2a and 6 of the manuscript as presented in G. W. F. Hegel: *Schriften und Entwürfe 1799-1808*, ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt R. Meist, as vol. 5 of G. W. F. Hegel: *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg, 1968-). See also: Eva Ziesche, 'Unbekannte Manuskripte aus der Jenaer und Nürnberger Zeit im Berliner Hegel-Nachlaß', *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* (1975), 29:430 ff.

44. This text is found in the fragments from lecture manuscripts on the philosophy of nature and of spirit (1803-4), in G. W. F. Hegel: *Jenaer Systementwürfe I*, ed. K. Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle, as vol. 6 of *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg, 1975), p. 285. This point is also evident in Hegel's application to nature of Schiller's conception of the 'living shape', so that here this characterization of intuition is already connected with nature. See GW 6:35-6; cf., explicitly, G. W. F. Hegel: *Jenaer Systementwürfe III*, ed. R.-P. Horstmann, with the assistance of Johann Heinrich Trede, as vol. 8 of *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg, 1976), p. 275.

their definitive forms—symbolic, classical, and romantic—he links these shapes with different historical epochs,<sup>45</sup> whereas the early outline of the *Realphilosophie* of 1805–6 still construes the forms in a structurally formal way. In 1805–6, art appears either as plastic art or as musical art, and is comprehensible under the conditions of execution of pure objectivity, or those of the pure I, or as an intermediate form between the two. Music is characterized as ‘presentation devoid of intuition, related to time’, plastic art as ‘static portrayal of the divine’, and painting as an intermediate form of the two, as something ‘plastic that incorporates *color*, something self-oriented that implicitly takes the form of sensibility’. Poetry in turn mirrors plastic art, as ‘representation of the shape in something musical, the intonations of which extend to speech—representation that has content within it’ (GW 8:278). This makes it evident that Hegel both reaches back to the reflections of his first system (the 1800 ‘Fragment of a System’) and—also consistently sets forth distinctions typical of the later aesthetics. The characterization of poetry, initially lacking, is now incorporated organically, and in doing so Hegel reaches back for further examples. Once again, in distancing himself from Schelling and romanticism, Hegel characterizes poetry by contrasting the Homeric epic, which stands closer to the ideal of plastic art, with nature poetry, an ‘all-seeing’ that leads to the ‘music of things’ and accordingly to ‘purely intellectual beauty’ (GW 8:279; Hegel appraises nature poetry as a restricted kind of poetry; cf. GW 8:278). Coming after music, poetry indeed occupies the final position in the system, although religion and the state surpass art. ‘Art in its truth is much more so *religion*’ (GW 8:280), and the state, the ‘spirit of actuality’ (GW 8:284), in its connection with the church, goes above and beyond art. Art in fact simply begets

the world as spiritual and for *intuition*—it is the Indian Bacchus, not the transparently self-knowing spirit but instead the *enthusiastic spirit* that wraps itself up in sensibility and image, concealing in it what is awesome. Its element is intuition—although the intuition is the *immediacy* that is not mediated—and this element is therefore not suited for spirit. Hence art can give to its shapes only a restricted spirit; the beauty is the form—it is the illusion of the absolute vitality that is content with itself and is enclosed and consummated within itself. (GW 8:279)

With this the position of art is finally established within the system of philosophy, as it is in culture as the history of spirit discovering itself. Hegel

45. GW 8:277–87. In this text too the conclusion of the philosophy of spirit occurs under the heading: C. Art, Religion and Knowledge.



enlarges upon these systematic sketches in his Jena reflections by a few observations about the characterization of works of art as well as about the differentiation, within the concept of mythology, between nature mythology and spiritual mythology.<sup>46</sup>

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel formulates, in its essential content, the basic characterizations of aesthetics—the conception of the ideal, of the forms of art, of art as element of cultural history or the history of spirit. How he deals with Greek tragedy forms a central element of this completion of the systematic conception.<sup>47</sup> In the treatise on *Natural Right* Hegel lays out the principal significance of his conception of tragedy, through the historical-philosophical conception of a 'tragedy within the ethical sphere'. As in the conception of Greek tragedy, here too the circumscribed sphere in which the ethical orientation holds good is determined to be the way to a reconciliation, but now to a reconciliation within the framework of the philosophically assured 'absolute ethical life'. Even though this text may only conditionally be counted among the reflections on aesthetics, it must in

46. Hegel characterizes mythology as being able to achieve natural shapes as well as shapes of consciousness, and in doing so he distinguishes among various forms of mythology. Of particular interest in this context is the fragment 'of its form in contrast to its content', which is part of the newly-discovered manuscripts from the Jena period (Ms. 3a). These observations are expanded by a condemnation of nature poetry (cf. Ms. 12b, Ms. 13a, Ms. 14a). Hegel enlarges them further by a definition of the art work. On this point, compare the definition of the *Differenzschrift* (GW 4:75), that the work is a 'product of the individual, of the genius, yet it belongs to mankind' (Harris and Cerf, p. 171), by which Hegel broadens Schelling's characterization of genius to a cultural-historical perspective. Schelling's treatise *Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung* (*Sämmtliche Werke* 4:485 ff.) contains the metaphysically-grounded companion piece of this conception of genius from which Hegel critically distances himself in the lectures on aesthetics. The 'great individual' no longer creates the modern Christian world's exemplary work of art, because neither is Christianity universally accepted as interpretation of the absolute, nor do single individuals have the capacity to mediate universally, through a work of art in a beautiful shape, the worldview of their time. One of the aphorisms from Hegel's 'Wastebok' (a collection of aphorisms written between 1803 and 1806) is connected to this point. See Friedhelm Nicolin, 'Unbekannte Aphorismen Hegels aus der Jenaer Periode', in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), esp. p. 14; complementary to it is Ms. 4a, from the newly discovered manuscripts. For interpretation, see Otto Pöggeler, 'Die Entstehung von Hegels Ästhetik in Jena', in *Hegel in Jena. Die Entwicklung des Systems und die Zusammenarbeit mit Schelling*, ed. D. Henrich and K. Düsing (Bonn, 1980) (*Hegel-Studien, Beiheft* 20) pp. 249 ff. Also see, in this connection, Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst* . . . , pp. 192 ff.

47. See the text of the *Phenomenology* in GW 9, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heide (Hamburg, 1980), esp. pp. 376 ff.; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), pp. 443-4. For interpretation of this point, see Otto Pöggeler, 'Hegel und die griechische Tragödie', in *Heidelberger Hegel-Tage 1962*, ed. Hans-Georg Gadamer (Bonn, 1964) (*Hegel-Studien, Beiheft* 1), pp. 285 ff. Also see Pöggeler, 'Die Entstehung . . .'. Gethmann-Siefert presents the early conception of tragedy in connection with the reflections of the lectures on aesthetics, in *Die Funktion der Kunst* . . . , esp. pp. 198 ff.

any event be taken into consideration, for in the *Philosophy of Right* of 1817, and so, close in time to the *Encyclopedia* and to the first lectures on aesthetics, Hegel takes up once again his distinction between nature mythology and spiritual mythology, and he elevates this distinction into being the principle of different forms of states.<sup>48</sup> In connection with all these reflections Hegel arrives at a final conclusion, which in the course of the lectures on aesthetics he conjoins with his thesis of the end of art, or the 'past' character of art: 'Certainly in our time the living world does not form the work of art within itself.' To gain a foothold for one's own creating, the artist must, 'in his own imagination transpose himself into a past world, must dream for himself a world, but *his own work* is also utterly stamped with *the character of dreaming* or being non-living, *the character of the past*' (Ms. 4b).<sup>49</sup>

Within the scope of his activity as instructor at the Nuremberg Gymnasium, Hegel set down anew the significance of art in the tenor of his own reflections in the 'System-Program', but also in the sense of this thesis of the 'past' character of art. Through treatment of what is beautiful he sees one 'aspect of the philosophy of spirit' laid bare. It is interesting that even now Hegel still grasps what is beautiful as the 'life' of the idea, as unity of concept and reality; 'what is beautiful is the very thing portrayed as freed from the conditions and constraints of contingent existence.'<sup>50</sup> The Nuremberg preparatory studies manuscript treats aesthetics only in a few places, for in Hegel's view it *can* be treated wherever possible in the preparatory studies of

48. See G. W. F. Hegel: *Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie, und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften*, in GW 4, esp. pp. 484–5. See also G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft*. Heidelberg 1817–18, with addenda 'from the lectures of 1818–19, transcribed by Peter Wannenmann, ed. Claudia Becker et al. (Hamburg, 1983) (G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, vol. 1), esp. § 135. See the English edition of the latter work: Hegel: *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818*, ed. the Staff of the Hegel Archives with an intro. by Otto Pöggeler, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1995), pp. 242–6.

49. This manuscript belongs to the writings of the Jena period (see GW 5); in it Hegel for the first time formulates a skepticism regarding his own earlier position.

50. *Nürnberger Schriften*, p. 101. Hegel develops a corresponding characterization of life in the *Subjektiven Logik für die Oberklasse*, §§ 81 ff. (Nachlaß Hegel K. 16, file IV, in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz). There it states that the 'ideal is the idea considered in the aspect of existence; however, as such an idea that is in conformity with the concept. [The ideal] is therefore what is actual in its highest truth' (§ 81). On this point see *Nürnberger Schriften*, p. 229, for Hegel's emphasis that, in beauty, life is reflected once more as idea in its immediate existence, 'is grasped' as freed 'from contingent, needy externality' (see § 83). See also, on the interpretation and presentation of the manuscript: Ziesche, 'Unbekannte Manuskripte...', esp. pp. 439–40, as well as Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 243 ff.

the gymnasium but it *must* be treated in the university, and of course at any given time in connection with the encyclopedia of philosophical knowledge, as part of the philosophy of spirit. Belonging to this philosophy of spirit 'in addition to psychology together with anthropology, jurisprudence and moral philosophy, are then aesthetics and the philosophy of religion' as well as also the history of philosophy.<sup>51</sup> Hegel develops his conception of aesthetics in particular in the *Encyclopedia for the Upper Grades*,<sup>52</sup> the final paragraphs of which also include art as the first stage of spirit in its pure presentation, that is, the first level of absolute spirit. In art, spirit becomes 'objective for intuition and representation'. The arts are distinguished according to the 'element in which they portray what is beautiful', to wit, either for external intuition or for internal intuition. So painting and the plastic arts, music and poetry (epic, lyric, and dramatic), are juxtaposed apart from any set historical sequence.

At this point not only is the systematic conception of aesthetics that Hegel formulated in the 1817 *Encyclopedia* solidly sketched out; also, Hegel's first lecture series on aesthetics at Heidelberg in 1818 has been foreshadowed, both systematically and content-wise.<sup>53</sup> Interpreters are at odds as to whether these first lectures already contain a treatment of Oriental art in conjunction with the conception of the symbolic art form.<sup>54</sup> In fact in the first edition of his *Encyclopedia* Hegel had not yet separated the treatment of art from that of religion, although already in 1818 he prepared an

51. *Nürnberger Schriften*, pp. 441, 456.

52. Of particular interest on this point is a manuscript of the *Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse*, 1808-9 (Hegel-Nachlaß K. 16, file III). See Ziesche, 'Unbekannte Manuskripte...', pp. 439-40; also file IV, pp. 443 ff., described by Ziesche, which bears the title *System der besonderen Wissenschaften* and contains, as the third and last segment, a treatment of art, religion, and knowledge (§§ 160-3), under the title 'Spirit in Its Pure Presentation', p. 440. See also *Nürnberger Schriften*, p. 230.

53. *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, for use with his lectures, by D. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg (Heidelberg, 1817). See §§ 453-64, comprised under 'a. The Religion of Art'. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences)*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1971). There were two revised editions of the *Encyclopedia*, published in Berlin in 1827 and 1830 respectively. For the 1830 edition, see the newly-edited version by Friedhelm Nicolai and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg, 1959).

54. See Ernst Schulin, *Die weltgeschichtliche Erfassung des Orients bei Hegel und Ranke* (Göttingen, 1958), p. 34; Michael Hulin, *Hegel et l'Orient. Suivi de la tradition annotée d'un essai de Hegel sur la Bhagavad-Gita* (Paris, 1979); Reinhard Leuze, *Die außerchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel* (Göttingen, 1975); on the preceding, *Hegel-Studien* (1981) 16:66 ff.; *Hegel-Studien* (1978) 13:319 ff. Also see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst*, pp. 252-3, and her 'Die Ästhetik in Hegels System der Philosophie', in *Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, ed. Otto Pöggeler (Freiburg and Munich, 1977), pp. 127 ff., 141 ff.

independent notebook on aesthetics for the first lecture series, a notebook that he may have outfitted with paragraph divisions analogous to those of the *Philosophy of Right*. This notebook is lost, although one of the recently rediscovered fragments on aesthetics still bears a paragraph sign and treats the symbolism of fantasy. Hotho took this manuscript as belonging to the later Berlin manuscript, and in editing the *Aesthetics* he attached it to the later lectures, as shown by a notation in his handwriting on the first page ('poetry'). However, according to the report of the Preface to the *Aesthetics*, it also could have been taken over into the later Berlin Notebook from the Heidelberg Notebook.<sup>55</sup>

A little later Hegel prepared a new manuscript for his Berlin lectures on aesthetics, a manuscript foundational for all the lecture series, and in doing so, as Hotho reports, he inserted into this notebook a series of memoranda for use with the various lectures. Like the Heidelberg Notebook, this one too is lost. A few of the inserted memoranda, ones that Hotho had passed on to friends and interested parties after preparing the published edition, have become accessible once again today, via indirect routes. The first one we can cite here is the aforementioned text fragment on the symbolic art form, the fragment concerning the symbolism of fantasy. In addition there is a sheet on "genuine objectivity"<sup>56</sup> and likewise a fragment about Prometheus. In the case of these texts we can with great assurance infer that they belong to the sheets inserted into the Berlin Notebook. Also belonging here are additional excerpts from Goethe's writings and from newspapers.<sup>57</sup>

55. See 'Neue Quellen zu Hegels Ästhetik', announced and explained by H. Schneider, *Hegel-Studien* (1984) 19:9 ff. Since Hegel publicized his lectures in the summer semester of 1818 in the following way as 'Aesthetics: Prof. Hegel, as dictated, five times weekly from 5 to 6 o'clock' (*Briefe*, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 111), this could be a segment that Hegel developed for his Heidelberg lectures but never completed. From this point on Hegel could have placed it among the textual insertions of the Berlin Notebook and utilized it again later on. Schneider unequivocally relocates the text into the conception of the symbolic art form in the Berlin lectures on aesthetics. Evidence to the contrary is that already with the *Phenomenology* Hegel developed the triadic structure of art forms. See Jeong-Im Kwon, 'Die Metamorphosen der "symbolischen Kunstform": Zur Rehabilitierung der ästhetischen Argumente Hegels', in *Phänomen versus System*, pp. 41 ff. The development of the philosophy of religion verifies, in any case, that in Berlin Hegel essentially further pursued and developed his conception of the symbolic art form. This fact is also reflected in the various lecture series on aesthetics.

56. See 'Hegel über die Objektivität des Kunstwerks: Ein eigenhändiges Blatt zur Ästhetik', announced and discussed by Lucia Sziborsky, *Hegel-Studien* (1983) 18:9 ff. This sheet was utilized in the *Aesthetics*; see pp. 15–16 of the first edition.

57. See Schneider, 'Neue Quellen...', pp. 21 ff. A few of these excerpts are the following. Pieces from the *Morning Chronicle* about a performance of Macbeth (pp. 27–8), and about the

Since both of these notebooks on aesthetics are lost, we possess only very insufficient sources from Hegel's own hand. The material does not make it possible for us to reconstruct the lectures on the philosophy of art in the way that was done in the published edition. However, as Hotho's Preface to the *Aesthetics* makes clear, even the information from Hegel's notebooks would not be able to guarantee a restoration of the authentic aesthetics of Hegel, because these notebooks develop the aesthetics for the most part only in its outlines. For this reason researchers are left with editing the transcripts of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics.

### B. THE TRANSCRIPTS OF HEGEL'S BERLIN LECTURES ON AESTHETICS

In Berlin Hegel gave his lecture series on aesthetics four times, before a growing number of auditors. The transcripts known today from all the Berlin lecture series are, in their essentials, reliable testimonies to the shape and the development of the philosophy of art. Of course historically and philologically we must classify these as secondary sources, although in their totality they provide a picture of the philosophy of art that in all likelihood comes closer to Hegel's own thought than does the heretofore extant, homogeneous text into which Hotho amalgamated the sources and manuscripts in the published edition.

The stock of direct transcripts and carefully-elaborated transcripts of Hegel's Berlin lectures on aesthetics far surpasses the sources referred to by Hotho or Lasson. Of course the set of transcripts known at this time is only in part the same as the set on which Hotho and Lasson based themselves, although the sources do make it feasible to reconstruct Hegel's lectures. Of the transcripts that Hotho utilized for the published edition of the *Aesthetics*, those that have been rediscovered include his own direct transcript from 1823, Griesheim's notebook from 1826, and a notebook by Heimann from 1828-9. In contrast to the materials available to Lasson for his critical edition, the state of our information has improved in multiple respects, because in the intervening years we have come to know transcripts from all the lecture series, even including the first and the last ones, to which

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female vocalist Catalini (pp. 28-9). Items from Goethe's *Ueber Kunst und Altertum* and from the treatise *Über Philostrats Gemälde* (pp. 30-1), as well as a copy of the poem 'Ein großer Teich war zugefroren' (pp. 35-6). Schneider's commentary provides information about the utilization of the notations in Hegel's *Aesthetics* (p. 33).

Lasson could still have had no access. The notebooks that he utilized partially overlap with Hotho's material, but today are only known in part. Lasson bases himself on Hotho's transcript as well as on the elaborated version by Griesheim for the year 1826, and likewise on Kehler's 1826 transcript, materials which are again accessible today. In addition to these, Lasson gives as his sources two further anonymous transcripts from 1826, as well as an anonymous transcript from the same year that conveys only one part of the lectures.<sup>58</sup> These transcripts are lost.

At the present time only one transcript is known from each of the first two Berlin lecture series on aesthetics, in winter 1820-1 and in summer 1823.

With the source for Hegel's first lecture series in Berlin we have a mirror image of that state of elaboration on which Hegel based his announcement that the aesthetics would soon be published as a book.<sup>59</sup> This testimony to the lectures of 1820-1 comprises an elaboration by Wilhelm von Ascheberg for a fellow student (*Ascheberg*, 1820-1).<sup>60</sup> It is not a direct transcript but instead a later elaboration that naturally has lesser value as a source than do the direct transcripts. However, the lectures are carefully transcribed and fully conveyed in some 271 pages.

In the summer semester of 1823 Hegel announced a series of four-hour lectures on 'Aestheticam sive philosophiam artis'.<sup>61</sup> So far the only source for these lectures (*Hotho* 1823) draws upon the direct transcript of Heinrich Gustav Hotho (1802-73). From 1822 on Hotho studied with Hegel for a number of years and, in addition to the aesthetics, he transcribed a number of other lectures too. After Hegel's death he not only took over the editing of the aesthetics lectures, but also succeeded Hegel in lecturing on aesthetics at the University of Berlin.

The most abundant source material that exists is for the 1826 lectures on aesthetics, which, once again, were announced as four-hour sessions with the title 'Aestheticam sive philosophiam artis'.<sup>62</sup> In these lectures Hegel

58. For this information, see Hotho's Preface, p. xi, as well as Lasson's *Die Idee und das Ideal*, X:390 ff.

59. The draft of a letter to Creuzer (end of May 1821) states, about Creuzer's *Symbolics and Mythology*: 'I cannot say how much I find that having such a book in hand furthers my own work, especially on aesthetics. I propose to lecture on aesthetics in the winter. Your work enables me to go more deeply into the subject, and probably in time to have something to publish on it' (*The Letters*, p. 466).

60. G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesung über Ästhetik*, Berlin 1820/21: Eine Nachschrift. I. Textband, ed. H. Schneider (Frankfurt am Main, 1995). See H. Schneider, 'Eine Nachschrift der Vorlesung Hegels über Ästhetik im WS 1820/21', *Hegel-Studien* (1991) 26:89 ff.

61. 'Aesthetics or philosophy of art'. See *Briefe*, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 116.

62. See *Briefe*, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 117.

retained the twofold division into a General Part and a Particular Part, and he again began with an Introduction that, at the same time as laying the foundation for the ensuing presentation, was supposed to set forth a structure oriented to the phenomenon.

These lectures established new emphases with respect to the content. From the outset of the Introduction, for instance, a distinctive foundation is conveyed for approaching artistic beauty as the higher beauty, because it is spiritual. Hegel moved to the forefront a few aspects that he set out in 1823 at the beginning of the General Part, together with a few allusions to inorganic and organic or living beauty in nature. In the lectures of 1826 Hegel again took up these thoughts at the outset of the General Part, although both the expansion of the beginning, and the reflections in the context of the ideal, provided an insufficient foundation for characterizing natural beauty in the *Aesthetics*. In any event we find in the transcripts of Hegel's lectures a rudimentary intellectual outline for the broadly laid-out chapter of the *Aesthetics* concerning the beauty of nature.<sup>63</sup>

The presentation of the symbolic art form is also modified in an interesting way. As in his lectures of 1823, Hegel passes over to the presentation of the symbolic art form after he has developed a (third) characterization of the ideal as external determinacy of the idea, as 'actuality' of art, and from that has achieved a comprehensive, structural defining of the three art forms. The symbolic art form is then no longer tripartite, as 'immediate unity of the symbolic', 'separation of the immediate unity', and 'return to unity, from the separation of significance from configuration'. The second symbolic form, as the 'fermentation of the incipient distinction', becomes instead assigned to the 'Indian intuition', and the third, the 'death of the natural', is the Syrian and Egyptian intuition. Finally, under the fourth form, the 'decadence of the distinct elements', Hegel assembles all the examples extending from the poetry of sublimity (the Jewish intuition) right up to the contemporary phenomenon of poetry, examples previously assigned to the third element, the 'return from the separation'. Of course it is a serious issue for the material that now fable, parable, enigma, apologue, and so forth, come to be called forms of decadence, not forms of the unity of significance and shape. With this, however, Hegel simply draws an obvious

63. The elaboration of content in this chapter on natural beauty points to other sources. With the transcription by Immanuel Hegel of Hotho's 1833 lectures on 'Aesthetics' we doubtless possess such a source; see n. 5 above. So, in his own lectures Hotho in fact expanded the part dealing with natural beauty, as he did in the *Aesthetics*, and enhanced it so as to make it a constitutive step in the threefold rhythm of the dialectical system of the philosophy of art.

conclusion from his 1823 lectures, one that embraces all these forms, attached to fable, as 'hybrid natures'. More interesting is an amplification that goes beyond the culmination of these four symbolic forms. Until now Hegel had selected only examples from Shakespeare in order to stand for contemporary symbolic forms. Now he juxtaposes to the final 'decadence' of the symbolic art form a poetic presentation that is capable of restoring the 'feature of the freedom of the Orient': Goethe's *West-östliche Divan*.<sup>64</sup> Together with the usual features of individual works of art also found in the previous lecture series, the treatment of classical and romantic art forms contains the attempt, foremost, to discuss contemporary art in the sense of the emphasis on Goethe's *Divan*, namely, as successful examples, either 'beautiful' or 'sublime' (accordingly no longer beautiful, yet important in content), of art's impact in the modern world.<sup>65</sup>

Not only is the lecture series of 1826 the one best able to be reconstructed, based on the numerous sources handed down; also, it appears to be of extraordinary interest materially. By engaging intensively with the phenomenon of art, in particular the art of his own time, Hegel in fact prepares in these lectures for the systematic firming-up of his thesis of the past character of art, a thesis he inserts into the paragraphs on art in the 1827 *Encyclopedia*. By doing so he sets aside the 1823 lectures' starkly accentuated structuring of

64. This connection with Goethe's *Divan of West and East* (1819) has been presented in a case study by Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Barbara Stemmrich-Köhler, 'Faust: Die "absolute philosophische Tragödie" und die "gesellschaftliche Artigkeit" des West-östliche Divan: Zu Editionsproblemen der Ästhetikvorlesungen', *Hegel-Studien* (1983) 18:23 ff. See also by the same authors, 'Von Hammer, Goethe und Hegel über Firdausi: Literaturkritik, Geschichtsbild und kulturpolitische Implikation der Ästhetik', in *Welt und Wirkung* . . . , pp. 295 ff. In addition to an allusion to Goethe's poem 'Mahomeds Gesang', Hotho's 1823 transcript also transmits a detailed discussion of Shakespeare, supported by plentiful citations that are inserted wholly in the margins.

65. Introduced at the conclusion of this introduction are individual examples involving content, ones that provide more detailed elucidation of this connection. On this point see the articles in the volume *Phänomen versus System*. Discussed here among the examples of the symbolic art form, of painting, and the characterization of opera in connection with the conception of modern drama, is Hegel's philosophical involvement with the phenomenon of art. On interpretation of the *Divan*, see also the dissertation by Barbara Stemmrich-Köhler, *Zur Funktion der orientalischen Poesie bei Goethe, Herder, Hegel: Exotische Klassik und ästhetische Systematik in den 'Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem Verstandnis des West-östliche Divan' of Goethe, in Frühschriften Herders und in Hegels Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik* (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York, Paris, 1992) (*Bochumer Schriften zur deutschen Literatur* 31). She presents Goethe's conception of the *Divan* in connection with Herder and develops (an only very meager) interpretation of the reception of the Orient linked to Hegel's engagement with the *Divan* in his lectures on aesthetics. The work of Jeong-Im Kwon, *Hegels Bestimmung der Kunst: die Bedeutung der 'symbolischen Kunstform' in Hegels Ästhetik* (Munich, 2001), gives a fuller account of this connection.



art and of the arts as a historical phenomenon, in favor of an examination, by way of examples, of the philosophical conception. The 1826 lectures prepare the way not only for the systematic precision of the 1827 *Encyclopedia*, and also that of 1830, but also for the altered arrangement presented in the final lecture series, with its stronger weighting of the arts via the separating out of a third part, the Individual Part.

The direct transcripts are of principal interest here too for contemporary interpretation of the sources that have come to be known in the meantime. There are only four of these direct transcripts from the 1826 lectures, and they vary in quality.

An anonymous transcript (*von der Pfordten* 1826) in the possession of the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin (and previously housed in the Westdeutschen Bibliothek Marburg,) contains a text that is terse, to be sure, but very precise and to the point in its distillation of the thought. This direct transcript, by P. von der Pfordten, bearing the title 'Philosophy of Art', consists of 92 sheets, that is, 183 pages in seven notebooks. Especially in the first notebook it is provided with succinct commentaries in the margins. It transmits the lectures fully. Dates have been inserted sporadically. The first date is 8 June 1826, toward the end of the second notebook in the order (next to the material in the General Part concerning the characterization of the externality of the ideal), and the last date is 1 September.

Another direct transcript (*Kehler* 1826) is by Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler (1804–86), and is entitled 'Philosophy of Art, or Aesthetics. By Hegel. In Summer 1826'. It begins with the date 24 April 1826, and transmits the lectures just as fully. (The last date, 1 August, is located in the middle of the part on dramatic poetry.) An indication of contents, placed at the beginning, concludes with 'II. Classical Art Form'. In 459 pages Kehler records the lectures in sweeping and fluid handwriting. He transmits Hegel's delivery in concise sentences, with his protocol for their economical construction involving the omission of articles, of infelicitous repetitions, and often the use of auxiliary verbs. However, in its contents the transmission is complete.

A few years ago another anonymous transcript (*Aachen* 1826) of the 1826 lectures on aesthetics, together with several other sources for Hegel's lectures, was rediscovered in the possession of the Aachen city library. The transcript bears the title 'Aesthetics, by Prof. Hegel'. The recording begins with the indication 'Summer Semester 1826, from 4 April on, afternoons from 5 to 6'. A penultimate date at the beginning of the treatment of lyric poetry is 3 August, and a final date within the part on dramatic poetry is 'Friday 1 September'. The manuscript is marked by moderate use of shorthand, overlapping double letters, and plain, broad handwriting, all of which are

features of a hastily-composed direct transcript. The style as well manifests the concise, transcription-like sequence of thought, but is more refined compared to the Kehler notebook. The lectures are transmitted fully on 219 pages.

Another transcript of the 1826 lectures (*Garczynski* 1826), rediscovered only recently, stems from the Polish poet Stefan von Garczynski (1805–33). It has the title 'Philosophy of Art, or Aesthetics, presented by the Royal Prussian University Professor of Philosophy, in Berlin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in Summer 1826, audited by [St. v. Garczynski]'.<sup>66</sup> The transcript consists of 113 sheets, that is, 225 closely-written pages, and concludes on sheet 110 (page 221) on 1 September 1826. The writer adds here a 'Briefly written resume of the parts and of the whole', although it covers only the first part, the 'Preface to the Symbolic Configuration'. This transcript too provides reliable information about Hegel's 1826 lectures.

Although they transmit a less direct picture, two careful formulations of the lectures nevertheless are a check on the completeness of the contents of the direct transcripts. These are by Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim (1798–1854) and Johann Conrad Carl Löwe (1807–91).

Griesheim's notebook (*Griesheim* 1826) bears the title 'Philosophy of Art, by Prof. Hegel. Summer 1826. Transcribed by Griesheim.' It contains the complete contents of the lectures. The text has been outfitted with interspersed headings—occasionally also with marginal notes—and with an extensive table of contents.

Löwe's notebook (*Löwe* 1826) documents the aesthetics just as fully, in 311 pages, and has the title 'Aesthetics, according to Hegel. I. C. Löwe'. It has been provided with careful organization within the text—often by underlining the text instead of by separately inserted subheadings—as well as by a clearly-worked-out general organization set forth at the beginning. Also, the notebook contains sporadic marginal comments that become fewer toward the end. Instead of having various deletions and substitutions within the text, it was reworked after the fact. So it lacks any abbreviations, each page beginning is noted briefly in a separate line on the preceding side, and the transitions are set out with lavish calligraphy. Possibly the notebook relies on the formulations of other students, because Löwe is not listed as an auditor for the 1826 lectures.

Hegel announced his lectures on aesthetics for the winter semester 1828–9 once again under the same title, but now as five-hour lectures.<sup>67</sup> In the Preface

66. The name was cut out. But the transcript was bound together with one from a lecture course by Savigny in the same handwriting, and the transcriber is identified by name.

67. See *Briefe*, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 118.

to the *Aesthetics* Hotho dismisses the 1828–9 lectures as a hardly relevant text, because in this course of lectures Hegel offered a purely ‘pedagogical’ reworking of his aesthetics. As opposed to this assessment, the sources known today attest that here too we find a new advance in the presentation and thoughtful mastery of the materials, one of interest for research.

Despite all the speculations of contemporary Hegel interpretation, the three known transcripts made by Heimann, Karol Libelt, and Rolin, clearly confirm the fact that Hegel set forth the revised version of his systematic conception of art in the lectures too, the one that he developed in the 1827 *Encyclopedia*. They provide, first of all, a refinement (recorded with precision by Heimann and Libelt) of the always-emphasized ‘past character of art with respect to its highest possibility’, along the lines of the *Encyclopedia*. Linked to this point is a reweighting of numerous individual examples in which, especially in the 1826 lectures, Hegel discussed the historical influence and significance of art in the circumstances of the modern world. Finally, this refinement of the systematic conception led to the new, now tripartite, organization of the aesthetics. Hegel sketches out, in a concisely outlined presentation, his characterization of the idea and of the ideal, as well as the conception of the forms of art (in which the portrayal of the classical art form in particular is robustly schematized). He relocates the examples from the arts into a third part of his lectures. What Hotho attributes to pedagogical resignation and desperation appears in the sources for the lectures as a consciously undertaken modification and reconstruction of the material, under radically systematic premises that call for a thoroughgoing engagement precisely with the problematic parts, with the conception of the symbolic art form and with examples of the romantic art form, especially contemporary ones.

In the final lecture series Hegel begins, by way of introduction, with a characterization of the domain of aesthetics, with the realm of the beautiful and how it ‘lends itself to philosophy’. He proceeds once again through the various points he always treated: natural beauty versus artistic beauty; imitation; the characterization of appearance; various characterizations of the purpose of art; various approaches to aesthetics; also, a conceptual determination of the relationships among art, religion, and philosophy, together with the thesis of the past character of art, more extensively refined in contrast to its elaboration in 1826. Then follow the treatments of the General, Particular, and Individual Parts with reference to—as Heimann conveys it—the characterization of the ideal, the forms of beauty structured according to form and content into symbolic, classical, and romantic art

forms, and the conclusion of the Individual Part with a history of the separate arts.

The symbolic art form becomes newly organized yet again, into: 1) the treatment of symbols as such; 2) the relation of an inwardness to nature; 3) fantasy symbolism, or the symbolism of sublimity in the cases of pantheism and Judaism; 4) the more specific symbolism that belongs to Egyptian art; 5) conscious symbolism, or the separation of form from meaning, in fable, parable, and the like. The decisive engagement with Goethe as a 'modern' form of symbolic art is missing in this context; the *Divan* is mentioned in the third or Individual Part, and hardly in a prominent place, only as an example of poetic success. The classical and romantic art forms remain unchanged in principle but are presented concisely (without detailed examples). With Heimann and Libelt, the third part (begun on 23 January 1829) occupies almost half of the transcription.

The best transmission of these lectures is found in the transcript by Heimann (*Heimann* 1828–9), which bears the title: 'The Aesthetics, according to Hegel's lectures, transcribed by Heimann. In the winter semester 1828–9'. Heimann provides a complete overview of the five-hour lectures, beginning with 26 October 1828 and ending with the lecture of 2 April 1829. The transcript comprises 141 pages, written compactly but neatly and clearly. In the introductory part (up to the subdivisions) Heimann introduces numerous organizational notes in the margins, as well as indications of the contents by key words at the tops of the pages. Yet despite the numerous drastic abbreviations within the handwritten text, we can conclude that this is a direct transcript into which these features were inserted only later, especially since the structural formulations were not continued throughout and the lecture dates were carefully and consistently indicated each time in the margins of the text.

Another direct transcript (*Libelt* 1828–9) that likewise fully reproduces the last lecture series on aesthetics comes from the Polish educator and philosophical author Karol Libelt (1807–75). It bears the title 'Aesthetics, by Prof. Hegel in winter semester 1828–9'. The transcript has 292 pages, numbered up to the second part of the manuscript, 'particular art forms', which Libelt dated subsequent to the lectures. The last date is 13 March. Following page 92 is a thirteen page insertion by another hand that transmits the lectures of 28 November, 12 January, and 12 February. The sheets were numbered throughout after the fact, and the insertion is included in the numbering (152 sheets, or 305 total pages). Up to about the second part a generous margin is utilized for organizational and thesis-like, summary marginalia. Despite a certain linguistic awkwardness, the transcript conveys

the content of Hegel's lectures although, as compared to the Heimann transcript, it lacks a succinct grasp of Hegel's thought.

In addition, as a third testimony to the 1828-9 lectures, there is an incomplete transcript by Rolin with the title 'Philosophy of Art, Prof. Hegel, begun 27.8.ber' (Rolin, 1828-9). Although Rolin indicates October 27 as the beginning, the notebook commences with text dated 26 October in the other transcripts. The notebook ends with the 27/29 (of January 1829), at the beginning of the third part, which characterizes architecture as such, with the description of the Tower of Babel or Temple of Bel. The transcript runs some 98 pages. It contains explanatory marginal remarks in the French language that accompany the introduction, and then proceeds in a continuous text with shortcomings typical of an auditor who is not in full command of the German language (simple sentences often incorrectly construed, orthography suited to French, and numerous deletions and substitutions).

Along with the transcripts of Hegel's aesthetics mentioned so far, there are a few secondary sources, which are of course oriented less closely to Hegel's lectures but nevertheless are instructive concerning the transition from lecture testimonies to the published *Aesthetics*. For instance, in a composition by the student Kromayer (Kromayer 1823/6), who assembled his own version of Hegel's aesthetics from the documents of 1823 and 1826, the strategy of Hotho's edition becomes clear.

Kromayer's composition is entitled 'The Aesthetics or Philosophy of Art, according to the lectures of Herr Professor Hegel in the years 1823 and 1826'. The first part of it contains a careful fair copy of 500 pages. Kromayer compiles Hegel's expositions in the two lecture series in a way similar to how Hotho did it for his edition. He interweaves the documents for the lectures of 1823 and 1826 in such a way that Hegel's elaborations in the lectures of 1826, emphasizing different points, become integrated into the text of the 1823 lectures. In this way the material emphases of the two lecture series are arranged side by side. That becomes especially clear in the opening passage of the lectures. In 1823 Hegel stated just briefly the thesis setting artistic beauty apart from natural beauty, and thus in the following series he grounded this thesis by a detailed reflection on natural beauty. In his composition Kromayer so interweaves the two versions that the result is a unitary, basic connection, the systematically structured transition from the conception of natural beauty central to Enlightenment aesthetics, to the approach to artistic beauty in the aesthetics of German idealism. By this procedure, which can also be shown in further examples, he attains the same kind of completeness that Hotho realizes in the published edition of the aesthetics by filling out Hegel's manuscript with the help of the various

lecture transcripts. What is unproblematic for an individual's workup of the aesthetics for private use surely leads to problems in the production of an official version of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, problems with which a critical edition of today has to deal.

In investigating the provenance of the systematic feature in Hegel's *Aesthetics*, it will be informative to look at Hotho's own writings, for Hotho resorted not to the systematics provided in the *Encyclopedia* but instead to his own familiarity with Hegel.<sup>68</sup>

A lecture series on aesthetics that coincides with the editing of Hegel's *Aesthetics* affords an especially good insight into the 'workshop' in which Hegel's *Aesthetics* originated. A transcript by Hegel's youngest son, Immanuel Thomas Christian Hegel (1814-91), with the title 'Aesthetics lectures given by Hotho in summer 1833, transcribed and elaborated by Immanuel Hegel', transmits this additional secondary source. Like Hotho did in 1823, Immanuel Hegel outfitted his direct transcript with marginal notations, ones he later added to the manuscript. Hotho's organization of aesthetics is interesting, for he too chose a tripartite division. Of course he only partly based it on Hegel, but it is informative for his systematic interventions into the *Aesthetics*. The first part treats the concept of the beautiful. A second and a third part treat natural beauty and artistic beauty respectively. The second part, which presents natural beauty by itself, corresponds to the rudimentary presentation in Hegel's 1826 lectures. For instance, the chapter treats the 'beauty of inorganic nature' in one section, the 'beauty of organic nature' in a second section, and the 'beautiful human figure' in a third section. Perhaps based on this systematizing and expansion of Hegel's reflections is the fact that the part on natural beauty in the published *Aesthetics* exceeds by far, in length and contents, the brief sketch conveyed in the lecture transcripts. Hotho dedicates the entire third part of his own 1833 lectures on aesthetics to artistic beauty, commencing with a section on fantasy, which is subdivided into the different forms of fantasy, namely, 'symbolic', 'plastic-ideal', and 'romantic' fantasy. A second section of this part on artistic beauty treats 'objectified artistic beauty', initially in general terms and then with a view to individual artists and to the spirit of art. A concluding section of this third part treats the history of art itself in the sense of the conception of 'speculative art history'.

The fact that Hotho not only carried the systematic structuring of Hegel's aesthetics forward into his own lectures but also utilized it continually for

68. Of course we will be able to reach a final conclusion about this connection only from an accurate compilation of Hotho's literary remains.

his own philosophical interests as well as his theoretical interests concerning art, that is, for the development of 'speculative art history', provides a further testimony to Hegel's lecture activity in Berlin. A fragmentary manuscript by Friedrich Theodor Vischer survives from the year 1832, one he prepared in Hotho's lectures, presumably his lectures on aesthetics. For these lectures Vischer conveys a systematic outline corresponding to that of Immanuel Hegel's transcript and constructed analogously to Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art.<sup>69</sup>

In my opinion the most important argument for accepting as authentic the *Aesthetics* of Hegel, edited by Hotho, rests on this synergy of the direct reception of Hegel's thought with Hotho's own continuing focus on characterizing the role of art within the state, which is not only theoretically well-constructed but also practically effective. Hotho and Vischer make this their concern in their own writings, and in doing so they document with their own works the tendency of Hegel's aesthetics to be historically influential. This tendency, continuing until today, allows Hegel's philosophy of art to appear as a systematic-dogmatic system, one that cites numerous examples and takes up the phenomenon of art, albeit not in a disinterested way. It would have been extraordinarily desirable had Hotho elaborated his own announced intention (as he states in his Preface, p. x) of adding to the second edition of the *Aesthetics* 'a synoptic description and overview of the different lecture series and of their instructional alterations', in order to justify the configuration of the text. Surely that would have already settled beforehand the discussion about the authenticity of the aesthetics, a discussion Georg Lasson sought in vain to initiate almost 60 years ago. Since Hotho did not carry out this plan, Hermann Glockner's description of the genesis of the *Aesthetics* would retain its straightforward sense: 'It was a momentous day when the young Hotho visited Hegel, his revered master who had just returned from the Netherlands and was still quite infused with the noble art he had beheld there . . . . That is when the creative spark jumped over to Hotho. He remains faithful to the great teacher and to Dutch art and to aesthetics.' Today especially the persistence of this account appears to be a dispiriting, unintended irony: 'We owe it to one hour, replete with charming humanity and replete

69. The manuscript bears the title 'Hotho' and is in the University Library, Tübingen (Md. 787a/108-7). Vischer went to Berlin for a year with the intention of hearing Hegel, on a stipend he received from acquiring his master's degree. When he arrived in Berlin in 1832, Hegel had recently passed away and Vischer could only attend lectures by Hegel's pupil, Heinrich Gustav Hotho. This initial contact was the beginning of a lifelong scholarly exchange between them.

with spiritual life, that Hegel's philosophy of art has come down to us in the most worthy way.<sup>70</sup>

Knowledge of the transcripts of Hegel's Berlin lectures on aesthetics can for the first time impart sufficiently precise insight into this state of affairs. The knowledge of one of these transcripts is, however, already sufficiently informative for an initial fundamental orientation. Therefore Hotho's own notebook of 1823 is published in this volume for the first time, and as the first of all the known transcripts to be published.

### C. HOTHO'S TRANSCRIPT OF THE 1823 LECTURES

With the notebook for the 1823 lectures on aesthetics we have before us one of the transcripts that Hotho utilized to prepare for the publication of the *Aesthetics*. Furthermore, it represents the first of those lecture series to which Hotho gave preference, over the initial and last series, as providing the consummate version of the aesthetics, formally and with respect to content. There is no other direct or reworked transcript available for the 1823 lecture series. In the previously-mentioned version of Kromayer, which weaves together the lectures of 1823 and 1826, we find no information pointing beyond Hotho's 1823 notebook that could be assigned clearly to this earlier series, and for that reason Kromayer's formulation gets no consideration here as an additional source.

The endeavor to publish the transcript of a single lecture series separately is certainly problematic because the criteria for choosing are hard to establish. We could equally well have appealed to historical priority or to material priority and, for example, selected Hegel's first Berlin lectures on aesthetics of 1820-1, or else a particularly well-done transcript of one of the later series. Since no manuscript on aesthetics by Hegel himself is available, the obvious suggestion is to judge the value of the various transcripts as sources according to how close they are to the lectures. Going by this consideration, the direct transcripts of the lectures doubtless

70. Hermann Glockner, 'Die Ästhetik in Hegels System', in *Verhandlungen des zweiten Hegelkongresses vom 18.-21. Oktober 1931 in Berlin* (1932), 2:167. In a similar sense, Glockner's account of Vischer remains ambiguous. In his description Vischer appears as the 'learned disciple' of a great master. In any case, however, this master of the terrain of aesthetics was not, as assumed, Hegel, but instead Hotho. See Glockner, 'Die Fortbildung der Hegelschen Gedanken in Fr. Th. Vischers Ästhetik', in Glockner's *Die ästhetische Sphäre. Studien zur systematischen Grundlegung und Ausgestaltung der philosophischen Aesthetik* (Bonn, 1966), pp. 336-7.



deserve preference, and of interest in the second rank are the reworked versions prepared afterward by various students based on their direct transcripts but closely tied to the lectures. These reworked versions are indeed often more attractive as texts because, as formulated, they are easier to read and more concise, but naturally they are more removed from Hegel's lectures than are the direct transcripts.

Taking into account all these considerations, Hotho's own transcript from 1823 appears to be among the most interesting ones, if not the most interesting of all the transcripts known until now. First of all, his 1823 notebook is obviously a direct transcript that Hotho afterwards outfitted with marginal notations showing its organization, and with short summaries of the content. Of course its closeness to the original lectures as given by Hegel in the 1823 summer semester is no longer to be guaranteed by a direct comparison with Hegel's notebook on aesthetics, although from others of Hotho's direct transcripts of lectures his astonishing capacity for grasping the sequence of thought in its essentials, and for reiterating it precisely in individual points, can be established beyond all doubt.<sup>71</sup>

71. Judging the transcripts of course depends upon what one expects from such a testimony to Hegel's thought. By not relying too strictly on the norm of authenticity, that is, by being satisfied with a reiteration that is materially close to precise although not faithful word-for-word, then with good reason Hotho's transcript can be given priority in the publication of the transcripts. In addition to the aesthetics, Hotho transcribed the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of world history. For the world history lectures, Hotho's ability to render Hegel's thought with precision can be checked in a first-rate way. Hotho's transcript of the philosophy of world history, which among others was prepared in a manner similar to the notebook on aesthetics (by folding the outer margin of the double leaves or sheets), can be compared with the reworked version of Griesheim as well as with Hegel's own manuscript. For these lectures on the philosophy of world history Hegel formulated in writing a new introduction, which is still preserved and has been transmitted in the two transcripts by Hotho and Griesheim, and they differ insignificantly as to the oral presentation. Through comparison of the beginning of the transcript with the text of this introduction in Hegel's own hand, it is evident that Hotho conveys Hegel's arguments right down to the vocabulary, to be sure presented in short form and often condensed to their material core. The material contents of the presentation certainly are preserved by doing so, and indeed, as can be ascertained from comparison with the manuscript, to a far greater extent than is the case with Griesheim's transcript. Minor rearrangements in the text prove to be Hegel's rearrangements in his free delivery (that is, the rearrangements are reported in both lecture transcripts). Very often substantive forms are converted into verbs, which perhaps can also be attributed to the difference between free delivery and a written manuscript. In any event we can say that in this test case Hotho's transcript is not only adequate but is even superbly precise, although it does not involve handing down Hegel's own words literally, but instead involves the intellectual content of his reflections and his delivery. It is therefore appropriate to surmise that in the philosophy of art, his own special field, Hotho labors with the same interest and degree of precision as in the other lectures. Here too we may infer that Hotho reiterates Hegel's thought precisely and with understanding, and achieves a high degree of completeness.

This capacity is also evident in the 1823 notebook on aesthetics. Where the other transcribers (and the testimony to the first lecture series of 1820-1 belongs to this kind of presentation) report on Hegel's examples individually (often just bunching the examples together), Hotho endeavors to grasp the sequence of thought and to exemplify it in a materially correct way. He succeeds at this in a form that is concise and, with few exceptions, even consists of well-formulated diction. The result of this method of transcribing may of course be that the authenticity of the spoken word cannot be guaranteed throughout. Its advantage doubtless lies in the fact that the authenticity of what is intended gets optimally preserved in this way.

We can point out a further feature typical of Hotho's transcripts. In the layout of his notebooks for the lectures Hotho folds the sheets to prepare a generous margin that takes up about a quarter of the page. He can utilize this margin later on for organizing the lectures and reconstructing their theses. In the 1823 lectures on aesthetics he makes very extensive use of this possibility. In a second stage, obviously after the lectures but closely connected to them, Hotho carefully goes over his notes again, noting the essential structural points, the definitions of central concepts, and the overall flow of the argument in the lectures, and enhancing still-fragmentary or imprecisely-given original citations in the text by precise references. In the margins alongside the transcribed text in this fashion we find, first of all, the organization that Hegel himself provided in the lectures and that also emerges in the textual body of the transcript, as well as the aforementioned further organizational subheadings of the text that provide an overview of the sequence of thought. At the beginning of important sections Hotho inserts an abbreviated overall organization of the sequence of thought. So he seems to be carefully going over his transcript once more, has devised the notations carefully for easy memorization, according to the most important aspects, and has to some extent corrected the text of his lecture notes (now and then contrariwise to the sense he originally wrote down). The later precise citations show that this arrangement was not just provisional in character but was undertaken with the obvious intention of checking carefully what he heard. So, as the result of comparing the known transcripts of the lectures on aesthetics as well as comparing Hegel's manuscript with Hotho's notes, we may hold firmly to the fact that Hotho's transcript of the 1823 aesthetics lectures still preserves for us a testimony to Hegel's aesthetics lectures, one that reports the course of Hegel's thought clearly and unambiguously, making this course of thought available for interested persons in a form that is reader-friendly, well-organized, and elaborated in detail.

Naturally this kind of presentation instantly prompted criticism. So the assertion that, with marginal notes to a direct transcript we are dealing with Hotho's own independent aesthetics, must tempt the reader to assume that perhaps the 1823 source has no more value than does a formulation after the fact. In any event it is not the case that the text of the marginal notes differs from the transcript and might be traceable back to other sources than Hegel's lectures (such as tutorial sessions on the lectures, as perhaps took place with the philosophy of right). The marginal glosses in fact go beyond the text only when precise citations are inserted (chiefly from Shakespeare). In other instances without exception they introduce a repetition of the textual material, in the course of which Hotho's independent work here too is simply in the concise conceptual style that is characteristic of his transcript. The course of thought is, as it were, once again reduced and compacted to its essentials. Hence the second-stage marginal notes must count as less authentic than the direct transcript, although they are included in the German edition of this volume [but only in part in the English edition] because they formed a unity with the text of the transcript, one that allows the entirety of the transcript and marginal glosses to become an informative documentation of Hegel's lectures for a reader today, and an advantageous way of receiving them. Hotho's transcript documents the whole lecture series on 288 octavo pages, and provides a precise picture of Hegel's essential thoughts. Since this manner of presenting Hegel's lectures is far less complex and faces far fewer obstacles to its production than is the case with the published edition of the *Aesthetics*, it also is especially suitable for providing an introduction to Hegel's aesthetics. Therefore Hotho's 1823 transcript of the lectures on aesthetics still preserves a testimony to Hegel's lecture activity, and publication of this transcript appears both worthwhile and advisable, not only based on historical considerations.

Another special external feature of the direct lecture transcript is the fact that further insertions have obviously been added later to the marginal glosses. These notations in Hotho's handwriting (but now in black ink rather than brown ink) introduce organizational outlines throughout that must relate in part to outside sources, and they frequently deviate from the organization developed in the first round, that is, when the original marginalia were entered. These organizational outlines also no longer harmonize with the text of the 1823 manuscript, but instead have more affinity with the published edition of the *Aesthetics*. So we can suppose with considerable certainty that Hotho inserted these notations when he utilized his transcript for editing Hegel's *Aesthetics*, possibly before using this documentation for his own lectures on aesthetics, given after Hegel's death and recorded in an

1833 transcript made of these lectures by Immanuel Hegel. However, most of Hotho's entries—with new organization substituting for the initial organization and deletions<sup>72</sup>—have presumably been made in order to designate material utilized in preparation for editing the *Aesthetics*.

This second version of the transcript's 'reworking' [what we elsewhere refer to as the third stage] is of interest subsequently because it provides an indisputable indication that Hotho utilized his own notebook for the editing of the *Aesthetics*, and with great assurance valued it as an authoritative source.<sup>73</sup> In fact in the Preface to the *Aesthetics* Hotho points out specifically that the best version of Hegel's aesthetics was presented in the lectures of 1823 and 1826. For the best version he will have turned to his own notebooks, indeed especially to the 1823 notebook, as indicated by the later notations in the margins and by the deletions. The modifications of the organization that he worked out originally in conjunction with Hegel's lectures have obviously been developed in the course of comparing the various notebooks Hotho had available for the editing. Certainly they document a preliminary stage for the *Aesthetics*. In this way Hotho's 1823 notebook offers one of the essential points of reference for the published

72. The pages are mostly crossed-out diagonally, although many times also line by line. Those of the subsequent marginalia and textual insertions from the second stage, soon after the lectures, that are significant for the meaning of the text (only a small fraction of the total) are included in this English edition. They are not incorporated into the text of Hotho's transcript but are instead indicated in the footnotes. See the appendix to this volume, entitled: The Constitution of the Text in the German Edition and in this English Edition.

73. People have expressed doubt about this, but for insufficient reasons. Wilhelm Vatke contends that, in the overall editing of the *Aesthetics*, Hotho is supposed to have based himself above all on Vatke's transcript of 1828–9, although according to statements in the Preface that is extremely unlikely. As far as Hotho's own indications go, he has made this 1823 transcript the foundation. Above all, the traces of work on the published edition of the *Aesthetics* in Hotho's 1823 transcript favor it. Heinrich Benecke, who refers to this remark in his biography of Vatke, repeats in their essentials Hotho's explanations in the Preface, and portrays the editor's task particularly in Hotho's sense of it. The editor must in fact adequately reproduce Hegel's 'stirring flash of inspiration': 'whoever seeks to record what is heard' must—entirely in Hotho's sense—'have followed Hegel for a long time, with insight and affection; he must have been in a position to locate for himself, and to draw upon, substantially involved participants' (Heinrich Benecke, *Wilhelm Vatke in seinem Leben und seinen Schriften* (Bonn, 1883), pp. 88 ff.). Instead of Hotho, the essential role in this enterprise is, in any event, ascribed here to Vatke. This thesis is not subject to checking because Vatke's literary remains have been lost. On this issue, see 'Neue Quellen zu Hegels Ästhetik', p. 39. There Schneider concedes to Vatke's transcript this prerogative claimed by Benecke. Hotho's own literary remains, which are only available in part today, on the contrary enable us very readily to separate Hegel's body of thought from Hotho's. Above all, there are numerous indications for ascertaining such inserted connecting links, and even substantial expansions.

edition of the *Aesthetics*, since Hotho seems, and not only in the glosses, to have entwined the elaborations from the later lectures around this foundation. At least for the General Part and the Particular Part this assumption is well-founded. The transcripts of the last lecture series will have been his source of material for the third part of the aesthetics, the Individual Part, since his own 1823 notebook, as well as the other transcripts from 1826, integrate into the Particular Part, in their essentials, the examples by which Hegel illustrated his position.<sup>74</sup> Hotho's harsh criticism of the quality of the last lecture series also supports his not drawing unnecessarily on the sources for those lectures, so that he only used them where his own notebooks and the other sources for the 1826 lectures were insufficient.

One might in fact have proceeded by showing extensive agreement of the first two parts of the *Aesthetics* with Hotho's 1823 notebook as well as the other transcripts from 1826. Yet there is no such agreement, as a formal comparison of the transcripts with the *Aesthetics* already demonstrates. Each of the known transcripts—with those from the same year frequently agreeing in their documentation, while varying by kind of text—develops a considerably different picture of Hegel's philosophy of art than does the completed *Aesthetics*. Therefore, given the magnitude of the editorial interventions in Hotho's editing, each text (the direct transcripts and even the versions reworked by students) can appear to be as authentic as the later-established published edition.

So the editing of the transcripts of Hegel's aesthetics has not only historical value for expanding our knowledge of the sources; it has the significantly *systematic sense of producing for the first time an adequate basis for relevant discussion with, and about, Hegel's 'Aesthetics'*. This far-reaching and bold thesis has been tested up to now in a few case studies (surely not yet in a sufficient number of them) with strikingly identical outcomes. In the lecture transcripts we not only encounter a different Hegel; these testimonies also provide a far more adequate foundation for philosophical discussion, a foundation already as such counteracting many prejudices held by the critics of Hegel. Foremost among them is the reproach that Hegel superimposed on the historical phenomenon, on the variety of the arts, his system of a dialectical, lifeless mechanism of thought—a reproach refuted from the outset by these texts. In all the transcripts we encounter a philosophizing that engages itself reflectively with art as a decisive element of human culture, that

74. Schneider's assumption that Vatke's notebook gained special significance for Hotho may play a part here. Hotho did, to be sure, include this notebook in naming his sources. See 'Neue Quellen...', pp. 39–40, and Hotho's Preface, p. xi.

structures itself carefully and attentively—in short, an approach that is in a comprehensive sense *phenomenological*. Since, based on this thesis, the value of the undoubted secondary sources, the transcripts, considerably surpasses the 'tertiary' source for the aesthetics in the published edition, these secondary sources should, in conclusion, be represented by a few examples of this new, relevant Hegel who, in constantly renewed and deeper endeavors in his lectures, characterized art in its role for the historical world. In this setting Hotho's transcript speaks for itself, as testimony to one of these reflective 'journeys' of the philosopher through the world of art.

### III. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AS REFLECTED IN ITS ORIGINAL RECEPTION

Future philosophical discussion of Hegel's aesthetics will remain dependent on the sources for Hegel's aesthetics, that is, on the few statements in his published writings as well as principally on the transcripts of his Berlin lecture series. Given the status of the sources, it is of course hardly possible to reconstruct Hegel's aesthetics unambiguously, nor can it make sense to rely any longer on the text of the published version constructed by Hotho or on a 'restoration' of the authentic aesthetics of Hegel similar to this completed version. The four Berlin lecture series Hegel delivered based on his Berlin manuscript are already so essentially different from one another that we may no longer speak of '*the aesthetics*' of Hegel.

Nevertheless, in the development and in the modifications of the various lecture series, the most important systematic aspects are identical, as are the basic concepts of art and, above all, the basic characterization of art. We also find constantly recurring themes in the discussion of fundamental decisions and the debate with other, more or less related, positions on philosophical aesthetics, such as art theory. In contrast to this continuity, as he proceeded Hegel varied the lectures with regard to the arrangement of his thoughts, the weighting of systematic aspects, and the examples provided. Hence we cannot definitively answer the question as to the authentic text of Hegel's aesthetics, and perhaps not even meaningfully pose it. Even basing ourselves on the documents with 'final touches', the transcripts of the essentially reoriented lecture series of 1828-9, does not bring to light either the only valid, consistent presentation of the problems or the final shape of the aesthetics as Hegel envisioned it. Our description of Hotho's procedure for preparing the text of the published version, a procedure he recounts in the Preface, has already shown what minimal justification that version can muster in support of the claim that it conveys this definitive conception of Hegel's aesthetics, complete both systematically and in its content. Comparing this text with the different lecture series can only intensify the skepticism about it.

Yet despite all their difficulties, despite their continuous and unfinished modifications, a substantially consistent conception of the aesthetics can emerge better from the lecture testimonies than it can from the three-volume, systematic *Aesthetics*. Despite their different weighting of problems and despite their alteration in the structure of the lectures as a whole, all the

series in fact proceed from a unitary, systematic foundation and from a clear conception in virtue of this foundation. This conception survives, both formally and in its content, in the modifications Hegel made in the course of his lectures, but it differs in principle from that of the *Aesthetics* published in 1835.

Even his thorough restructuring of the aesthetics lectures along the lines of a philosophical reflection on the historical phenomenon of the arts and artistic performance, a reflection Hegel undertook in the 1826 lectures but especially in the final series, fits in without disturbing the systematic conception of the aesthetics in the characterization of art in the *Encyclopedia*, as the first stage of absolute spirit. The same holds good for the examples that Hegel drew upon in ever increasing numbers and included in the third or Individual Part, in treating the world of the arts. Through his manner of discussion, combining organically the philosophical, historical, and experiential modes of treatment, Hegel carried out a consistent explication of his systematic position without any dogmatically preconceived opinion and without overwhelming the phenomenon by the concept, practices for which the *Aesthetics* is justifiably reproached.

Hegel's aesthetics is fundamentally different in this very way from the systematics Hotho built into his own lectures. The extent to which the different systematic and basic decisions of the philosopher, and those of his editor, affect individual instances can best and most clearly surface when we compare the descriptions of the various examples taken as illustrative of the individual arts, in judging the phenomenon. Here too the multiple lecture testimonies are more convergent and internally consistent than are the contents of the, at first impression rigorous and finalized, published edition of the *Aesthetics*. Also, the result of checking the content likely will be the conviction that even a documentation without combining all the sources, an isolated transcript of one of the four lecture series, conveys Hegel's aesthetics more authentically than does the systematically well-constructed, complete and comprehensive, *Aesthetics*.

To demonstrate this thesis, as an experiment we place Hegel's systematic approach to aesthetics in connection with the 'thematic' introduction of his lectures. By doing so—and as further supported by an analysis of the structure of the lectures—we obtain the framework for philosophical engagement with the phenomenon of art in the way that Hegel included it in his lectures. While criticizing established art theory, he exhibited this framework right in 'judgments about art', which for Hegel are descriptions of individual works of art.



### A. THE SYSTEMATICS AND THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE AESTHETICS

The modifications of the conception of aesthetics in the various lecture series lead to a number of divergences between the contents Hegel delivered in his Berlin lectures and what posterity until today knows, admires, utilizes, and finally—as hermeneutically-oriented philosophizing in good form demands—shrugs off as a dogmatic system based on premises and conclusions. Taken as a dogmatic system, Hegel's conception appears to be an overwhelming of history by the concept, clearly unmasking itself in the 'classicism' of aesthetics, in the honoring of specific arts purely based on conceptual favoritism, and the inevitable consequence, the thesis of the end of art. To the contrary, as Hotho's Preface to the *Aesthetics* reveals, the system of aesthetics stems not from Hegel but instead from Hotho; thus the so-called basic aporia of the aesthetics are automatically avoidable, the problems removable, by going back to the sources for the lectures. Camouflaging the thesis of the end of art by a dialectically reconstructed, conceptual characterization of art with reference to the 'ideal', characterizing the art forms up until now in an ample stock of aesthetics value judgments, calls for a systematic framework that is not Hegel's but instead remains clearly assignable to Hotho. Consequently, when we eliminate this aesthetic system as sheerly an editorial feat, the criticism must automatically become untenable too. Hegel would then be the non-dogmatic thinker of history, as he is viewed even by a few interpreters of the *Aesthetics*. Within the framework of this 'system-free' aesthetics, the thesis of the past character of art in particular must undergo change, for, as is evident, art is not done yet.

Nevertheless, Hotho is not the only one who stresses numerous times that the system of aesthetics has to be integrated into the lectures. Other auditors of Hegel's lecture series too confirm that in his lectures Hegel did not proceed strictly systematically, and Hegel himself can be cited as witness to the fact that, and to what extent, his aesthetics deviates from the systematic foundation of the *Encyclopedia*. In his lectures on the philosophy of art Hegel at least sought to avoid delivering his 'system' of aesthetics in a mechanical-dialectical construct of concepts. In lectures on other topics too he seems to have shown this forbearance and, as he did in the aesthetics, he must have oriented his reflection to the subject matter and not, contrariwise, given the system precedence over the phenomenon. For example, auditors of the lectures on the history of philosophy, just like those of the aesthetics, emphasize as laudable the fact that Hegel made his points in a

lively and interesting manner but was not 'caught up in dialectic'.<sup>75</sup> Theodor Mundt confirmed this point for the aesthetics lectures, which he attended in the 1826 summer semester. He said that in these lectures Hegel presented aesthetics 'for the first time in a very fully articulated sequence, as a specific part of the whole system'. The systematic conception nevertheless remains present, but only as background. Mundt remarks ironically that Hegel disappointed his 'community of the absolute concept', which included, in addition to the students, a large 'number of well-known and respected men from all circles of Berlin'. Whereas in the *Encyclopedia* Hegel wrestled with the system of philosophy, he commenced the lectures on aesthetics 'willingly from a perspective uplifting for us young people, by seeking to guide us out of the "shadowy realm of thought", out of its deepest thicket in which we wandered about with him in his *Encyclopedia* that same semester, and now to guide us into the terrain of the beautiful'.

How different, in contrast to such reports, the 1835 published edition of the *Aesthetics* appears to be. In fact the *Aesthetics* presents much that is dialectically complex in order to bring it closer to representing a system of aesthetics. Above all else, the dialectical 'construction throughout' departs from the lecture testimonies at all the transitional points, especially as found in the elaboration of the world of the arts based on the conception of the ideal as well as the art forms,<sup>76</sup> and takes the place of a systematics that Hegel himself introduces differently and also elaborates differently. It is also interesting that the reception of the *Aesthetics* at that time even criticized the 'wooden representation of the dialectic' Hegel (supposedly) built into his work, and found it to be an alien element, whereas people today, admirers and rejecters of Hegel alike, accept it as an organic element of his philosophy of art.<sup>77</sup>

75. An anonymous writer using the initials R. J. reports in his 'Biographischen Erinnerungen', with reference to the lectures on the history of philosophy, that Hegel presented his theses with great pedagogical skill. 'Hegel spoke with clarity and in a popular manner, in the exemplary way called for at the lecturn; at no time was anything caught up in dialectic in order to excite and impress the hearer' (*Jahrbücher der Gegenwart*, ed. Albert Schweigler (1847), pp. 739 ff.; see *Berichte*, no. 435, p. 283.) For Mundt's comments on Hegel's presentations, in the rest of this paragraph, see *Berichte*, no. 460, p. 300.

76. Examples from the *Aesthetics* can be cited for all the arts. An especially striking example is found in the transition from architecture to painting, in which Hotho's reflections, by means of a dialectical construction of the difference between the two arts and the manner in which they proceed separately, substitute for, and distort, the subject matter. On the interpretation of this point, see Gethmann-Siefert, 'Phänomen versus System', pp. 11-12, 31.

77. In a review of the *Aesthetics*, Christian Hermann Weisse addresses the fact that Hegel built into his lectures a very wooden representation of dialectic, one making the system of his aesthetics unsystematic. Weisse is in any event completely unaware that his criticism applies to Hotho, not to Hegel. See *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst. Kritiken, Charakteristiken, Correspondenzen, Übersichten*, nos. 210-15 (September 1838).

In the lectures on the *Encyclopedia* mentioned by Mundt, as in the 1817 published version and likewise in the revised edition of 1827 and the final one of 1830, Hegel develops the systematic foundation of the philosophy of art. In the aesthetics lectures he forgoes that direct approach for good reason, favoring instead a 'thematic' presentation.

In the first edition of the *Encyclopedia* (1817) Hegel already establishes the systematic locus of art, and with it the role of aesthetics in his system of philosophy. In doing so he finally consolidates the development of a conception for which he had already laid the foundation independently in his critiques of religion in the *Early Theological Writings*. He introduces the basic framework of aesthetics by linking an idea of beauty, conceived Platonically, with the thesis of the so-called 'System-Program', by grasping rational ideas simply 'aesthetically and mythologically', therefore only in the concrete form of their historical actuality and efficacy as such. In this symbiotic relationship of beauty as idea with the inevitable historical concretization of the idea, as well as with the attendant variance in how beauty as idea is grasped, Hegel in fact establishes the conception of the 'work', a conception that, ever since his Jena period, becomes decisive for further steps in the development of the aesthetics. Via his new version of systematic philosophy in the discussion with Schelling, the function of the idea of the beautiful in the philosophical task of 'unifying' the antitheses of finite reflection changes, and with this the significance of art changes too. Hegel now grants to art only a restricted possibility of mediating truth, namely, mediating a merely historical *being-conscious* of truth, not mediating the ultimately valid, explicit foundation of truth. The 'intuition of the self-shaping or the objectively self-discovering absolute', as Hegel defines it in the *Differenzschrift*, and not only in the 1817 *Encyclopedia*, as the first stage of absolute spirit, nevertheless becomes conclusively and definitively established as surpassable. In the lectures on aesthetics Hegel once again examines intuition, in its specific operational sense for the definition of art as a 'work', for its possibility of historically mediating truth. In individual cases this examination leads to differentiating intuition as a being-conscious of truth in the 'ideal', as the idea present 'aesthetically and mythologically'.

At the beginning of his lectures Hegel points out that he does not start systematically but instead—as the matter can best be described—phenomenologically. In the course of his reflections on the phenomena and his various interpretations, philosophical as well as art-theoretical, he seeks to gain a concept of art and, in doing so, at the same time to establish the 'domain' of aesthetics as what, without further grounding, he counts as the 'realm of the beautiful'; he also seeks to establish the way to develop this

domain in thought. Elsewhere he has done this 'systematically', and so at the beginning of the lectures he uses this term 'systematic' from time to time for what is, at least provisionally, a definite decision regarding the status of the beautiful, and its historical and living effect in art, within the system of absolute knowledge. Hegel established or modified this systematic conception before his first lectures on aesthetics in Heidelberg (that is, in the 1817 *Encyclopedia*) as well as while his Berlin lectures on aesthetics were, so to speak, under way, and also in the revised 1827 and 1830 editions of the *Encyclopedia*, prior to the cessation of this labor brought about by his death.

Already in 1817 Hegel defined art as the first stage of absolute knowledge—defining the 'work' as the manifestation of a people's ethical life and thus as the manifestation of historical spirit or, in Hegel's terms, of 'objective spirit'. Here objective spirit, the work of art as the specific mode of the presence of ethical life within a people, appears of course from a new angle, but, just as before, in such a way that art has value as the result of the human spirit's activity in confirmation of itself and of nature. In the philosophical system too he understands art as the consummation of ethical life in the unity of a spirit that is overarching and at the same time real. The 'identical and concrete essence of nature and of spirit' realizes itself in the beautiful figure (1817 *Encyclopedia*, § 457), realizes itself as 'God', as the power that founds, directs, and legitimates ethical life. Except that this reality of spirit is not grasped as a mere historical consciousness, for instead, in the context of the *Encyclopedia's* portrayal of 'absolute spirit,' it appears reflected once again as self-knowing. Hegel calls the 'immediate shape' of this knowing the 'ideal', with the double meaning of 'intuition and representation of absolute spirit' (1817 *Encyclopedia*, § 456), in the way it realizes itself in the shape of the gods in the religion of art—in keeping with the view he held since completing the *Phenomenology*. As Hegel already puts it in the Nuremberg sketch on 'Propaedeutic', the idea, developed in explicit philosophical terms, is juxtaposed to the 'ideal' as 'life'. What earlier reflections ascribed to the idea of the beautiful, to the integration of knowing into life, now comes under the province of philosophy. Beauty is considered to be the idea according to the aspect of existence, and of course sensuously intuited existence. As Hegel constantly repeats in the lectures, as ideal, beauty is 'the concrete being or existence' of the idea.

What follows from this for Hegel is a finitude of the ideal, substantiated in two ways. As a beautiful shape, the work of art formally accomplishes the 'penetration of intuition, or of the image, by thought' (1817 *Encyclopedia*, § 460) although, because at the same time it has the material element attached to it, this beautiful shape remains something 'formal' and is not the ultimately valid, conclusive mode of the givenness of historical truth.

That is why the work of art can actualize its content—the divine as the truth of subjective and objective spirit in the particularity of the people's spirit at a given time—always just in intuitive-finite fashion. Hegel illustrates this point in the lectures on aesthetics by the beautiful shape of the Greek gods. The second reason for the finitude of the ideal rests on the subjective producing of art, which, as self-divesting activity, leads to a new immediacy, that of the work. In the work, however, subjective immediacy takes the shape of the universality of a simple, immediate intuition,—in Hegel's conceptual terms, the shape of the 'substance of the subject' (1817 *Encyclopedia*, § 462). Artistic production appears as 'substantial production' (§ 472), and as a beautiful shape it cannot redeem its implicit claim to truth. As the aesthetics then explicitly states, the beautiful shape remains a phenomenon to which philosophical reflection makes reference.

In the second edition of the *Encyclopedia* Hegel enlarges on the consequences of the finitude of the ideal, to the effect that art becomes 'something merely-formal', not only because of its de facto, historical character but also with reference to the ideal. Hegel then carries this thinking further in the philosophy of right as well as in the aesthetics, by once again establishing the role of art in the state.<sup>78</sup> Art leads beyond immediate intuition simply to certainty without the capability of making itself sure of such truth (1827 *Encyclopedia*, § 557). Also, the definition of artistic creation as 'substantial production' undergoes a further restriction when we reflect on the individuality of the artist. Although putting historical truth into the work, and letting the divine appear within the finite, as beauty, involves the activity of the 'genius', this takes place in and via 'inspiration'. However, inspiration remains ambiguous, both spiritually and also as 'unfree emotion'. In such an arrangement art's content can be affected not only by the form of the 'substantial production' but, over and above that, also by the subjective-individual realization of this production, which, in addition, stands juxtaposed to the universal mediation. For Hegel, in the course of art's historical development the artist comes to be 'master' of the god, not the god's servant, and the beautiful work remains a sensible-external thing, prepared with 'technical understanding' (1827 *Encyclopedia*, § 560).

Art necessarily points beyond itself in this way, to an ongoing, explicit, and unequivocal mediation of historical truth. While in the first edition of the *Encyclopedia* Hegel provides a transition from the religion of art to revealed religion, and from revealed religion to philosophy, in later

78. See Hegel: *Lectures on Natural Right*... § 158, pp. 294–6.

reflections he sets forth more specific features of this transition, ones he fills out in the aesthetics by defining the three art forms (symbolic, classical, and romantic) historically and structurally. The religious-cultic framework within which the work stands a priori, in virtue of its specific mythological content, does indeed ask too much from what art can deliver, more precisely, from the capacity of the intuition as a mediation of truth. In virtue of the mythological content, which the beautiful figure, as merely natural, cannot yet adequately represent, and which in any case, in the Christian version, the beautiful figure as human-historical can no longer adequately represent, religion is on the one hand situated as 'a past condition lying behind beautiful art', and on the other hand it goes above and beyond art.

This point is evident in both the lectures on aesthetics and the later editions of the *Encyclopedia*, in establishing the symbolic art form, which, as art of the sublime, does not yet make possible a configuration commensurate with the idea. In this case the religious representation has not yet achieved adequate expression by means of art. In the revealed faith of the Christian religion, religion as 'future' (1827 *Encyclopedia*, § 563) goes beyond art, that is, the religious representation has the force of consistently displacing and dissolving the truth claims of art. In the aesthetics Hegel demonstrates this point in detail in the treatment of Christian art in the romantic art form, and draws the conclusion that, following upon the symbiotic relation of art and religion in the case of the Christian religion, the way is prepared for the separation of art from religion, not the separation of art from mythology. Now the 'Humanus', every just-conceivable variety of human cultural self-actualization, will become the 'new Holy One' of art. But because of the multiplicity of possibilities, art necessitates reflection. As Hegel explains in characterizing the classical art form, only the Greek religion of art succeeds in achieving, in the figure of plastic art, what is seminal for all art, that 'beautiful union' of finite and infinite. The unity of poetry and politics, called for programmatically in the 'System-Program', is realized solely in the historical epoch of the Hellenic religion of art. The exemplary function of this past form of human historical actualization, through and by means of the work of art, Hegel can keep intact for the modern world solely as a formal structure but not with respect to its content. The Greek polis alone is 'work' in the double sense that it was founded on art and achieved itself through art, and at the same it was shaped structurally as a work of art. A repetition of this original status is no longer possible in the modern world, and to this extent Hegel agrees with Schiller. For this reason too Hegel calls for the disengagement of the idea of the beautiful

from the idea of the state, in the case of the epochs before and after that of Greek art.

So his contention, that for the modern world art in its highest possibility is something past, becomes understandable, that is, past as art producing the mediation of historical truth from its own impetus, from its own sense of accomplishment. The characterization of the ideal and of its differentiation in the structurally different modes of delivery in the work of art, the characterization of the three art forms, then rests on this basis. So, on the one hand Hegel can lay claim to have given aesthetics a systematic foundation but, on the other hand, in this foundation to have left open for his lectures on aesthetics the possibility not only of testing in individual cases the structural, initial assumptions of the *Encyclopedia*, but also of making further differentiations.<sup>79</sup>

Hegel's labor on the system of philosophy in the *Encyclopedia*, together with the discussion of the form of cultural-historical consciousness that he sees present in the work of art, in the historical vitality of the idea, gets reflected in the development of the lectures on the philosophy of art. Whereas the two Berlin lecture series of 1820–1 and 1823 remain close to the original conception of the 1817 *Encyclopedia*, the 1826 lectures exhibit clear traces of a 'fermentation' of the systematic perspective that leads to the revised edition of the *Encyclopedia*.<sup>80</sup> Reciprocally, work on the *Encyclopedia* leaves in its wake traces in Hegel's final lecture series on aesthetics.

In the first lecture series (1820–1), after an introduction presenting the outline of the whole, the General Part contains the description of the beautiful as such or the idea of the beautiful, which Hegel carries over into

79. The characterization of intuition as Hegel presents it in treating painting becomes especially interesting at this point. Intuiting is not just mediating truth insufficiently, and not in the full sense of philosophical lucidity; instead intuition itself seems to be more or less capable of this mediation within the various arts. 'Intuition' in art is based on the capacity for a distinctively developed sensibility, and, beyond beholding nature, it approaches the construction of the given space through the play of colors, and the resolution of the play of colors constitutive of space, by the principle of imitation (the 'musicality' of color', as Hegel defines it) of reflective sensibility, initially that of musical tonality, and then of the word as the medium of poetry. According to Hegel, in art intuition does not remain mere sensible intuition but instead, over and above the artistic design of the beautiful figure, it is always a mediation between the sensible and the spiritual. See Gethmann-Siebert, 'Phänomenon versus System', pp. 24 ff.

80. In Hotho's transcript of 1823 there are already evident unmistakable traces of a refinement along the lines of the later *Encyclopedia* edition, traces that escaped Hotho's attention presumably owing to his affinity for the romantic body of thought, traces he at least no longer took into consideration in his editing of the *Aesthetics*. See Gethmann-Siebert, 'Die Rolle der Kunst im Staat. Kontroversen zwischen Hegel und den Hegelianern,' in *Welt und Wirkung von Hegel's Ästhetik*, pp. 295 ff.

a characterization of the ideal. Since for him the ideal is the 'determinate being, or existence,' of the idea, he already ties in here a journey through the world of the arts, that is, he sheds light on the historical operation of the ideal in a series of art works taken to be exemplary. This sequence passes over organically into specifying the three forms of art, the symbolic, classical, and romantic art forms. In his treatment Hegel allocates approximately equal space to each of the three forms, a feature that he alters in the later lectures. The Particular Part treats the various arts as forms realizing the structural determinacy that Hegel had previously construed according to the relationship of the beautiful or sublime figure to its historically and epochally variable content. This part also involves what Hegel calls 'the existing work of art' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 190, p. 355 in this text). The characteristic feature in this treatment of the Particular Part is Hegel's investigation, in a distinctive fashion, into how art, as an accomplished 'work', achieves a historically specific cultural function, in varieties specifiable in historical terms and according to 'individual peoples'. He is often criticized for the fact that he assigns architecture to the symbolic art form, sculpture to the classical form, and so forth. But we should not understand this as Hegel simply carrying his systematics, developed in the General Part, over to the world of the arts; instead we should understand it as the description of a specific art's function complying more or less precisely with its structural description. It is of course self-evident that in various cultures other arts co-exist with the specific art works that are the predominant ones. The role of art in a specific culture, namely, in a specific religion and type of state, is, in Hegel's view, simply determined in advance structurally by one or another of the arts. So, separating out the roles of architecture, sculpture, painting, and poetry, as we see them systematically prefigured, appears upon closer examination to be Hegel's reflective attempt to introduce historical descriptions of art's surroundings, that is, descriptions of the culture as well as of the sphere of influence of the works themselves.

Hegel ultimately takes this into account in the 1828-9 lectures when, for treating the world of the arts, he separates out from the General Part and the Particular Part a third or Individual Part. In doing so he gives the treatment of the art forms the character of a preliminary structural examination, and he sets the examples apart from it much more so than in the preceding lecture series. In the 1826 lectures Hegel already made a separation, more clearly than in 1823, between a first and a second section of the General Part, a separation in which the second section contains the various art forms. As the 1828-9 transcripts describe it, he then locates these art forms under the heading of the Particular Part, which previously had been reserved for the



characterization of the arts. As explained in the Preface to the *Aesthetics*, Hotho sees this simply as expressing a concession to pedagogy. In the evolving lectures on the philosophy of art, the modification of the organization appears to be a further development organically, one having sprung from consideration of the historical phenomenon. The 1826 lectures already prepared extensively for this renewed testing of the systematic concept in the historical characterization of the arts, in their role in the forms of culture analyzed concurrently. In his final lecture series Hegel draws upon the systematic conclusions definitively established in the 1827 *Encyclopedia*, together with a reweighting of the lectures in favor of detailed consideration of the historical influence of the arts. The characterization of the 'ideal' as the 'determinate being' or 'existence' of the idea persists.<sup>81</sup> This characterization outlines, in the three art forms, the framework of the ideal that inevitably varies by culture—the configuration of spirit in humanity's development. By this means Hegel succeeds in arranging, in a third or Individual Part, the possibilities or features of the 'existing ideal', namely, the art forms in their historical efficacy; that is, by his characterizing the examples from the arts as complex cultural events, and not simply judging them as, and condemning them to be, 'aesthetic' in the narrower sense.

Hegel prepares for these modifications in an interesting way in the structure of the 1826 lectures, because in these lectures he already quite decidedly varies individual aspects of his characterizations. He presents the symbolic art form in particular, but also the romantic art form too, with considerably greater differentiation.<sup>82</sup> Changes in the structure of the symbolic art form are of interest not only in light of the fact that Hegel considerably expands his information on the Oriental world, as the Berlin lectures on the philosophy of religion especially show, but also above all because he consciously stresses an examination of his thesis of the past character of art. So, as one example, after characterizing the symbolic art form, he discusses the possibility of a recapitulation of this specific art form, that is, of its consummating

81. This point is already emphasized in Lasson's critical examination of a few sources, in his *Die Idee und das Ideal*. Researchers pay scant attention to Lasson's remarks because, with unshakable confidence in the authenticity of the published text of the *Aesthetics*, people are unable or unwilling to part company with its own oft-cited definition. Within the framework of the 1976 Hegel Colloquium, Lu de Vos (of the Catholic University, Louvain) developed a presentation of the new conception of the 'ideal' as characterized in the Berlin lectures, with the help of the sources critically examined by Lasson. The suppositions of de Vos are confirmed by information from the newly-discovered source materials.

82. For a precise description of the development of the symbolic art form, see J.-I. Kwon, 'Die Metamorphosen der "symbolischen Kunstform"'.

a world primarily bound up with the Oriental world, under the conditions of the modern world. Another example is that, in characterizing drama via a description of opera (and likewise in the course of discussing the poetic adaptation of Greek drama) he discusses the possibility of letting art from the past that is alien and different, not just individually but also structurally, become living once again under present-day circumstances. Presumably this reflection is linked to posing an issue Hegel must have been aware of from Schiller interpretation, the issue of the significance of historical material for contemporary poetry. Hegel poses this issue in a way fundamentally similar to how Schiller does it, in stressing that what must be represented as having such relevance is not only the poetry by itself but also at the same time its historical setting. For example, if poetic mediation of what is alien were to succeed, then the total 'world of Oriental poetry' would have to be mediated poetically. Through poetry the truly ethical pathos of Greek tragedy could likewise have become living once more, could have become effective for the present day. In 1826 Hegel presents Goethe's *Divan of West and East* as an outstanding, poetically successful, example of such mediation, within his own culture, of what is alien, a mediation that positively sets itself apart from all the other attempts to let the 'light from the Orient' appear once again in the present.<sup>83</sup> In any event Hegel singles out Goethe's efforts from among the poetic adaptations of Greek drama, because Goethe succeeds in transforming the Greek divine pathos into powers of the soul, that is, he succeeds in mediating, in beautiful form, the objective ethical life of Greek tragedy with the particularity of the romantic art form, with subjective inwardness. In complementary fashion Schiller succeeds in allowing 'genuine pathos' to achieve verbal expression in modern drama, although the beautiful form gets lost, for it must give way to sublimity.

Evident in such examples, ones to be analyzed still more closely in comparison with the 1835 *Aesthetics*, is how Hegel places the emphasis in his reorganization. He re-examines the symbolic and romantic art forms, which call into question the realization of the 'ideal', as to whether, and to what extent, these forms are still capable of providing, in historical works of art, that comprehensive human orientation that Hegel sees realized in the Greek polis as a work of art. The constraints that necessitate Hegel's holding

83. 'Light from the Orient' was the title of an anthology to which Goethe was a major contributor. See also publications, known to Hegel, by Heinrich Stieglitz: 'Brahma spricht, Sinesischer Poetenklub, Indischer Affendienst'. (See also W. Bonsiepen, 'Altpersische Lichtreligion und neupersische Poesie', in *Hegel in Berlin*, ed. Otto Pöggeler (Berlin, 1984), pp. 196 ff., esp. p. 200.)

fast to the thesis of art's character as something past are not aesthetic constraints but instead are structural and historical, as can be shown from their more specific features.

Based on this re-examination, Hegel draws out its consequences not only in the reworking of the *Encyclopedia* but also in his final lecture series in winter 1828–9. In the lectures he separates the treatments of the ideal and the forms of art into a first and a second part. Once again, after a comprehensive overview as an introduction, the General Part contains a relatively brief presentation of the vitality of the idea—and with it the most sweeping characterization of the ideal. A second part is occupied in great detail with 'particular art forms', the characterization of classical art being more concise than in the other lecture series, and the symbolic and romantic art forms presented in more detail. In the third part Hegel then investigates the 'particular configurations of the work of art' (as Libelt records it in his transcript), or the 'individuality of the arts' (as in the transmission by Heimann).

An interesting indication of the 1827 *Encyclopedia's* influence is the fact that in these 1828–9 lectures, after characterizing the symbolic art form, Hegel withdraws the possibility he introduced in 1826 when he ventured the view that a recurrence of the symbolic art form on the soil of modernity could be entertained. Consequently, in the third part he treats Goethe's writings solely as poetically successful literature. Unlike the 1826 lectures, the decision here seems to be that such revivals of 'historical materials', likewise the poetry of past times, can and should claim only 'partial' relevance. Nevertheless Hegel sticks to his principal method of evaluation. Works of art are to be judged by their historical and ethical relevance for specific epochs and cultures, not according to their purely aesthetic quality and so according to beauty or ugliness or other singular perspectives of aesthetic science. With the aid of examples, Hegel's way of judging allows for very precise investigation, but it runs counter to the way in which the descriptions of art are situated and emphasized in the published *Aesthetics*.

In the lectures on aesthetics it is therefore evident too that Hegel continued to work based on the foundation modified in preparing the second edition of his *Encyclopedia*. Not only are its paragraphs corresponding to the chapter on absolute spirit essentially expanded; the 'thesis of the end of art', or of the past character of art, refined as much as possible, bears fruit for the structure and content of the lectures on aesthetics. However, in the *Aesthetics* Hotho gives credence in Hegel's name to precisely the opposite, by continually honoring, above all other art, the beautiful art that has grand content (for Hotho the romantic, this is Christian religious content). When

we examine the thesis of the past character of art, a thesis Hegel himself explores while providing a more discriminating characterization of all the art forms—symbolic, classical, and romantic—and a thesis that might be verified or falsified by suitable examples, we are led to different results. The sources for his Berlin lectures on aesthetics provide clear information about this. In fact, in his philosophical characterization Hegel always takes up the issue of cultural relevance, not the issue of the aesthetic value of beautiful art and art that is not beautiful.

In this regard, in the material explication in the revised version of the *Encyclopedia* (albeit in the direction his aesthetics took after engaging with Schiller, Hölderlin, and especially Schelling), Hegel emphasizes that in modern culture art is suited to have merely partial significance. Art becomes displaced culturally by other modifications of consciousness (by religion, by institutionalized ethical life in the modern state, and ultimately by philosophy). In the 1826 lectures on aesthetics Hegel prepares the way for this differentiation, although clearly in the course of the lectures themselves he still does not put it as sharply as the *Encyclopedia* does. The basis for this is obvious: Hegel takes these lectures as the occasion for examining once again, with regard to the troublesome points of his own thesis of the 'past character' of art, just how convincing his own assumptions are. The final lectures of 1828–9 show the result of this examination. The transcripts of these lectures record faithfully the sense of his reflections in the 1827 revised *Encyclopedia*. So, to begin these final lectures on the philosophy of art Hegel must have carried forward the systematic variations that he developed in the 1827 *Encyclopedia*. Hence he can rightly say that in the lectures he does not expressly substantiate the systematic basis for aesthetics. In fact he presupposes it in what for him turns out to be the final version of the lectures.

The enduring foundation for the structure of the lectures on aesthetics becomes apparent in this way, in company with the modifications in how they mediate this structure. Hegel characterizes art from the perspective of its structure and the history of spirit. That is, philosophical aesthetics characterizes the function and role of art in the historical culture of humanity. He retains this perspective in all the lecture series, just as he does the issue as to whether, and to what extent, this role of art within the state lends itself to distinctions with respect to various epochs and cultures. By presupposing this foundation we gain, from the developmental history of Hegel's thought, a plausible conception retained in all the lecture series throughout their alterations of the presentation. Seen against the background of the history of spirit, more specifically the cultural and philosophical characterization of art, the variations appear to meet the 'phenomenological obligation' of

achieving a systematic structuring of the historical phenomenon itself. The concept of art cannot be constructed prior to, and apart from, looking at art's history; it cannot just be superimposed on the changing reality. Hence the modifications in the structure and execution of Hegel's lectures may count as further evidence for the more concise version of a basic intention that, before launching into the Berlin lectures, Hegel had already established when he characterized the ideal, an intention he explicated more fully in these lectures. Characterizing art involves adequately grasping the 'vitality' of the rational idea, its express and mythological presence in the work of art, without allowing the idea to ossify within the concept because of the system of philosophical thinking.

Already apparent in the structural changes of the lecture series is a tendency toward increasing occupation with art, and we lose sight of that in today's definitive text of the three-volume *Aesthetics*. It is uncontested in Hegel interpretation that Hegel devoted himself ever more extensively to the arts. In this we see the relevance of the *Aesthetics*, for this feature is documented in the turn to the phenomenon, at least in the intention of overcoming the dogmatism of absolute knowing for the sake of the historical appearance of the beautiful in art. Seen against the background of this interpretation, publication of the 1823 transcript, to which Hotho certainly referred in editing the aesthetics volumes, may also then support the 'current importance' of Hegel's aesthetics. This hope has always buoyed up philological and philosophical interest in the sources for Hegel's lectures. On this assumption, we can say that in his lectures Hegel leaped over the boundaries of his philosophical system; in his philosophical aesthetics he proved to be truly the consummate phenomenologist, representing 'his own time' and, in doing so, 'grasping in thought' the decisive elements of the culture. Viewed in this way, the last two lecture series, rich in materials, appear to be particularly interesting and significant, because in them a phenomenological Hegel in the true sense of the term, one who grasps the history of the arts, seems to win out over the systematizer. In any event, hope for liberation from the dogmatic system of absolute spirit proves to be deceptive if we adopt the *Encyclopedia*—as Hegel intended it—as the systematic foundation of the aesthetics. From this perspective, then, the significance of various transcripts as basis for the actual import of the aesthetics is, upon closer examination, reversed. The early lecture series, which presuppose the systematic framework of the 1817 *Encyclopedia*, and perhaps also the later lectures of 1826, considered apart from the later edition of the *Encyclopedia* in 1827, could, if need be, have supported the assumption that Hegel turned away from the system and to the historical phenomenon. With the last

lecture series Hegel makes it known unequivocally that he not only has a system of aesthetics but also takes it into consideration in his lectures. The lecture transcripts clearly reproduce the systematic backing of the *Encyclopedia*. Nevertheless, neither the reproach of dogmatism nor the suspicion of classicism can be adduced against the arguments laid out there.

Hegel in fact reflects more intensively on the arts at the very place where he presses on to spell out in its finally valid form his thesis of the past character of art. The *Encyclopedia* revision precedes a comprehensive and deliberate process of examination in the lectures on aesthetics. The reorganization of the 1828–9 lectures is substantially prepared for already in 1826: the systematic outline gains specificity, and demonstrating its coherence clearly to the students becomes more pressing. As a result of this systematic progress, the last lecture series contains at the same time both the *Encyclopedia* edition's thesis of the past character of art and the height of reflection on the phenomenon itself. Hegel's aesthetics or philosophy of art in fact always gains its specific character, but now decisively exemplified, from constructively conjoining systematic and phenomenological-historical interests. With its systematically refined introduction, together with its concurrent accentuation of the phenomenon in the third or Individual Part on the arts, the *Aesthetics* edition appears to be phenomenology of art. Yet philosophical reflection that 'grasps art in thought', taken together with the conceptual tools for understanding the arts, frees one to look at the subject matter itself, at the arts within the framework of historical culture as such. Hegel describes the historical phenomena—the arts and their historical development as well as their cultural significance—in a rigorous procedure of philosophical investigation, one guided by a systematic foundation; that is, he expounds and justifies the arts as historical experience of truth.

As we learn from the sources for Hegel's Berlin lectures, we may presume that Hegel not only developed a 'system' of aesthetics but also introduced it into the lectures in the way typically used for 'thematic' pedagogy. That is clearly evident in the modification of the systematic weight given to art in revising the *Encyclopedia*. This in fact leads to a constructive reorientation of the analysis of art and the arts according to the history of spirit, in particular to a post-1826 analysis of the thesis of art's character as past, an analysis updated, more discerning, and tested in the phenomena. In the course of refining his systematic structure Hegel clearly paid less attention to characterizing the classical art form, something that should at least have encouraged skepticism with respect to the 'reproach of classicism', if not already counting as a first refutation of this criticism.

Unlike what Hegel does in the lectures, Hotho, in introducing his edition of the *Aesthetics*, stresses that the lectures themselves do not provide a Hegelian system of aesthetics; that such a system had to be developed for the first time with his own edition of the lectures, and had to be integrated into the texts. The result of this editorial procedure, and a further problem of the 1835 *Aesthetics*, is the incompatibility of the different systematic views of Hegel and of the editor of his *Aesthetics* respectively. The systematic discussion of aesthetics that Hegel sets forth within the framework of the *Encyclopedia*, in the pertinent paragraphs treating absolute spirit, motivates Hotho's interest in a reflective aesthetics from Hegel capable of rivaling the aesthetics of Schelling and that of Solger. Thus Hotho integrates into the *Aesthetics* a systematic foundation that fits in with his own 'speculative, art-historical' codification of aesthetic judgment, one making it possible, based on dialectical thinking, to develop a cultural-political and aesthetic evaluation of individual works of art with regard to their acceptability in the modern state. On closer examination, Hotho's contention in the Preface, that his own interventions in the *Aesthetics* are confined to integrating into the text a systematics faithful to Hegel, proves from the outset to be incorrect. Accordingly, the authenticity of the entire transmission of Hegel's philosophy of art is at stake. That is because, in virtue of the system Hotho integrated into it after the fact, Hegel's *Aesthetics* gets completed as a speculative aesthetics in which, through the structural description of the function of art, philosophy has become the definitive arbiter of what is art and what is not art. The specific shape of the phenomenology of art Hegel developed in the lectures, in conjunction with his systematic discussion of art in the *Encyclopedia*, becomes, in Hotho's editing of the *Aesthetics*, just as unrecognizable as are Hegel's explanations closely connected materially with this reasoning and its method, which are reflections on the cultural-historical function of art.

This explosive point naturally shows, above all, that the thesis of the end of art within the framework of Hegel's, as well as Hotho's, systematic aesthetics has to be revised. This thesis clearly results from Hegel's characterization of art according to the history of spirit, therefore from *his* system of aesthetics; however, it does not, as the published version of the *Aesthetics* suggests, clearly lead to a classicism linked with it, to a pronounced and preeminent interest in beautiful art. Both the *Encyclopedia* and the various lecture series on the philosophy of art show that structurally distinguishing art's function as it varies across different cultures is the foundation of this thesis. Hegel goes on to say that in human culture art has a key function, that it cannot be only one phenomenon alongside others; instead, as reflective

form of the given, art must be the mirror of the culture and at the same time its promoter. In and through art a cultural community strives for its conscious identity, finding or thematizing this identity by manifold possible forms of self-realization and world-realization. The thesis of the 'end' of art or, better put, of the 'past character of art with respect to its greatest possibility', is therefore understandable only within a framework characterizing the forms of art, consequently within the framework of the specifically philosophical structuring of art's historical function.

The same point holds for the 'classicism' of aesthetics.<sup>84</sup> This 'classicism' in fact forms the premise for the thesis of the past character of art, although not in the aesthetic sense that Hotho inserts into the *Aesthetics*, which implies that the Greek classical period, in its works of beautiful art, provides the standard for all subsequent art. Antiquity, and with it the classical art form, gains the key position for Hegel's history-of-spirit characterization of art because he views Greek civilization as a culture founded upon art. In antiquity the artists gave a people its gods, along with its ethical life as well as the forms for institutionalizing it. In this epoch culture does not embrace art as one among several essential elements; instead the culture as a whole is a 'work of art'.<sup>85</sup> In fact, through a cultural analysis of the history of spirit Hegel acquired his concept of the work of art as being a result of human activity, a result at once an outgrowth or manifestation of the historical consciousness at that time and a mirror of it. For that reason the character of the work of art can be made understandable structurally, from its orientation to a specific epoch and culture. However, art is not fixed in terms of aesthetic content by being oriented to the classical-Greek ideal; it does not become 'classical'. That is because the function of art in history—in the way Hegel defined it—forms the plumbline for reflections on the variations in such historical-cultural significance, but it by no means forms the standard for 'aesthetic' value judgments.

84. On this issue, see Gethmann-Siebert, 'Vergessene Dimensionen des Utopiebegriffs. Der "Klassizismus" der idealistischen Ästhetik und die gesellschaftskritische Funktion des "schönen Scheins"', *Hegel-Studien* (1982), 17:119 ff.

85. Hegel develops this point in connection with the Jena philosophy of spirit, in 1805–6. In 'ancient times everyone routinely participated in the *beautiful* public life—beauty is the immediate unity of the universal and the singular, is an art work in which no part separates itself from the whole, but instead there is this brilliant unity of the self-knowing self and its portrayal' (GW 8:263). Otto Pöggeler presents an overview of the development of the conception of aesthetics during the Jena period, a conception introduced by the collaboration between Hegel and Schelling. See his 'Die Entstehung von Hegels Ästhetik in Jena', in *Hegel in Jena*, pp. 249 ff.



From his earliest philosophical writings, right up to the Berlin lectures on aesthetics, Hegel develops the structural characterization of art from its cultural function (specifically, the founding of a people's ethical life or the constituting of its historical culture) hand in hand with the gradual elaboration of his philosophical system. Whereas he mainly ascribes the same relevance to the art that has the same structural function in each historical culture, in his Jena writings and reflections he differentiates these structurally identical functions with respect to different historical contexts. In this way the thesis of the end of art is not the result of a dogmatic system, as people commonly maintain, for instead spelling out art's external differences, in a cultural and historical reflection, has a converse catalytic effect on the configuration of the system. Nor is 'classicism' specific to the thesis and foundational for it, which would be a consequence of dogmatically tying the future of art and of the arts down to a (consummately beautiful) past. In fact Hegel takes for his model and standard not *works of art* but instead a *function of art* within the culture, a function that, in its modifications and variations, he defines in structurally different ways for distinct cultures. A closer look at how Hegel sets forth, and explicates, the reciprocal conditioning of phenomenon and system, of the historical appearance of art and its philosophical elucidation, sheds light on both 'work' and 'function'. That art attains its highest possibility in a specific culture, that there 'cannot be, or come to be' anything 'more beautiful' than the Greek images of the gods, as Hegel supposes, does not strictly mean that, alongside classical beauty, all else must sink to the level of non-art, inasmuch as this beautiful figure cannot be equaled. The ultimate proof that this is a coherent dismantling of the two 'basic errors' of Hegel's aesthetics can be gained by looking at the descriptions of the arts and of individual works of art.

Looking at the world of examples in the aesthetics uncovers a different and certainly authentic train of thought, one pervading the lectures and differing from the arguments in the published text that impose uniformity on the various lecture series. Hence with these examples too, drawn from both the conceptual-structural characterization of art and the assessment of individual arts and works of art, we can clearly demonstrate the unfortunate consequences of the 'systematic deception' in the editing of the published version of the *Aesthetics*. Before we can discuss more carefully this result, as well as examining it in a few individual examples, we must first analyze a further systematic and introductory presupposition of the aesthetics, one in which Hegel establishes the implementation of systematically-oriented reflection by methodically taking hold of the whole as well as of the details. It is the characterization of the 'ideal'. This too, and the 'logic' of the

aesthetics coupled with it, appear in a new light from a comparison of the published version with the lectures.

### B. THE 'IDEAL' AND THE FORMS OF ART

At the beginning of Hotho's transcript of 1823 we find the feature of the aesthetics' argumentation that later presumably motivated Hotho, in preparing the published edition of the *Aesthetics*, to suppose that Hegel had not developed a system for his aesthetics. At this point Hegel describes his own procedure as one of beginning directly with the phenomenon: for that reason he cannot commence the aesthetics with a construct of its 'origin within the concept'. 'Our intention cannot be to carry out this proof, to construct its origin within the concept, for that takes place in an antecedent part of philosophy. Here, where we separate out this science, we begin directly; we do not have it as a result because we do not take into account what precedes it. That is why we begin directly, and initially we have nothing but the representation that there are works of art' (Hotho 1823, Ms. 6-7; p. 187 in this text). Unlike Hegel, Hotho defines this as a 'merely thematic' opening to which he denies systematic relevance.

Hegel commences his lectures on the philosophy of art in his typical fashion, with a determination of its object, the realm of what is beautiful, or the field of art. However, variations among the lecture series are already evident in the further course of this wide-ranging part that he formulated in advance, variations that Hegel obviously introduced in reacting to his audience, and they involve expansion of parts that he discovered needed elucidation. So, from one year to another he places the main emphasis differently in this best-formulated part of the aesthetics.<sup>86</sup>

86. To all appearances Hegel prepared ahead of time the basic, introductory parts of his lectures in particular and even formulated them extensively. The few parts discovered from his notebook confirm this. Whereas the later sections are documented by fragments in the *Aesthetics*, often found as just bits and pieces, sentence fragments, and individual abbreviations on pieces of paper, there is at least one attestation to such a conclusively-formulated part. (On the features of this fragment of the aesthetics, see Lucia Sziborski, 'Hegel über die Objektivität des Kunstwerks', pp. 9 ff.) Nevertheless, comparison of the various lecture series beginnings available from the transcripts of the four Berlin series shows that Hegel introduced variations in them too. We find this substantial variation of the nevertheless precise advance preparation of the initial lectures in the case of lectures on other topics as well, for instance in the *History of Philosophy*, for which Hegel worked out anew and fully, in a manuscript too, the beginning of its last lecture series. (See also n. 71 above.)

Two extant transcripts, (*Ascheberg* 1820–1) and (*Hotho* 1823), document in exemplary fashion that in these lectures Hegel confined himself rather laconically to defining the domain of aesthetic objects as the beauty of art, as the realm of the beautiful, or just as the field of art. In 1820–1 he discusses a few aesthetic theories in this connection: the historical positions in philosophical aesthetics that lead to his own conception—those of Kant, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, and Tieck. In the 1823 lectures, prior to this historical survey, Hegel inserts a fuller discussion of the concept of appearance, and he seeks to provide an answer to the question as to whether the beautiful appearance could be deceiving and may be deceiving, if art is supposed to be worthy of philosophical treatment. We find comparable reflections already in the 1820–1 lectures, although there they turn up at a different place, namely, at the beginning of the General Part, in the more specific explanation of the significance of the idea of the beautiful. So, ostensibly Hegel seems to have brought these reflections to the fore in reaction to the discussion of his aesthetics among his students—possibly in order to avert the misunderstanding that the aesthetics is a less relevant part of his philosophy. In fact people might assume that the beautiful appearance, because it is a sensuous appearance, leads ineluctably to downgrading art to an element of (absolute) spirit that is of only limited interest, to downgrading the philosophy of art to a superfluous part of the system of philosophy, at best of limited relevance to it, and then the lectures on art would cease to be of philosophical interest.

In order to demonstrate the genuine philosophical relevance of taking up art, Hegel must produce a characterization of the beautiful and so its origins, its appearance—‘beauty comes from appearing’ (*Schön kommt von Schein*), as he defines it consistently. This characterization goes beyond the position of Schiller, which is oriented to Kant. Hegel refers to Schiller’s argument, borrowed from Kant, that the beautiful appearance is in a position to mediate truth rather than deception only if it achieves the renunciation of actuality (of reality). This argument ultimately serves Schiller in strictly separating the realm of beautiful appearance, of the aesthetic or ideal condition, from that of reality.<sup>87</sup> From the outset of his philosophical reflections Hegel opposed this separation of appearance from reality, of beauty from the concretely historical relevance of action. In the lectures on aesthetics he reiterates this early critique, by more precisely characterizing

87. See, above all, the reflections in the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford, 1967). Hegel had already examined these essays critically, prior to developing his philosophical system. He did so principally in the reflections and writings of his Frankfurt period, in discussion with Hölderlin.

the relationship of appearance to reality. At the same time, by his philosophical systematics he produces a rigorous argument for the relation of (beautiful) appearance to reality: in contrast to mere appearance, the beautiful is a form of absolute spirit, of spirit reflected within itself, not a form of spirit that is just conscious in an empirical sense.

In the lectures Hegel takes up the systematic verdict of the *Encyclopedia* in ever more explicit form, by placing the emphasis of his philosophy of art on going beyond Enlightenment aesthetics. He specifies his approach as concern with spiritually-produced artistic beauty rather than with the imitation of natural beauty. In both kinds, the beautiful appearance counts as capable of mediating truth, as 'reality of the idea', which finds its 'determinate being' (*Dasein*) in natural beauty, its 'existence' (*Existenz*) in the spiritual beauty of the human figure; and only explicit reference to the idea allows us to interpret the 'beautiful appearance' as capable of truth. These reflections, into which Hegel launches as early as the first Berlin lecture series, are found throughout all the lecture series; only he varies the basis for them, in the sense of going on to characterize appearance more precisely as the realm in between sensuous-empirical vividness and the manifestation of truth or the potency that Schelling ascribes to intuition as 'intellectual intuition'. Hegel consciously stays between these two extremes when, in a way typical for his aesthetics (developed in departing critically from Schelling), he links reality and idea: in the characterization of the ideal.<sup>88</sup>

In the first Berlin lectures on aesthetics (in an excursus characterizing the ideal as the beautiful whose form is the sensuous) Hegel already stresses this point: 'The term "beautiful" (*schön*) comes from "appearing" (*Scheinen*); that is, the concept comes to the appearing... being as appearance is set forth in the beautiful; for the concept pervades the externality, it appears. So the appearing stands higher than the being; for the essential nature first

88. At this point we can mention this-thought just briefly; however, it clearly forms the background for Hegel's later characterization of poetry. For instance, the characterization of the 'ideal' in 'The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate' (in the *Early Theological Writings*), and in Hegel's early engagement with Schiller, runs as a leitmotif throughout the development of his philosophical aesthetics. This leitmotif becomes decisive not just for the characterization of the 'ideal' as the vivid, concrete being or historical existence of the idea, in the double character of sheer receptivity and initial form of reflection; it also works itself out right in concrete individual instances. In a differentiation regarding the 'ideal', Hegel sets forth art's various forms of execution, mirrored in the characterization of the forms of art: identification with the intuition, reflection of the intuition, and also—as will be shown later—critical refraction of the intuition into form and content (such as identification with beauty of form in abstraction from trivial content, and so forth). For his more specific reasoning, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst*..., esp. pp. 142 ff., 256 ff., and 'Die geschichtliche Funktion der "Mythologie der Vernunft"...', pp. 226 ff.

gains a being through this emergence in the externality, that is, it appears; thus truth itself is this appearing.<sup>89</sup> These thoughts read like a summary reflection concerning Hegel's attempts, subsequent to the *Differenzschrift*, to assign to art its systematic-conceptual status as the phenomenon of beauty. In the subsequent lectures of 1823, obviously in responding to the need for more precise elucidation of these thoughts, Hegel separates and grounds the individual steps explicitly and more precisely at the outset by differentiating appearance as deception from the appearance in which truth becomes manifest and that is the 'essential element of essential being itself'. In contrast to empirical actuality, one can define appearance as deception (as did Kant, and Schiller with him). But Hegel stresses that what we 'let count as actuality is a more powerful deception, a more inauthentic appearance, than that of art'. From this perspective empirical life, the 'life manifesting itself to us', of course appears to be a reality, but it counts as reality relative to the 'world of deception'. In contrast, beautiful appearance (in art) counts as the 'world of truth'. So the beautiful appearance indeed falls short of the form of thought, and yet it is worthy of becoming the object of scientific, that is, philosophical, consideration in the proper sense; more precisely, it is worthy of being discussed as one of the other distinct modes of absolute spirit. In fact art 'in its appearing points, in virtue of itself, to something higher, to thought' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 3; p. 183 in this text); it portrays 'in a sensuous manner, what is itself higher' and brings it 'closer to sentient nature' (Ms. 4, p. 185 in this text). Already of interest here is the reasoning that leads to the 'past character of art with regard to its highest possibility' and at the same time to the characterization of the work. Hegel says that by means of fantasy—or, as he formulated it in the Jena period, as the 'inspired spirit' (GW 8:279)—art must 'bring to consciousness, in their authentic character, the highest needs of spirit...' (Ms. 5; p. 185 in this text). At this point Hegel directly appends the reflection that leads to forming the conception of the romantic art form, as his emphasis that what is sensuous is not always, and unconditionally, in a position to mediate the entire depth of spirit. That is why 'only a certain stage of truth is capable of being the content of art. For there is a more profound existence of the idea, one that the sensuous is no longer capable of expressing, and this is the content of our religion, our culture. Here art takes on a different shape than at earlier stages. And this more profound idea, the Christian idea in its highest stage, is not capable of being represented sensuously by art; that is because it is not

89. We find an identical etymology in Aloys Hirt, 'Versuch über das Kunstschöne,' in *Die Horen* (1797), year 3, part 7, pp. 5 ff.

sufficiently related and amenable to what is sensuous. So far as stages go, our world, our religion and our national culture, are to be expressed beyond art, as the highest stage, what is absolute. So the work of art cannot fulfill our ultimate, absolute need; we no longer pray to a work of art, and we have a more circumspect relationship to the work of art. For this very reason we also have a more specific need to reflect about the work of art' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 5; p. 185 in this text). As Hegel has shown elsewhere, and repeats here in the phenomenological and step-by-step discussion, art thus cannot be 'the highest expression of the idea' (Ms. 5; p. 186 in this text).

Paralleling the remarks in Hegel's initial explanation, as well as those in the fuller explication of this connection at the beginning of the General Part, Hotho's 1823 transcript also documents the fact that Hegel took up this conception of appearance once more, in connection with characterizing what is living. The sensuous element in the 'living thing', just like the sensuous element in what is beautiful, is to be characterized as spiritualized sensuousness. In this vein Hegel reiterates clearly, from the perspective of the aesthetics, his thought that the vitality of the idea manifests itself in what is beautiful.<sup>90</sup> The development of the conception of the beautiful in nature ties in organically with this reflection, just as does the reflection's carryover into a theory of what is truly beautiful in art, that is, into immediate connection with the idea. This thought too seems to have been set forth at first very tersely; it gets explicated more precisely in the further course of the lectures. Hotho puts the point simply: 'What we call nature, the external world, makes it harder for spirit to recognize itself' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 3; p. 183 in this text). In place of the succinct definition that one should proceed from artistic beauty as the higher beauty, not from the beauty of nature, Hegel introduces, right at the outset of the 1826 lectures, a broader, more diversified, argument as to why his lectures are dedicated to artistic beauty and accordingly to a superior beauty, namely, to a beauty that is authentic because it is spiritual beauty. The reflections that Hegel set forth at the beginning of the General Part in the first two lecture series, thus not in the Introduction but instead in connection with characterizing the idea of the beautiful as ideal, now shift in part to the start of the lectures and enlarge on what Hegel already sketched out briefly in 1820–1 and 1823. In 1823 he stated that art is, 'so to

90. The characterization of beauty as 'vitality of the idea' is found in the propaedeutic writings of the Nuremberg period. Hegel repeats it in the aesthetics, right up to the last lecture series: 'Life and what is beautiful are one and the same' is how it reads in Libelt's direct transcript (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 65). See also Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 264–5.

speak, something binding the spiritual to the sensuous'; for that reason 'the nations' have 'set down their highest representations' in art. We find this thought in fuller form at the outset of the 1826 lectures. Here too the individual testimonies naturally differ from one another in their exact wording, but not in their intellectual content. The trustworthy and precise 1826 transcript by von der Pfordten pulls this line of thought together concisely and in its essentials. At the same spot Griesheim reports a fuller clarification as to why what is artistically beautiful deserves a privileged position, but by using the same systematic argument: that artistic beauty is to be called a higher beauty because historical consciousness gives itself expression in it.

It is significant that, by referring back to this basic decision, Hegel can develop a characterization of the work of art, one he achieves in turn by specifying the beautiful—by characterizing the idea as ideal. This transition from the conception of what is 'living' to the characterization of the 'ideal', in the course of juxtaposing natural beauty to artistic beauty, is evident in Hotho's 1823 transcript (see *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 10–11, 71–2; pp. 192 and 248 in this text). From his baseline concerning artistic beauty, Hegel infers a distinctive feature of art that is essential for characterizing the ideal: 'Art accordingly has for its object the portrayal of the truth of the existent being that, insofar as it is commensurate with the concept, must be in such a way that it is in-and-for-itself. Therefore truth has to be other than mere accuracy, for instead what is external must harmonize with something inner that in itself is something true. This is the nature of the ideal as such' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 71–2; p. 248 in this text).

It is also evident here that Hegel makes connections with his deliberations in his own earlier systematic reflections. In the sketch of a system in the *Differenzschrift*, art already appears as the 'being' of the idea. This initial, and still hardly noticeable, departure from Schelling—in connection with characterizing the specific form of intuition pertaining to sensuousness, thus in the context of the concept of appearance—gains explosive force by the time Hegel spells out this concept materially in the lectures on aesthetics. He draws out the consequences that he established in expounding his system of philosophy, namely, in going over the subject matter once again by describing the world of art, more specifically by describing how art mediates historical spirituality. The systematic threads of these reflections remain intact. Art is one mode of the determinate being of historical truth, perhaps a mode of its reflective existence but in no way a reflective certainty. Such assurance of validity can be guaranteed only by the absolute authority of the divine, backed by religious representations, or better, by the methodical procedure of philosophy. In specifically establishing the

'vitality' of the idea, in characterizing the ideal, Hegel draws upon the result of this characterization of the beautiful and of art that he elaborated since the Jena period.

We find reference to Hegel's characterization of the ideal, taken from the *Aesthetics*, not only in the philosophical discussion but in almost every treatment of art theory, art history, or literary studies. The *Aesthetics* defines the ideal as 'the sensuous appearing of the idea' (1st edn., 1:144; 2nd edn., 1:141). This apt and catchy definition has in turn constantly been criticized because people justifiably assume that, by characterizing the ideal as the idea 'appearing sensuously', the philosopher was led astray in diminishing the power of art with regard to its historical function and the possibilities for its execution. On the other hand, this definition has such striking import that in it we see Hegel's entire aesthetics brought to conceptual form.

This fundamental characterization of the ideal, occupying such a central place in the published edition of the *Aesthetics*, is not to be found in any source for Hegel's Berlin lectures known so far, nor can it be discovered in the statements on art Hegel published himself.<sup>91</sup> In Hotho's transcript of 1823 we find an extensive discussion of the connections obtaining among art, appearance, sensuousness, intellectuality, and the idea as the 'principal concern of spirit' as such. Along with these elaborations the conceptual elements surface once again, ones that may have motivated Hotho to introduce into the *Aesthetics* the contaminating definition of the ideal as the 'sensuous appearing of the idea'. Nevertheless, Hegel purposely isolated these factors from one another, and he himself defined the ideal not on the basis of this linking of sensuousness with the idea, but instead by conjoining the 'appearance of the sensuous' with 'art'.<sup>92</sup>

91. See Lasson's edition, *Die Idee und das Ideal*. Lu de Vos (see n. 81 above) has outlined, but not yet published, a 'logic' of the aesthetics on this basis.

92. The unambiguous reference to art when speaking of the 'appearance of the sensuous' is even confirmed in the marginal notations in Hotho's transcript. The linkage of the sensuous with appearance initially crops up in one of these marginal notations: 'Accordingly, art has the sensuous within itself not as concretely living but only as appearance of the sensuous, as sensuous overlay'. This notation relates to the text just below it: 'So in art what is sensuous is elevated to being appearance, and art thus stands halfway between the sensuous as such and pure thought' (Hotho 1823, Ms. 17; p. 200 in this text). This consideration is repeated precisely in the corresponding gloss in the margin, while the linkage and the reversal to 'appearance of the sensuous', of interest for the subsequent definition of the ideal, is found only in Hotho's reflection as commentator, in the margin of the manuscript, and is not found in the directly transcribed text. (Remark from the English language editor: While 'appearing', or *Scheinen*, and 'appearance', or *Schein*, are often used interchangeably, there is a difference between 'appearing' as an activity or occurrence and 'appearance' as a condition or status.)



As becomes clear from the transcripts of the later series, in the 1823 lectures Hegel delivered the General Part in greater complexity and breadth than he did subsequently. That has its effect on the characterization of the 'ideal' as well as on that of art. So, for example, in Hotho's transcript we find a formulation most readily understandable as the motivation for characterizing the ideal as 'sensuous appearing'. In the subsequent transcripts there are virtually no grounds for directly linking pure sensuousness and idea. Hotho reports on Hegel's explanations of two assumptions that at first appear to be paradoxical, that art is 'a way of making spirit aware of its interests' although, on the other assumption, art nevertheless is 'not the highest way of expressing truth' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 5; p. 185 in this text). The reasoning behind the latter assumption, which Hegel formulated in the so-called 'thesis of the end of art', and which he based on the argument that art, religion, and philosophy differ while having the same content, involves a more specific characterization of the kind of sensuousness that is admitted into art and the manner in which the sensuous is admitted into art.

Here Hegel once again explicitly undertakes a change of course decisive for the elaboration of his aesthetics, namely, in his critique of Schelling's conception of 'intellectual intuition'. He initially expressed this critique in extremely polemical fashion in the Nuremberg propaedeutic reflections, in particular the reflections on psychology, via a critique of the cognitive faculty of (empirical) intuition. In the introduction to the aesthetics he retracts this polemic against the capacity of intuition for mediating truth, just as he had previously retracted his disqualification of appearance as a possible mediator of truth.

There is a mode of intuition or vividness that is not relevant for art and that also provides no information for the philosophical characterization of art, and it is the aspect 'of sheer intuition' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 16; p. 198 in this text). In sheer intuition the sensuous just simply crops up, and that is what serves to set this sensuousness apart from the 'sensuous feature of the work of art'. The sensuous feature of the work of art exists as something 'for the inner nature of human beings, for something that we can also call spirit' (Ms. 16; p. 198 in this text). In a markedly modern-like analysis of the sensuous act of empirical intuition, as in artistic intuition, Hegel demonstrates, by how he defines the object posited in [artistic] execution as well as the manner in which it is set forth, that sensuousness in art cannot be the sensuousness achieved by organic-empirical life; instead it is something brought about by spirit. He bases himself on Kant's definition that interest

in the beautiful object is freed from immediate interest in the object, but he redefines this reflection, taken from the *Critique of Judgment*, along the lines of such an analysis of spiritual accomplishment. 'Art's concerns are devoid of desire and thus unrelated to what is sensuously concrete'; instead they pertain to what is reflectively sensuous (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 16; p. 198 in this text). 'The interests of art parallel the interests of intellect; art too lets the objects be free and is a free examination in the sense of letting the things exist over against itself' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 17; p. 199 in this text). Here Hegel argues in the sense of the often misunderstood 'disinterested' pleasure in what is beautiful, as this point is found in Kant; that is, he obviously grasps Kant's original intention.<sup>93</sup> At the same time he revises his conception of intuition, whereas in the polemic against Schelling its capacity for mediating truth was initially restricted in scope.

Art posits intuition itself as a hybrid nature, as a sensuous existence of the spiritual bringing-about of a world. *Hotho's* transcript states, for instance: 'The appearance is manifold; art makes appearance into the sort of thing that everywhere in it would be the organ of the soul, the manifestation of it' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 70; p. 247 in this text). In the introduction, as subsequently in filling out the philosophy of art, Hegel for this reason emphasizes that art does not grasp nature in its immediacy; that art does not grasp the living thing as natural living thing, but instead grasps it as spiritual living thing. In art, which ought not, and may not, leave nature in its immediacy (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 205; p. 367 in this text), human beings devise a representation of the world, and indeed a sensuous representation. This representation is mediated not via an abstract sign, as in language, 'but in a sensuous way. So the content is said in one respect to be present, in another respect present in such a way that we recognize that the content is not the actual thing but instead is the content of the representation' (Ms. 196; p. 359 in this text). In describing painting, Hegel brings this point to conceptual form, in a definition that can be extended to art's mediating role in general. Art is the 'representation of the representation' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 196; p. 359 in this text). Accordingly, art itself determines itself as a phenomenon of reflection, though not a reflection presenting itself in the form of a discursive succession of insights achieved and a logically consistent, methodical

93. See Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §5, in *Immanuel Kant: Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 23 vols. (Berlin, 1910–55), vol. 5 (1913); pp. 43–5 in the translation by J. H. Bernard (New York, 1951). See also Werner Strube, '“Interesslosigkeit”. Zur Geschichte eines Grundbegriffs der Ästhetik', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (1979), 23:148 ff.

explication; instead art presents itself in the form of speculative illumination (*Aufscheinen*).<sup>94</sup>

Consequently the sensuous element in art ought not to be regarded as sheer intuition, but also it cannot be transposed into that 'intellectual intuition' in which, according to Schelling, philosophy finds its supreme consummation. The 1826 lectures introduce this restriction once again, basing it on a characterization of art's final purpose. Hegel emphasizes that art is 'merely one form (among others) in which spirit brings itself to appearance' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 6), and in this way he connects the characterization of the intuition specific to art with the concept of appearance. 'Art is a particular mode in which spirit brings itself to appearance, or realizes itself', is how it reads in another direct transcript of these lectures (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 3). As such, art is capable of letting the 'result' of a process of experience appear simultaneously in intuition (something linguistic as well as philosophical explanation is barred from doing). In the final lecture series Hegel reflects on the validity of such intuitively mediated knowledge, via an allusion to Aristotle. Art has to do with 'the appearing of what is true' (*die Wahrscheinlichkeit*) (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 3), that is, it carries out a mediation of truth in a nonconceptual medium. The beautiful appearance, insofar as it is beautiful, points to what is 'truthful' in the 'sensuous present' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 25). Hegel concludes from this the need to explicate this form of the historical efficacy and presence of truth, as well as its relevance. In the 1823 lectures Hegel introduces these considerations openly when he characterizes the specific sensuousness of art. The most important aspect is that 'in no way is the art product's purpose to be a naturally living thing. That is because the sensuous feature of the work of art is solely for spirit and should be for it alone' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 15-16; p. 198 in this text). The work of art does not address the concretely living human being who finds satisfaction in latching onto a natural product; instead it addresses the one who reflects. Spirit 'should find satisfaction by means of this sensible material' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 15, p. 198 in this text). Insofar as the sensuous element of art serves to satisfy the needs of spirit, on the one hand this sensuous element must be characterized as ideal, but on the other hand it cannot yet be looked upon as what is 'abstractly ideal'. In Hotho's transcript what follows is the characterization that seems to approximate the definition of the ideal as

94. Joachim Ritter discussed this connection more precisely in 'Landschaft', contained in his *Subjektivität. 6 Aufsätze* (Frankfurt, 1974), esp. p. 175. For how this consideration links up with Hegel's expanded conception of 'intuition' in the lectures on aesthetics, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, p. 235 ff., esp. 289-90.

'sensuous appearing of the idea', although here it refers explicitly to the work of art: 'There is the pure, sensuous appearance, and in more specific form, the shape' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 18; p. 200 in this text).<sup>95</sup>

In the later lecture series too Hegel accentuates the point that 'art... [is] a distinctive form in the way that spirit realizes itself, thus a particular mode of spirit's bringing itself to appearance' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 2). After various attempts at determining the purpose of art, that is, at its philosophical definition, Hegel proceeds to define more precisely this 'spiritual' element of art with the aid of the concepts of 'idea' and 'ideal'. The idea, 'since it is concrete', is then stated to be 'what is highest, and its portrayal... [is] art's purpose and vocation' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 7). Appearance is the means for the portrayal, such that 'art portrays the idea by the appearance' (Ms. 7). Here Hegel also rebuts the criticism that appearance is to be summarily dismissed as deception, and concludes: 'Appearance in art is a far higher and more authentically real form than what we are in the habit of calling reality or the way we are accustomed to view the sensuous' (Ms. 7). This confirms both how close Hegel's formulation is to that of the 1835 *Aesthetics*, and also the irreconcilable difference between them.

The work of art and—in general terms—the 'ideal', is not the 'sensuous appearing of the idea'; instead, in the sensuous appearing the idea mediates itself concretely and historically, becoming 'aesthetic and mythological'. This shows that the formulation of the lectures stands much closer to the early 'System-Program' and likewise closer to the characterization of the ideal as the presence of the rational idea in the living, historical actions of the founders of religions. *Hotho's* 1823 transcript specifies, by an implicit borrowing from Aristotle, the way in which 'the sensuous element of the work of art' is, and ought to be, '... for spirit'. The ways 'in which the sensuous is found in art' are themselves of course reflected, spiritualized modes of the 'theoretical senses' of sight and hearing, which are related to spiritual fulfillment. In connection with this implicit reference to Aristotle, in the final lecture series of 1828–9 Hegel can then speak of 'the appearing of what is true' (*die Wahrscheinlichkeit*) that he established in the 1823 lectures, in the sense of the unrestricted, implicit capacity for truth on the part of the specific sensuousness of art.

95. Also, in the 1823 lectures Hegel illustrates the potentially spiritual content of the sensuous by pointing to the sculptural form of the Greek gods that finds the natural shape of the spiritual in the sensuous (human) figure. Cf. *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 31; p. 213 in this text. This thought is found throughout the lectures.

In fact in the 1823 lectures Hegel develops a definition of the ideal to which Hotho's later wording—that it is 'sensuous appearing of the idea'—approximates. At the same time, however, Hegel allows for the 'sensuous appearing' in the full sense of the appearance of truth, a sense that is missing in the critics' later restriction of this definition in principle to sheer sensuousness. Art does not involve the sensuousness of the concrete material, but instead involves the sensuous insofar as it simply appears. 'So in art what is sensuous is elevated to being appearance'—'the pure sensuous appearance, and in more specific form, the shape' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 17–18; p. 200 in this text). Through the shape art finds its central and mediating position between the sensuous as such and pure thought. Wherever Hegel proceeds to a more detailed elucidation of this conception, he follows it up with a characterization of the work of art, that is, of its concretely-historical effect or, in other words, art's function in history. In 1823 he provides the needed enhancement to this characterization by referring to Schiller's poem 'The Gods of Greece', in which, just as in the Aristotelian linkage of sensuousness with the 'theoretical senses', the way 'in which the sensuous comes into play in art' can be further characterized. Art deals with 'the "shadow realm," of the beautiful. These sensuous shadows are the works of art. Herein lies the more specific necessity according to which the sensuous is the purpose of art. Hence the sensuous can come into play in the work of art only in accord with the two ideal senses' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 18; p. 200 in this text).

By a description of intuition's ability to mediate historical knowledge, a description found from the *Early Theological Writings* on up to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one expressly grounded in Schiller and having ties to Plato, Hegel achieves the specific positioning of his aesthetics in between 'aesthetic Platonism' and the more concrete terms of Aristotelianism. He does not in fact devalue art based on its sensuousness, but instead emphasizes consistently that precisely its *specific* sensuousness is what makes art 'worthy' of becoming the object of philosophical treatment; indeed for that reason art is necessarily classified among the phenomena of 'absolute spirit'. 'For its material art therefore has the "spiritualized sensuous" as well as the "sensualized spiritual". The sensuous enters into art as the ideal sensuous, as the abstractly sensuous' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 18; p. 200 in this text). To this sensuous material there corresponds the activity of the artist, that is, the specific 'production' of historical truth apprehensible in the sensuous thing. Art is spiritual and material activity all in one.

Ultimately, in an explicit formulation of the tendency already become clear in the transcript of 1823, through its historical allusions, Hegel in the later lecture series no longer characterizes what is ideal exclusively based on its connecting the idea to the sensuous; instead he characterizes it at the same time as the idea's individuality, subjectivity, or living shape. Yet we also find these same reflections in Hotho's 1823 transcript. In these 1823 lectures too, in explicitly treating the idea and the ideal, Hegel characterizes the idea as absolute life, as the unity of concept and reality; 'what is abstractly ideal makes itself appear (*scheinen*), continually making its own material existence into appearing and, in doing so, its freedom, its ideality, is *evident* (*erscheint*)' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 46; p. 227 in this text). The elements of this ideality—the subjectivity and individuality of the idea, its foothold in shape—are, in Hegel's extensive presentation as Hotho cites it in his own transcript, graspable as a restricting of the idea's vitality by the appearance (see especially *von der Pfordten*, Ms. 49–50). To be sure, this restriction is in turn partly overcome in the succession of the different possible modes of realization, therefore in the succession of various ways of grasping the presence of the spiritual in the sensuous. For example, in his transcript Hotho reiterates a definition that characterizes natural beauty as 'an appearance, a determinate being' of what is ideational, because in natural beauty the ideality still brings itself to expression in the form of sheer lawlikeness or regularity. This kind of determinate being of the idea of course also has its significance in the work of art (cf. *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 61; p. 239 in this text), namely, in all the forms of regularity or lawlikeness of the portrayal, such as its schematics. However, in art the idea is already mediated subjectively: 'With subjectivity, the idea enters into existence' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 65; p. 243 in this text). Art, which 'has for its object the portrayal of the truth of the existent being (of the idea), accordingly surpasses every mode of mere givenness' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 71; p. 248 in this text). So the nature of the ideal as such consists in 'the fact that the external, existent being corresponds to what is interior and has led back to it, although not in such a way that it has progressed to thought as such, but only progressed to the focal point of individual subjectivity' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 72; p. 248 in this text).

Thus Hegel explains that, in the ideal, 'spirit sets its foot into what is sensible' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 72; p. 249 in this text). This formulation is better suited to the subject matter, to describing the form of historical mediation of truth via art, than is Hotho's concise definition of the ideal as 'sensuous appearing of the idea'. With the help of this metaphor Hegel in fact sustains a conception of the ideal found consistently in all his reflections, in his historical discussion and the attendant conception of the work of art as the

idea's necessary concretion, as its 'aesthetic and mythological' presence. This metaphor likewise mirrors the reorientation of his early characterization of art via the elaborated system of philosophy, because in recognizing that art, religion, and philosophy have identical contents, Hegel can now present three explicitly distinct ways of mediating historical spirit. The spirit that, in art, 'sets its foot into what is sensible', remains, in its singularity, pointed toward the establishing of a higher universality. This conception of the ideal with reference to art's subject matter also surfaces in the later Berlin lecture series, but not the characterization of the ideal as 'sensuous appearing' of the idea.

Unlike what Hotho's definition insinuates, a critique of Hegel's conception of the work of art, or of the general definition of its historical function as 'ideal', must not extend to the logic of 'appearance', or to what Platonists regard as the inability of sensation to be knowledge. The widely-known definition of the ideal as 'sensuous appearing of the idea' points the discussion from the outset to a narrow scope for evaluating the arts and their possibility of mediating historical truth. Ever since his earliest characterization of the ideal in the *Early Theological Writings*, Hegel set about discussing the historical concretion of the 'determinate being, existence, or vitality' of the idea; and yet, because of its altered definition of the ideal, the *Aesthetics*, from the beginning of its influence in 1835 and thereafter, appears to be 'speculative art history'. In the latter, philosophy subjects art to a much more strict classification and aesthetic assessment, one additionally hampered by the defect of an unacceptable under-determination of art as 'being bound to appearance', because it is bound to 'sensuousness'. On the contrary, through his philosophy of art Hegel seeks to develop an evaluation of the cultural significance of the arts in different 'epochs and peoples', that is, to develop, by a formal description of the ideal, a structured characterization of art's historical effects. His description of the ideal in the lectures makes this intention clear. He consistently characterizes the ideal in the way the 'System-program' formulates it, as the 'aesthetic and mythological' presence of the idea in the historical-cognitive activity of human beings. The 'logic' of the *Aesthetics* loses sight of this dimension; in its characterizations it latches onto the logic of the 'sensuous appearance'. In it the ideal becomes a merely insufficient form of cognizing truth, thus displacing a characterization of truth's historically infectious spread in forms that vary while at the same time remaining the same in their basic intention. A 'logic of the aesthetics' must instead keep its eye on the specific combining of 'aesthetic Platonism' with Hegel's conception of history. Hegel himself provides sufficient occasion for this when he defines the ideal as the 'determinate being', 'existence', or even 'vitality' of the idea.

This characterization of the ideal—and not its definition as ‘sensuous appearing of the idea’—becomes constitutive for the conception of the work as well as for its further structural characterization in the forms of art. What follows this account of the ‘ideal’ and of the spirit that, in art, sets ‘its foot into what is sensible’ is a further indication, more constitutive for the aesthetics, that in fact the idea has thus entered ‘into existence’ in the ideal, just as ethical powers entered into the state (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 77; p. 253 in this text). From this explanation we can conclude that this kind of ‘determinate being’ or ‘existence’ is not only an inwardly reflected form of presence, but is also at the same time an effective presence. So, in characterizing the forms of art as well as in the descriptions of the various arts, Hegel develops, within a cognitive perspective, his conception of the ideal, in the sense of this portrayal of a self-differentiating capacity for execution by sensuous intuitiveness. Thus his conception of the ideal first characterizes the conception of the ‘work of art’ and so the central concept of the aesthetics,<sup>96</sup> but then also characterizes the specific ‘aesthetic judgment’ with respect to individual works of art that evaluates the arts based on their function in human culture and history.

Hegel first works out the possibility, and the further characterization, of the ideal as work of art, as ‘beautiful shape’, in which to explain what for him is its urgently needed historical concretion. From the outset it appears clear to him that, as he specifically stresses in the aesthetics lectures, the sphere of art does not fall ‘in the logical domain, in which thought develops on its own as thought’ (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 54). In the sketch of the General Part in the 1826 lectures Hegel connects the two main components of this first part of his aesthetics by emphasizing that the idea of what is beautiful can be portrayed in its more specific determinations only if we grasp it equally as ‘ideal’. ‘The *idea* by itself is what is true as such, in its universality; but the *ideal* is this truth, is the idea together with its actuality, individuality, subjectivity. So we can distinguish two determinations. First, the idea as such, and in the second place its shape; and both together constitute the ideal, that is, the idea given shape’ (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 27). Based on the concrete relationship of the idea to its shape, the various versions of the ‘imagination’ yield both interconnected and distinct versions of its symbolization.

96. The conception of the work also underlies a development in the course of Hegel’s thought that, within the framework of the aesthetics lectures and by characterizing the ideal, becomes concrete in a description of the work based on its historical function. For a more specific account of the conception of the work and this conception’s significance for aesthetics, see Gethmann-Siebert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 16, 328–9.



For Hegel, the depiction found in the symbolic art form is a still-inadequate symbolizing of the historical, concrete effectiveness of that to which it points, namely, a shape of the idea achieved by abstractly infinitizing the merely natural shape. With its 'spiritual' natural figure of the human being, the classical art form achieves an 'adequate imagining of the idea... the ideal appears here in its actuality' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 28). This reality in turn finds its resolution in an obligatory reflection on the human sphere, as historical consciousness. 'So in this third stage the spiritual emerges as something spiritual, the idea emerges as something independent. In reaching the point of being for itself, the spiritual is freed from the sensuous portrayal, and to spirit, which transcends it, this sensuous element is a matter of indifference. In this way the portrayal becomes once again a symbol' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 31). Hegel even describes his characterization of the ideal as the 'formal' characterization that can prove its worth only in passing over to a concretely historical treatment, since 'the ideal develops itself in itself, not within one of its forms, and this distinction portrays elements of itself as beautiful, as art work' (*Aachen*, 1826, Ms. 31). By looking at 'the art that develops itself as real', we succeed in grasping 'spirit in its truth' as historically effective spirit. In his later lecture series Hegel explicitly stresses that he grasps and presents this spiritual element as the 'absolute spirit' (*Aachen*, 1826, Ms. 31), so that each art work to be considered is therefore comprised under this general definition of a 'work' that the *Encyclopedia* establishes.

It is almost obligatory, then, to examine the individual arts based on this premise, but not as subject to dogmatic control by the concept. Hegel already undertook this examination of the arts in his 1823 lectures, strictly along the lines of an initial characterization of the ideal and of the work. Over the course of the historical development of art and the arts, what is evident to him is the possibility, investigated ever anew, of grasping reflectively the vivid actuality of truth. So the characterization of poetry gains a preeminent position, one the critics often judge negatively. Yet in the course of characterizing poetry in his lectures this very description of it becomes more appealing. In fact, in the concluding treatment of the arts Hegel discusses the possibility of the sensuous symbolizing the spiritual, thus the various ways in which 'spirit' has 'set its foot into what is sensible'. All of these various possibilities, beginning with architecture and continuing with sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, proceed from the premise that the *spiritual* is present, in the sense of a concrete interpretation of the world and a guide for action. Hegel then demonstrates the possibilities of its *sensuous presence*, in examples from the individual arts. Poetry gains its distinctive place in virtue of the initial conception of the ideal, for specific sounds

acquire meaning in words, in 'becoming signs of a spiritual interior' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 39; p. 218 in this text). Because Hegel designates the ideal in general as being a kind of ascent of the sensuous to spiritualization, because the sensualization of spirit always stands at the same time in danger of descending to being appearance in the sense of sheer deception or, in comparison with what naturally appears beautiful, as this appearance, to becoming misinterpreted, Hegel emphasizes in the lectures that poetry is 'the universal, all-embracing art, is art ascended to the highest spirituality. That is because in poetry spirit is free within itself; it has cut itself loose from merely sensuous material and has relegated that material to being its own signs. . . . At this highest level, however, art ascends beyond itself and becomes prose, becomes thought' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 39; p. 218 in this text). His concluding argument then explains how poetry lifts up the other arts into itself. In poetry, space and time, as the universal forms of the sensuous to which painting and music respectively remain bound in the way they spiritualize the sensuous, are put at the free disposal of spirit. The sensuous element of space belongs to painting, the sensuous element of time to music. Both are evident in poetry as the 'mark of spirit, as the thinking subject that conjoins within itself the endless space of representation with the time of the musical tone' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 40; p. 219 in this text). The truly interesting approach of Hegel's aesthetics lies in this characterization of the 'objectivity' of the work of art by an analysis of artistic execution. Going beyond Kant and later conceptions focused on Kant, Hegel analyzes art's execution (and in doing so characterizes the specific reality of the work of art). He does this not by looking solely at the transcendental conditions for its subjective execution. Instead he looks equally at the historical environment of its execution. His systematic aesthetics springs from this plurality of interconnected perspectives.

A glance at his concrete characterization of individual works of art shows how little Hegel had 'aesthetic-judgment' in mind when he described the arts; or also, on the other hand, how little he dogmatically tied the phenomenon back to his system of absolute knowledge. It is also important here that each art involves the possibilities of spirit's experience in history; more specifically, that each art involves the experience of a world-interpretation that realizes itself in concrete forms of life and their self-presentation in art. As our conclusion, therefore, we will have to shed light on the remarkable interplay of phenomenon and system in a few examples from the lecture transcripts, examples in which Hegel's own and distinctive philosophical way of dealing with the arts becomes clear.

### C. THE WORLD OF THE ARTS CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY

In the sources for Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, alongside the conceptual labor on the structural characterization of art—which led to a revised weighting in the treatment of the three art forms—we discover a great many detailed and purposeful descriptions of individual arts and works of art. They portray what we could call the concretion of the concept, and Hegel integrates them, chiefly as examples, into the structural characterization of the forms of art. Only in his last lecture series, in winter 1828–9, does he separate the description of the arts as a third part, the Individual Part, from the characterization of the ideal and of the forms of art.

In today's critiques this third part of the aesthetics is, more often than not, singled out for praise as Hegel's 'phenomenology of art', as a shrewd assessment and sensitive aesthetic evaluation of the arts, of artists, and of their major works. It is mainly from this very point that people make the case for the phenomenological Hegel as opposed to the systematic Hegel, because it appears indisputable that, in the course of developing his information based on his enthusiasm for art, Hegel himself jettisoned the rigid dogmatism of his system of absolute knowledge, at least in the lectures on aesthetics. However, our more detailed discussion of the structural foundations of Hegel's aesthetics has already shown that the hope of contemporary interpreters and critics, that in the end Hegel himself abandoned his system, remains deceptive. Also, the descriptions of art and the critiques in the third and concluding part of the aesthetics, as well as Hegel's judgments on aesthetic worth, are regarded as thoroughly controversial. The spectrum of the critiques ranges from praise of the great, prophetic art critic, all the way to complaints about an eccentric, overly persistent, classical bias. In the debate about Hegel's aesthetics, well-meaning critics in particular constantly bring up how thoroughly Hegel engaged himself with art. For them the statements of the *Aesthetics* at any rate confirm, if not a vast knowledge of art, at least a skillful discrimination of great art from the abundance of what is lacking in value. Others find much missing in this part of the *Aesthetics*, and in their disappointment at how it lacks assessment of great works from the art of Hegel's own time we see their attempt to show the current importance of Hegel's aesthetics, not to conceal and suppress it. An example of the ongoing dilemma in which the attempt to rescue Hegel's aesthetics finds itself is the remark of a musicologist about Hegel's 'eloquent silence'

regarding Beethoven.<sup>97</sup> The critics also cannot suppress their consternation at the fact that whereas Hegel was of course aware of the Gothic churches in the region, as can be shown from his remarks from the Nuremberg years, in treating architecture he neglects them and establishes different centers of gravity than those important in his own day. So, some praise Hegel's ever deeper knowledge of all the arts; the enthusiasm that he personally expresses in constantly forging new paths and that is coupled with a precise intuition that seeks out what appeals to it. Others, in an equally justifiable critique, detect a narrowing of the philosophical vision to specific works, in particular to selected fine art in its classically-based setting.

This criticism, together with his failure to take a position on essential artistic events of the day, naturally fuels the suspicion that Hegel not only constructed his aesthetics in advance, classically, but also oriented art as a whole to a 'grand' past, in comparison to which the present can appear to be only a faint reflection of a bygone perfection. The auditors of his lectures, and his followers, had already remarked critically about the fact that, in his aesthetics lectures, Hegel adopted a considerably more distant way of dealing with the art of his own day than he did in his personal expressions. The enthusiasm found in his personal opinions and in his correspondence, in his interest in the artistic events of the day in Berlin, the capital city, does surface in the aesthetics, although as a rule much less forcefully when, at a reflective distance, he addresses the beautiful art of ancient times and in turn interesting forms of modern art. This philosophical reticence brought upon Hegel the reproach that his relationship with art is schizophrenic. Whereas in his personal life Hegel appears to be a more enthusiastic and much-impressed art aficionado, from the podium the philosopher nevertheless instructs his students that present day art is only to be deciphered adequately via reflection. Whereas Hegel himself spends his own scarce free time, and the means afforded him by the university, in going on art travels<sup>98</sup> and, as the young Mendelssohn-Bartholdy knew and reported sarcastically, even adjourns his lectures early so he can hurry to the opera, Hegel must at the same time have

97. See Carl Dahlhaus, 'Hegel und die Musik seiner Zeit', in *Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik im Berlin Hegels*, pp. 333-4.

98. Inge Blank reports that Hegel utilized a university stipend to undertake a trip to Vienna, where he indulged himself in music and the fine arts. His letters from this and other travels attest to an unrestrained enthusiasm, of which there is no trace in the lectures on aesthetics. See 'Dokumente zu Hegels Reise nach Österreich', provided and introduced by Inge Blank, *Hegel-Studien* (1981) 61:41 ff., esp. 50. On Hegel's travels in the Netherlands, see *Briefe*, 2:357 ff., 362 ff. (*The Letters*, pp. 661-2). On his trip to Vienna, see *Briefe* 3:53-5, 57 ff. (*The Letters*, pp. 614-30).

ingrained in his students an overriding skepticism as to the possibility and efficacy of art in modern society.<sup>99</sup> So Hegel the art enthusiast and citizen of the city of Berlin seems to set himself very much apart from Hegel the skeptical philosopher. Whereas the one Hegel approaches art with a view to the past, but also approaches the present and art's future possible development with receptive sensibility and curiosity, the other Hegel, imbued with the dogmatism of his philosophical system, concedes to art merely a 'partial' significance in the modern world. This latter Hegel corresponds in many ways to the critical picture in today's delineation of his aesthetics. Yet Hegel the citizen of a European metropolis who is enthusiastic about art also gains a hearing in the Individual Part of the aesthetics. The published edition of the *Aesthetics* in fact leaves the reader in the uncertainty, formulated by T. M. Knox, as to whether Hegel could have meant what he says in the thesis of art's 'character as past, when, as a countermove to the strictness of the philosophical system, he exhibits a remarkable enthusiasm for the art of his day.

The sources for Hegel's Berlin lectures have structural as well as singular surprises in store for the concluding part of the aesthetics too. Neither the fundamental bias in favor of beautiful art, documented throughout the 1835 *Aesthetics*, nor that edition's preferences for, and praises of, individual artists and works of art, is identical with the reflections that Hegel delivered in his lectures. Hegel did not jettison the systematic bedrock of the aesthetics; instead, in the course of his engagement with the arts he refined the consequences of his conception found in the *Encyclopedia*. The philosophical system manifest in the *Encyclopedia* remains the approach and foundation of the philosophy of art, and should also serve for critiquing it. Nevertheless, in the reflections of the lectures we encounter a different Hegel than the one to whom we are accustomed, even in the evaluations of the arts. The positive and negative judgments of the critics must be fundamentally revised in light of information about the sources of Hegel's philosophy of art, especially in the analysis of Hegel's judgments about art. That is because in the lectures on aesthetics not only do we find

99. See the criticism by the composer, Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy: 'Still, it is crazy that, while Goethe and Thorvaldsen are living and Beethoven has been deceased for only a few years, Hegel maintains that German art is dead as a doornail. Not so (*Quod non*). Too bad for him if he feels that way. But when one gives a bit of thought to the argument, it turns out to be quite empty' (*Berichte*, no. 669). See also Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's comment in *Berichte*, no. 675: It is incomprehensible 'that the philosopher H[egel] still continually maintains that art is ended, as if art as such could have ceased to be.' [Tr.] Bertel Thorvaldsen (1770-1884) was a Danish sculptor who lived at Rome. Some of his statues depict figures from classical mythology.

consideration of other works of art than those in the *Aesthetics*; also, Hegel gives a different status to the examples he introduces for the systematic philosophical treatment of art. The focus of attention is not the *artistic judgment of the expert*, but instead the issue of the *historical significance of art*. Even when Hegel deals with individual works of art, he sometimes presents the historical significance of art in a different way. That is because, instead of the speculatively-based, quite judgmental, evaluation of the arts, what emerges in the 'aesthetic judgments' in the lectures is the examination of the structural possibility, in art, of experiencing historical truth in the different versions of the individual realization of the 'ideal'.

Just as in the characterization of the ideal and of the forms of art, so too in the philosophical description of the world of the arts in the various lecture series, Hegel sticks consistently, in their essentials, to his objective arguments. By reweighting and modifying the main emphasis, he simply endeavors to portray better, and to mediate, the philosophical method of dealing with art reflectively. For that reason of course his explicit engagement with the arts does not abandon his framework for characterizing the ideal and the forms of art; instead it makes further distinctions within this structural framework. In this part of the lectures on aesthetics too, some of the reflections initially display an unbroken continuity with earlier, even pre-systematic, considerations. Others are added as augmentation, and in doing so Hegel establishes new emphases, in particular in the last two lecture series. Despite this continuity in his assessment of the phenomenon, the end product refutes both the reproach of dogmatism and the suspicion of a 'classicism' in the assessment of art. The criticism that both content and form involve a preconceived bias cannot be sustained with regard to the assessment of the arts in the lectures on aesthetics. In the *Aesthetics*, on the contrary, we find numerous footholds for this criticism.<sup>100</sup>

Instead of this oft-criticized use of the concept as the basis for the explication of art, in his lectures Hegel sets forth broadly interesting reflections, as, for instance, in deliberating whether or not the structuring of the ideal via the forms of art could on occasion have been completely historicized. He tests these thoughts by supposing that in all epochs and cultures—but at least in the modern world and in modern art as the melting-pot of past and present—the various forms of art might be able to exist symbiotically. In doing so he makes Goethe's poetry in particular his point of entry for discussing earlier art forms made current under modern circumstances.

100. For individual instances, see Gethmann-Siebert, 'Hegels These vom Ende der Kunst...'. *Hegel-Studien* 19 (1984), 205 ff.

The revival of ancient material in such modern literature as Goethe's play *Iphigeneia at Tauris*, the poetic feat of making the Oriental world contemporary in his *Divan of West and East*, but also the transposing of epic settings into lyric poetry or carrying on the epic genre in the idyll *Hermann and Dorothea*—all this motivates Hegel to re-examine his thesis that in the modern world art has forfeited its all-embracing significance. Unlike Hegel's 1797 critique of Schiller in the last version of 'The Spirit of Christianity', a critique to which he finally committed himself in the 'Wallenstein' essay, we find in this later examination of Goethe new and surprising variations on the theme of the historical influence of the arts. The gamut of discussable possibilities ranges from inquiry into the sublimely symbolic art that is not-yet-beautiful art, to analysis of the modern version of the symbolic art form. This includes engaging with the beautiful ethical life of Greek tragedies and its reflected form in Goethe's 'poetic adaptations' (but surprisingly, not in Hölderlin's), as well as the description, in Schiller's dramas, of sublime pathos, namely, the pathos that is no longer beautiful but is nevertheless ethical pathos, as the typical form of modern tragedies.

We find thought experiments of this kind not only in Hegel's characterization of poetry but also throughout his treatment of all the arts, in particular in the examples he draws from the arts of the romantic art form. He contrasts the beautiful everydayness of Dutch genre painting with the no-longer-beautiful presentation of God in Christian images. He does not disparage the beauty of musical works (opera) in light of their inconsequential story lines. In similar fashion and with a lack of bias surprising to a reader today, he discusses how art is received. The possibilities for an adequate reception of art range in fact from enjoying beautiful form—happily not something Hegel frowned upon as illegitimate—to being awed by sublime content. It is evident, by and large, that in dealing with art Hegel's concern is not with the sophisticated, philosophically ever-more-complex, judgment of the art connoisseur, but instead with the issue of art's significance for everyone—for people in the modern world as well as for people in ages past. Instead of the speculative art history that plays out so frequently in the foreground of the *Aesthetics*, in tandem with its assessments and condemnations of art, what emerges in the lectures is the issue of art's meaning 'for us', the urgent question as to the meaning of art for modern people, which has its answer against the backdrop of the portrayal of other peoples and other times.

Unlike the 1835 *Aesthetics*, in Hegel's lectures we find shifted to the foreground an ongoing and more forceful engagement with, and evaluation of, two problematic art forms, under the heading of 'beauty'. Whereas in the

*Aesthetics*, as we read it more than 150 years later, Hegel seems, as we said, to cling to beauty as the supreme aesthetic category—to beauty as unity of the true and the good—in the lectures he appraises beauty differently. The oft-criticized ‘aesthetic Platonism’<sup>101</sup> said to have steered the young Hegel to deficient appraisals of art, to art’s excessive metaphysical baggage, led in the *Aesthetics* to a critique of art that, by incorporating art-theoretical reflections, gets elaborated into a hard-and-fast, speculatively-based system of parameters for aesthetic judgment. ‘Beauty’ remains the supreme aesthetic designation. The divine as art’s content, especially in the Christian religious representations, guarantees the ‘greatness’ of the arts, their character as ‘works’. In contrast, descent (*Abfall*) into the prosaicism of ‘everydayness’ counts as the emphatically incriminating, aesthetic ‘original sin’.

Neither in Hegel’s Berlin lectures on the philosophy of art nor in his other reflections do we find an extensively formulated system like that, a system of the interplay of philosophy with speculatively integrated art theory and art history, an interplay intended to be utilized for aesthetic evaluation of the various arts and artists, for-art criticism. In confronting the historical phenomenon, the lectures situate the question of beauty within a spectrum of diverse aesthetic perspectives, and this leads to an unbiased evaluation of the historical-cultural significance of individual works. Aesthetic categories of course play a part in this evaluation, but they lose the character of strict parameters for distinguishing art from what is not art. To cite first just the extremes, arts that are beautiful-but have trivial content stand alongside forms of art that have ‘ethical pathos’ and are no longer beautiful. In an unbiased way Hegel considers the fact that *each* instance could have involved art works in the full sense, that is, the possibility of establishing, via art; a historical consciousness and with it a historical culture. Any limitations of art’s character as a ‘work’ come solely from the standpoint of its providing historical guidance, apart from any designation of the art as beautiful or not beautiful. In any event this evaluation of the arts does away with the classical ranking of all individual phenomena based on the most beautiful among the works (based on Greek sculpture or beautiful Renaissance painting), a ranking found throughout the published edition of the *Aesthetics*.

This redirecting of the philosophy of art away from speculative evaluation of art by the expert, and toward philosophical reflection on art’s historical significance and manner of influence, can be demonstrated by comparing the sources for the lectures with the *Aesthetics* on this issue, of course not

101. See, in particular, Klaus Düsing, ‘Idealistische Substanzmetaphysik: Probleme der Systementwicklung bei Schelling und Hegel in Jena’, in *Hegel in Jena*, pp. 25 ff.



exhaustively but surely from a few illustrative examples. These indications are important when we go beyond the 1823 Hotho transcript from the second Berlin lectures on aesthetics because, clearly for the first time in 1826, Hegel intensifies his engagement with the arts and consciously expands his view of the various phenomena, ranging from beautiful art to the art that is no longer beautiful, in his own self-critical preparation for refining the thesis of the end of art in the *Encyclopedia*. In the final lecture series Hegel retracts many of these summer 1826 reflections, progressive ones as we understand them today, by restricting them and robbing them in part of their explosive nature. By this time he has already set forth the systematic refinement of the thesis of art's past character, and he departs from the procedure of the 1826 lectures to probe deeply into this point. Instead of the endeavor to test the thesis of art's past character with an abundance of examples, a balanced conception of aesthetics now emerges once again, a conception bringing the abundance of materials under control in a third part, the Individual Part. In the last lecture series too Hegel introduces numerous examples and discusses them in detail, a practice Hotho, in his introduction to the *Aesthetics*, ascribes to the exigencies of pedagogy. Once again, however, we should not understand this practice as Hegel seeking anew, and perhaps definitively, to abandon his system (the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopedia* is evidence to the contrary); instead Hegel is ironing out the imbalance to which the critical investigation of 1826 led, by thinking things through once more. At the same time, by his philosophical-reflective assessment of art's significance in modern society and for the state, he takes a position opposed to those contemporaries of his Berlin activities who sought to replace the issue of art's political interest with the issue of artistic inspiration.

By dealing with the various arts, Hegel seeks to gain a perspective for the philosophical evaluation of art, one putting the multiplicity of aesthetic judgments under a unitary standard of evaluation. (For Hegel, 'unitary' here means a perspective 'achieved systematically'.) Only a unitary standard of evaluation like this lets one proceed to discern aesthetic quality, that is, to make aesthetic judgments in the narrower sense, and to develop a critical way of approaching individual works both contemporary and historical. In the Individual Part of the aesthetics Hegel sets before our eyes a kaleidoscope of the various arts, as the 'world of the arts', and in it he expands upon two points: the unitary perspective for evaluating art philosophically, and the spectrum of aesthetic categories that such an evaluation lays out and states with sufficient precision—categories that refer to, and are appropos of, a phenomenon that takes various shapes.

Hence comparison of the 1823 and 1826 lecture series can be informative for a critical encounter with Hegel's aesthetics, above all for the very promising prospect of resolving the dogmatic system in a way conducive to the phenomenon of art.<sup>102</sup> However, the version of the aesthetics in the 1828–9 lectures, which (in virtue of Hegel's death) has in fact become the last authentic version, also positively stands apart from the published edition with respect to the extensiveness these lectures' aesthetic categories, their consequences for the evaluation of art and, above all, their restraint with regard to systematic dogmatism while at the same time being philosophically rigorous. These advantages of the lectures can be demonstrated especially in Hegel's portrayal of the individual arts.

### 1. Art's Character as 'Work': Architecture, Sculpture, and Epic

Interpreters of Hegel's aesthetics give scant consideration to his theory of architecture. They find little of interest in it, aside from a few topics of standard knowledge in a discussion of the origins of the art of building in wood or stone, topics about which Hegel debated with Aloys Hirt.<sup>103</sup> So, at least at first glance, it seems that Hegel's theory of architecture can offer little of value for our contemporary discussion. Nevertheless Hegel attaches to it the first strands of his portrayal of a complex web of art's acts signifying the world, a natural world that forms the human environment.

For example, Hegel is interested in monuments with a configuration still oriented to natural shapes (such as the reproductive organs), because these monuments involve a signifying of the world, bringing to light symbolically what is essential to a historical culture. He engages in interpreting this act of signifying, which principally involves symbolizing, via the natural shape

102. See the more specific discussion of this point in the introduction to the volume edited by Gethmann-Siefert, *Phänomen versus System*, esp. p. 10, n. 2.

103. In Hegel's letters we find a few references, some critical and some laudatory, to Gothic architecture (for instance, *Briefe* 2:340, 353; see *The Letters*, pp. 585–6, 597–8), but they say nothing about its theoretical background. Interpreters more readily find a way to engage Hegel's theory of architecture via classical building art. Yet here Hegel's conception frequently becomes divorced from any philosophical connection. For Hegel's theory of architecture see, for instance, Beat Wyss, 'Klassizismus und Geschichtsphilosophie im Konflikt: Aloys Hirt und Hegel', in *Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik* . . . , pp. 115 ff. Wyss opposes Hegel's theory of architecture in a larger study, although he bases himself exclusively in this case on the 1835 *Aesthetics*. See his *Trauer der Vollendung: Von der Ästhetik des Deutschen Idealismus zur Kulturkritik an der Moderne* (Munich, 1989). The major work by Aloys Hirt on which Hegel based his reflections is *Die Geschichte der Baukunst bei den Alten*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1821–7).

(including the human figure), the divine power inherent in the world, when he elucidates it in the case of the phallic pillar and the lingam. When the power of light produces sound in the symbol (in the stone column)—as Hegel takes to be the case with the Pillar of Memnon, basing himself on reports from Napoleon's expedition in Egypt—the divine becomes spiritual. The same is true of writing as shapes covering the surfaces of obelisks, when these inscriptions enable a work as a whole to become a spiritual explanation of the world. Apparently of lesser interest to him, in contrast, are the figures of the Indian gods prized by the romantics, and instead of them he turned to a work of symbolic architecture, to the Tower of Babel or, more precisely, the Temple of Bel.

In describing this work of art he turns to the poetic-historical account of Herodotus, but equally so to the account in the Bible. He explains that the symbol is not a portrayal of the god himself but instead serves to allot and furnish a place for the god in the world—in a 'work', because the work not only unites people in one religion but also, in their collective activity, makes them into a community. The import of this example from the world of the arts is not only the general point 'that people recorded their highest intuitions in the form of art, becoming conscious of them in the mode of art' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 2), so that 'in many religions' of the most diverse nations 'art... has been the only way in which the idea of spirit introduced itself to them' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 4). Here art additionally serves a different and special purpose. Art can achieve its goal of giving representational form to the idea of spirit only when it at the same time establishes a shared consciousness in the people. This is because their shared labor creates a shape that symbolizes the community, for this shape is at the same time 'a concrete point of unity for the religion' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 198; p. 361 in this text). Hegel calls the Temple of Bel or, as it is described in the Bible, the Tower of Babel, a 'work of everyone' that can serve as the 'point of unity for the people'. The royal tombs of Egypt are such 'works of the nation' too. However, Hegel still reckons Egypt's tombs among the 'instinctive labors' of spirit in history<sup>104</sup> because the consciousness of the community's makeup that they create is only minimally future-directed; because their art remains caught up in reenacting the cultural-political transactions of the real world in the realm of the dead.

For more specific features of the Tower, or the Temple of Bel, Hegel of course turns to Herodotus and to the Bible, and in doing so he repeats a way of deciphering the arts that goes beyond their poetic description, something he also does in other contexts. For these poetic descriptions are informative

104. See *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 203; p. 365 in this text. A similar statement occurs in the *Phenomenology*, § 691. See also n. 11, p. 365 in this text.

only to the limited extent of conceiving the architectonic structure as a 'work'.<sup>105</sup> So, when speaking of the work of art as a 'work of everyone' and as a 'point of unity', Hegel seeks to know the work as grasped in a more wide-ranging sense: that the work of art cannot be understood solely from comparison with all similar works. Instead, because it was produced by everyone together, it leads to the constitution of the culture as a whole. So in any case with the example of the Tower he captures a sense of the shared labor that leads to the erecting of a work of art. The effect of the 'shared character of the construction' is that what takes place in the shared labor and in the sensibility that accompanies this labor, namely, labor in the service of the deity, is 'at the same time a uniting into a state'. The circumstances of the labor provide the structures for interactions among the people. The meaning that people commonly give to this labor, the revering of a god by means of an edifice, provides direction to the activity, a direction binding the individuals together into a community. So the form of the ethical life of a specific historical people is embedded in the labor. Hegel points explicitly to the fact that this shared labor does away with the patriarchal social order and leads to an advance in freedom, namely, to an equality of all in the labor process. In the case of the Tower, the community's 'self-realization' in the shared labor manifests itself in this 'structure rising up to the clouds' (Gen. 11:4). If we are to believe the reports, this work not only brings individuals together but also unites the totality of the peoples of the ancient world (Gen. 11:6), establishing a political community where disparity had been prevalent, and making it possible to bridge over historical differences by shared labor, accordingly by fundamental rules of community activity, that is, by a shared ethical life. The 1823 lecture transcript published in this volume states explicitly that 'the way they all united to accomplish the one work was the bond that linked them to one another, as the laws do so for us' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 197; p. 360 in this text). Right up to the final lecture series Hegel did not deviate from this interpretation of the work of art as a 'point of unity'. He still stressed in 1828–9 that the work of architecture to which he points is the 'work of everyone' and 'hence their center. The laws are the ethical bond; the visible unity is the work' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 106a).

105. The description of the Temple goes back to Herodotus, 1:181; see *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago and London, 1987), p. 115. One transcript from the last lecture series cites Herodotus explicitly (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 106a). On the Tower, see Gen. 11:1–9. At the same time Hegel emphasizes that 'this is not the place to discuss what connection this [Temple of Bel] has with the Tower [of Babel]'. What is of interest (at least for Hegel) is not historical precision but structural evaluation.

For Hegel it is in this event of unification, of establishing ethical life in carrying out shared labor, that humankind steps forth from nature to humanity. In the history-of-philosophy lectures he mentions another myth, one portraying symbolically this same historical function of art. There too the myth states that in the beginning human beings lived as savages, lacking culture, and became 'united in a state' by the shared (even productive) execution of art. Someone taught them the 'arts and sciences' and by doing so educated them to humanity.<sup>106</sup> Here Hegel obviously characterizes the function of art in the sense he seized upon previously in his early reflections on Schiller's writings, and then carried further. Education to humanity is not merely cultivation of the mind, for it is a cultivation that extends through all the forms of one's life. What is initially an 'instinctive kind of labor on the part of spirit' manifests itself in visible symbols, ones that involve the interpretation of an entire world. They convey to human beings a meaning for their labor: reverence for the divine, and together with this meaning, their ethical life, the alignment of their community according to mutually shared principles for its common life.

From this interpretation of a symbolic work of art there remains only one small step to a more explicit version of the establishment of a people's ethical life. So, as the next topic and as a direct continuation of this reflection, Hegel discusses forms of art that accomplish the transition from the merely instinctive labor of spirit to consciousness. Whereas mythology, the interpretation of this occurrence as found in religious writings and also in the historical writings of Herodotus, was principally a retrospective reflection on the interpretive and self-constituting acts of a community as carried out in art, in the next example this act of explicit interpretation falls within the domain of art as such. The historical function of the work of art, a function Hegel had stated initially in the analysis of architecture, he in fact discusses in the same sense in the example of the epic and its historical signification. At this point he can tie into his own reflections from the Jena period, in stressing—in a definition also correctly passed down in the published

106. See Johannes Hoffmeister's edition, *G. W. F. Hegel: Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Hamburg, 1966), p. 209, which is a reprint of the 3rd edn., 1959, as prepared by Friedhelm Nicolin. Several of Hegel's clearest examples of this point come from ancient China. See *Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–6*, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2006–9), 1:108–9; *Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Vol. 1: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3*, ed. and trans. Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford, 2011), pp. 217–18.

edition of the *Aesthetics*—that the epic gives 'expression to all that the nation is in its deeds'.<sup>107</sup>

This concise summation is given quite clearly in the various lecture series on the philosophy of art, but the point is hardly recognizable in the *Aesthetics*. Hegel bases himself on Herder's thought that to understand the epic from any given time, we must stick to the historical situation of its origin and its effect. Hegel concludes from this, first of all, that it makes little sense to assemble the particular historical testimonies to a 'primordial poetry'. Instead one must devote one's efforts to the complete historical richness of what the epic has been, in order to be able to construct a 'world map' of its historical influence. In addition, in the 1823 lectures but also later on, he points out again and again that the epic in its more perfect form is found in Homer. As does Herder in his treatise on *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, Hegel considers Homer to be the 'blind' bard in whose song 'what is substantial is the empowering factor, and the individual is only the formal activity of the producing' (Hotho 1823, Ms. 105; p. 280 in this text). Herder employs this description of Homeric epic to distinguish Greek poetry from Oriental poetry. Hegel positions it as a form mediating between the symbolic and romantic art forms.

When Hegel sets the Homeric epics apart, most people wish to see this as just a variation of the classicism of his own aesthetics, because in Hegel's view the later forms of epic from the Roman world and the Germanic world can scarcely measure up to this original form. Hegel mentions the epics extolled in the reflections of the romantics as counterparts to Homer, but not in order to contrast them with an *aesthetically* perfected form of the epic; instead he does so to distinguish the original epic from later forms because of its *far-reaching effect*. In his opinion this far-reaching effect resides in the

107. See the first edition of the *Aesthetics* 3:415. In this connection, in the lectures Hegel referred to a debate about the collection of the Monumenta Nationum. So 'were Hegel to be president of the Academy [of the Arts] it would be called "Monumenta Nationum". The foundation of the consciousness of the people' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 397). So Hegel stood opposed to the program of the Academy of the Arts, which had taken as its task the preservation of its own nation's culture in the sense of promoting the establishment and historical documentation of a 'national art'. Hegel's reflection is in fact intentionally dissociated from the enterprise of moving the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (which had already appeared in a first volume) to the center of public interest. See Otto Pöggeler, *Preußens Kulturpolitik im Spiegel von Hegels Ästhetik* (Opladen, 1987), (*Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vorträge*. G287). See also Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Galerien und Ausstellungen. Von Boisserée bis zur Düsseldorfer Schule', in *Hegel in Berlin*, pp. 95 ff. On the consequences of this thesis of Hegel's for his students, a thesis also essentially playing a role in Hotho's editing of the *Aesthetics*, see, among others, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, 'Der grosse Repentent deutscher Nation...', pp. 335 ff.

fact that the epic articulates and hands down a form of life, and the fact that the epic provides the foundation for the language, and accordingly the culture, of a community that has grown up historically. This is what matters for Homer's world, in which the gods and heroes—in the sense of the ideals defined in the *Early Theological Writings*<sup>108</sup>—motivate people to imitate or emulate them in their own actions, and by doing so the gods and heroes establish the ethical life of a people as 'substantial ethical life'. In the complex circumstances of the modern world, in particular after the dissolution of art's identity with religion in the epochs and peoples defined by Christianity, art loses this possibility altogether, and the epics too have only partial significance. Hegel goes over the versions of this limitation right up to 'knight-errantry' losing its objective relevance, which finds its adequate artistic presentation in *Don Quixote*, the model for the 'romantic' chivalric epic, and which masters the stylistic device of irony.

This train of thought is easily and clearly understandable in the lectures. Hence the suspicion of classicism, seemingly confirmed by Hegel's reference to the epitome of the epic in Homer, is belied by the way in which the lectures present the conception of the epic. Hegel aligns himself directly with Herder, and so with his own earlier reflections, in emphasizing that the epic 'presents the world of an entire people', and does so right at the moment when a historical consciousness develops 'in which a people emerges to consciousness, coming forth from the stupefaction of its lack of self-awareness' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 401).<sup>109</sup> The same passage goes on to state that, in the epic, art establishes the 'world of a people in its totality, in such a way that spirit is still wholly at home in it.' Just as for the works described previously, the genesis of the epic presupposes the 'entirety of a people', and that 'entirety' forms the foundation for uniting individuals in a 'national

108. See *Early Theological Writings*, p. 267, where Hegel says Jesus teaches and exemplifies a form of ethical life that differs from the (Kantian) conception of commandments and duties.

109. These considerations are found already in Hegel's Jena reflections and in his thoughts from the Heidelberg period. Sulpiz Boisserée mentions, in his *Tagebücher, 1808–1854* (ed. Hans-J. Weitz in 4 vols., Darmstadt, 1978), a conversation with Hegel in which Hegel sets forth the distinction between Homeric epic and, for instance, the *Nibelungenlied*. Hegel remarks that the later epics do not construct the entire world of a people but instead are only in a position to describe phenomena within a more complex world, right up to the ironic resolution in Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. See *Tagebücher* 1:381 (the journal entry for 8 Feb. 1817). See also the statement in Hotho's 1823 transcript (Ms. 95; p. 270 in this text). Cited as additional epics of the 'romantic' art form are Camons (*The Lusiads*), Tasso (*Jerusalem Delivered*), works of Shakespeare and Voltaire, epics about El Cid, Dante's works, and the Arthurian epic, with Pindar as a contrast to them. All appear to be consciously-formed lyric poetry that thematises an aspect of the world, unlike the Homeric epic's constitution of an entire culture.

undertaking', by means of a shared 'purpose' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 411). The epic sings about an 'enlivened, independent ethical world . . . a people that exists in action' (Aachen 1826, Ms. 198–9). Unlike the work of architecture, however, in the epic an individual finds the words that comprehensively thematize this collaborative action, words that by doing so can undergird the tradition of ethical life.<sup>110</sup> The 'poet is the speaker', capturing in speech a representation shared by the people (Kehler 1826, Ms. 405), with the result that the 'poets' have 'given voice to the people' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 380).

Hegel regards Homer as having perfected this function of the epic; namely, that by art Homer brought about, and thematized, the ethical life of a people. This view manifests not the classicism of the *Aesthetics* but a social-historical reflection on what perhaps was historically the case but is not always so. Hegel deems the beautiful Greek polis as a whole to be a 'work of art'.<sup>111</sup> That is, in antiquity art founds the ethical life of a community, of a people, because it grasps, in words as well as in figures, the people's representation of the gods.

By interpreting art as 'work' Hegel also locates the transition from the characterization of the epic to that of Greek sculpture. Echoing Herodotus, he maintains that Homer and Hesiod gave to the Greek people their gods.<sup>112</sup> The significance of such gods, as well as the significance of the heroes represented in the epic, resides in the fact that human beings find in the ideal of the beautiful figure an ethical example to guide their action. Here we have the meaning of the thesis that the gods establish the ethical life of a people.<sup>113</sup> More precisely stated, the meaning of the heroes represented in

110. At this point Hegel seizes upon reflections from his Jena period, ones he developed in debating with Schelling. For Hegel, 'genius' means an individual who shapes a work of art simply derived from a whole, that is, one who finds (*findet*) it rather than invents (*erfindet*) it. As 'existing thought', the work of art constitutes and thematizes directly the ethical life of a people. In the lectures Hegel makes quite clear this embedding of the idea of genius in the conception of the work. As stated in 1826, for instance: 'Of course a people composes' no poems, but an individual can only compose such a poem 'to the extent of belonging to one's own people' (Aachen 1826, Ms. 197; likewise Kehler 1826, Ms. 407). On this interpretation, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst* . . . , esp. pp. 200 ff.

111. See GW 8:263. For an interpretation, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst* . . . , pp. 136 ff.

112. Herodotus 2:53 (*The History*, pp. 154–5).

113. Hegel had already arrived at this same characterization of the work in the *Early Theological Writings*, in portraying the 'ideal' of the founder of the Christian religion. The 'ideal' itself is 'work', namely, the emulation in action that establishes the Kingdom of God. Similar to the religious founder, the Greek figures of the gods also provide the warrant for an



the epic is filled out in the divine figures of the mythology, which in sculpture, from an 'instinct of rationality', get portrayed prominently in human shape. In fact human beings have not only 'taken the gods from what is their own'; they have also formed into gods the substantial powers that constitute 'what is substantial for individuality' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 86; see pp. 263 in this text). This thought that Hegel set forth in the early lecture series he preserves right up into the final series. Hegel repeatedly states that from the 'instinct of rationality' people necessarily adopt the human form as the form of the spiritual, hence take a natural shape like unto the divine for portraying the divine. These gods, engendered from spirit, are works of the 'artists—the poets and prophets and sculptors' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 126). In the final lecture series Hegel specifically emphasizes once again this achievement of art, in setting before our eyes pictorially the figures of the gods 'as products of spiritual consciousness' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 83; see also 29). The poet appears simultaneously as priest and prophet, 'constituting and interpreting his god' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 240; cf. *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 161; p. 328 in this text) and at the same time also creating a *beautiful* work by imagining the divine in a spiritual, natural shape. In the way Hegel defines the 'substantial ethical life', as the form of ethical action present to consciousness that manifests itself, for example, in the effect of the architectural works of the ancient world but also still in part in the epic, this ethical life, in the process of 'personification', finds its own becoming-conscious in a 'genuinely subjective' process (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 96). The beauty of the sculptured image stands for the possibility of making objective the inner powers that guide and move the subject. Arrayed in a beautiful circle of the gods, these inner powers are projected onto the heavens, thus manifesting in a naively direct fashion the ethical life of a people, its guiding principles of action concretized in the beautiful figure, set forth in the mythology.

From this it becomes clear that, in aesthetics, Hegel does not judge the very art he explicitly declared most beautiful from a purely aesthetic perspective; he does not, in a word, judge it to be from that point onward utterly

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ethical action, by founding the ethical life of a people and, in doing so, going beyond the ideal's unworldliness (which was already criticized in the *Early Theological Writings*). Also, from this perspective of the further development of earlier thoughts, the ancient divine figure becomes a work in the full sense of the word. On this issue, see Gethmann-Siefert, *Die geschichtliche Funktion der 'Mythologie der Vernunft'* . . . . Hegel had already developed in the *Phenomenology* (GW 9:379; § 707) the reflection that follows in our text, about the human figure as the natural shape of the spiritual.

the norm for all art. The beautiful art of antiquity is of interest based on its effect, not based on its appearance. In the lectures Hegel sets this art apart from other examples from the history of the arts because it produces the 'highest mode' of a historical 'consciousness of its people', because the artists are at the same time 'teachers of the people' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 29). Ancient art is therefore 'beautiful art' only because it mediates historical experience by at the same time elevating it to something spiritual and intuited, because the spiritual and the intuited find harmony in the shape of the gods. There the measuring stick for what is art and what is not art lies not in beauty isolated from significance, but instead always in beauty paired with historical significance. So, in the modern world too Hegel can see a meaning in the art that is no longer beautiful, and can grasp it as work.

The foothold for an enduring structural foundation for the world of the arts is gained already with the initial description of the works of architecture. For Hegel this foundation resides in the historical significance of the work, a significance he sets forth in the epic but also in the beautiful Greek figures of the gods. A work of art is measured by the plumb line of the historical meaning it achieves. But the historical meaning achieved by the work lies in the ethical orientation of a community. Hegel constantly refers back to this fundamental characteristic in the modern form of the epic too, and likewise in the portrayal of other arts. So this conception of the work, first set forth within the framework of the symbolic art form and which Hegel explicates once again in the classical art form, provides a connection with the other fine arts of painting and music, but especially so with poetry. In the Particular Part of the aesthetics; and finally in the Individual Part, Hegel himself draws this arc from the original development of art to its unfolding in the modern era, and he states more precisely his conception of the work via aesthetic descriptions of individual arts. An imaginative interpretation of the world, at first made immediately in nature, as Hegel discovers it in symbolic architecture, takes on sophistication by the choice of the natural shape of the divine, namely, the human figure, but then also by the choice of the medium—at first in the transition from the three-dimensional form of sculpture to the flat surface of painting, and then building up from the abstract reflectivity of the visible to the pure temporality of sound, and from there to poetry, to resonant speech, which at the same time has inherent significance.

## 2. Art and Time: Painting and Music

In characterizing painting and music, Hegel not only makes an explicit connection with his description of the work as he discussed it previously; he also develops the description further. That is, in characterizing the arts of the modern world too, ones no longer to be included under the classical art form, he proceeds in principle from a unity of art with historical-cultural life. In the forms treated so far, he set forth the identity of the ethical orientation with its configuration by art, an identity presupposing an affirmative identification with the content of art and with an active emulation of it that led to a shared ethical life. In treating subsequent art forms he discusses departures from an immediately affirmative identification of that sort, ranging from having a reflective relation to art to having an ironic-critical relation to it presupposing that the recipient only partially identifies with the work of art. Thus he discusses the kind of art that, considered from the aspect of cultural relevance, has only partial significance for it. In the prior forms the work, its producer, and the viewer, remain in an undivided unity; the artist expresses what constitutes the ethical life of all the people, finding the word for what all, without yet an explicit consciousness of it, have posited in their action. For later epochs and peoples, and for the arts prevalent in these subsequent cultures, Hegel proceeds from people's more complex cultural self-realization and, analogous to it, from art's more complex effect. Nevertheless the description of art as 'work' still underlies these reflections. That is because he examines the effect of art in the individual historical case, considering whether art appears to be an indispensable, constitutive element for the development and shaping of a historical culture, or else, as is often the case, whether art is of limited significance.<sup>114</sup>

114. As an alternative to reconstructing the intellectual unity of the aesthetics with the help of the concept of a work, there are attempts to position the concept of action as the basic category of the aesthetics. Rainer Wiehl develops the most complex version of these reflections in 'Über den Handlungsbegriff als Kategorie der Hegelschen Ästhetik', *Hegel-Studien* (1971) 6:135 ff. The sociology of art reinterprets action sociologically, and Hegel is assumed to hold such a conception of action. These sociological reflections appear far less conclusive than Wiehl's attempt to opt for historical action as the foundation for the interpretation of art. The concept of a work embraces the category of action as one element, namely, the element of establishing the work's purpose: it is said to facilitate ethical action. But the art work does not directly appear to be an action; instead it appears to be expressing the theme of the action by the measure of its justification, namely, as a pronouncement in practical discourse. For that reason the work-concept is, in my opinion, the most inclusive category. The result is that, like all the other interpretations, Wiehl must base himself on the *Aesthetics*, in which the honing of reflections on the conception of the work becomes, in Hotho's hands, far less clear than it is in the lecture transcripts. On how the sociology of art deals with Hegel, see Theodor W. Adorno,

At the outset of characterizing painting in the lectures, Hegel goes into the distinction between painting on the one hand, and sculpture or architecture on the other hand. This reflection, presented directly and economically in the lectures, prompts the editor of the *Aesthetics* to an extended logical speculation for which we find no counterpart in any of the sources for Hegel's aesthetics. In the lectures Hegel does not go into the dialectical transition from sculpture to painting, as beforehand into the transition from architecture to sculpture, but instead takes up, in simple formulations, the distinctions among the arts that are grounded in distinct ways of constituting the world. Whereas painting's world-constituting and its chief medium, color, tie this art as a whole back to its 'subjective' execution, architecture and sculpture allow the divine to appear still within nature itself. In a certain sense architecture can be grasped as the framework encompassing sculpture, which is the more adequate content, the divine in human shape. Painting must posit such a framework on its own. Painting's framework is not provided by the quasi-natural three-dimensionality of an architectural structure, nor is it found in nature itself as the painted figure's surroundings. By setting a framework, by a consciously-chosen slice of the world, painting constructs a *historical* world the content of which is not the beautiful divine figure, static and self-contained, but instead is the appearance of the divine (foremost the Christian God) in the setting and the action.

This greater reflexivity of the content expresses the heightened abstractness of the medium. In virtue of the picture's framework, which appears to be the *consciously posited* border and boundary of a specific situation or action taken from the historical world (not from nature, ostensibly the self-contained ground of architecture and sculpture), the specific design of the world in painting necessarily refers back to its being structured by the subject or, in Hegel's words, its design refers to subjective inwardness. This designed feature of painting, its higher level of reflexivity, influences the possible content of painting, which Hegel defines as historical portrayal (the history of God's dealing with human beings, and their history). But this feature is fundamentally manifest at the same time in the specific

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'Thesen über Kunstsoziologie', in his *Ohne Leitbild. Parva Aesthetica* (Frankfurt am Main, 1964), pp. 94 ff.; Peter Hahn, 'Kunst als Ideologie und Utopie. Über die theoretischen Möglichkeiten eines gesellschaftsbezogenen Kunstbegriffs', in his *Literaturwissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaften: Grundlagen und Modellanalysen, Mit Beiträgen von Horst Albert Glaser et al.* (Stuttgart, 1971), pp. 151 ff.; Thomas W. H. Metscher, 'Hegel und die philosophische Grundlegung der Kunstsoziologie', in *Literaturwissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaften*, pp. 7 ff.; Arnold Hauser, *Soziologie der Kunst* (Munich, 1974). For a critique, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Zur Begründung einer Ästhetik nach Hegel', *Hegel-Studien* (1978), 13:273 ff., esp. 276 ff.

sensuousness of the material, in fact in the color, which this art form first brings forth out of itself, brings to the dynamics of viewing, to the consequent interplay of light and dark.<sup>115</sup> 'Color is the element of painting. With this, painting relinquishes the objective character of matter, its total spatiality and externality, and is the abstracting from it.' The ensemble of light and darkness that makes itself specific in color lets 'nature become subjective'; light as the specific medium 'is the physical I' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 233; p. 390 in this text). Of course architecture or sculpture is 'certainly something visible, but it is not abstract visibility', what we have in the characterization of painting. The abstractly visible nature of painting fashions, so to speak, a medium of its own alongside the form, the line or contours. Painting is visibility, and brings itself about as visibility. In Hegel's terms, painting is 'particularized visibility, subjectively in itself. More specifically, it determines itself in color' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 37; p. 217 in this text). In his 1823 lecture transcript Hotho notes that this is how painting achieves a 'totality of appearance'. In the final lecture series Hegel even devotes a reflection of his own to this circumstance: 'The background intrudes, a relationship that must be sundered or cut off; the connection must be clearly excised (framework)' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 129). By the act of conscious 'world-constitution', that is, by severing the viewing from any sort of tangible context, painting frees itself from its ties to nature. Art relinquishes 'what is utterly material' in order solely to express and articulate the 'abstractly ideal sense of sight'.<sup>116</sup>

According to Hegel, one purpose of painting already becomes clear in the specific medium of this art, a purpose not falling under the traditional conception of the imitation of nature. Whereas architecture and sculpture let nature become visible as nature formed and shaped, painting, as a consequence of its specific medium, becomes disconnected from nature. Its

115. See Gethmann-Siefert, 'Phänomen versus System', pp. 34 ff.; Bernadette Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits in den Berliner Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst', in *Phänomen versus System*, pp. 91 ff., esp. 118 ff.

116. *Hotho* 1823, Ms. 37; p. 217 below. Bernadette Collenberg points out that Hegel defined this characteristic of color in a similar way in §320 of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*. There too emphasis falls on the sense of sight, whereas in the *Aesthetics* Hotho renders 'sight' (*Gesicht*) most often as 'feeling' (*Gefühl*), while in his 1823 transcript he writes *Gesicht* in this context. The fact that transformation of specific sensibility (the sense of sight) into a general reference to sensibility (feeling) does not accurately relay Hegel's intention is clear from an additional remark in the *Encyclopedia* passage: 'For sight there are only colors; the shape pertains to feeling, and for sight it is only something inferred from the alternation of darkness and light' (addendum to §320). On this point, see Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits...', p. 122.

shapes are not sheerly natural shapes, nor are they even the natural shape of the spiritual, nor is there cohesion, the world of shapes. Consequently both, shapes and world, are portrayed in the sense of a historical development, and the medium of this portrayal is simply the more reflective medium of painting. By structuring a world in which the divine appears once again principally in human shape, but at the same time appears in action, painting achieves a higher degree of abstraction. In doing so it gains the possibility of depicting setting and action, and of course of depicting them in turn by the color, which, in the *consummated act* of viewing, constitutes the form (the spaciousness) on the flat surface. Therefore painting rests on an inwardly reflected sensibility, as though reproaching the sense of touch. Hegel characterizes this sensibility principally as 'more abstract' or, in the way the lectures even put it, as a sensibility of the 'theoretical sense'. The senses of sight and hearing, the medium of painting and that of music, fall under this theoretical sense.

As he did with the art forms discussed previously, Hegel commences his portrayal of the romantic art form with art that has the divine as its content. Thus Hegel validates the painting in Christian art as distinguished because its specific sensibility, the visible clarity constituted by the play of colors, puts the artist in a position to portray vividly the operations of the Christian God in history, the specific mythological representations of the Christian religion. In the published *Aesthetics* it seems as though, in the realm of painting too, 'beautiful' art coupled with exalted content, namely, divine content, is considered normative for all other versions of the combination of form (here: play of colors) and content; but the lectures provide a different picture. In the 1835 *Aesthetics*, the beautiful portrayal of God in Renaissance painting provides the norm and reference point for an aesthetic critique of all the works deviating in beauty, or relevant content, from this art that is exalted because it is beautiful. Consequently, basing themselves on this presentation, people criticize Hegel's conception of painting as classical. Yet we find no such 'construct' of the various branches of painting in the lecture transcripts. Instead an interesting modification comes to light in the lectures, one that is surely unexpected. To the description of painting Hegel attaches a new correlation of beauty with cultural relevance, namely, that art is bound up with the 'work'. The ideality of the work of art, the unity of beauty and divinity, is *not* presupposed as being the culmination of Christian painting. Nor is there any gradation of art's subjects extending from God the Father, through the portrayal of Christ, to Mary and the saints.

Hegel stresses first of all that Christianity's religious images do not have to be beautiful, and in doing so he picks up once again a critique we find in his

earliest known statement about Christian painting.<sup>117</sup> Now too he stresses that painting remains thoroughly problematic when viewed from purely aesthetic perspectives, above all from the demand for beauty and harmony. In the lectures Hegel develops his conception of painting further, but in such a way that 'no-longer-beautiful' painting is not to be devalued aesthetically just because, in comparing this painting with portrayals of God that excel because they are beautiful, we would have to demote it to being what is inartistic. So Hegel now emphasizes that the universally relevant religious content of painting, as Christian art, of its own accord spreads beyond the beautiful portrayal's frame of reference. Coloration and configuration must abandon harmony and must lead to symbols of the incongruity between the intuition of the divine and the significance of the divine.

For this reason the subjects that interest Hegel are not the beautiful portrayals of God or of Christ, but instead the portrayal of Christ as the suffering one and as a child. There remains only one 'beautiful' subject matter in Christian painting, the portrayals of the two Marys—of course Mary the Mother of God, as well as Mary Magdalene 'the beautiful sinner'. According to Hegel, the Mary figure manifests the beautiful *nature* of the love for God, which comes to light in the symbol of unlimited human devotion. That is why in the lectures we find reflections concentrating on the types of images marked by an incongruity between content and form (such as the portrayals of the suffering of the child of God). In addition, the most superb configurations of the relationship to God, superb because successful, consist of the portrayals of the two Marys (of the Mother of God and of the devotion of the converted sinner). Hegel first takes up the Madonna portrayals (he discusses the portrayal of Mary Magdalene in the context of the story of Jesus). In this 'natural shape' of the God-relationship, inherently symbolizing the living fulfillment of the love of God, Hegel sees the only possibility, analogous to Greek sculpture, for exalting the natural figure of the human being without infringing on the symbol of the Christian representation of God. Therefore this portrayal remains the only one within the sphere of Christian painting that is both 'beautiful' and 'significant',

117. See *Theologische Jugendschriften*, p. 358 (a passage not included in the English translation, *Early Theological Writings*). In this reflection Hegel juxtaposes painting, as Medieval art, to Greek antiquity and the representation of beauty achieved in antiquity. In 1820, at the latest, after visiting the art museum in Dresden together with Friedrich Förster, he revised this judgment. See *Briefe* 2:268 and 290, and 3:48–9 (*The Letters*, pp. 609–10). Hegel's contacts with Karl Ludwig Fernow, who taught aesthetics at Jena, and with the art historian Sulphiz Boisserée at Heidelberg, were certainly decisive for his characterization of painting. On this, see Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits...'.

because its content and form remain congruent. Hegel already looks upon the other beautiful portrayal, of the Christian God in the motif of the Christ Child, as being less successful. In fact this subject matter is, at the least, problematic as to the congruence of its content and its form. Furthermore, especially in the case of Dutch painting and in the old German painting, not all portrayals of the Child appear to be successful ones. For Hegel the portrayal of God the Father, but also portrayals of the suffering Christ or of the martyrs, remain an altogether problematic subject matter. In these portrayals the beauty of the natural human figure shatters against the divine, absolute content that must be presented as history, as the process of God's dealings with human beings; with these portrayals too much is expected from the slow development of painting's technical possibilities. Only the reflexivity of color can make God's involvement in the historical process, God's historicity, present for us. But this kind of natural configuration, the portrayal of God in the setting and in the action, is not reserved solely for the portrayal of God; it can also extend to the 'prose of life'; it can extend from divine affairs to everyday things.

There is evidently a difficulty above all in making the Christian representation of God vivid, via the medium of painting, in modern religious images. If the presentation of the *Aesthetics* is credible, then Hegel addressed the 1828 art exhibition of the Berlin Academy of the Arts about these and similar images. His verdict was negative: 'Today's art exhibition contains, for instance, a number of paintings all of which, from one and the same (so-called Düsseldorf) school, have borrowed subjects from poetry, and indeed from the aspect of poetry portrayable solely as sensory experience. When we view these paintings repeatedly and more closely, they appear right away to be sweet and insipid.'<sup>118</sup> In the various lecture series Hegel certainly delivers a considerably more nuanced statement about the Düsseldorf painters. Although he repeats, from contemporary journals, the aesthetic criticism of these images as 'sweet and insipid', this differs from the purely aestheticist polemic of the *Aesthetics*. When beauty gets emphasized as the only relevant aspect, such a purely aesthetic critique with reference to the beauty of the images, and according to the norms for a beautiful performance, quite explicitly contradicts Hegel's intention.

118. *Aesthetics* (first edition), 1:208. This is familiar to us as Hegel's verdict, although he adopted it from *Schorns Kunst-Blatt*, which dismisses the Schadow School as 'too French' and disparages its 'sweet sentimentality'. [Th.] Friedrich Wilhelm von Schadow (1788–1862), a German painter, headed the Düsseldorf Academy from 1826 to 1859.



In Libelt's direct transcript of the final lecture series we find a decisive reflection on the fact that what matters in Christian painting is not the beauty of the images but instead exclusively whether these images can be useful for devotion (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 63—dated 18 Nov. 1828). In Hegel's view the religious images of the Düsseldorf painters are unable to evoke devotion in the way the old Christian images do, images that integrate individuals into the community through the viewing of religious figures. That is because the Düsseldorf painters endeavor to reestablish, via feeling, the bygone unity and universality of religious conviction.<sup>119</sup> In the end Hegel criticizes *this* aspect of their work. Throughout the lectures on aesthetics he in fact emphasizes that feeling is not sufficient to constitute a religious community and so, as a general point, feeling cannot be the foremost medium of art. So throughout, with his criticism of contemporary Christian art, Hegel neither aligns himself with Goethe's evaluation of the works of the Nazarenes (and implicitly of the Düsseldorf school) as 'pious non-art', nor does he adopt the position of Hotho's sheerly aesthetic polemic.<sup>120</sup> This critique of the Düsseldorf painters in the lectures, based on a purely esthetic evaluation of their religious art, appears to be illuminating and well-grounded in contrast to the aesthetic condemnations in the *Aesthetics*. Where art has lost its setting in life, where it has become estranged from the general devotional practice of the community, is removed from it and set in a museum, then, facing the demand for aesthetic qualities, art becomes subjected to a pattern of judgment and a system of values with which it initially did not have to comply and also to which it cannot conform in all its rules. Christian images have not been produced to be beautiful, but instead to make the community's religious representation vividly present, to serve the carrying out of the cultus by illustrating the contents of the faith. But if religious art is based sheerly on the subjectivity of a religious execution, if its basis is confined to feeling and this feeling becomes the exclusive content of the images, then, as Hegel explains, these paintings lack the truth of the religion just as they attenuate the possibilities of its presentation in painting.

119. See Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Die Kritik an der Düsseldorfer Malerschule bei Hegel und den Hegelianer', in *Düsseldorf in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (1750-1850)*, ed. Gerhard Kurz (Düsseldorf, 1984), pp. 263 ff., esp. p. 276.

120. How extensively Hotho's polemic mirrors his own opinion and not Hegel's is evident from his history of Dutch painting. See especially *Aesthetics* (first edition), 1:262-3, 265. To the contrary, Hotho praises great religious art, which, like ancient art, 'is said to be proper and great art, art with religious content'. [Tr.] The Nazarenes were German, Swiss, and Austrian painters who collaborated, from 1809 onward, in the belief that art ought to be exclusively moral and religious.

The various transcripts convey this train of Hegel's thought extremely concisely, but unanimously and quite precisely. There may also have been a purely historical reason for this, because in this reflection Hegel opposed a current trend shaping the background that his auditors took for granted in their approach to art. Already in his teaching activity in Heidelberg, thus surely prior to commencing the treatment of aesthetics as part of his system proper, Hegel came into contact with the enthusiasm for rediscovered older painting. The collection of the Boisserée brothers had already provided the occasion for his involvement in Heidelberg with the issue of the contemporary relevance of these older pictures.<sup>121</sup> Hegel possessed lithographs from the collection made by Johann Nepomuk Strixner,<sup>122</sup> and in his art travels he had already viewed famous paintings in Munich (1815), in Dresden (1820), and then in Vienna and in the Netherlands (more intensively at the outset of his teaching in Berlin). But in the lectures, as a reflection of his personal enthusiasm, we find simply a skeptical indication as to how inappropriate it is to evaluate these pictures aesthetically. Finally, Hegel also regards the relocation of these pictures to museums as a consequent misinterpretation of their actual claim to relevance, because preserving the pictures as cultural artifacts removes them from the arena in which they were originally meaningful. Also, the act of historical conservatorship in fact bypasses the original role of the pictures in the practice of devotion and gives them a new meaning, that of a cultural heritage.<sup>123</sup> Hegel has a thoroughly positive assessment of this new significance of the older art, as we see in his remarks in the last lecture series, on the painting gallery of the

121. See n. 117 above, as well as the contributions to the anthology *Die Bildersammlung der Brüder Boisserée. Ein Schritt in der Begründung des Museums*, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. Pöggeler (Bonn, 1995). See also Gethmann-Siefert's introduction to *Welt und Wirkung von Hegels Ästhetik*, pp. V ff. [Tr.] Sulpiz (Sulpice) Boisserée (1783–1854) and his brother Melchior Boisserée (1786–1851) assembled some 200 pictures in Stuttgart (which is not far from Heidelberg).

122. Sulpiz Boisserée sent some of these lithographs to Hegel in Berlin in 1827. See *Briefe* 3:176, as well as the note on p. 416; *The Letters*, pp. 336–7. In the same letter Hegel expresses the hope that he will soon see famous paintings in the Netherlands by Jan van Eyck and Hans Memling. Strixner (1782–1855) published the series of lithographs, beginning in 1825. For the following mention of Hegel's travels, see *Briefe* 2, Nrs. 357 ff., 362–3, and 3:53 ff. 73.

123. See Otto Pöggeler, 'Hegels Bildungskonzeption im geschichtlichen Zusammenhang', *Hegel-Studien* (1980), 15:241 ff. Also of interest in this context is Hegel's characterization of the 'Humanus' as the new sacred object of art, for the 'Humanus' corresponds to the literary model in Goethe's epic, *Die Geheimnisse* (*The Secrets*), the model of the human being, 'human' because cultured. If this 'Humanus' becomes the 'new sacred object', then the productive and receptive intentions of art expand once again, in what for Hegel is the characteristic synthesis of perspectives. For a more detailed interpretation of this point, see pp. 141 ff. in this text.

Berlin Museum.<sup>124</sup> However, even in acknowledging the historical relevance as well as the contemporary relevance of the older Christian painting, Hegel sticks firmly to differentiating art's immediate influence from a modern, historical-reflective appropriation of art. Weighty as Hegel's reservations are about the lost relevance of the pictures from old Christian painting, pictures universally received with enthusiasm, his reservations are even more pronounced when it comes to modern attempts at relevance. But these very reflections show that the issue is not, and ought not to be, an aesthetic critique of the pictures. In each case Hegel asks about Christian art's place in culture. Whereas the old painting had its 'setting in life', and with it had its own undeniable relevance, modern religious art must make do without the universal significance established by the cultic framework. Modern religious art remains aimed at individual, subjective inwardness and for that reason it cannot actually become a 'work'.

Hegel presents his critique of art in similar fashion in two additional examples: the renewed debate about the possibilities of idealized portraiture in connection with several pictures by Franz Gerhard von Kügelgen, and the critique of several pictures in the Berlin art exhibit with poetic subject matter. Since in the transcripts and notes available for the preparation of the *Aesthetics* Hotho found rather little about contemporary religious painting, he resorted to Hegel's review of religious pictures by his contemporaries, and integrated this textual fragment into the *Aesthetics*, even though Hegel may not have discussed these pictures himself in the lectures. In a review Hegel addresses four works on religious themes exhibited by von Kügelgen in 1820 at the Dresden art exhibition.<sup>125</sup> Hegel's description of the von Kügelgen pictures goes into the issue of whether an idealized portrait is in a position to portray a specific religious content, along the lines of classical historical painting or devotional pictures. The portraits pose two problems. The first one is that the portraits are marked by the 'demeanor of modern

124. The *Aesthetics* especially highlights this thought and links it with an extensive critique of the pictures in the exhibit, a critique for its own part not traceable to Hegel. See Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Galerien und Ausstellungen: Von Boisseree bis zur Düsseldorfer Schule', p. 75, and 'Die Wiederentdeckte Malerei', pp. 230 ff., both essays in *Hegel in Berlin*.

125. See *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 531 ff.; Karl Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844), 351-2. The 1820 journey to Dresden that Hegel made with Friedrich Förster was the occasion for these review notes. ([Tr.] Caspar David Friedrich, a prominent painter, lived and worked off and on in von Kügelgen's house. In that same year, 1820, von Kügelgen was killed by a thief while en route to Dresden.) In case he wished to utilize them for his lectures, Hegel recorded these reflections in Dresden but, judging by the testimony of the transcripts, he did not present them there. An interpretation of this matter is in Stemmerich and Gethmann-Siefert, 'Hegels Kügelgen-Rezension...', pp. 139 ff.

facial features', since they were unable (as the Greek images of the gods do) to express these features completely as 'distinctive shapes resting within themselves'. Hence Hegel contrasts von K gelgen's portraits with the facial features of ancient plastic art, though not in order to make an issue of their lack of beauty but instead to emphasize the limited expressive possibility of portrayal in portraiture. The second problem is that the basic character of the divine person cannot be captured in the portraiture mode; instead it can only be captured in the portrayal of a historical situation. Hegel exempts only two subjects from this constraint of the transition from the stationary portrayal befitting sculpture to the portrayal of action in a specific setting. They are, on the one hand, Correggio's *Mary Magdalene*, and on the other, the typical portrayal of the Virgin Mary. In the figure of Mary Magdalene, Correggio succeeds in portraying the 'basic nature', what is 'eternal, everlasting', and he does so 'in an expression that pervades the whole, so that in this characteristic there can be no before and after, nothing other than it.' In addition to Correggio's portrayal of Mary Magdalene, only the portrayal of the Mother of God is in a position to let the 'inwardness within the external' (*von der Pfordten*, 1826, Ms. 72) appear purely, to represent the divine as the 'basic nature' within a figure. The same does not hold good for other portrayals of religious subjects. That is why Hegel stresses that neither the person of Jesus nor the disciples 'in all of their individuality' can interest us. They achieve their relevance only 'through individual scenes from their lives', namely, by the possibility of letting a religious representation become vivid. Hegel presents this same view with respect to the fourth of von K gelgen's pictures, that of the *Prodigal Son*. Whereas the *Aesthetics* states that this picture expresses remorse and sorrow 'most beautifully', in his review notice Hegel emphasizes that, although these emotions are 'expressed in a noteworthy way', there is 'no absolute situation to be found' in them.<sup>126</sup> Here too the issue is the basis for painting's ability to provide an ideal portrayal of the divine. Even where painting does not resort to the individuality of feeling but instead resorts to a portrayal in portraiture—a portrayal that initially seems to correspond to the apprehension of the configuration of divinity in the plastic arts, because the expression of heightened inwardness in it can be linked with the beauty of the form—Hegel is not unfaithful to his systematic conception, although he would have had to be if his own aesthetics had been classical aesthetics. Instead, even in the case of the beautiful

126. On the discrepancy between 'most beautifully' and 'in a noteworthy way', see *Aesthetics* (first edn.) 3:79.

shapes of paintings, he points out that the issue is not 'beautiful' portrayals of the gods in the sense of ancient plastic art; instead, the very beauty of the picture shows this portrayal of the divine to be insufficient. Ideality and 'basic nature'—thus the religious representations foundational to the portrayal—are, with few exceptions, mutually distinct (the exceptions being the aforementioned natural shapes of the relation to God, namely, the figure of Mary the Mother of God, and that of the beautiful sinner woman in the setting of her devotion to the savior).

After treating painting, Hegel discusses the issue in music of whether, from a philosophical perspective, precedence should be given to vocal music or to purely instrumental music. Hegel decides, albeit hesitantly, in favor of music accompanied by words. Whereas pure sound can lead to indulging oneself merely in subjective feeling, the words of poetry attach the musically-stimulated feeling to thought. Hegel discusses a similar phenomenon in the realm of painting, in a few contemporary pictures with poetic content. The painter's basic problem actually is how to portray in a static way a more complex representation of God, namely, the representation of a historical God. Doing so consists of consciously accentuating, by the framework, the character of the execution, and integrating the nature of its form, as a process, into its constitution through the play of colors. These means possibly suffice for making this representation of God vivid. Portraying what is intended as action amounts to freezing this action in turn into a specific (and so, bounded) historical setting. A further step in the direction of sufficient reflectiveness lies in the inherently ambiguous, pictorial portrayal of God as a child, as well as in the figure of the suffering God, as no longer a beautiful figure. Because of these factors, the means employed by painting are of course more suitable than those of sculpture for giving vivid expression to the changed view of God [as childlike, and as suffering], although the portrayal itself becomes dispersed into a multiformity of the one God, a multiformity that supersedes the uniqueness and harmony of the beautiful divine figure.

Hegel brings all these considerations together in his descriptions of contemporary religious pictures, uncovering the problematic feature of painting here in a sharper form. Neither feeling as an equivalent to the representation of God, nor representation of the divine in an updated illustration, by portraying everyday things (in portraits and historical painting), suffices to express what is intended. In Hegel's view, whereas words as the representational vehicle carry music beyond itself and achieve a higher objectivity than that of feeling, painting, with all the sophisticated reflectivity of its medium (in contrast to sculpture), remains caught up in a static portrayal of

historical events. Action coalesces around the situation; in most cases the situation loses the unity of the beautiful figure and, as portrayal, it becomes 'problematic'. Only refracting the divine in a human mirror, in the image of trusting devotion, preserves the 'beautiful natural shape' in the artistic rendering of God. Symptomatic of this portrayal of God, however, is loss of the divine's objectivity. Its reduction to an inwardness become (vividly) external prepares the way for the withdrawal into this inwardness on the part of the romantic art form.

Wherever Hegel takes up contemporary works critically, these thoughts form the foundation of his critique. That is also evident in an actual controversy at the Berlin art exhibition about the works of the Düsseldorf painters, a controversy in which Hegel took part and which, like a judge of art, (according to the *Aesthetics*) he pursued as a critic of aesthetic inadequacy. In the lectures Hegel speaks instead about the problematic nature of rendering a representation by means of painting. The much-admired pictures of the Düsseldorf painters at the 1828 art exhibition, pictures devoted to poetic subjects, prompted different reservations on Hegel's part than they did from the critics of that day. These reservations certainly take a different form than does the criticism of an entire series of such pictures in the *Aesthetics*. The *Aesthetics* states: 'Most of the finest paintings portray a pair of lovers, such as Romeo and Juliet or Rinaldo and Armida, apart from any specific setting, with the result that what each pair does and expresses is nothing beyond being mutually in love, thus turned toward one another, glancing most lovingly at one another, gazing most lovingly.'<sup>127</sup> In contrast to this polemical trivializing of poetic painting in the *Aesthetics*, in the lectures Hegel asks us to consider the fact that, in attempting to make the subjective inwardness of feeling objectively visible, the pictures had to have failed. So, on a cursory reading his description does resemble that of the *Aesthetics*, but it has a somewhat different intention. In the final lecture series we find this statement: 'In the painting of fishermen and nymphs [by which he means a picture by Hübner, depicted according to a ballad by Goethe] we saw the inner longing or the loving couple. Rinaldo and his beloved. [There] the whole is set forth in the loving gaze of the eyes' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 130a). Whereas Hotho, writing in the name of Hegel, disparages Hübner's picture because the fisherman has 'a very prosaic countenance', one we 'would not regard as

127. *Aesthetics* (second edn.) 3:84-5. For an interpretation of this passage, see Gethmann-Siefert, 'Die Kritik an der Düsseldorfer...'. [Tr.] Rinaldo and Armida are lovers in Torquato Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered* (1580-1), an epic poem about the First Crusade.

capable of deeper, finer sensibilities',<sup>128</sup> Hegel addresses the problem that a feeling, one of loving devotion, must be captured in static fashion in a single gesture. He is not interested in the heated controversy about the beauty of this image or about its triviality, that is, its significance. His concern instead is simply the possibility of portraying subjective inwardness as such by the medium of painting.

In the final lecture series Hegel announces with utter clarity the basis for his skepticism: 'When it comes to inwardness, painting too takes a back seat to the art of poetry. As internally self-moving, what is inward can be explicated only by the poetic art. Inwardness is the lyrical element of sensibility. When painting ventures into what is lyrical, it misunderstands its own medium. People often talk a lot about the poetry of painting, but speaking this way is simply unsatisfactory and is a mistake' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 130).<sup>129</sup> However, for Hegel, unlike for Hotho and so for the 1835 *Aesthetics*, the mistake made by contemporary pictures lies not in the triviality of the portrayal but instead in a blending of incompatible elements. In Hegel's systematic explanation, the possibilities of portrayal in painting reside in portraying a specific setting in the frozen action of a picture's constellation of gestures and figures. Even in the painter's medium, preeminently the medium of color, this feature of executing something given objectively is sustained first of all in portraying God's dealing with human beings, and then in the everyday interaction of people with other people and with things. Thus Hegel considers that, as a rule, when a poetic painting can be meaningful, 'the explication of its sensibility' must 'be dramatic' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 130). The only thing that painting can adequately express is the action that has taken place in the situation, not the subjective inwardness of a feeling. Accordingly, and at odds with the *Aesthetics*, Hegel's skepticism

128. *Aesthetics* (2nd edn.) 3:85. See also the following note. [Th.] Rudolf Julius Benno Hübner (1806-82) was a German historical painter of the Düsseldorf School, and also a poet.

129. Hegel parts ways with the contemporary art critics, who deliberate whether or not they may suppose that the 'poetizing brush strokes' of the painters are capable of 'a new and thoroughly independent poetry of color', following poetic models. See Carl Seidel, 'Die schönen Künste in Berlin', *Kunstblatt* (1828), issue 10, pp. 221-2. The systematic intent of Hegel's critique is correctly conveyed only in part in the 1835 *Aesthetics*. Hotho multiplies the examples provided in the lectures, but boils Hegel's reflections down to a sheerly aesthetic critique. One example of his description not going far enough is found in the examination of Wilhelm von Schadow's *Mignon*, a painting the lectures do not discuss. (In any case none of the transcripts mention this picture, which the art critics enthusiastically announced as being in the forefront of the 1828 exhibition by the Berlin Academy of the Arts.) See *Aesthetics* 3:86: 'Such an utter hodgepodge can of course engage our imagination, but the painting cannot, as Schadow intended, portray the setting and the action without specificity, simply by Mignon's figure and physical appearance'.

about these pictures labors under a clearly systematic handicap. Hegel's skepticism involves painting's expressive possibilities as such, and ultimately the main issue is in turn whether, with these and similar pictures, one can be dealing with works of art in the full sense, with works in a position to establish the identity of a community. Hegel's answer is 'no', and so he has to uphold his thesis of art's character as something past. Certainly Hegel scrutinizes this step in multiple ways himself before he finally makes it systematically binding with the 1827 *Encyclopedia*. Also, in dealing with painting by critiquing a few contemporary pictures, he does not exhaust the arguments for and against painting's all-encompassing significance. Nor does Hegel attach this view exclusively to 'beautiful' portrayal or to pictures with 'grand' content (which in the published *Aesthetics* always means 'religious' content).

Whereas the 1835 *Aesthetics* places the Christian paintings of the Renaissance at the apex, discovering in them the truly beautiful, relevant, and at the same time ideal image, in the lectures Hegel takes up just a few works of the Italian painters, and does so only in passing.<sup>130</sup> Hence he by no means counts the Renaissance works as unsurpassable because of the beauty of their portrayals of God and Christ, as the *Aesthetics* would have us believe.<sup>131</sup> In virtue of its primary content, painting inevitably becomes 'no-longer-beautiful' art, and precisely because of that it can, in aesthetically problematic portrayals, be consistent with its own intentions. In a counter-move to the 'no-longer-beautiful' art that grasps the divine in the setting and action, beauty and formal perfection gravitate to the genres of painting with inconsequential content, ones that, at least in contemporary judgment, get dismissed as hardly worth attention, and in art exhibitions too get displayed in less prominent positions. In contrast, in a detailed reflection in his lectures, Hegel prizes the art of everyday matters, the Dutch genre painting and the still life.

130. Hegel of course knew about the first volume, appearing in 1827, of Carl von Rumohr's three-volume *Italienischen Forschungen* (Berlin and Stettin, 1827-31). However, even in his final lecture series he did not change his outlook. He did indeed mention then that Italian painting too, like Dutch painting, developed from, and then cast off, religious content. 'Italian art likewise moved on to cheerful topics of civil life' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 135). However, he singled out the Dutch paintings as truly fine art. See Gethmann-Siefert, 'Hegel über Kunst und Alltäglichkeit', pp. 252 ff. For his reflections Hotho bases himself substantially on the last lecture series, in which Hegel, prompted by von Rumohr's work, makes more extensive reference to Italian painting. See Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits...', esp. pp. 138-9.

131. See, above all, Kehler 1826, Ms. 346-7. On this point, also see Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits...', pp. 145 ff.



Hegel imparted to his students, and demonstrably also to his disciple Hotho, an enthusiasm for the old German and Dutch painting.<sup>132</sup> Yet Hegel himself hesitated to incorporate this information and these experiences without further ado into his philosophy of art.<sup>133</sup> In places where the lectures dealt with individual arts and artistic trends, Hegel purposely made up his mind, as he proceeded, about this possibility of transferring his own individual experience of art, and his own cultivation and connoisseurship, historical as well as tasteful, into his philosophical aesthetics. He developed a way of linking or integrating this other kind of knowledge and opinion about art with the philosophy of art. One example is that his celebration of Dutch painting goes hand-in-hand with reflection based on art history and the philosophical examination of this art. The argument that Hegel introduced to justify his praise of Dutch pictures he derived from the theoretical determination of the significance of color. Because of the subordinate status of the content itself, in these pictures the color gains an artistic significance of its own.

Whereas the 'idealistic' and the 'old German' emphases made the revival of Christian painting all the more conducive to 'inferior products and mediocre talents' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 52), the Dutch took 'everyday actuality' as their topic. Owing to their religious relevance, Hegel exempted the old Christian pictures from aesthetic criticism; but pictures that make the 'prose of life' become vivid hold up well when subjected to an aesthetic critique. Dutch art is the art of what appears, and in allowing for the appearance of what is beautiful in everyday life, Dutch art attains an unsurpassable perfection. In all the lecture series Hegel goes into this characteristic feature of the Dutch pictures. He states: 'In their beauty, the aspect of appearing has been made prominent' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 186; p. 349 in this text). The content itself is of lesser interest than the perfect configuration of the content, the superior handling of color and, as Hegel defines it, the 'musicality of the color'. Hegel prepared the way for these thoughts in his theoretical engagement with Goethe's *Farbenlehre* (*Theory of Color*) as well as with Goethe's

132. Like Hegel, Hotho too traveled to see, among others, works by the Dutch. But in his case this historical interest was from the outset based in a 'speculative art history' that in turn includes enthusiasm for art, the elevation of feeling, information, and reflection, all into a knowledge about art, comprised of decidedly aesthetic judgments of value, that Hotho published in numerous reviews and critiques, but also in historical works. Corresponding elements of the *Aesthetics* clearly bear the impress of this conception and thus stand in contradiction to Hegel's intention.

133. In Hegel's letters from Vienna we find him considering specifically how these experiences could be reflected upon philosophically. See *Briefe*, 3:53 ff.; *The Letters*, pp. 614-30.

translation of, and commentary on, Diderot's *Versuch über die Malerei* (*Essay on Painting*). In studying these writings Hegel acquired his conception of coloration, of the constitutive significance color has for painting.<sup>134</sup> He emphasizes examples of this significance of color in the pictures that the Dutch produced after the Reformation, and thus ranks them as very accomplished paintings. Of course Hegel does point out in the final lecture series that the Italian painters too, above all Leonardo da Vinci and Correggio, mastered the art of coloration (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 137). Whereas in the Italians' pictures the content, the portrayal of the divine and of God's history with human beings, was still the decisive element, the Dutch were able to expand the appearance of beauty to include all things, even everyday things. They studied, 'so to speak, the musicality of color, evoking the shininess of metal, of luggage, and the like, by the arrangement of the colors' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 56).

In the 1823 transcript by Hotho, presented in this volume, we find an indication of Hegel's assumption that the 'magic of color' opens the way for the transition to the next art, that of music, as a further form of sensuously mediated spirituality. 'The objective aspect is, so to speak, already suspended, and the effect hardly takes place any longer through something material. The art of music emerges wholly on the subjective side' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 245; p. 400 in this text). The interesting aspect of this thought, Hegel's linking of consummate beauty with the everyday character of the content, is absent from the published *Aesthetics*. That is because Hotho directs these reflections on the musicality of color, on the magic of the beautiful appearance, not to the art of the commonplace, the still life or genre painting, but instead to art with religious content, emphatically to the 'idealistic' sector of painting, to beautiful Renaissance painting. As it is portrayed by the *Aesthetics*, Renaissance painting achieves, via the 'music of color' or the 'magic of the coloration', a revival of the beautiful figure of sculpture. Hegel, to the contrary, directs this description in terms of color

134. See Collenberg, 'Hegels Konzeption des Kolorits...', esp. pp. 132 ff. Hotho repeated this consideration in his own 'Travel Studies on Painting', in describing several works of Renaissance painting, and he also put it in the *Aesthetics* in this context. See Gethmann-Siebert, 'H. G. Hotho: Kunst als Bildungserlebnis...', esp. pp. 249–50. In a September 1835 issue of the *Venice Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände*, Hotho writes, in 'Reiseskizzen aus den Briefen eines Kunstfreundes': 'Whoever does not understand how to see and enjoy this magic of coloration can pronounce no decisive judgment about Titian'. He even continues (in referring to the portrayal of John the Baptist): 'It was as though sculpture had sought to conjoin itself at this point with the music of the color, once again in a plastic earnestness of its own' (correspondence report no. 29, p. 1178).

not only to different pictures than Hotho does, but also at the same time to the contrasting material context. His concern is to highlight both the beauty of the *Dutch* pictures and—by pointing to the color—precisely the independence of painting in contrast to sculpture. Furthermore, by separating the relevance of the content from the beauty of the pictures, Hegel prepares for a complexity in the artistic execution, one he develops further in music. Consummate beauty on the part of the portrayal and the configuration, their formal perfection, does not have to emerge coupled with historical significance involving 'authentic ethical pathos'. So artistic execution in the present day, that is, with the advent of the romantic art form, becomes more multifaceted than the way in which the execution was delineated structurally in the classical art form. What can be mediated is not only beauty's identification with significant content, but also the pure enjoyment of the beautiful as such.

Hegel makes this evident using an extreme example involving opera. Before doing so, however, he discusses the beginnings of this dissociation of beauty from historical significance in the case of the Dutch paintings, and he does it via the issue of whether these pictures—prized as 'beautiful' by people today just as they were at the time of their creation—may be called works of art. This thought is conveyed especially fully in the final lecture series. Libelt's direct transcript reads: 'The Dutch made what is their own into what the portrayal aims at, and took pleasure in it. What is their own is the soil on which they stand, the soil they made for themselves and which they still preserve from the onslaught of the sea. They liberated themselves from Spanish rule. The townsfolk and the farmers gained political and religious freedom; they preserve it wholly through their own activity and enterprising spirit, in matters small and large, and as a result they are prosperous. This sense of cheerfulness that proceeds from self-esteem, from having provided for themselves, is no ordinary thing' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 59).<sup>135</sup>

This consideration too simply gets submerged in the published version of the *Aesthetics*. An aestheticist polemic gains the upper hand in the *Aesthetics*, in place of assessing the extent to which the Dutch articulated their civic sense and civic pride through the transfiguration of everyday things by means of beauty; the extent to which they expressed in art the essential elements of their being constituted as a people who gained a land of their own by labor and by liberating themselves religiously and politically from

135. For the interpretation of this conception, see Gethmann-Siefert, 'Hegel über Kunst und Alltäglichkeit...'.

'Spanish grandeur'. In taking up Dutch painting in the *Aesthetics*, alongside the honoring of religious paintings we find a pronounced skepticism directed toward the less exalted sectors of painting, above all the genre pictures. Hotho uses the occasion to link a half-hearted tolerance of the Dutch genres with an excessively sharp critique of a few contemporary pictures that were on display at the Academy exhibition of 1828. He says that, be as they may, these Dutch pictures nevertheless portray 'as a rule something inherently commonplace, inferior, and nasty, without any compensating comic element. In one example, a nasty woman quarrels with her drunken husband in the tavern, and does so quite viciously; what this then shows, as I [sic!] already indicated previously, is nothing but that he is a dissolute fellow and she is a venomous old woman.'<sup>136</sup> The 'wholly different interpretations' of everyday things, for which the Dutch are praised, clearly go unmentioned. In the *Aesthetics* Hotho largely avoids dealing with the Dutch, or turns doing so into a formality. Thus he cites Goethe's remark that, in Dresden, when securing accommodations with a shoemaker, upon entering that place Goethe 'thought he was seeing before... (his eyes) a picture by Ostade, one so perfect that it could simply have been hung in a gallery'.<sup>137</sup> This reflection appears with a different effect in the lecture transcripts. There it is not a matter of recognizing an artistic value that makes the picture suitable for a public art exhibition; instead the remark simply involves the coloration. 'Goethe recounts that in Dresden he secured accommodations with a shoemaker, and when he entered them they looked to him like a picture by van Ostade. The coloration that day was so like that of the Dutch picture' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 136a).<sup>138</sup>

Also of interest here is how, in evaluating painting, Hegel concentrates on the way artists treat color. In Dutch painting generally, and in its everyday objects, the treatment in fact facilitates the bringing forth of an appearance within appearance, that is, facilitates setting the materials of painting in an expressly reflexive mode. This linking of art to the accomplished act of 'seeing', a linkage painters bring about by the sensuous medium of color, Hegel describes as the 'musicality' of painting. By this term he means to indicate the perfection of the form-constituting play of color that

136. *Aesthetics* (2nd edn.) 3:123-4.

137. *Aesthetics* (1st edn.) 3:75. [Tr.] Adriaan van Ostade (1610-85), a Dutch painter of everyday scenes, was a pupil of Frans Hals.

138. The 1826 lectures report the added thought, also contained in the *Aesthetics*, that Goethe had acquired the capacity of looking at nature through the eyes of a specific artist. See, for instance, *Kehler* 1826, Ms. 353.

contextualizes what is visible, wholly in the sensuously accomplished act of 'seeing' in the visual sense. Just as with musical tones, the shape of the picture comes together as a whole only in the sequence of execution and interpretation. So painting achieves its independence not only from the abstract character of the spatial three-dimensionality, which is secured also by its contours, but additionally achieves it in a specific constitution of the completed picture as both produced and received in an inherently complex sensibility, in virtue of what Hegel calls 'the theoretical sense of seeing'. Because this kind of sensuous expression, in the way the Dutch give color to their pictures, reached its zenith especially in the still life and genre paintings, Hegel ranks them as the highest level of accomplishment in all of painting. Like ancient sculpture, this painting is beautiful art although, interestingly enough, it no longer has the divine for its content but instead transfigures, with the radiance of beauty, the townsmen's way of life in its everyday character. Whereas the beginnings of Christian painting remain locked into a 'stationary' method of portrayal, painting undergoes a development the high point of which Hegel locates in the 'musicality' of color, a pinnacle he finds in pictures with inconsequential subject matter.

When they had gained their freedom, the Dutch set art into its own congenial ambience. The human figures become subordinate. The Dutch painters work up the fleeting moment of a wholly ordinary setting masterfully into an enchantment of colorful appearance—suffused with unreserved freedom and merriment. (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 135)

The vitality of art is captured here. Expression and wit come into play here, the pleasures of idleness, and then the full scope of action, the magic of the appearing; here we have the musicality of art in which the content does not matter. The art of the appearing becomes what predominates. (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 131)

If we impute to Hegel a 'classicism' of the sort that is in fact palpable in the judgments about art in the *Aesthetics*, then reflections such as these must seem especially surprising. Hegel not only consistently attests to the fact that Dutch painting, in its formal perfection and nearly unmatched manner, is in a position to produce beautiful art. He also discusses at the same time whether we may designate these pictures as being 'works' of art. Such a discussion would be superfluous within the framework of a classical aesthetics. But Hegel sees himself obliged to consider it. He vindicates the fact that a world 'born and reborn from spirit' is evident even in the still life and the genre painting of the Dutch; the fact that a political and religious achievement is manifest in the ordinary comforts and the beauty of the arrangement of their world, an achievement constitutive of their society. Seen from this perspective, the Dutch pictures are works of art *for their time*,

although *for us* today they can only be thematic of the worldview of a specific, bygone political state and of a distant epoch. These pictures are relevant to us only in our historical reflection. We can enjoy their beauty apart from having to play a part in the politically and religiously significant concerns they involved. That is why, in the case of the Dutch paintings, Hegel hesitates to speak of timelessly valid 'works' of art, and sticks to his thesis that this beautiful art too has only partial significance for us. Present-day paintings are unable to surmount this partial significance because, in contrast to the Dutch paintings, modern paintings lack not only a link to a shared political world and to a universally accepted religiousness but, over and above this, they lack a link to objectivity as such. For modern paintings the world, like the religiousness of individuals, becomes apprehensible only in feeling. Even though they portray this feeling by resorting to poetic models, it can be expressed only inadequately through painting.

Philosophical interest in evaluating art is clearly evident in these examples too. In the lectures Hegel always sets out from the question as to whether a specific phenomenon may be a 'work of art'; whether it can pass muster as the ethical orientation of a community. Wherever his answer is negative, or else is positive only for specific historical constellations, Hegel develops in connection with it a '*historical*' reflection that works out the meaning of that art 'for us'. In this instance, just as he does more pointedly in his discussion of opera, he introduces the aesthetic enjoyment of what is beautiful as the possibility of artistic execution with limited relevance. No isolated aesthetic evaluation or condemnation of individual works—according to merely formal perspectives or ones based on taste, or, as we often find in the *Aesthetics*, ones based entirely on religious content—gets handed down to us in either the preserved sources for the lectures or Hegel's other thoughts on art that he published himself.

This mode of philosophical reflection on the arts also gets repeated in the following thoughts on music and poetry.

Consequently, in characterizing music Hegel proceeds to demonstrate that music's medium (the resonance of tones in time) makes the art itself more strictly dependent on the musical performance. He makes the relatively abstract characterization of the romantic art form by means of 'subjective inwardness' more concrete in this way. Analogous to his portrayal of the transition from sculpture to painting, Hegel identifies music's medium as the possibility of presenting, in the sensuous domain, an even more continuously spiritualized actuality, one 'removed from spatiality' in the inwardness of the subjective performance. The sounding and resounding of tones in time, with their sequence arising only from the totality of an ongoing performance,

becomes for Hegel the aspect of actual interest in this part of his own aesthetic reflections. The characterization of color already prepared the way for time, as the element of musical performance, to appear as a form of sensibility that is not only subjectivized but is also at the same time spiritualized. In his aesthetics of music Hegel, as a matter of course, points directly to the difficulty with this spiritualization, namely to the 'sheer subjectivity' of the performance. In this reflection, paired with a few quite rudimentary bits of information about music theory, Hegel exhausts his aesthetics of music. It culminates with the question as to whether vocal music ought to take precedence over purely instrumental music, since purely instrumental music does indeed speak to the expert, but it seduces the layperson into wandering off into the sheer rapture of feeling. In weighing this point too, Hegel reaches no firm judgment for or against any relative ranking of instrumental music vis-à-vis vocal music.

In comparison with the extensively-elaborated and well-constructed 'aesthetics of music' in the 1835 *Aesthetics*, what Hegel said about music in the lectures appears meager and in need of augmentation. The students were moved to remark that Hegel is no expert on music, and perhaps Hegel himself said as much in passing.<sup>139</sup> Because of this awkward situation with the sources, in editing the lectures Hotho obviously felt called upon to augment Hegel's aesthetics of music in line with his own abilities. In Hotho's expanded framework, musical art appears once again in the aesthetic gradation from the classical and unquestionably acceptable art of a Mozart, a Bach, and so forth, down to opera as the banal form that merits little attention.

Because of that, the aesthetics of music in the *Aesthetics* also reflects a fundamental discrepancy between Hotho and Hegel, his teacher, one that results in demonstrable improvement in the philosophical concept of music but is to the detriment of Hegel's deliberation about music, because it confines its import to classical music. Unlike his disciple Hotho, Hegel only in fact personally found the entertaining forms of music extraordinarily appealing. He sought to take them in reflectively and to integrate them into the way he characterized artistic performance in the modern world. Thus we find reflections on opera embedded in his discussion of tragedy and modern drama. Hegel regarded Greek tragedy as being the occasion for thematizing, at the center of Greece's 'beautiful art', an initial form of the dismantling of beauty's unity with ideality. The conflict of ethical orientations is evident in

139. Kehler 1826, Ms. 366.

Greek tragedy, as it is later on in modern drama. In the inevitable 'aftermath' of this 'collision', various deities direct the religious-ethical action. The collision articulates, via the need for reconciliation, the limits of beautiful art. Greek tragedy provides this reconciliation by the belief in fate, and the collision gets superseded in a final harmony. In modern drama, on the contrary, the reconciliation fails to come about, and harmony and beauty fall by the wayside.<sup>140</sup> Against this modern version of an art that is 'no longer beautiful' but that nevertheless thematizes 'ethical pathos' (and which Hegel would for that reason be ready to call a 'work of art'), he situates what is also a modern phenomenon, the opera. In opera, as in ancient tragedy, all the arts are 'taken up' harmoniously in one work of art, in a new unity, and they blossom in this teamwork. Architecture is the theatrical set; painting is the transference of sheerly natural three-dimensionality into an interconnected world; there is music and dance in the motion of figures (of gestures); singing too is the reminder of the higher spirituality of poetry. In opera all these art forms are in turn arrayed in relation to one another and achieve a harmony of what is beautiful, a harmony of beautiful appearance that is comparable to ancient tragedy. Hence Hegel seeks to treat opera as a total work of art, and he singles it out as an example of genuinely beautiful art in the modern world. But in modern beautiful art, right along with the harmony of beautiful possibilities for configuring the various arts, we find trivial contents for the soul, and the result is that the operatic material offers nothing of a more profound interest for the enlightened citizen of a modern state.

Unlike his disciple Hotho, Hegel is quite prepared to regard opera too as interesting and relevant; not because it has a great reputation for its own sake, but just because it is entertaining, as is the mode of its reception, the enjoyment of beautiful form. As Hegel does in discussing the significance of genre or still life paintings (to which, in any event, Hotho, in the published *Aesthetics*, is inclined to assign a barely defensible, aesthetically marginal existence), he repeats here his acceptance of what has non-relevant content, on the premise that even in the modern era, subject to the structural handicap of the romantic art form, beautiful art is still possible. As in his discussion of Dutch painting, Hegel is concerned with the question as to whether a work of art in the full sense is produced in such phenomena, a question he answers in the negative in this context too. Still life and genre painting are

140. We find this kind of interpretation of the conception of tragedy in Otto Pöggeler's 'Hegel und die griechische Tragedy'. See Gethmann-Siefert, 'Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte', pp. 192 ff.



only able to convey the political self-consciousness of a specific people for *their own* time, by transfiguring in these forms, with the radiance of beauty, the results of human labor and political development. Although opera is beautiful art, its relevance, meaning by that the content it conveys, must likewise be inconsequential *for us*. Yet art as beautiful form remains culturally relevant all the same, for the expression 'beautiful execution lacking identification with the content' at least captures an acceptable way for the modern world to receive art, and the relation that modern-citizens have to art. One of Hegel's reflections in his earlier writings, the *Nürnberg Schriften*, posed the question: Who then must be the audience that art addresses? Is it merely the expert, or is it everybody? In his lectures on aesthetics, as a thoughtful conclusion on this issue, Hegel develops a quite pertinent conception of art (of its execution, as well as of the art-product), a conception capturing art that is relevant but no longer beautiful and extending to art that is beautiful but with inconsequential content—a conception neither condemning, nor giving precedence to, any one of the forms in the way we are made to believe in the *Aesthetics*.

Hotho in fact was unable, or was able only with difficulty, to share his teacher's special fondness for the inconsequential contemporary art of a Spontini or a Rossini. As a result, he even altered the sense of Hegel's aesthetics of music.<sup>141</sup> Hence not only do we detect numerous editorial interventions in Hegel's aesthetics of music, insertions drawn from Hotho's own thoughts and publications, ones supposed to round off the conception both in form and in content. We also find a severe, systematic reorientation that is of little help on the issue of non-relevance in Hegel's aesthetics. But despite Hotho's restriction of significant art to beautiful art with important content (to beauty linked to 'ethical pathos'), a restriction signifying a fundamental alteration in Hegel's broadly-drawn conception of artistic achievement, Hotho's individual interventions in the chapter on music are relatively inconsequential. They spring from the concern to make a scholarly improvement in Hegel's aesthetics of music as a whole, and to 'polish' it—the kind of effort found throughout in Hotho's treatment of the individual arts in Hegel's aesthetics. What follows are only a few indications serving to

141. See the more precise analysis of this relationship in Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Das "moderne" Gesamtkunstwerk: Die Oper', in *Phänomen versus System*, pp. 165 ff. [Tr.] The early operas of Gasparo Luigi Pacifico Spontini (1774–1851) were quite popular, although from the 1820s on his compositions were much criticized in Berlin. The operas of Gioacchino Antonio Rossini (1792–1868)—including *The Barber of Seville*, *Othello*, and *William Tell*—have enjoyed far more enduring success.

describe the nature of Hotho's interventions and to document the necessity of taking Hegel's views from the original sources.

In his *Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst*, published in 1835, Hotho describes his teacher Hegel as an expert on the fine arts. Hotho says that, with a 'universal overview', Hegel approached all the arts enthusiastically; 'he was capable of fathoming all their domains, epochs, and works. Poetry of course proved to be most accessible to him, yet he did not fail to uncover the secrets of architecture too, and still less did sculpture escape his ken; he had an innate eye for painting, and all kinds of musical masterworks were always comprehensible to his ear and to his spirit.'<sup>142</sup> This description is doubly interesting. While Hotho bestows unlimited praise on Hegel's enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, all the other arts, in musical aesthetics Hotho seems to regard further development as not only a given but a necessity. Hegel's taste in music was in fact hardly suited to meet with the approval of his disciple, who thought of himself as sticking to the great classical works. Hotho the student often reported critically that Hegel took in all sorts of musical events in Berlin with boundless enthusiasm.<sup>143</sup> We find no echo of this enthusiasm for art as such in Hegel's lectures. In them his procedure is to develop reflections on art and the arts in a philosophically-grounded way. We find these reflections in the *Aesthetics*' chapter on music too, namely, in the controversy we discussed regarding the relative priority of instrumental music or vocal music. They become unrecognizable as specifically philosophical arguments, to be sure, because Hotho embeds these discussions within an abundance of Hegel's 'own positions' about specific works of art and about the significance of individual instruments.<sup>144</sup>

To the contrary, in the lectures Hegel develops an extremely concise structure for the aesthetics of music. He begins with the parallelism of painting and music in his discussion of the musicality of color and, for want of specific theoretical assumptions, he develops a description of musical tone that takes in the various instruments, in an analogy to Goethe's

142. See Hotho's *Berichte*, nr. 385.

143. See Gethmann-Siefert, 'Das "moderne Gesamtkunstwerk": Die Oper', pp. 175 ff. in *Phänomen versus System*. In the *Berichten* we find numerous indications of this enthusiasm for art; see nr. 708, nr. 435, nr. 328, and others.

144. An especially extreme instance is mentioned at the conclusion of the chapter headed 'Music'. There Hegel says: 'From my youth onward I recall myself as being, for example, a virtuoso on the guitar' (*Aesthetics* 3:218). This sort of expression is not found in the lectures. However, via such thoughts Hotho expands the topic of 'the artistic execution' many times over. He urgently sets about highlighting classical examples from art, and in doing so brings Hegel's statements into line with the aesthetic taste of his times.

conception of color. He sees the various principles of the instruments, the production of the tone through a column of air or by a vibrating string, as harmonized into a living symbiosis—analogue to embodiment in flesh—in the human voice, with the elements of this symbiosis only able to be realized in part in man-made instruments. We can then discover in this reflection, if anywhere, the mirror image of Hegel's enthusiasm for opera and for the song. However, Hegel restrains his own preference for a specific form of music and develops a link from the theory of painting (the conception of color) to the conception of musical tone, and from there to the tone of the spiritual sound, to the word of poetry.

Hegel's own experiences of art nevertheless leave in their wake noticeable traces in the lectures—traces that differ, to be sure, from what the musical critiques in the *Aesthetics* suggest. Hegel modified his structural conception of the aesthetics of music, in contrast to the 1823 lectures, when he was motivated to do so by intensive preoccupation with contemporary music in particular, during a trip to Vienna.<sup>145</sup> In the 1826 lectures he places the emphasis principally on a 'music proper', music set to words; this music 'has support in representation' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 368). As a second form he names instrumental music, the music that, 'being free, becomes independent'. In Hegel's view the problem with this second form of music is that either it advances to being art for the expert, so that 'theoretical knowledge' is a requisite for performing it, or else in effect what takes its place, 'if one does not have this knowledge', is 'one's own imagination, or else boredom' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 372). In the latter case music becomes the 'expression of feeling, which remains more or less empty' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 372). Although, as the transcripts of these lectures report, Hegel is no musical specialist (see, for instance, Kehler 1826, Ms. 366), he seems to have made the effort to put musical experience into a reflective form. He had already announced in his letters that he intended to attempt this, and in fact in the 1826 lectures on aesthetics he made a few steps in that direction. However, as Hegel writes in a letter from Vienna, a reflection of this sort would have had to 'become a more scholarly and long-winded investigation than in any case was feasible'.<sup>146</sup> That is, Hegel ultimately was not very satisfied even with the modified concept of musical aesthetics, the sharper distinction

145. See Inge Blank, 'Dokumente zu Hegels Reise nach Österreich', pp. 41 ff. It is regrettable that she bases herself solely on the published *Aesthetics*. However, Hegel's reports in letters he sent from Vienna appear in a different light if we read them against the background of the conception in the lectures. See Gethmann-Siefert, 'Das "moderne" Gesamtkunstwerk...', esp. pp. 179 ff.

146. See *Briefe* 3: 66.

between instrumental music and vocal music, a distinction supported by reflection about the technically integrative harmony of the human voice. The final lecture series brought no new aspects to bear on the aesthetics of music, even though the whole conception remains unbalanced and necessarily unfinished, whereas in the *Aesthetics* it takes the shape of a well-rounded part of the system, with a philosophically speculative foundation, theoretical grounding, and an all-embracing critical perspective. So Hegel did not even pursue his 'scholarly investigation' into musical experience as far as what Carl Dahlhaus supposes to be an 'eloquent silence' with regard to Beethoven.<sup>147</sup> Instead it extends just to a conception of opera as a beautiful art, although an art no longer providing a relevant sense of direction. By means of musical aesthetics, and preliminarily by the conception of painting, Hegel established his classification of poetry as being the philosophical focus for engagement with verbal art. For poetry too appears to Hegel as an art that is beautiful but no longer universally relevant, or else as an art that is no longer beautiful but has an authentic ethical pathos.

### 3. Art as Vivid Interpretation of the World: Poetry

Despite all his personal enthusiasm for painting and music, Hegel gives poetry the place of greatest significance in aesthetics. In the early transcript from 1823 we find the statement that poetry is 'the universal, all-embracing art, is art ascended to the highest spirituality' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 39; p. 218 in this text). This description is repeated in all the lecture series. Poetry counts as the spoken art, accordingly as 'the authentic art... that takes up within itself all that spirit apprehends' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 154); and in another formulation, poetry is 'the richest, the most scientific, element of portrayal' (Ms. 154). Or, as both the 1826 series and the final series quite strongly

147. See Dahlhaus, 'Hegel und die Musik seiner Zeit', pp. 333–4. Dahlhaus puts Hegel in the mold of a secret fan of Beethoven. Since Dahlhaus bases himself purely on the 1835 *Aesthetics*, it is natural to ask whether it is Hotho instead who is this fan of Beethoven. As the documents from his journey to Vienna show, perhaps Hegel was not conversant with Beethoven's music himself. His description of instrumental music as found in the lectures also is not apt to motivate him to intensive involvement with this form of music. Hegel's aesthetics of music is a chapter given perfunctory treatment by the interpreters; only a few philosophical investigations grasp this conception. Examples are: Adolf Nowack, *Hegels Musikästhetik* (Regensburg, 1971); Heinz Heimsoeth, 'Hegels Philosophie der Musik', *Hegel-Studien* (1963) 2:161 ff; Jens Kulenkampff, 'Musik bei Kant und Hegel', *Hegel-Studien* (1987) 22: 143 ff. Kulenkampff's starting-point is that Hegel conceived of the aesthetics of music from the concept of dance, that is, of movement. These reflections too are in any case just supported from the published *Aesthetics*; the lectures themselves do not support such an interpretation.

emphasize, 'Poetry is the most perfect art'.<sup>148</sup> Also important for Hegel is the fact that poetry comprises symbolic, classical, and romantic poetry, while architecture is prominent in symbolic and classical art, and sculpture represents classical art.<sup>149</sup> So too Hegel deems poetry to be the art that completes music and painting in the reflected medium of speech. 'It is the third to these first two arts, is the art we have ascribed to the soul, to the subject. It is objective, has specific content, but no other externality than that of representing, the externality that links what is inward with itself.' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 191) Whereas Hegel counts painting principally as the Christian art that develops itself secondarily into a worldly content, and music as the art of subjective inwardness that is assigned to spirituality only in virtue of the addition of a verbal text, poetry combines these modes of art's execution all in one. In line with his considering poetry as extending over all the structural forms of art, Hegel also treats the full array of verbal arts in his chapter on poetry. To demonstrate by examples the importance of this part of the aesthetics too, in what follows we include only a few reflections from this broad spectrum.

For Hegel, poetry is in very large measure also the art of the modern era. It is the art in which the modern 'Holy One' is the person who is cultivated or is undergoing cultivation; as stated everywhere in the lectures, modern poetry is the art that has for its content 'universal humanity, the human heart in its fullness' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 189; p. 352 in this text). It is self-evident that the severing of art from divine content makes manifest not only art's freedom from religious assumptions but, according to Hegel, also art's character as past. The possibility of art severing itself from religion, with regard to the fullness of human possibilities, he accordingly links with descending into the prosaicism of life or into what is merely 'interesting'.<sup>150</sup> Hegel nevertheless does not see the decline of art in this severance of art from

148. This point can be verified for both lecture series. For instance, *Aachen* 1826 (Ms. 191) and *Libelt* 1828–9 (Ms. 29) state: 'The third is sound insofar as it is expressly the sign of the representing. That is then poetry... and the most perfect art, then, is poetry.'

149. One transcript from 1826 reads as follows: 'There is a symbolic and classical building design; in poetry we have symbolic, classical, and romantic poetry. In the case of sculpture this [broader representation] is of no importance' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 57).

150. In the philosophy of religion as well Hegel points to this severance of art from religion. See G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, ed. Georg Lasson, 2 vols. in 4 parts (Leipzig, 1925–9; Hamburg, 1966), 1:285. See also Hegel: *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, 3 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984–7; repr. Oxford, 2007), 1:234–40. In the lectures on art too Hegel emphasizes that art has of course the same content as religion and philosophy have, the mediation of historical truth; but that art brings this content into play in its own distinctive way. See *Aachen* 1826 (Ms. 34); Lasson, 2:280.

'grand content'. He points expressly to, and cites, Goethe's epic *Die Geheimnisse* (*The Secrets*): 'Goethe says that the "sacred" is what binds human beings to one another' (Hotho 1823, Ms. 196; p. 359 in this text).<sup>151</sup> As examples of the range of interpretation of poetry in Hegel's aesthetics, the versions portraying the universally human are for that reason singled out from this problematic content of art—problematic in Hotho's view because of art's confinement merely to the 'universally human'; these are versions that from Hegel's perspective document in exemplary fashion the possibility or actuality of beautiful art or of no-longer-beautiful art. From 1826 on Hegel himself gives increased weight to these problematic examples because, in discussing them, he tests from the outset the refinement of his thesis, in the 1827 *Encyclopedia*, of the past character of art. Here we also find the important characterizations of art that, analogous to the treatments of painting and music, bring into view alternative forms of execution with modified possibilities for the configuration of art. Moreover, these examples are often presented with a different emphasis in Hotho's rendition in the *Aesthetics*, and are given a significance different from what they have in the lectures.

Whereas in the final lecture series, but also already in 1826, Hegel lays out, at the beginning of the chapter on poetry, the grounds for poetry's prominent position, in the first lecture series (1821) and in Hotho's transcript (1823) we find these grounds in the introductory characterization of art's ideal. Accentuated in the characterization of poetry is an aspect that Hegel discusses in the course of the later lecture series, namely, the aspect of spiritualized sensuousness that is differentiated from one stage to another. This thought is decisive for the characterization of color in the chapter on painting; it is expressed in the characterization of musical tone, and reaches its culmination in the characterization of the medium of poetry. The specific sounds in speech, in words, and accordingly sensuality as mediation of the truth in art, gain the possibility 'of becoming signs of a spiritual interior' (Hotho 1823, Ms. 39; p. 218 in this text). For Hegel characterizes the ideal, defined as concrete being or existence of the idea itself, by an ascent from its presence grasped merely sensuously and intuitively, to forms of reflection, because, although every perceptible rendering of what is spiritual remains

151. For the interpretation of Hegel's reference to this unfinished epic by Goethe, see Oskar Walzel, 'Der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit', *Euphorion* (1932), 33: esp. 99–100; Otto Pöggeler, 'Dichtungstheorie und Toposforschung', *Jahrbuch für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (1960), 5:118; Martin Donougho, 'Remarks on "Humanus..."', pp. 214 ff. See also Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, esp. pp. 319 ff.

constantly at risk of degenerating into appearance as mere deception, poetry appears as the pinnacle of the development of sensuous intuitiveness, and at the same time as overcoming it. As Hegel stresses throughout the lectures, that is why poetry is not just 'the universal, all-embracing art, is art ascended to the highest spirituality'; poetry at the same time prepares for the passage over to thought. 'That is because, in poetry, spirit is free within itself; it has cut itself loose from merely sensuous material, and has relegated that material to being its own signs. . . . At this highest level, however, art ascends beyond itself and becomes prose, becomes thought' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 39; p. 218 in this text). In grounding this position of poetry, Hegel links it to the differentiation of forms of sensuousness in painting and music. Space and time, as the universal forms of sensuous experience, link themselves, in the language of poetry, to the conditions for thought. The intuitive form of space, as an element of architecture, sculpture and, in sublimated form, painting, and the intuitive form of time as the element of music, manifest themselves in poetry as the 'mark of spirit, as the thinking subject that conjoins within itself the endless space of representation with the time of the musical sound' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 40; p. 219 in this text). Proceeding from this differentiating within the conception of intuition, and together with it the differentiating within sensuousness as the element of art, Hegel also explicates further, in the case of poetry, the specific forms of intuitive spirituality's realization, something he has already analyzed in the other arts.

Whereas music appears in its culminating point [in opera] as beautiful art, and music's content seemingly cannot lay claim to the requisite universality, Hegel finds in dramatic poetry a counterpart to this version of a beautiful art that is enjoyable as one sees fit and has inconsequential content. Hence he treats epic poetry first and then lyric poetry, but places special emphasis on the discussion of the significance of modern drama. Modern dramas (in particular those of Schiller) count as the no-longer-beautiful art of the modern era that makes it possible to translate ancient tragedy's 'ethical pathos', the mediation of ethical life, into an art suited to modern times. So Hegel constructs his conception of poetry between two corner posts. The high point of music, the opera, forms one of them, and drama forms the complementary point of reference as art that is relevant but also does not progress to the universality of a world-historical work. This systematic framework allows him not just to structure, in a way suitable to the phenomena, the various forms in which poetry appears, but also at the same time to discuss, from the standpoint of philosophical inquiry, the significance of art for the present day.

The spectrum of poetry's influence extends from the ancient epic to the idyll, from the epic's establishing socially relevant, cultural identity, to the lyrical representation of subjective inwardness. In the chapter on poetry we also find a conception of ancient tragedy still discussed today, together with a conception of modern drama that is likewise of interest, and a characterization of the novel as well, as the new epic of the modern world with its new Holy One, the 'Humanus'. Beautiful art and no-longer-beautiful art, evocation of feeling as well as of ethical life, combine in poetry through the medium of an internally reflective tone, through language, and they gain an affinity with what is spiritual, an affinity Hegel is unable to discover to this pronounced degree in any of the preceding arts.

In the description of poetry too it is not possible, within the framework of this introductory commentary, to discuss all of the typical ways in which the 1835 *Aesthetics* departs from the lecture sources, although even its treatment of the various examples from poetry conveys, in a distorting mirror, smaller to more drastic changes and reevaluations. To document the philosophical relevance of the editorial interventions for the characterization of poetry, we select just two examples out of many, namely, the way in which Hegel discusses Schiller and Goethe.

The fact that Hegel 'discusses the great classical poets of this era in philosophical terms is no surprise to the reader of the *Aesthetics*. What is of interest, however, is that the *Aesthetics* constantly strives to bestow equal rank on Schiller and Goethe, whereas in the lectures, with specific reference to their poetry, Hegel consistently draws a distinction between them as to both the aesthetic evaluation, and the relative ranking, of Goethe's and Schiller's literary works. In the *Aesthetics* the early works of both Schiller and Goethe are criticized from the standpoint of beauty. 'The early products of Goethe and Schiller are products of an immaturity, yes even products of a crudity and barbarity that can shock us.' But this no longer applies to the late works. Here we find truly beautiful works by both of them, celebrated works by Goethe above all in lyric poetry but also in drama, by Schiller above all in dramatic literature. 'The mature manhood of these two geniuses—who, we can say, knew how for the first time to provide our nation with poetic works, and who are our national poets—first gave us profound, splendid works that arose from authentic inspiration and are likewise thoroughly cultured in form—similar to how the venerable Homer was inspired with, and produced, his eternal, immortal epic poems.'<sup>152</sup>

152. See *Aesthetics* (first edn.) 1:34, for these quotations.



In the lectures too Hegel describes Schiller and Goethe as 'our national poets', although at the same time he distinguishes between them not only in how he assigns their literature to specific branches of poetry, but also in how he accepts their works as 'beautiful'. He describes Goethe as a poet who stands closer to the epic and whose accomplishments are decidedly foremost in lyric poetry, and in the novel as the 'modern epic'. In drama, Hegel singles out for praise Goethe's literary adaptations of Greek materials, but he is dubious about the dramatic effect of Goethe's other compositions. In dramatic effect, Goethe takes a back seat to Schiller. With Schiller it is not only 'the content that carries weight, a content interesting and worthy for its own sake' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 428), but also the 'ethical interest that is maintained and sustained' (Ms. 447). In contrast, Goethe is 'less dramatic than Schiller; he sticks to his concentrated form, which is suited to the song' (Aachen 1826, Ms. 65).<sup>153</sup> Hegel also does not fail to comment on the underlying structure:

Because in Schiller's case there is always an ethical foundation, expressed energetically, clearly, brilliantly, with splendor, his tragedies have had this kind of impact and they are still constantly performed... [whereas] the locus of Goethe's tragedies is not in this genuine pathos, and so they end differently and for that reason do not have this effect on the stage. (Kehler 1826, Ms. 446)

It is otherwise with the poetic adaptation of Greek materials and the translation of Greek mythological themes into the form of reflective subjectivity. In this case Hegel calls attention in particular to the *Iphigenia at Tauris* because (in this composition but also in others) Goethe successfully transposed the substantial ethical life of the Greeks into the modern conception of a subjectivity, by translating the divinely ordained action of the ancient drama into a reflective action, one for which the subject is responsible. 'Goethe lets Iphigenia abandon herself to her emotions (*Gemüt*), and she appeals emotionally to Thoas. So the plot development proceeds via the spiritual element of emotion.'<sup>154</sup> Hegel ranks the *Iphigenia* as 'one of the

153. We find the same comment in another transcript of this lecture series: 'Goethe is less dramatic than Schiller. In his poems Goethe has the intense manner that is more befitting the song' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 105).

154. [Tr.] The following points are pertinent to the abbreviated references in the quotations from *Libelt* in the text. The name of the play by Euripides is also rendered as 'Iphigenia Among the Taurians'; the Taurians are a Scythian people in the Crimea (the 'Taurian Chersonese'). Thoas is their king. The goddess Artemis has rescued Iphigenia from being sacrificed, so Iphigenia goes to her temple in Tauris. Her brother Orestes comes to Tauris to seize the statue of Artemis and return it to Athens. Thoas is prevented from sacrificing Orestes to the goddess. Iphigenia and Orestes escape with the statue.

foremost compositions' because, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, it eliminates the defect of the Greek tragedy, which still introduces its gods as external authorities controlling the action: 'Gods with their external reality are a sheer superstition.' Hence this reconciliation of the conflict of ethical powers Hegel locates far beyond the possibilities of classical Greek tragedy. For us, at least, the settings as portrayed in Greek tragedies could have involved 'something wholly foreign to us' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 85). 'The god who resolves the difficulty does not appear to be advantageous for art. In his *Iphigenia* Goethe locates all effective power in the soul of the one who acts. In Euripedes, Athena appears and commands Thoas to desist, and allows Iphigenia to make off with the statue. In Goethe's case [*Iphigenia*] trusts the truth' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 78-9). That is, she puts her trust in argument and insight. The reason why Hegel evaluates this translation of ancient mythology into enlightened thinking so highly is not ultimately because it corresponds to his own early conception of a 'mythology of reason' that is said to come to decisive expression in art. Just as Schiller succeeded in doing in a few poems, so Goethe, by recasting ancient dramas, was able to bring the mythological content into a modern form while at the same time mediating it by reflection.

Hegel's taking up Goethe's *Divan of West and East* also falls in step with this line of argument. It involves a poetic translation of a different culture, one foreign to us and bygone, into the possibilities for its realization in our own time. Hegel emphasizes this perspective once again in treating the specific forms of poetry, now under the aspect of a translation of epic literature into modern lyrical poetry with content that is substantial, not merely subjective. Schiller, in contrast, appears as the modern dramatist; his art is not beautiful like Goethe's, but instead is distinguished by a 'genuinely ethical pathos'.

Against the backdrop of the examples discussed so far, it is perhaps unnecessary to emphasize once again the fact that Hotho personalized these descriptions when he adapted them in his honoring these two individuals, namely, in a panegyric about Goethe and Schiller as poets. Goethe and Schiller stand out as literary figures in comparison to Klopstock, because in 'Hegel's' view these two are more universal, and they guarantee better the ongoing influence of the epic than does Klopstock, the author of a Christian epic: 'For in contrast, Schiller and Goethe lived not merely as bards of their own times, but as all-embracing poets; Goethe's songs in particular are the most excellent, most profound, and most influential songs we Germans possess in modern times, because they belong wholly to him and to his people and, as grown up on our native soil, they also fully express the

basic tenor of 'our spirit'.<sup>155</sup> The reason why Hotho confers equal poetical rank on Schiller and Goethe, why he gives precedence to Goethe along with Schiller, is surely based on two facts. First, after Hegel's death Hotho not only took over his lectures on aesthetics and continued them in the spirit of his own speculative art history; at the same time, over many years, he also gave lectures and talks on Goethe as a poet, and in a series of biographical testimonies he expresses his unlimited admiration for Goethe and his poetry. The second fact is not biographical but, in the strict sense, is aesthetic. In his own lectures Hegel too honored Goethe's poetry as 'beautiful art'. So in Hotho's scale of value Goethe's poetry must rise to the rank of Schiller's dramas. In the *Aesthetics* the resulting ranking of the 'two national poets' is established correspondingly, because it reckons Schiller's dramas as also being 'beautiful art'.

The question of course is whether this bestowal of equal artistic praise on Schiller and Goethe, whether calling attention to their accomplishments in all areas of poetic literature, is not in fact decidedly different from Hegel's reflections in the lectures on aesthetics. This question can be answered unambiguously by comparing the *Aesthetics* with the lecture transcripts also in their characterizations of poetry, and the example chosen shows with utter clarity the consequence of Hotho's editorial modifications. However inconspicuous the expansion of the description of Schiller and Goethe may appear to be, a description expanded by extensive praise of both poets as artists and as virtuosos in all areas of poetry, it has a serious effect on the conception of philosophical aesthetics in relation to specific arts. The essential perspective that Hegel wishes to highlight in his description of 'our national poets' is in fact missing from the commendation and critique in the *Aesthetics*.

At first the difference in preference for one or the other artist, for one or the other's poetry, seems to be hardly significant. But on closer examination we see, as documented in this revised weighting in the individual case (as in so many others), essential differences in evaluating the role of art in the modern world. Whereas for Hegel this evaluation considers whether specific works are suited to the modern era and are in a position to function as works of art in the full sense of the term, as the foundation for the worldview of a community, Hotho is everywhere on a quest for beautiful art and great art,

155. See *Aesthetics* (first edn.) 3:478. [Tr.] Friedrich Gottlob Klopstock (1724–1803) wrote an epic poem, *The Messiah*, in eight cantos, the first three of which (1749) were enthusiastically received, but the latter ones (from 1770 on) were less successful.

the guarantee of which is to be sought and found in the outstanding personality of the artist and so in an aesthetics of genius.

In his lectures Hegel always points at the outset to the fact that Schiller has come closest to his own speculative conception of aesthetics, that surely Schiller, as 'artist... felt the totality of the idea before philosophy did' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 32). In his discussion of dramas Hegel pursues this point further, in connection with Schiller's conception of aesthetic education. Schiller took up the Kantian standpoint and thematized the claim laid upon human beings by sets of opposed laws—those of inclination and duty, of necessity and freedom, of existence in time and existence in the idea—and in his dramas Schiller found no ultimate reconciliation of these opposites. Nevertheless Hegel, consciously echoing the ancient epic, seizes upon Schiller's and Goethe's works as possibilities for a mediation of truth through art. While the *Aesthetics* states that Goethe and Schiller are 'our national poets', Hegel formulates this thought differently in the lectures in his own symptomatic way, in fact purely with an eye to the work and without concentrating on the great personality of the poet. 'Goethe's and Schiller's poetry has made the German people. A tone has been provided in which... [their poetry] can continue to be sung' (Aachen 1826, Ms. 197), because they thematize and mediate anew 'German sensibilities and perspectives' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 407), and so the history of their own people and once again specifically the reason-based culture of the West.

Hegel credits Schiller's literature with being the direct attempt to further the conception of ancient tragedy as inclusive of the conditions of modernity. Schiller also seeks to achieve the same result as tragedy, namely, a shared ethical life and the 'reconciliation of the ethical with itself'. He even portrays this in the action of a 'great individual... who suffers ruin while struggling with fate, but in doing so still maintains his inner freedom' (Aachen 1826, Ms. 212). What defines itself superficially, in Kant's sense like Schiller's, as the art of the sublime, therefore as no longer art that is beautiful, in Hegel's view stands for the possibility that *works* of art can be provided in the enlightened world of modernity. A simple replay of antiquity does not accomplish this, as Hegel makes clear by criticizing in particular the adoption of elements in the ancient style, such as the chorus in *The Bride of Messina*. In Schiller, what is comparable to ancient tragedy is not the formal elements but instead the portrayal of the characters.<sup>156</sup> In Schiller's dramas

156. Schiller's play *The Bride of Messina* (1803) takes ancient Greek drama as its model. Hegel's critique of the chorus in the tragedy is found in the *Nuremberg Schriften* (119). The transcripts reiterate this criticism, that what is emphasized by the insertion of the chorus is

the 'expression is ascribed wholly to the action' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 438); exemplary-historical action is evident here even in the tragedy, action that seeks to transplant the thought of freedom into the deed, as Schiller explains in his correspondence about *Don Carlos*.

So Hegel explicitly asks about the extent to which the dramatic configuration of Schiller's plays can have validity, namely, about the attempt to deploy reason and freedom as making possible universal guidance for action; that is, whether, and to what extent, such a dramatic configuration can be designated a 'work'. From this perspective he at the same time acquires a starting point for his specific critique.

Unlike the 1835 *Aesthetics*, in the lectures Hegel takes up in detail just Schiller's *Wallenstein*, *The Robbers*, *The Maid of Orleans*, and *William Tell*. He provides the key to understanding them via his reflections in the 'Wallenstein' essay.<sup>157</sup> His critique of *The Robbers*, and with it of the further plays, has been in place since the Jena period.<sup>158</sup> The most important aspect of the critique is the fact that Hegel does not juxtapose two versions of art, thus ancient tragedy and modern drama, but instead two versions of poetic thematizing, accordingly two versions of artistic reflection on the action. Just as ancient tragedy articulates the reflective form of the epic, namely, the portrayal of the 'collision' of different orientations for action, under the circumstances of the polis, so modern drama examines the possibility for action, by which is meant the deployment of reason and freedom in the circumstances of the modern world. Hence Hegel compares the heroes of Schiller's dramas in particular instances with the heroes of the ancient epic, not with the characters of tragedy. This aspect too subjects the characterization of drama to the question of its work-character, and the answer to the

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simply what is 'substantial, what remains in its substantiality' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 450; cf. 412; also Aachen 1826, Ms. 214). As for the rest, Hegel seems to have prized this very composition extraordinarily, for he praises *The Bride of Messina* as 'masterful' (Libelt 1828-9, Ms. 114a). Schiller's *Don Carlos*, also mentioned by name just below in our text, is a poetic drama written in 1787.

157. Hegel locates the fundamental problem in the fact that the action is constrained by the inner conflict between duty and inclination. This point is stressed in the *Aesthetics* too: see 2:182. The transcripts unanimously confirm it. In Hotho's 1823 transcript we find criticism of the Weimar staging of *William Tell*; see Hotho 1823, Ms. 102 (p. 277 in this text); on this point see also *Aesthetics* (1st edn.) 1:360, (2nd edn.) 1:351, and *Briefe* 1:78 and 80. [Tr.] *The Robbers* (1781) was Schiller's first play. Dates for the others are: the *Wallenstein* trilogy (1796-9), *The Maid of Orleans* (1801), and *William Tell* (1804).

158. For the interpretation of this critique, see Gethmann-Siebert, *Die Function der Kunst*..., pp. 355-6.

question whether in drama we are 'dealing with a work of art' gets cut loose from a merely aesthetic comparison of ancient tragedy to modern tragedy.

In acting for all like the Greek heroes, the 'great individual' or person of action in modern drama is concerned with the attempt to carry through on the opportunities afforded by reason, thus with the attempt to found a state that satisfies the requirements of reason and freedom. However, unlike ancient heroic action, such an 'action founding a state' must inevitably fail under the complex conditions of the modern world. In modern drama the conflict arises because of the presumption of a heroic independence under the conditions of the bourgeois world. Because of this presumption, the action (the realization of reason and freedom) does not lead to the founding of a state but instead degenerates simply into crime. An individual of the modern world can achieve historical influence in a universal sense 'only by revolting', by revolution and by exiting 'from the bourgeois condition'; since the putative 'independence is achieved only by opposing the established order, by opposing its human society' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 15a-16). For that reason this independence on the part of the individual is 'a poor approximation to independence, and it necessarily eventuates in crime' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 84-5; cf. *Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 72).

So Schiller's dramas on the one hand are distinguished for their genuine ethical pathos, but on the other hand they document the fact that modern individuals are not in a position to translate into reality what they intend, the freedom and rationality of human beings.<sup>159</sup> The deed of the single

159. Hotho's transcript records this thought in its description of *The Robbers*. Moor 'creates for himself a heroic condition', but in doing so simply becomes 'an enemy of the social order' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 79; pp. 255 in this text). This thought gets refined in the 1826 lectures when they state that 'in the cultured condition', a people's shared basis for action cannot be established by the deed of the single individual. What is evident in this deed is just the 'departure from the social bond' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 54). Also, in taking up *The Bride of Messina* and *The Maid of Orleans*, but especially, for example, in the critique of *Wallenstein*, Hegel points out that, like the heroic character, Wallenstein counts himself as 'the whole' and wants to take responsibility for it (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 15 and 15a). However, in the final lecture series Hegel emphasizes, to the contrary, that Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* and Schiller's *Wallenstein* nevertheless thematize 'our own history', hence must be of concern to us (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. E49). To be sure, he does draw a distinction with respect to the chosen subject. Whereas 'knighthood... feudal times' have 'a heroic soil' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 16), *Wallenstein* falls in a different category. The main character 'sets himself up as independent governor of the political order', and meets with failure when facing the existing balance of power, more precisely, when facing the twofold duty of the soldier to the commanding officer and to the state. In his decision, Wallenstein does not bear in mind this network of obligation and responsibility. Since the soldier's decision is for duty as opposed to personal inclination, Wallenstein is powerless, is 'forlorn' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 85; *Aachen* 1826, Ms. 54). The power standing opposed to Wallenstein is therefore not the power of another heroic character but

individual founders on the network of obligations, and yet the drama thematizes the will to reason and freedom. Using one of Schiller's *Xenion*, or satirical epigrams, which compares ancient tragedy with modern tragedy, Hegel presents this point in a succinct and pithy fashion. He says that the Greek comes away from the tragic performance, with all its horror, having a less-burdened heart, but the modern person leaves weighed down in thought. In these modern dramas the great individual, the person of exemplary action, becomes in fact a 'criminal' to the community. In taking up the concerns of the Enlightenment, Schiller thus thematizes the inability to constitute a 'work of the state' through the action of a single individual.

Art is no more able, on its own model, to achieve a new state built upon reason than the single individual is in a position to do so in world-historical action. The humaneness of the world cannot be guaranteed by art, let alone be produced by art, not even and precisely not when art makes this its explicit aim. In his final lecture series Hegel thematizes this point in all its poignancy by the remark that the 'limitation of art lies not in it, but in us' (Heimann 1828-9, Ms. 17; see also Libelt 1828-9, Ms. 25). Hence Hegel confirms the *Encyclopedia's* conception with this firm conclusion: 'There is something post-art. Art as explication of truth passes over into something higher, and this factor determines the position of art as it exists for our time, since we are above and beyond art. . . . Art has had its day' (Libelt 1828-9, Ms. 30-1).

Whereas Hegel sets Schiller apart as the greatest of the modern poets, yet appraises his work as no-longer-beautiful art, based on the incongruity of its form with its content, the *Aesthetics* implies that we are not dealing here with Hegel's final word on the historical shape of art. Truly beautiful art is to be found in Goethe's poetry, and this poetry appears as the culmination of art in the modern era. Certainly when compared once again with the sources for the lectures, this high regard for Goethe must also be subject to 'demythologizing'. In no case does it spring from any hesitancy or inconsistency or even dialectic in Hegel's evaluation of specific arts. Instead it is simply thanks to Hotho's own taste in art and his own appraisal of aesthetic worth.

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instead the power of society constituted as a whole. The attempt at liberation founders in face of 'a naturally-constituted difference' in the modern world. Hegel also discusses this point in the *Philosophy of Right*. Thus in the earliest known direct transcript of it (1817), by Peter Wannenmann, we find an identical discussion with reference to the murder of Caesar. What is noteworthy about this event is that 'The single individual who sets himself up as the embodiment of the will of the world ends by being destroyed' (*Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science*, p. 57).

In seeking a central perspective in Hegel's approach to Goethe, we find it in the general issue of the possibility of creating a 'work of art' in the modern world; but we especially find it in the discussion about what significance beauty retains in present day art, and what status humor, the reflective refraction of direct statement, can gain for art. Already in characterizing Dutch painting and the opera, Hegel showed that beautiful art is possible even under the conditions of the modern, enlightened world. Using the fundamental philosophical definition of poetry, Hegel also can assign to reflection a genuine role in art. In seeking art's further possibilities, he adheres principally to Schiller's linking of immediacy and reflection. What becomes vivid in Schiller's dramas is the realization of reason and freedom in human forms of life, the mediation of ethical life in stricter form, namely, in filling out the characterization of the sublime developed in Kant as well as in Schiller; content-wise, this realization at the same time appears as the failure of the intention (freedom) in the action. Accordingly Schiller not only connects up with Greek tragedy; he discovers its specific renewal for the modern era, for the ending of the time of the 'great individual'. In contrast, Goethe's 'translation' of the Greek tragedies leaves the tragedies in their original form, as the thematizing of the conflict within the ethical domain.<sup>160</sup> To be sure, reconciliation is no longer attainable by affirming fate, as in the

160. The lectures on aesthetics are not the first time Hegel expressed a skepticism about the possibilities of Greek tragedy. Already in his early characterization of 'beautiful religion', Hegel developed the thought that the gods who appear in tragedy as ethical powers trigger collisions in human action that are no longer able to be 'resolved (*aussöhnen*) by the spirit of beauty and so' are to be 'annulled by reconciliation (*Versöhnung*)' (see *Early Theological Writings*, p. 200, where the translation is a bit different). In the *Phenomenology* too Hegel points to the fact that in tragedy (demonstrated here in *Oedipus* and *Antigone*), behind the back of self-consciousness, so to speak, there looms a decision that will destroy the individual, but one revealed only by the action (GW 9:255; *Phenomenology*, §470). Consequently he maintains in the lectures on aesthetics that the tragedies belong to a 'more abstract, later period' than does sculpture (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 397), and he expressly calls the *Antigone* one of the Greeks' 'most sublime works of art' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 85a). See also *Phenomenology* (GW 9:253-4; §467), as well as the indication that what this art involves is 'the great concerns of humankind' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 7). In the *Aesthetics* Hotho either overlooks this important nuance, that already tragedy is no longer viewed as beautiful art, or else he consciously conceals it. In fact he highlights there, in Hegel's name, the 'consummate beauty' of Greek tragedies (*Aesthetics*, 1st edn. 1:358). In Hegel's own portrayal of tragedy his thinking does not conclude that Goethe produced 'beautiful art' just like the Greeks, but instead that in Goethe's transformation of Euripides' *Iphigenia* the way is paved for the transition from a merely external understanding of the gods, to a 'relationship of soul to soul' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 90; p. 266 in this text). See also Ms. 89, p. 265 in this text (the portrayal of the Eumenides by Sophocles), as well as *Libelt* 1828-9 (Ms. 70-1). See the interpretation of this point in Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst...*, pp. 196-7; Pöggeler, 'Hegel und die griechische Tragödie', pp. 285 ff.



original Greek tragedies; instead, as is evident in the specific description in the *Iphigenia*, it is attainable by reflection, by intersubjectively mediated insight. In both forms the production of art and its reception go beyond direct identification with the content, passing over into a double reflectivity—portrayal of the breach between intention and action in the drama [Schiller], or reconciliation via the insight achieved in the critical analysis [Goethe]. The 'deus ex machina' of Greek tragedy gives way to reason.

Paralleling this more sophisticated way of taking up ancient forms, and in a second train of thought, Hegel explicates the issue of the continued existence of epic poetry under changed historical conditions. From this perspective his leading theme becomes his own ranking of the two great poets (Schiller as the dramatic poet, Goethe as more the epic poet). While 'ethical life' or 'authentic pathos' appears in stricter form in Schiller's dramas, 'humanity' comes across in a greater wealth of forms, in Goethe's poetry, running from song, through the reflectivity of drama that integrates beauty within it, up to the modern epic and, to the novel, which reaches its peak in Goethe's *Bildungsroman*. Add to these the idyll *Hermann and Dorothea*, and the lyrical realization of the epic culminating in the form of 'objective humor' in the *Divan of West and East*, two efforts that arouse Hegel's special interest.

We find 'beautiful' art among Schiller's poems too, although in the songs he also presents 'more content that is worthy on its own account' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 88a; likewise *Kehler* 1826, Ms. 428). In contrast, Goethe remains in one respect caught up 'more within himself', more 'in the personal sphere'. Many of his songs are 'congenial, cheerful larks, subjective situations; however, they contain his most splendid work' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 428).<sup>161</sup> Nevertheless the special character of modern songs and

161. It is interesting that in this connection Hegel reiterates his early description of genius, one he developed in his interactions with Schelling in Jena, and at the same time links it to his characterization of the artist in the context of the ancient epic. In fact he validates Goethe's and Schiller's poems as 'these songs in which the German language and the customs of the people take shape; however, this can only take place via an individual who, to be sure, belongs to the people; the poet is the tongue [of the people] . . .' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 84a). The other transcripts report these thoughts strictly with reference to the Homeric epic. At this point a line is drawn from the ancient epic to the poetry of Goethe and Schiller. Hegel himself breaks this continuity once again by referring to Homer as the 'blind bard' who does not introduce his individuality in the form of subjective inwardness. 'In Homer's case we must not fundamentally represent it as people making a poem; a people makes no poem, for instead the individual does, one who must belong to the people; Goethe and Schiller have German sensibilities, insights; the people as such has not done the singing, the poet is the people's tongue' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 407). We also find the same thought in the final lecture series. Hegel points specifically to the fact that the same relationship of poet and people can continue, even though in modified form. 'A people

epics resides not in the fact that they omit topics of universal importance, but instead in the progression to the subjectivity of the poet. Hence Hegel emphasizes that in Homer's case we can discover 'no originality on the part of the artist', which is different from, for instance, the case of Shakespeare or that of Sophocles. This conception of the artist's originality extends to the issue of humor: to the refracted views of objective events owing to a consciously distanced, subjective performance ('subjective humor'), or else to objectivity mirrored in a subjective attitude of resignation, of 'cheerfulness in the face of things' ('objective humor'). Whereas the ancient epic poets still count as 'original', as also do ancient and modern dramatists 'because they simply portray the subject matter', what is 'humorous' 'deals with singular [that is to say: subjective-individual] notions' (*von der Pfordten* 1826, Ms. 25a). Hegel sees this entire spectrum represented in Goethe's songs, because Goethe exhausts these possibilities of the epic in his poetry, ranging from lyric sensibility, through lyrical revival of the folk song, on up to the novel. At the same time, however, idyll and epic widen the horizon to realizations of 'objective humor', because they juxtapose forms of portraying subjective-reflective ways of viewing the world that have objective content or reference, with sheerly subjective inwardness.

In the transcripts of the final lecture series we do of course find Hegel's disconcerting statement that 'all the lyric poems in particular are occasional poems', since they have for their content 'specific situations, namely, feelings' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 74). This prompts Hotho to an extended polemic in the *Aesthetics* against the contention that Goethe's poems are 'social pleasantries'.<sup>162</sup> However, Hotho's vindication misses the sense of this statement. Hegel specifies the 'occasion' more precisely as the 'situation', and the situation in turn as an event of merely subjective interest. That is why he moves on from lyric poetry to the song, since 'for this reason folk songs have a distinctive charm' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 426), because what the 'situation' configured lyrically in this case expresses is not the sheer sentimentality of the individual, and because the way in which this lyrical creation is received

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creates a poem insofar as the poet knows how to express the people's spirit. Such a thing can be ongoing.' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 147a-148). This too is subject to the restriction that the 'spiritual powers' expressed through the poet do not mediate themselves subjectively, but instead come forth purely in accord with the subject matter: The 'singer who performs stays in the background—Homer is blind; the subject matter itself is what accomplishes it' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 145).

162. See Gethmann-Siefert and Stemmrich-Köhler, 'Faust...'. In this instance Hotho especially targets Theodor Mundt, who in his own 1845 *Aesthetics* took up at length Hegel's description (citing notes on a lecture in 1826 that he himself attended), and set it up as a chapter of his own.

must not be limited to individual feeling. That is why Hegel expressly praises Goethe's arrangements of songs of this kind, which 'in the most meaningful way embody what is characteristic of the nation' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 426). Hence one transcriber of the 1826 lectures also records Hegel's statement:

Third [next to hymns and odes] is the song, which comprises within itself nearly the whole range of lyrical diversity; the song gives the lyrical its distinctive characteristic. In this diversity as such, what especially comes to the fore is the particularity of the people. All nations have songs, and collecting the folk songs of all nations therefore has a distinctive appeal. Herder and Goethe have . . . often arranged them beautifully, without altering their essential character. (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 203-4)

However, the transcripts also clearly record Hegel's statement that just sticking to the song [as it is] is a state of 'semi-barbarity'.

Neither Herder nor Goethe is guilty of this semi-barbarity. Just as Greek tragedy integrated the epic, Herder and Goethe are able to transpose the song into our own time. Especially in the case of Goethe, we find a way of dealing with folk songs that Hegel says links epic poetry with a specifically modern form, with the mediation of the subjectivity of feeling. The example of the folk song substantiates the fact that lyrically thematized subjective inwardness is not merely relevant to the individual; the beautiful form substantiates the fact that something other than subjective inwardness can be involved in the poetic mediation to us. Hegel speaks about these possibilities for overcoming subjective inwardness in favor of a greater universality in many phenomena, possibilities he treats collectively as the issue of the possibility of an epic in modern times.

In referring to Schiller's conception of an idyll that leads human beings not 'back to nature' but instead 'onward' to the formation of a more humane culture,<sup>163</sup> Hegel gains a persuasive foothold for discussing Goethe's endeavors. In Goethe's case too he discovers in the idyll the possibility of configuring an 'objectivity' of subjective inwardness, by integrating subjective-inward experience into the general horizon of the world or of the historical situation. Hegel discusses Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* in this light. At the same time he discovers in Goethe's *Divan of West and East* the outstanding poetic attempt at transposing poetic forms and contents of the past into the present day.

163. For Hegel's interpretation of Schiller, see Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, 'Idylle und Utopie. Zur gesellschaftskritischen Funktion der Kunst in Schillers Ästhetik,' *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schiller-Gesellschaft* (1980) 24:32 ff.; also her 'Vergessene Dimensionen des Utopie-begriffs . . .' pp. 119 ff.

In the idyll Hegel sees the opportunity to overcome sheer subjectivity by portraying, in various stages, a form of life mediated by subjective inwardness. Hence he aligns the idyll with the epic, namely, by discussing it with respect to whether in this case an epic of the modern world is developed, one capable of taking over the function of the ancient epic. Hence even in the characterization of the idyll, Homeric poetry provides Hegel's principal foundation for giving prominence to the relevance of this poetry. 'In Homer there is... so to speak, an idyllic condition, although at the same time something higher. In the idyllic condition one is limited to the benevolence of the environment, but in the epic one thereby serves exclusively higher purposes' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 71-2). This involves the fact that what the Homeric heroes achieve directly in life, the shape given to their milieu, resembles the immediate life form of the idyll in the narrower sense (the idyll defined by Schiller as the 'Arcadian idyll'). Unlike this kind of idyll that Hegel also finds in the modern era, for instance in the *Luise* of Voß or in Gessner's *Idyllen*, which, like mythology, contain 'no history', he credits Goethe's idylls as successful modern efforts.<sup>164</sup> Hegel discusses two forms of the idyll found in Goethe, one being the transposing of the epic into its modern form, in the novel, in the idyll of *Hermann and Dorothea*, and then the *Divan of West and East*, which reiterates the epic in more modern form in 'objective humor', in the cheerfulness of the idyllic mode, by mediating a foreign form of life.

In deliberately discussing these examples that for the most part met with disapproval from contemporary critics,<sup>165</sup> Hegel explicitly opposes all other

164. Johann Heinrich Voß (1751-1826), a German poet, was better known as translator of the Homeric epics and other classical works. (See n. 115 to *Hotho*, Ms. 275; p. 427 in this text.) Salomon Gessner (1730-88), a Swiss author and painter, published a volume of prose idylls and an epic poem. (See n. 79 to *Hotho* Ms. 97; p. 273 in this text.) Goethe's contemporaries had already judged his occupation with the *Divan* to be an unfortunate aberration from the proper route to the modern epic, an aberration from the reworking of the *Faust* literature. Only Heinrich Heine and Hegel took a favorable stance regarding Goethe's *Divan* literature. On this issue, see Stemmrich-Köhler, 'Die Rezeption von Goethe's West-Östlichen Divan im Umkreis Hegels' in Pöggeler, *Kunsterfahrung*..., pp. 381 ff.

165. For a more detailed interpretation, see Gethmann-Siefert, 'Idylle und Utopie', as well as 'Die Funktion der Kunst...' pp. 332 ff. For Hegel, the Arcadian decadence-forms of the idyll are linked to conceptions of poetry that remain mythological, prior to all history, and that he criticizes for this reason. 'Myths do not yet contain any history'; see G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, 2nd half, vol. 2: *Die orientalische Welt*, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg, 1968) p. 267; see *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Vol. 1, pp. 111-14. On the contrary, the romantic poetry that confines itself to poetically configuring the idyllic harmony of the individual with nature no longer contains any history; that is, it replaces reality with a 'dream' world.

attempts to revivify the past—such as the free renderings of the *Nibelungenlied* that come forward claiming to revive a 'Germanic mythology' and thereby to merge the poetry of the modern world with its own origins, with its authentic 'ur-poetry'. For Hegel, what they express historically cannot be accepted as 'what is our own'; above all, it cannot be the prehistory of 'conditions today', of the endeavor to maintain political independence (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 74). All that is historical 'is then our own not if we ourselves have done it, but instead only if the nation to which we belong has done it, if it stands connected to our own condition, if this condition can be viewed as its result' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 73). Whereas the revived epic poems of our own past in practice take a back seat to the Homeric model (they do not establish 'our world' because they do not contain the origins of our historical self-understanding), Goethe's endeavors seem to incorporate the intent of the ancient epic.

In the 1823 lectures Hegel already takes up the contrast between 'idyllic epic poetry' and Goethe's idyll *Hermann and Dorothea*. As opposed to the idylls devoid of history or the epics oriented to a history foreign to us, Goethe portrays the rediscovered harmony of individuals against a 'larger background'. In the 1823 lectures Hegel stresses principally the fact that, in doing so, the action of this modern epic, the idyll *Hermann and Dorothea*, still 'confines' itself to 'a private or personal condition' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 275; p. 427 in this text), although it already provides 'a larger background'. In the final lecture series Hegel drops this skepticism and thinks that there is a connection reconciling the world-historical revolution with the individual harmony upheld in the face of fragmented circumstances. These lectures state that the world-historical background is provided as 'a secondary perspective' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 150), and the idyll is therefore 'splendid, because it has as its background the concerns of the world, the motif of the native land' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 72). Therefore Hegel envisions, at least in a modern epic or in a novel, the possibility, or the complete form, of the idyllic mode as Homer realized it, namely, the realization once again of the prospect of individual action upon the historical situation of the nation.

Whereas *Hermann and Dorothea* could still be subject to the criticism of the idyll to which Hegel refers in citing Jean Paul's definition of the idyll as 'complete happiness within limitations',<sup>166</sup> he exempts the *Divan* from this criticism. At the same time, with the poetic individuality of the *Divan* Hegel

166. [Tr.] Jean Paul is the pseudonym under which Johann Paul Friedrich Richter (1763–1825) wrote many very popular novels, and humorous and satirical works. Some of his writings are idylls or romances.

highlights a thought he discussed previously in considering the possibility of casting a modern work of art in humor, in the reflective refraction of what is portrayed, both in the portrayal and in the reception of it. So, in the description of the *Divan* two perspectives coincide that are important for Hegel in the characterization of the work of art. History must remain present at least as the objective background of a form of life, just as Hegel has emphasized in the case of *Hermann and Dorothea*, and this history must be mediated in a modern, inwardly reflective form, the way he finds it in Goethe's *Divan*.

Just as has been evident so far with all the examples Hegel singles out, he discusses Goethe's *Divan of West and East* with respect to whether it can be a 'work of art' for the modern world, a work developed and effective under the conditions of modernity. The conditions for the creation of such a work are fulfilled in representing one's own history and employing a form of representation that is inwardly reflective, but the efficacy of the work, in the sense of founding a culture, is debatable.

Hegel's students and contemporaries were well aware that, by these reflections, Hegel sought to get involved in the discussion about the possibility of a new epic for modernity. Even so, they certainly did not have a favorable view of Hegel's stance in this debate about poetry. Not only in his own publications but also in the *Aesthetics*, Hotho assigns to *Faust* the description that Hegel coined for the *Divan*. In doing so Hotho not only confirms the lament of his contemporaries that 'apart from Goethe's *Faust*, according to Hegel, there is obviously no longer any poetry'.<sup>167</sup> He also changes the evaluation of Goethe's poetry. Hotho regards *Hermann and Dorothea* as the transfiguration of civic-ethical relationships by means of beauty. He regards *Faust* as the 'absolute philosophical tragedy', which, similar to Schiller's tragedies, manifests 'ethical life as what is actually substantial' (Löwe 1826; Ms. 303), 'what is genuinely pathetic', and 'of

167. On this point, see *Berichte*, 521. For the description of Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea*, as well as of his *Werther*, see the correspondents' accounts in the *Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände* (1828), no. 211. Linked to these is Hotho's review of Goethe's novel, *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* (*Affinities*), in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1829), no. 105–12, and (1830), no. 41–8. The fact that Hotho understands both Goethe and Schiller as poets who apprehended the 'basic interests' that affect their own time 'or affect all times' is likewise confirmed in his own publications. See the correspondents' accounts in *Morgenblatt...* (1828), no. 173; cf. no. 210; cf. also the review of the *Affinities* in the *Jahrbücher...* (1830), no. 41, p. 323. Interestingly enough, Hotho carries over Hegel's description of the *Divan*, in minimally altered form, to the description of the *Wanderjahre*, in which, as everywhere in Goethe's novels, 'we find depths of feeling masterfully coupled in the portrayal with the greatest clarity, calmness, and presence of mind', *Jahrbücher...* (1830), no. 41, p. 328.

great ethical interest' (Ms. 304), and what is of course manifest in the beauty of its poetic execution. It is noteworthy that in the 1826 lectures Hegel moves the consideration of Goethe's *Divan of West and East* to the end of the discourse on the symbolic art form. Thus he stresses that in the *Divan*, together with the 'freedom of the spirit', Goethe recovers a mode of portrayal that becomes 'symbol once again' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 30). Whereas in the *Aesthetics* Hotho endeavors to fend off from Goethe's poetry altogether the criticism that it is mere 'social pleasantry', and portrays his *Divan* as the consummate expression of the poet's personality, in the lectures the issue is clearly this systematic query as to what extent the *Divan* may be called an epic of modernity, accordingly a work of art.<sup>168</sup>

In both the 1826 lectures and the final lectures Hegel no longer treats the *Divan* after the characterization of the symbolic art form, as the replay of symbolic poetry on the soil of the romantic art form. He describes the *Divan* as the possibility of attaining substantiality or objectivity once more, beyond the lyrical portrayal of subjective inwardness. So his evaluation of the *Divan* at first seems to come quite close to the description inserted by Hotho into the *Aesthetics*. The 1826 lectures also compare Goethe's earlier songs to the later ones: 'When we compare Goethe's earlier songs to the songs of his maturity, we recognize the different character [of the two groups]: Only later did he complement them with this cheerfulness, this Parrhasian manner of representation, of feeling;<sup>169</sup> the *Divan of West and East* shows that here he was first touched by the Eastern spirit. The *Divan* is inexhaustible in its images, expansive with joy, certitude, carefreeness, even in the polemic against societal circumstances, against the crowd.' What comes to expression in this poetry is 'the poet's substantial attitude inwardly and in relation to objects' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 171).<sup>170</sup> The final lecture series too takes up

168. For curiosity's sake, here is the description in the *Aesthetics*: 'In contrast to the gloomy poems of his youth and their intense feeling, Goethe, in contrast to his obscure youthful poems and their concentrated feeling, even in his later years became seized by this expansive, untroubled cheerfulness, and as an old man, permeated by the aura of the East, in the poetic ardor of blood permeated by immeasurable bliss, has gone over to this freedom of feeling that, even in polemics, has not lost the most beautiful, untroubled character.' (*Aesthetics*, 1st edn., 1:446-7; 2nd edn. 1:464) Compare to this the statement in *Berliner Schriften*, p. 731: 'His whole life Goethe made love poetic—what he values—(his genius is lavished on this prose). The poetry of love he has come to know in the Oriental element—his *Divan*.'

169: [Tr.] Parrhasius, from Ephesus in Asia Minor, was reputed to be the greatest Greek painter of antiquity. Also, Parrhasia was a district in Arcadia; so the allusion here could be to an 'Arcadian' style of literature.

170. The other transcripts too report this description in the same terms. Thus, for instance, *Aachen* 1826 (Ms. 106) and *Löwe* 1826 (Ms. 153).

this thought in order to confirm it, albeit at a different point. 'In Goethe's *Divan of West and East* there is satisfaction in fantasy, freedom of spirit beyond the restrictedness of the world, praising of timely enjoyment. This is the higher orientation of the lyrical song' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 151a; likewise, *Heimann* 1828-9, Ms. 137; dated 28 March 1829). Goethe thereby not only succeeded in achieving by himself a new form of poetry or even, as Hotho supposes, a new personal cultivation; from Hegel's perspective, with the poetry of the *Divan* Goethe is able to evoke a 'receptivity' in the reader, one that makes possible 'enjoying works of other nations too, even more distant ones' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 7). The *Divan* makes possible 'thinking one's way into foreign customs' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 75). Whereas the 'Easterners... are fortunate to have epic poems in all eras', we in the modern world have succeeded in reclaiming, in isolation, one epic of this kind. In addition, this epic sticks to refracting the mediation of what is foreign to us. Hegel underscores this interpretation of the *Divan* by making an aesthetic value judgment (one that Hotho, in the *Aesthetics*, removes from the *Divan* and reapplies in general to Goethe as a poet): 'In his *Divan of West and East*, after the East has touched him in his maturity, Goethe attains the pinnacle of poetry' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 376; reads the same in *Aachen* 1826, Ms. 191).

'Freedom of spirit' is the essential thing in this poetry, not 'freedom of feeling' as the *Aesthetics* would have us believe. What occasions this aesthetic praise of 'freedom of feeling' is 'joy, certitude, carefreeness', no 'innocuous play', not 'freedom in toying with rhymes and contrived meters too, and with this carefreeness there is an inwardness and gladness of the heart moving within itself'.<sup>171</sup> Instead of 'spiritual freedom and poetry', Hegel speaks in the lectures of 'freedom of spirit', which he clearly aligns with the Kantian conception of the disinterested good will, when he states that in the *Divan* there is 'everywhere a play of beautiful fantasy, one that proceeds from happenstance' but that can be 'deeply felt apart from desire' (*Libelt* 1828-9, Ms. 103a). In the 1826 lectures Hegel certainly makes this point, and perhaps still more unequivocally. The 'love songs in the *Divan of West and East* show that Goethe was influenced not by external forms but instead by the spirit of the Orient.' 'The free, cheerful spirit of the Orient later came over him, as distinct from morbidity or concentration of the heart within itself. Happiness or cheerfulness interests itself in the object but is satisfied in it' (*Kehler* 1826, Ms. 200). The *Divan* highlights the cheerfulness of enjoyment, the completeness of the things of this world as internally

171. See, for this description, *Aesthetics* 2:239-40 and 3:463.



substantial, objective givens that are not annulled and dissolved in the purposes of individuals, in subjective inwardness. Hence Goethe's *Divan* stands for the possibility of achieving an aesthetic world as such, and in addition for the possibility, in the aesthetically executed world, of allowing history to be mediated, most especially the history and culture that are foreign to 'our own'.

Aesthetic praise of the *Divan*, of Goethe's supreme poetic accomplishment in it, is based in this way on the systematic description of the function of the work of art in history. The *Divan* in fact appears to be the culmination of the modern work of art because of how, like the song, it realizes the beautiful form poetically; how, like the novel, it realizes the historical background poetically; how, like pre-romantic art, it realizes objectivity poetically. In its poetry the culture of other and bygone foreign peoples becomes accessible as a form of life. Yet this form of life takes a 'polemical' stance toward the current modes of achievement of our own time, both poetical and everyday achievement. Hegel accordingly links this point to an additional thought important to him, namely, the reflective mediation of cultural experience through poetry. Goethe himself describes his own work in the *Divan* in this bifurcation, referring both to the role of reflection in poetry and also to the self-directed irony in assessing the poetic act. A correlative passage from Goethe's correspondence with Zelter should be mentioned here because Hotho also utilized such sources in the *Aesthetics* but obviously misunderstood them. Goethe relates to Zelter that in new poems for the *Divan* the Muslim religion, mythology, and ethics are once again given a place in a poetry as befits their years. 'Unconditional submission to the unfathomable will of God, a more cheerful outlook on the shifting forces of earth that constantly recur in circular and spiral fashion, love, inclination oscillating between two worlds, with all that is real being refined, resolving itself into symbols. What more does Grandpa want?'<sup>172</sup>

Unlike Goethe, who locates his stature as poet in the irony of renunciation and in the cheerfulness in the artistic execution of an ennobled reality, Hegel finds in the *Divan* the possibility of realizing 'objective humor', because the description of the *Divan* appears to be an enhancement complementary to the description of humor in the discussion of Jean Paul. Whereas 'Jean Paul... often' surprises 'by ingenious wit' (Kehler 1826, Ms. 126), and for that reason is described as one of the greatest humorists, he lacks the setting

172. *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Zelter*, according to the manuscripts, ed. Max Hecker (Leipzig, 1913), 1: 59-60. Goethe laments as well the skepticism regarding a style of poetry that 'presses on to reflection' (1:430-1).

in objectivity that distinguishes Goethe's *Divan*.<sup>173</sup> Contemporary critical discussion about the *Aesthetics* readily highlights Hegel's conception of humor as the possibility, in going beyond the systematic framework, of discovering great art also in the modern world.<sup>174</sup> Interpretation up to now has provided an insufficient basis also for this attempt at rescuing Hegel the great phenomenologist as opposed to Hegel the dogmatic systematician, at suspending his thesis of the past character of art by pointing to beautiful art in the modern world. If we go by Hegel, then Jean Paul does not measure up as perfecter of the comic medium; instead, if need be, the 'one who does is Goethe in his *Divan*, based on the poetic possibility of linking 'cheerfulness' with objectivity in a new symbolic poetry. With this point it is evident yet again that efforts on behalf of the current importance of Hegel's aesthetics can better achieve their goal if the sources for Hegel's lectures become fundamental to the interpretation. The *Aesthetics* in fact distorts this coherent point too, because its description of the *Divan* cannot be moved into the discussion about the significance of humor, therefore directly into the debate about the significance of reflectivity in the refraction of irony and of substantial subjectivity. The poetic mediation of a foreign form of life in 'cheerfulness'—and it alone—fulfills the requirements of 'objective humor', for it arises from more intensive 'labor of the heart and spirit' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. E 52), although it does lead to lightheartedness of poetic execution. Hegel's aesthetic praise in the case of the *Divan* links up with his question about the 'work of art' of modern times. With it he reaches the conclusion that in the *Divan* Goethe has 'accomplished what is superb poetically', even though comprehending in poetry what is foreign to us cannot provide a direct guide for action; instead—as befits the enlightened modern age—it can 'only' provide pleasure in what is beautiful, coupled with pleasure in the 'otherness' of possible forms of life. 'The cheerfulness of the poetic character' in no way involves 'the soul's extricating itself from all

173. 'Jean Paul is one of the greatest humorists; he frequently [surprises] us by ingenious wit, but just as often by eccentric juxtaposition. He has folios of miscellanies that he assembled from writings of all kinds. But the essence of originality is that the subject matter is from one spirit' (*Aachen* 1826, Ms. 82). We find the same critique already in 1823; here too it says that, by stringing together the most heterogeneous things, the 'subject matter is then brought in quite externally' (*Hotho* 1823, Ms. 187; p. 351 in this text). The final lectures too point out this difference on the part of subjective humor and objective randomness, by which 'great interest...' is 'undercur' because one notion is followed right away by 'a new one that is likewise momentary' (*Libelt* 1828–9, Ms. 101a). This critique of 'subjective humor' forms the background for the description of 'objective humor', of 'cheerfulness about things...'.

174. See H. Schneider, 'Komödie des Lebens—Theorie der Komödie', in *Hegel in Berlin*, pp. 79 ff.

the painful entanglements within the limitations of actuality' (*Aesthetics* 2:240). Instead it involves a historical cultivation of human beings in poetic pleasure: the 'Humanus', that is, the human—because cultivated—citizen of a modern state, as the new Holy One of art.

As in his characterization of Dutch painting, here too Hegel may still be hesitant as to whether we are permitted to speak of a 'work of art' in the full sense of the term. In any event, however, he sees beautiful art, and at the same time relevant art, realized for the modern world too, in the sophistication of the poetic possibilities. In praising the *Divan* aesthetically, Hegel rounds out the possibilities of artistic production and artistic execution with reference to the version of an 'objective', 'substantial', and nevertheless reflective rendering of the world. Despite giving no direct guidance for action or indicating an affirmative identification, as in Greece, but instead the 'partial' guidance of reflective pleasure, art in the modern world for this reason no longer mediates religion and, with it, the seriousness of an unconditional guidance for action; art instead simply comes on the scene as suggesting configurations of forms of life.

After closer examination, as this cursory journey through the characterization of the 'world of the arts' has shown, we can put an end to an ultimately disturbing topic in Hegel's *Aesthetics*, namely, the frequent condemnation and enthusiastic highlighting of specific works of art and artists. In the lecture transcripts we find no basis for such a judgmental approach to art. Of course from time to time Hegel develops his conceptions with examples from various works of art; but he structures the discussion in such a way that he always explicates his aesthetic praise or condemnation within the systematic context of the question as to the significance of works of art in the historical world. Whereas the *Aesthetics* ultimately appears to be the completed conception of Hotho's speculative art history, the testimonies to the lectures allow a different picture to emerge before the eyes of the reader—a sophisticated philosophical reflection carefully testing itself as well as the phenomenon, a reflection on the significance of the arts for human culture.

This selective presentation of a few examples from the philosophical characterization of the 'world of the arts' makes evident the fact that the preferential judgments about art in the *Aesthetics* attributed to Hegel, ones made in the name of philosophy and on the basis of absolute knowing, have neither stemmed from Hegel nor been developed in the sense of his philosophy of art. For some time interpreters of Hegel's aesthetics have awaited expectantly the edition of the lecture manuscripts, in the hope of being delivered from the dogmatic system of 'Hegel's aesthetics' by Hegel himself.

This hope will in any event be fulfilled to the extent that the integrated system of the *Aesthetics* produced by Hotho is superseded by the lectures, although not as though Hegel himself developed no such systematic foundation of aesthetics. The converse hope, that historical-critical editing of the sources for Hegel's *Aesthetics* spares the reader from the frequently irritating evaluations and condemnations of art, until now has found little traction. Nevertheless, the consequence of editing the lecture sources is that many judgments about art in the *Aesthetics*, in addition to those already mentioned, may not be ascribed to Hegel, and some even have to be traced back expressly to Hotho. The system of the aesthetics is established with the 1817 *Encyclopedia* and its revisions in 1827 and 1830. However, in the context of the philosophy of art as conveyed in the sources currently known, the judgments about art stand as exemplifying the philosophical treatment, and accordingly the systematically-backed structural treatment, of the arts, and function as a critical examination of their theoretical features. Whereas throughout the published edition of the *Aesthetics* we are dealing with great art having 'ideal' content (in Hotho's view, for the modern period even emphatically Christian content) designated as beautiful art prior in time to art's no-longer-beautiful degenerate forms, Hegel himself develops a combination, worth considering, of systematically-backed discussion with an examination that does not predetermine the phenomenon. So the philological labor on the lectures on the philosophy of art certainly opens up for discussion a new linkage of system and historical phenomenon, now a linkage that is Hegel's own.

#### IV. 'TRANSCRIPTS ARE OF COURSE OPAQUE SOURCES',<sup>175</sup>

The skepticism Heidegger expresses about transcripts introduces what until today has remained decisive for many Hegel interpreters and for our relationship to authentic philosophical texts: the assessment of these writings and expressions as the work of a genius, as a completed whole. This point surely also explains the hesitation to give up the completed edition of the *Aesthetics* that Hegel's student, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, provided after Hegel's death. Also stemming from this respect for the text and for the word of the great philosopher is an excessive hope tied to the testimonies to the lectures, and a misunderstanding of the possibilities of a historical-critical reconstruction. A reconstruction cannot therefore involve recovering the voice of the 'master' himself, the spoken or written word for its own sake. In criticizing this expectation and in treating his own works once more, Hegel even proceeds to demythologize them. Just as he makes the decisive aspect for philosophical aesthetics the philistine's question about art, what it could and should be 'for us', so we too, in the course of textual reconstruction, ought to consider the problem-oriented question of relevance as our guideline. In Hegel's definition, a work is something stemming from a shared labor, something in which the genius simply captures in words what has prepared for itself in the labor of all. We may, and should, regard Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art too as such an attempt to grasp the times in thought. Their documentation brings to our attention, in its initial outlines, not the original 'Hegel', not the word of the great philosopher himself, but instead the endeavor to discern art's philosophical import. Shortcomings can be remedied, but never along the lines of sheer fidelity to the word, never in reconstruction of an *'ipsissima vox'* ['the very voice itself']. We can and must accept such shortcomings, and accept the fact that the presentation of problems is perhaps insufficiently worked through, by pointing out that, just as Hegel continued to develop his aesthetics, so too the reconstruction of the sources for his lectures must remain a 'work in progress'. Even the historical-critical editing of the sources for the lectures must serve

175. The remark is Martin Heidegger's, from 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache', in his *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 3rd edn. (Pfullingen, 1965). See *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York, 1971), p. 6: 'Transcripts are muddy sources, of course . . .', a statement in 'A Dialogue on Language' made by the 'inquirer' (Heidegger), in speaking of a transcript, made by a Japanese professor, of Heidegger's 1921 course entitled 'Expression and Language'.

the subject matter, must take up Hegel's reflections on the philosophical characterization of art, must make the sources better because more easily readable and, by remedying the overlapping parts, must consequently portray a more original undertaking in the philosophy of art. Carrying these thoughts further rests with us. That is, Hegel's aesthetics does not, in a hieratic tome, become a more complete, systematic presentation of the philosophy of art, but instead becomes itself a contribution to the philosophical comprehension of a phenomenon that appears to be an undeniable element for human culture as such. His reflections must be understood first of all in their genuine pertinence to the subject matter; but also, in considering the further development of the phenomenon of art as well as of efforts to investigate it intellectually, these reflections must become subject to correction, and must be extended and developed.

It goes without saying that the attempt at the historical-critical reconstruction of an original, material position is only a substitute for a publication of that position. Given the circumstances, it would thus appear fully desirable had we had available Hegel's aesthetics as a work he himself authorized, in accord with his own plans. It must remain an open question how the 'aesthetics in any event was supposed to have appeared—whether Hegel planned, as the lectures' foundation, a book in the style of the *Encyclopedia* or the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, quite possibly, as a few fragments on aesthetics from Hegel's own hand suggest, divided into numbered paragraphs. The development the lectures underwent subsequent to 1820–1, thus subsequent to the first expression of a plan for their publication,<sup>176</sup> makes it unlikely that such an outcome was conceivably in the offing for Hegel; a definitive end to this vast project even appears implausible. Even in Hegel's own intellectual workshop the aesthetics remains a project capable of, and needing, development, as documented by the extensive restructuring even in the last lecture series. For that reason, but also because the completed version of this part of his system of philosophy at the hands of Hotho has become dubious at many points, in the future it will become necessary, in the ongoing scholarly treatment of issues and problems in aesthetics, to go back to the transcripts of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics or the philosophy of art.

'Transcripts are of course opaque sources'; they could have instead masked the intended points, possibly falsifying them in the subjective refraction of how unskilled students received them. It would certainly have been advantageous to have at our disposal Hegel's own reflections at least in manuscript form, not just as a matter of historical curiosity but above all

176. See *Briefe* 2:266; *The Letters*, p. 466. See also n. 18, p. 18 in this text.

for the sake of the subject matter, the conception of aesthetics. Based on the situation of the sources, this too is not possible. We can scarcely hope that the missing manuscripts Hotho was still able to utilize will ever again be available. But should that come to pass in the future, then surely they would confirm the statements of the lecture transcripts rather than the 'completion' of the aesthetics in the published edition.<sup>177</sup> Even if this historical-philological 'stroke of luck' were to occur and Hegel's own manuscript were to be rediscovered, the lectures provide solid information about Hegel's thoughts on aesthetics, about the way he discussed the basic problems of philosophical aesthetics and their illustration in examples from the various arts.

Furthermore, the excellent overview of all the lectures that we have today, and especially the multiple documentations of individual lecture series, allow us to develop a quite precise picture of Hegel's aesthetics. Upon examination, the transcripts appear without exception to be amazingly exact in the consistency of the transmission. That too does not seem surprising when we think about the purpose of direct transcripts and lecture notes. In fact these fruits of study were often the basic materials in the transcriber's own later library. The transcripts and formulations handed down to us were therefore preserved in private libraries as documents of Hegel's aesthetics. Add to this the fact that the students, by relying on utilizing the scant possibilities for the transmission of knowledge, undertook the business of 'note taking' with great diligence and strict planning. The fact that Hotho provided his lecture notebooks with an exceptionally generous margin shows in this instance that he prepared the direct transcript for later editing and augmentation, and for that reason set it up to insure a complete documentation of the lectures. The other students' notes too indicate great precision in transmitting important definitions and descriptive statements, often precisely when Hegel's contentions contravene their own opinions. They likewise took care to allow no gaps in the arrangement of the notes. Marginal notations in the transcripts witness to the fact that auditors made an effort to document for other students the times of individual lectures, so that someone who was unable to attend in person could obtain a substitute record of the lecture. Thus we find writing by a different hand interspersed in a few transcripts, arising from the effort to have at one's disposal also records of the lecture sessions one had not attended oneself, that is, the effort to document Hegel's lectures in their entirety.

The introduction Hotho provided for the 1835 edition would already have engendered skepticism regarding his claim about the authenticity of

177. See Gethmann-Siebert, 'Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst'.

Hegel's aesthetics. His description of how the text was constituted<sup>178</sup> is too skimpy to justify solid confidence that with the *Aesthetics* we have in our hands not only a completed text, but also Hegel's own presentation of the philosophy of art. Furthermore, the *Aesthetics* is by no means an easily understandable text for one who does not wish to justify the inconsistencies in argumentation as being Hegel's 'dialectic', and to exempt them from philosophical examination. From the vantage point of a consistent presentation of the philosophy of art, each individual lecture transcript—so far as it is simply complete, or even to the extent that it documents Hegel's remarks as such—is superior to the *Aesthetics*. That is because, in the testimonies to the four different Berlin lecture series handed down to us, while the philosophy of art does appear each time in a modified version, yet each time it appears as an integrated framework. In contrast to the repetitive, published edition with its many duplicate passages, Hegel's construct becomes lucid in the transcripts, the key points of his argumentation become recognizable and, from an overview of all the documents, even the sense of the modifications ultimately becomes comprehensible.

Of course in the lecture transcripts we receive Hegel's aesthetics 'at second hand', although the loss of authorial authenticity goes hand-in-hand with a material gain. A dismantling of the much-renowned, completed shape that Hotho worked out for the *Aesthetics* is no longer distressing when we also take into account the attendant problems its editing caused for our contemporary understanding. Besides, the extant versions of the lectures from different years had surely been completed and polished by Hegel himself in a certain way each time. Completing the aesthetics part of the system in multiple ways would not involve [Hotho's] self-serving admonition that Hegel himself considered the problems of the philosophical treatment of art simply as already more or less satisfactorily solved; or at least as subject to reexamination although not needing reexamination to any great extent. That is because, according to Hotho's report, Hegel's own manuscript for all these versions of the aesthetics in the lectures was his own sketchy, preliminary outline, fully formulated only in brief passages. So the lecture transcripts, at least in how they go beyond Hegel's written-out template, document his versions of the authentic configuring of the pieces into a whole.

The philological controversy as to how one can deal, in historical-critical fashion, with the manifold and extensive materials for the aesthetics, will of

178. See this text, Section I, C, 'The Genesis of the Aesthetics: From Sketch to System', pp. 20–34; also Gethmann-Sieft, 'Ästhetik oder Philosophie der Kunst', esp. pp. 94–5, 102 ff.



course continue for a while. In any case Hotho's procedure for compiling all the materials must be avoided. The explication of Hegel's thoughts in the course of the different lecture series (right up to his restructuring a two-part division of the philosophy of art into the three-part division in the lectures of 1828–9 that was immortalized by the published edition) becomes unrecognizable in virtue of the *Aesthetics*' confusing of the various sources. Therefore the task at hand is to document the lectures in their own exemplary texts. In any case doing so avoids the repetition of materials resulting from simple accumulation of information from the various lecture series. As the various examples were affected by modifications in presenting the aesthetics, Hegel in fact presented and discussed them at different places in different lecture series, and in doing so he often also weighted them differently from time to time; whereas Hotho treats the examples as a whole each time the transcripts of the different lecture series document them. Editing the lectures by bringing together all the sources for a single series has the advantage, over the 1835 *Aesthetics*, that these duplications and multiple entries can be avoided. Yet at the same time, compiling several transcripts loses the unitary character of documenting an 'aesthetics' at second hand'. With a compilation, the vitality of the mode of reception and style of transmission that are characteristic of the specific documents gets lost irretrievably; we lose the historical attraction of seeing Hegel's lectures in the mirror of a unitary reception by one individual. Nevertheless, there is doubtless an advantage in a completeness attainable only by combining different testimonies. This dilemma too can be solved if, in deciding in favor of editing the lectures in texts by series, *one* sound text is selected as the foundation (if possible, a direct transcript) and, if need be, supplementary material from other direct transcripts or formulations is added in the footnotes. The augmentations and supplementary material should not be integrated into the text, for then we obtain once again a text newly-constructed from a subjective refraction later in time and far less immediate.

The edition of the 1823 lectures on aesthetics in this volume is relatively unburdened by editorial problems of the aforementioned kind because, besides Hotho's transcript we know of only one other formulation of these lectures (*Kromayer* 1823/6), one that blends together two lecture series, 1823 and 1826, in the manner of the 1835 *Aesthetics*, albeit while guided purely by witnesses to the lectures and not by a perspective of its own.<sup>179</sup>

179. This formulation provides no supplementary material clearly referable only to the 1823 series (that is, its augmentations can be verified from the 1826 lectures). Hence—and because the formulation documents only the first part of the lectures—our edition of the 1823 transcript is not augmented by *Kromayer's* formulation.

The direct transcript of the summer 1823 lectures not only affords the advantage that Hotho conveys Hegel's lectures very carefully and, in comparison to other transcribers, in a way that is very trustworthy and strictly guided by Hegel's direction of thought. In addition, this transcript opens the door to the very interesting possibility of comparing what was delivered in one of the lecture series with the results that Hotho (re)constructed, on the foundation of all the lectures, as 'Hegel's' philosophy of art.

At any rate the hope that, by historical-critical labor on the sources, we can obtain absolutely certain information, that is, authentic information, about Hegel's delivery of the philosophy of art, is overblown. What comes within our reach is a knowledge of Hegel's aesthetics as reflected in the initial, lively, and often astonishingly clear reception of it. Progress made by going back behind the completed construct of the *Aesthetics* ought not to be underestimated. Laboring to interpret Hegel's aesthetics using the sources instead of the published version already makes it evident now that doing so substantially solves a series of conceptual problems. Previous interpretations had at best to capitulate when they faced these problems, the mark of their helplessness being their 'dialectical' treatment of the phenomena to be dealt with—'dialectical' because the treatment is contradictory and incomprehensible with regard to the subject matter. Thus we may proceed from the fact that the very textual condition achieved by going back to the lecture testimonies documents more than just the lifeless, rough exterior of Hegel's thought, as Hotho wants to make us believe would be the case in his statements introducing the *Aesthetics*.

With Hotho's own transcript of the lectures we have before us at least one document of a presentation of aesthetics or philosophy of art as thought out by Hegel himself, a document that, in contrast to the published version, enables the contemporary reader to have insight into Hegel's train of thought and argument. The transcript gives us a more ready access for understanding the presentation than does the *Aesthetics*, an access made possible because the presentation is mediated by auditor Hotho's efforts at understanding it. The astonishing discrepancy between their own notes and recollections, and the posthumously published *Aesthetics*, a discrepancy that contemporary auditors of Hegel's lectures had already noticed, and which Hotho conceded in his 1835 introduction, may also motivate today's reader to do further research into the sources.

Spending time with the sources for Hegel's lectures is not merely recommended but is unavoidable for becoming more involved with the subject matter—the philosophical characterization of art. In addition, the sources make it possible to take up, and critically advance, a discussion on the

information, one prompted by Hegel. To his auditors Hegel seems to argue more comprehensibly in the lectures than he does in his writings. His auditors already noted this phenomenon themselves. Thus Ludwig Feuerbach writes, in a letter to his father: 'In his lectures Hegel is far less unclear than in his writings—indeed, I might say that he is clear and easily understood; for he very much takes into account the levels of comprehension and conceptualization possessed by the majority of his auditors.'<sup>180</sup> Karl Rosenkranz, later Hegel's biographer, calls attention to the students' particular accomplishment, their 'being able to transcribe quite orderly notebooks from what, in my opinion, was delivered in ruminative fashion.' Consistent reports of the lectures indicate that Hegel found a large and interested audience, one focused on committing his remarks to writing as precisely as possible.<sup>181</sup> Two circumstances may have contributed to their clarity and perspicuity regarding Hegel's delivery. One was the fact that, as Hotho reports, a few passages of the aesthetics were 'written down word-for-word in advance', and were repeated 'always in the same form, because fully worked out'. Johann Eduard Erdmann reports the other circumstance, that Hegel, 'where he heard about a good transcript by one of his listeners . . . had it copied, and it became a basis for future lectures, such that changes and elaborations were entered on it. . . . Although Hegel always based his delivery on a notebook, the listener could infer, from Hegel's constant leafing back and forth and searching above and below, the existence of corrections, insertions, and the like.'<sup>182</sup>

This account shows that the students' efforts to achieve a complete, substantially precise rendition of Hegel's lectures were viewed as successful not only by their fellow students but also, in many respects, by Hegel himself. The custom of preserving lectures through direct transcripts as the foundation for later scholarly activity of one's own leads, in a manner

180. *Berichte*, no. 405, p. 265. On what follows in the next sentence above, see also no. 421, p. 276.

181. The impact of Hegel's lectures is attested to not only by the fact that, more than fifteen years later, Theodor Mundt chose for his own *Aesthetics* the structure of Hegel's lectures, and that in his work Mundt constantly mentions and critiques Hegel's aesthetics. Also, the students themselves report that their fellow students took practical measures to transcribe Hegel's lectures with special precision. On Theodor Mundt, see *Berichte*, no. 460, p. 301. Often they point out the large number of Polish auditors Hegel had at that time. As another student reported, the Poles included the 'most diligent transcribers' that he 'had ever encountered in a lecture hall'. He indicated that one student 'always had his pen at the ready, like a soldier with his ammunition', so that he missed 'no syllable of the master' (*Berichte*, no. 435, p. 282).

182. See *Berichte*, no. 688, p. 442. The previous report, from Gustav Thaulow, derives from an 'oral discussion with Hotho.' See *Berichte*, no. 690, p. 443.

astonishing to students today, to good and precise reproductions. Auditors utilized their notes on Hegel's lectures for their own scholarly labors, but they valued these notes principally as in part the foundation for intense discussions about the subject matter itself. The reception of Hegel's aesthetics in his own time may be a model in this respect for our engagement with it today. The discrepancy between the auditors' own notes and recollections, and the posthumously-published *Aesthetics*, may also motivate today's readers to do further research into the sources, in order to get nearer the subject matter, the philosophical characterization of art, and to carry on a discussion stimulated by Hegel.

THE HOTHO TRANSCRIPT OF  
THE 1823 BERLIN LECTURES

# LECTURES on the PHILOSOPHY of ART

The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures

Hegel gave lecture series on aesthetics or the philosophy of art in various university terms, but never published a book of his own on this topic. His student, H. G. Hotho, compiled auditors' transcripts from these separate lecture series and produced from them the three volumes on aesthetics in the standard edition of Hegel's collected works. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert has now published one of these transcripts, the Hotho transcript of the 1823 lecture series, and accompanied it with a very extensive introductory essay treating many issues pertinent to a proper understanding of Hegel's views on art. She persuasively argues that the evidence shows Hegel never finalized his views on the philosophy of art, but modified them in significant ways from one lecture series to the next. In addition, she makes the case that Hotho's compilation not only concealed this circumstance, by the harmony he created out of diverse source materials, but also imposed some of his own views on aesthetics, views that differ from Hegel's, and that the ongoing interpretation of the aesthetics part of Hegel's philosophy has unfortunately been taken to be Hegel's own.

This translation of the German volume, which contains the first publication of the Hotho transcript and Gethmann-Siefert's essay, makes these important materials accessible to the English reader, materials that should put the English-speaking world's future understanding and interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of art on a sounder footing.

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## PREFACE

This volume in the *Hegel Lectures* series of Oxford University Press is an English translation and edition of *G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst. Berlin 1823. Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Gustav Hotho*, edited, with an introduction, by Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (Hamburg, 1998). Acknowledgement of those contributing to the German edition appears at the conclusion of the appendix in this volume that is entitled 'The Constitution of the Text in the German Edition, and in this English edition'.

Herr Manfred Meiner of the Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, made possible the inclusion of this volume in our *Hegel Lectures* series. As always, the professionals of the Oxford University Press editorial staff were consistently reliable and helpful, as too were the suggestions by an anonymous reader for the Press. Peter C. Hodgson, with whom I have collaborated on a number of the volumes in this series, generously gave this work his meticulous criticism; I couldn't have done it without his advice and assistance, although of course any remaining flaws or inadequacies are entirely my responsibility.

A special thanks to Ms. Darlene Reynolds, who patiently and expertly typed what must have seemed like countless revisions of each part of the manuscript. Without her this project would never have seen the light of day. Finally, my wife Mary Ann has provided constant love and support not only in this but in all areas of my life.

Robert F. Brown





# THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

The Lectures of H. Prof. Hegel  
Summer 1823  
Berlin

H. Hotho



# INTRODUCTION

## I. TWO CHALLENGES TO THE WORTHINESS OF ART FOR PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION

- The topic we are considering is defined as the realm of the beautiful, more precisely as the domain of art. When we select, from the broader realm of representation, one topic for examination, initially it stands at a distance, in an obscure twilight, and we must first of all distinguish the topic from other domains in order to become better acquainted with it. So then we intend to begin by taking up a few views that can confront us initially at this point. There are two of these views. First, it can seem that art—as object of the free fantasy to which the full richness of nature stands open, and that nevertheless has the power to create its own images over and above nature—is not susceptible to scientific examination. For science has to do with what is necessary, not with what is contingent. Moreover, people even think that art is not worthy of philosophical examination. Art is an amiable genius that dabbles in everything, that tones down the seriousness of life's circumstances, entertains us, displays pleasing forms everywhere, but is distinct from life's truly ultimate purposes. If it be the case that the seriousness of life lies outside the purview of art, it would surely be out of place to want to examine art seriously. It can also strike us in the second place that art has to do with appearance or semblance, that it abides in deception, so that what is beautiful (*das Schöne*) gets its name from the appearance (*vom Scheine*). So one can suppose that genuine purposes ought not be promoted by deception and appearance, that appearance is not the authentic medium for genuine purposes. Therefore, should art also share purposes with other means of mediation, then surely its medium, that of appearance, would not be suited for these purposes. [2]

### A. ART AS APPEARANCE AND DECEPTION

As for the circumstance that art produces appearance and has appearance as the mode of its existence, this point is correct; and if we posit appearance or semblance as something that ought not to be, then art's existence is surely deception. So appearance is art's mode of externality. However, as to what appearance is, what relationship it has to essential being, we have to say that, for all essential being, all truth, not to be an empty abstraction, it must appear. The divine must have being-for-one (*Sein-für-Eines*), or determinate being, which is appearance as distinct from what is implicit. For appearance

is not something nonessential, but instead is an essential element of essential being itself. What is true is for itself within spirit; it appears within itself, is there for others. So there can be a distinction solely in the manner of the appearing; thus the material of determinate being alone can constitute the distinction. And art will therefore have its distinctiveness solely in the manner and mode of the appearance, not in the appearing as such. As we stated, this appearance that belongs to art can be looked upon as a deception; and indeed so as compared to the external world in the way that world surrounds us in its material conditions, and also as compared to our inner, sensible world. We do not speak of what is external as deception, nor too of what lies in our inner being, in consciousness. We speak of all such things as actuality. In contrast to this actuality, we can characterize appearance in art as deception, but we could justifiably maintain that what we otherwise let count as actuality is a more powerful deception, is a more untrue appearance, than that of art. For the region of external things, and that of inner | experience, are what in empirical life, in the life manifesting itself 3 to us, we call something actual, and we must grant validity to it, although instead of being the world of truth, this whole sphere is rather the [3] world of deception. First of all, we know that genuine actuality is something beyond this immediacy of sensing and of external objects. Therefore, this externality is to be declared, in a higher sense, as a more severe deception than is appearance in art. As compared to thought, then, the determinate being of art can be called an appearance, and later on we will touch on what this point involves.

### *B. ART AND THOUGHT*

In light of its appearance, art does of course take a back seat to thought, and yet art essentially has an advantage over the mode of external existence in that, in art as in thought, we are seeking truth. Art in its appearing points, in virtue of itself, to something higher, to thought. Immediate sensibility for its own sake, however, does not point to thought but instead renders it impure and conceals it, usurps it, passing itself off as subsistent being, and by its form it hides what is inward, what is higher. In contrast, art in its portrayal has this feature of pointing to something higher. What we call nature, the external world, makes it harder for spirit to recognize itself. What follows from this observation about the nature of appearance is that art sets itself apart from other modes of truth not in virtue of appearance but only in virtue of the manner of its appearance. Had we said, then, that art is not susceptible to scientific examination even though it is susceptible to

philosophical examination, then the direct response to this is that philosophy is not to be separated from the scientific method, for philosophy knows things according to their inner necessity, according to the necessity of the development from them themselves. | And this is the character of science as such. So philosophy just has to present the inner necessity of the object, and it is therefore science. To be sure, we could not always quite consistently have laid claim to a scientific treatment in the case of art for, as a lofty domain, art involves many presuppositions with regard to the materials and the form of its presentation. Art utilizes the contents of the whole [4] of nature, which is of course the object of other sciences and so is something already dealt with. These presuppositions must therefore be adopted as presuppositions already dealt with scientifically.

A further issue for the worthiness of art for scientific treatment is that art can, to be sure, be viewed as casual play, as external adornment for life's circumstances and as an enhancement for other objects.<sup>1</sup> In this mode art is nothing free or independent.<sup>2</sup> What we can consider is therefore simply free art. Art is capable of serving other purposes; it can be a mere sideshow. However, it also shares this feature with thought, which on the one hand is self-fulfilling but, on the other hand, can equally well be used as the medium for what is devoid of thought, in the service of what is contingent and ephemeral. In considering thought, we set it apart in its independence, and so too with art in its independence. For art's ability to express thought, it has the most exalted character, one shared with religion and philosophy; like these two, it is a way of expressing and bringing to consciousness the divine, the highest demands of spirit. Peoples have set down their most exalted representations in art, and often art is the only key to | learning the religion of a people. Art is the intermediate link between pure thought or the supersensible world and the world of immediacy or present experience, the

1. The characterization of art as 'casual play' picks up on the account of free art as play (*Spiel*) by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in §43 of his *Critique of Judgment*, where he contrasts free art with handicrafts (as occupations performed for a wage), within the larger setting of distinguishing 'pleasant' art from beautiful art. In §14 of this *Critique* Kant distinguishes the beauty of the work of art from external decoration, which—as beautiful objects added 'as an enhancement for other objects'—either detracts from the beauty proper and is then mere 'adornment' or, taken in a positive sense, plays a part in the beautiful form. For Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, see Immanuel Kant: *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 23 vols. (Berlin, 1910–55). The *Critique* is in vol. 5 (1913); Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York, 1951), pp. 146–7, 61–2.

2. Here Hegel plays on a distinction Kant draws in the *Critique of Judgment*, §16: 'There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*), or merely dependent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*).' See Bernard, p. 65.

latter being a sensuous region that thought as such portrays as something 'over there'. Art reconciles the two extremes; it is the intermediary linking the concept with nature. So, in one respect art shares this characteristic with religion and philosophy; however, art has a distinctive way of portraying, in a sensuous manner, what is itself higher, and of thus bringing it closer to sentient nature. To this general characterization of art we can append the observation that, when we said art has its source in free fantasy [5] and is accordingly something unbounded, it follows that the fantasy is not allowed to wander about in unruly caprice, but instead must bring to consciousness, in their authentic character, the highest needs of spirit, and from that have its enduring character. Also, it may not have a random multiplicity of forms in doing so, for its form is determined within its content.<sup>3</sup> Worthy content calls for a suitable form.

We have to remark in addition that, when we said art is a way of making spirit aware of its interests, art is not the highest way of expressing truth. We will speak later on about this error of taking art to be the absolute mode.<sup>4</sup> Art is also constrained as to its content; it has a sensuous material, and for

3. The Roman poet Horace—Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65–8 BC)—calls for coordinating the subject matter of poetry with its meter and the subject matter of painting with its portrayal. [7k] Horace wrote the *Ars Poetica*, the name by which his *Epistle to the Pisones* came to be known by posterity, about 18 BC. On this view of poetry, see *Ars Poetica* 85 ff.; trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, in *Horace: Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica* (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), pp. 456–9. This particular passage in Horace mentions poetry and tragedy, but not painting.

4. Hegel is criticizing the assumption of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) that art, as intellectual intuition of the absolute, is the supreme object of philosophy (the 'organon' of philosophy). Already in his Jena writings and reflections Hegel distances himself from Schelling in the same way, by pointing to art's limitation 'with respect to its content' (for example, in the 1801 *Differenzschrift*.) See Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg, 1968 ff.), 4:75–7; *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, N.Y., 1977), pp. 171–4. In his treatise *Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung* Schelling develops the 'historical construction' of the intuition of the absolute in a work of art, which he designates as the 'model for considering the universe' as such. See Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols. (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), 4:485 ff.; see also n. 46, p. 45 in this text. The correlative 'speculative construction' of the intuition of the absolute is found in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*, in the characterization of art in connection with the 'Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy' (*Sämmtliche Werke* 3:612–34; *F. W. J. Schelling: System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1978), pp. 219–36. Schelling also presents the 'speculative construction' in his Jena lectures on aesthetics of 1802–3, for which we have evidence only in manuscript form; see 'Schellings Ästhetik in der Überlieferung von Henry Crabb Robinson [1802/3]', ed. Ernst Behler, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (1976), 83:133–83. Schelling also develops this characterization of art as intuition of the absolute in lecture fourteen of his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (*Sämmtliche Werke* 5:344–52); trans. E. S. Morgan, ed. Norbert Guterman, as *On University Studies* (Athens, Ohio, 1966), pp. 143–51.

that reason too only a certain stage of truth is capable of being the content of art. For there is a more profound existence of the idea, one that the sensuous is no longer capable of expressing, and this is the content of our religion, our culture. Here art takes | on a different shape than at earlier stages. And this  
6 more profound idea, the Christian idea in its highest stage, is not capable of being represented sensuously by art; that is because it is not sufficiently related and amenable to what is sensuous. So far as stages go, our world, our religion and our national culture, are to be expressed beyond art, as the highest stage, what is absolute. So the work of art cannot fulfill our ultimate, absolute need; we no longer pray to a work of art, and we have a more circumspect relationship to the work of art. For this very reason we also have a more specific need to reflect about the work of art. We have a freer stance vis-à-vis a work of art than earlier on, where the work of art was the highest expression of the idea. The art work comes under our judgment; we subject its contents, and the appropriateness of the portrayal, to our considered examination. *In this regard the scientific knowledge of art has become more requisite than in ancient times.* We respect art and have art, but we view it as nothing ultimate; instead, we think about it. [6] This thinking cannot have the intention of producing art in turn, but only that of understanding its accomplishment.

We should be satisfied with these remarks at this point. They concern art's aspect of having to do with appearance and its ability to be an object of scientific knowledge, but they indicate that art is not the highest expression of the absolute.



## II. THE SPECIFIC TOPIC: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

Now we have to be more specific about the examination of our actual topic. The philosophy of art constitutes a necessary component within the circle of philosophy as a whole. In viewing the philosophy of art in this way, we come to grasp it within this whole, for it can be grasped in this way only within the presentation of the whole. Grasped in this way it becomes proven, for 'proof' simply means 'demonstrating the necessity'. Our intention cannot be to carry out this proof, to construct its origin within the concept, for that takes place in an antecedent part of philosophy.<sup>5</sup> | Here, where we separate out this science, we begin directly; we do not have it as a result because we do not take into account what precedes it. This is why we begin directly, and initially we have nothing but the representation that there are works of art. We can begin more specifically from this general representation, and can refer to what we find as representation within us. We are to proceed with this representation and to indicate the points of view that were formerly professed about these aspects. At the same time we intend to add a fundamental examination in brief of these aspects, to have the benefit of correcting the general representation and so of further determining how we must hold this representation with reference to the contents and materials of art.

We will find three features in our representation. [The first one] is that art is no natural product but is something made by human beings. In the second place, art is produced for human beings, and is first taken from the sensuous realm and exists for the senses. Art in its breadth borders on what is sensuous, and no boundary can be drawn. The third point is that the work of art embodies a particular purpose. [7] These are the three aspects that external reflection grasps.

### A. THE WORK OF ART AS A HUMAN PRODUCT

#### 1. Rules for Its Production

With reference to the first point, to the fact that the work of art is a human product, it was said in former times that rules have to be set for the

5. Hegel developed the systematic foundation for his aesthetics in the *Encyclopedia*, the first edition of which was the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Heidelberg, 1817). Here in our text he refers to lectures on the *Encyclopedia* given in Berlin and alternating with the lectures on aesthetics. See the 1817 *Encyclopedia*, §§456–64, and the 1827 Berlin *Encyclopedia*, §§556–63.

- production of the work of art.<sup>6</sup> For it seems that one could become aware of how one accomplishes what it is that one does. | And if one knows this procedure, then it is one's free choice to proceed in the same way, so that everyone is able to produce works of art. Formerly art was subjected to this examination, which was called art criticism, the examination of what emerges with a work of art and the way in which this criticism should and must be carried out, the theory of the fine arts.<sup>7</sup> The intent of this is to furnish rules for making the work of art, prescriptions for its production. What this intention involves, namely, the giving of rules, is forsaken today, since it is conceded that works of art are not brought about according to rules, because only something external or mechanical can be produced according to rules. All of what is said to be brought about in this external way is specifiable according to rules. If I know these rules I need only engage in formal activity, for the rules embrace the entire concrete specificity, and my formal, abstract activity alone has to realize it. With a work of spirit, however, spirit is no such merely empty activity following an accepted, specific procedure; for spirit must determine itself from out of itself, must work from out of itself. Therefore the work of art, not being something mechanical, is not to be grasped under a rule. Yet people have established rules that do not pertain simply to what is mechanical, as in the *Ars Poetica* of Horace.<sup>8</sup> Anyone can learn how to make a rhyme and can do so, for it is a sheerly mechanical process. But the prescriptions go further and, as we see in

6. In the *Ars Poetica* of Horace, Hegel finds implicit the view that the work of art, as something produced by and for human beings, has to obey rules for its creation (see n. 8 just below). In any event, the continual demand for rules according to which anyone would be able to produce works of art (as our text states just below) points rather to the poetics of the Baroque and Enlightenment periods.

7. Hegel alludes to the *criticus*, the reviewer (*Kritiker*) or art critic (*Kunstrichter*), a figure dominating the field of debate about art during the second third of the eighteenth century. See, for instance, the preface to the second edition of *Critischen Dichtkunst* (1737), by the founder of the Leipzig school of criticism, Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–66). Hegel was familiar with this tradition via Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), who mentions the figure of the '*Kunstkritiker*' in his *Betrachtungen über die Quelle des Schönen und Erhabenen* (1757). Mendelssohn substituted the term '*Kunstrichter*' in a later printing of this work, newly titled as *Ueber die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*. See Moses Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. F. Bamberger et al., 23 vols. (repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1971), 1:287–305. The following sentence in our text does not refer to the assessment of art works based on established forms and deduced in the judging of art, but instead refers to ancient poetics.

8. The *Ars Poetica* enlarges upon the demand for rules for the production of works of art. Alongside the artistic understanding that is readily learned, Horace places a distinction of genres, a characterization of subject matter. Hegel takes up this issue in his characterization of poetry just below in our text. Hegel owned this text of Horace in the Baxter edition prepared by J. M. Gessner, *Horaz: De arte poetica* (Leipzig, 1772), a work popular in his day.

Horace's epistle, they involve an unlimited universality; a poem ought to have an interesting theme.<sup>9</sup> [8] These are perspectives that surely are to be considered. But one detail of this perspective is another matter, the detail that actually suffices for the production, because such generalities do not capture the singular point | that pertains to the execution. An apothecary prescription spells out everything precisely, and it can be followed. But a wholly general prescription does not suffice for the execution, which is why it is amiss to give such rules as the kind by which anyone can produce a work of art.

## 2. Genius and Inspiration

So people abandoned this opinion but fell into its opposite, no longer seeing the work of art as the product of a general, formal, abstract, mechanical activity, but then seeing it as the product of a quite distinctively gifted spirit. Indeed they saw that such a human being only need scope to prove his specific, unusual quality (*Besonderheit*), with the result that he is free to speak from the 'stance of being something universal, in-and-for-itself,'<sup>10</sup> since such a formal procedure would spoil one's production. Therefore from this perspective people looked upon the work of art as a work of an unusual talent or genius. In one respect this is correct; talent plays a part, and talent is a specific ability of spirit,<sup>11</sup> and therefore a limited mode of being gifted, of genius, is more universal. We will speak later about the extent to

9. Horace does not say this directly, although we do find relevant explanations about content in his characterization of poetry's subject matter: 'He who has learned what he owes to his country and his friends, what love is due to a parent, a brother, and a guest, what is imposed on senator and judge, what is the function of a general sent to war, he surely knows how to give each character his fitting part.' (*Ars Poetica*, 312–16; Fairclough, pp. 476–7.) Horace also requires of the work of poetry that: 'poems... must have charm, and lead the hearer's soul where they will' (99–101; Fairclough, pp. 458–9). In doing so the poet faces a difficulty: '... if you boldly fashion a fresh character, have it kept to the end even as it came forth at the first, and have it self-consistent' (125–7), lest 'mountains will labor, to birth will come a laughter-rousing mouse' (139; Fairclough, pp. 460–3). Also, in referring to the genre of satire, in which 'the lure and charm of novelty could hold the spectator' (223–4; Fairclough, pp. 468–9), Horace decrees that an interesting content calls for the right rule and the suitability of the content to the form. Hegel came upon the category of being 'interesting' in the *Versuch über die Malerei (Salons)* of Denis Diderot (1713–89) and in *Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie (The Study of Greek Poetry)*, by Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829). For the latter, see *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler et al. (Paderborn, Munich, and Vienna, 1958 ff.), 1:222–3. Also see Kant's criticism of a merely empirical interest in what is beautiful, in §41 of the *Critique of Judgment* (Bernard, pp. 138–40).

10. [Tr.] The German for the imposing sequence of words within quotation marks is: *Sich-an-ein-Allgemeines-an-und-für-sich-Seiendes-Halten*.

11. 'Geistes' ('of spirit') is scarcely legible in Hotho's manuscript. It could perhaps be 'Tages' ('of the day' or 'of the occasion').

which genius and talent are at the same time essentially something natural. At this point we only wish to remark that, in the production, any consciousness of the act has been held to be detrimental, such that the producing was taken to be a state called 'inspiration'. In such a state, genius is set in motion by one's own free will or else is aroused by an object. In Germany there was an era in which this opinion was valid. It was the era of genius, and it came about here owing to the early creations of Goethe and Schiller. In their creations these poets departed from their predecessors by disregarding all the rules that were devised at that time. In their initial works they [9] quite intentionally | proceeded contrary to those rules.<sup>12</sup>

We do not intend to take up the confused concepts of inspiration. We have already remarked, about the standpoint of genius, that genius and talent involve a natural element. In that context, however, we know that such genius calls for the cultivation of thought, and for practice in what thought produces. That is because the work of art has a purely technical aspect that must be practiced, and this is also true in the case of the poet. Meter and rhyme belong to poetry. Inspiration is no aid to skill in them, and skill is needed for the artist to be master of this aspect and not be hindered by the rigidity of the subject matter. In addition, the artist must know the depths of spirit and of the heart, indeed all the more so the higher the artist's stature. The artist knows these things not immediately but instead only through studying the outer and inner worlds. From this study the artist acquires the material for the portrayal. It is the case, then, that one art has more need of

12. The concept of inspiration goes back to Plato (428/7–348/7 BC) and his conception of a divinely infused inspiration (certainly in its highest form a philosophical inspiration, not a literary inspiration). Hegel alludes also to the discussion begun by Horace and continued in eighteenth century aesthetics and Kant, as to whether inspiration might be indicative of the truth of literature. English literary theory and art theory (in particular that of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, who lived 1671–1713) influenced the concept of inspiration, or 'Promethean enthusiasm' in Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), and the young Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832). This became the fundamental concept of the 'era of genius' (as Hegel calls it). Goethe calls it a 'renowned, much-discussed, notorious literary epoch', in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, pt. 3, book 12. See *Goethe: Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Ernst Beutler, 18 vols. (3rd edn.; Zürich, 1979), 9:520. Genius proves itself preeminently in virtue of the fact that 'it oversteps existing laws, casts off established rules, and declares itself as having no boundaries', instead of providing 'laws and rules by its action and deeds' (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, pt. 4, book 19; *Werke*, 10:161). Hegel's remark in our text does not in fact allude to the early writings of Goethe and Schiller that still keep to traditional forms; instead it is pertinent to Goethe's 1773 play, *Götz von Berlichingen*, whose protagonist is a genius at odds with his contemporary society (*Werke* 4:73–175), and possibly also to his 1774 novel, *The Sorrows of the Young Werther* (*Werke* 6:7–124), and to Schiller's 1781 play, *The Robbers*; see Schiller: *Werke, Nationalausgabe*, ed. Lieselotte Blumenthal and Benno von Wiese, 43 vols. (Weimar, 1943 ff.), vol. 3.

study than do others. Music, for instance, has to do with the wholly indeterminate experiences of what is inward, just with the nuances of the heart that are devoid of content, devoid of thought.<sup>13</sup> Music has no need whatsoever of any spiritual subject matter in one's consciousness; hence musical talent is for the most part evident quite early, when head and heart are still empty, when spirit and life are still inexperienced. That is why there can be virtuosos who are deficient in character and spirit. It is otherwise with poetry, where what matters is a thoughtful portrayal of the human spirit, of the forces that move it. That is why the first creations of Schiller and Goethe are often unrefined and | barbaric.<sup>14</sup> That runs counter to the customary view that inspiration is linked to the fires of youth, and makes it the case that most of what is in these creations is cold and dully prosaic. Those men produced beautiful, profound works only via the cultivation of thought. Homer was inspired to his immortal songs only as an old man.<sup>15</sup> [10] So the spirit determined in a specific way has to cultivate itself by intense study. 11

### 3. Art Products and Natural Products

The third observation could be comparing the art product to a natural product, with regard to the fact that, as a human work, an art product takes a back seat to a natural product. Surely an art work has no internal feeling, is not something animated throughout but is only superficially so, whereas the work of nature is something internally alive. People customarily reflect on this by setting the natural product above the human product, since we ascribe the work of nature to God and the work of art only to a human being. So, what we must say about this contrast, this positioning of the work, is that, as a thing, the work of art is certainly nothing animated, and, since there is nothing just externally alive, the living thing is higher than what is lifeless. However, there is no work of art with respect to this aspect of being just a thing, for the work of art exists only as spiritual, as having

13. Hotho added 'almost' before 'devoid of thought'.

14. See the *Ars Poetica* 315–16 passage cited above in n. 9, and Hegel's mention just above in our text that the early creations of Schiller and Goethe 'disregard all the rules'. At this point, after 'unrefined and barbaric', Hotho added to the text: 'cold and outright prosaic'.

15. Since this theme, similar to that of the blindness of Homer (who lived about 770–700 BC), is a widely-discussed topic, we cannot determine whether Hegel is referring to a specific source. Hegel owned two editions of Herodotus' work *The History*, which contain discussions of Homer's life written by their editors. They are: *Herodoti libri IX*, ed. Conr. Heresbachio (Cologne, 1562); *Herodoti historiae*, ed. Heinrich Stephanus (1592). Each contains a life of Herodotus by L. Valla. See the compilation of lives of Homer made by Thomas William Allen, ed., in vol. 5 of *Homeri Opera* (Oxford, 1912), in the series *Scriptorium Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*.

received the baptism of spirit; it portrays something spiritual, something shaped in harmony with spirit. Therefore the product of art is from spirit and is for spirit, and it of course has superiority in that the natural product, though a living thing, is something transitory, whereas the work of art is something abiding, something permanent. What is more, its permanence is even of greater interest. From the mere fact that they have taken place, events are also of course past; the work of art gives them permanence. As  
 12 a rule, spirit is | higher than nature, and God has more honor from what spirit makes than God has from the natural product. The fact that people set the human over against the divine involves in one respect the misconception that what a human being does is nothing divine; the misconception that God does not work in human beings as God does in nature. Within spirit, what is divine has the form of being something conscious and of having been produced by consciousness. In this respect the divine operates through the medium of consciousness. In nature the divine has operated through a medium too, through the medium of externality, a medium that, as what is sensible, indeed takes a distant back seat to consciousness. So, in the work of art the divine is elicited by a much higher medium. [11] External existence in nature is a far less suitable way of portraying the divine. So, by a more accurate characterization, we must eliminate this misconception that the work of art is only a human work. God works in human beings in a more authentic way than God does in the soil of mere naturalness.

#### 4. Why Human Beings Produce Art

The fourth characteristic concerns more specifically what on the whole is essentially at issue. The preeminent question is: Why does a human being produce a work of art? For it can strike us that such productions are random amusements. Later we will speak in a concrete sense of the need for art. Art is linked to specific, universal intuition and religion. So the question is a more concrete one than it is possible to answer here. What we can say at this point is that the universality of the need for art involves none other than the fact that human beings are thinking, are conscious. In being consciousness, one must place before oneself what one is and what, on the whole, exists;  
 13 one must have these as one's objects. Natural | things just *are*; they are just onefold, just simply exist (*sind nur einfach, nur einmal*). Yet as consciousness, human beings double themselves; they simply *are*, and then are *for themselves*. They bring before themselves what they are, intuiting themselves, standing before themselves, and are consciousness of themselves. They simply bring before themselves what they are. So the universal need

for the work of art is to be sought in a human being's thought, since for a human being the work of art is a way of bringing before oneself what one is. People do this in science and the like too, but they do so in the same way in art. When, in the second place, we find human beings also as consciousness in relation to an external world, they also have this more specific need to alter the externality found there and to alter themselves as something natural, to place their own stamp upon themselves. One does this in order to recognize oneself from the shape of the things. This is already a factor in a child's first impulse—it wants to see something that it has brought about.<sup>16</sup> This factor pervades these manifold configurations, right up to [12] this mode of production of one's own self as it exists in a work of art. Human beings proceed in this way not merely with external things, but in themselves. They do not leave themselves as they are inherently; they adorn themselves. Barbarians pierce their own lips and ears, and tattoo themselves. All these aberrations involve not leaving oneself as one is by nature. Among educated people this practice becomes the spiritual cultivation by which one produces oneself. So this rational feature of human beings expressing themselves as consciousness, of doubling themselves, of exhibiting themselves for themselves and for others, is a universal need. Accordingly the work of art is humanly-made, and with it consciousness itself becomes its own object. And this is the great necessity of human rationality.

That suffices for this characteristic. |

14

## B. ART AND THE SENSES

### 1. The Awakening of Feelings

The second characteristic that we found in the work of art is that it exists for human beings and indeed specifically for their senses, and therefore it must have sensuous materials.

This reflection provided, first of all, the occasion for supposing that art exists specifically to arouse pleasant feelings, that is, feelings that are suited to the nature of feeling. From this standpoint people made the investigation of art into an investigation of feeling, and they asked which feelings are to be awakened, for instance, fear, or compassion? But these are not pleasant. How could the consideration of a misfortune prove to be satisfying? This way of considering works of art is spelled out above all from Mendelssohn's

16. Hotho added to this sentence: 'it throws a stone into the water, because then the concentric circles are its own work, in which it has the intuition of its own being.'

era onward, and in his writings we can find many discussions of this sort.<sup>17</sup> The term 'aesthetics' is also used here.<sup>18</sup> So this is actually an inappropriate term, although the name is of no consequence. Some have also used the term 'callistics',<sup>19</sup> although the issue here is not what is beautiful as such; instead the issue is artistic beauty. Investigation as to which feelings ought to be awakened [13] does not get one very far. Feeling is the dull, indeterminate region of spirit or the form of this region. What is felt is stultified, enveloped, and subjective. In feeling, distinction is therefore wholly abstract and is no  
 15 distinction of subject matter. Take, for instance, fear, of which terror and anxiety respectively are but the quantitative intensification and modification. In the case of fear there is a being, and something approaches that threatens to destroy this being. There is also an interest, with something negative bearing upon it. Both the being and the closeness of the negative factor, taken together, go to make up the feeling of fear. But this relationship is wholly abstract and indeterminate; the content of the feeling, as feeling, is wholly abstract. All these feelings are experienced in relation to the most

17. In his *Briefen über die Empfindungen* (*Letters on Feelings*) (Berlin, 1755), Moses Mendelssohn, especially in the eleventh letter, remarks on the configuration of the arts insofar as they can be effective in arousing pleasant feelings. (See Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. F. Bamberger et al., 23 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1971), 1:85 ff. In his 'Betrachtungen über die Quellen und Verbindungen der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften', published in Leipzig in 1757 and included in the *Philosophischen Schriften* (Berlin, 1761), under the title, 'Ueber die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften', he characterizes 'beauty' as the 'autocratic mistress of all our feelings', and feelings in turn 'are always accompanied by a specific degree of pleasure or of displeasure' (*Gesammelte Schriften* 1:167–8). See also Mendelssohn's 'Zufällige Gedanken über die Harmonie der innern und äußern Schönheit' (ca. 1755), in an earlier version of his *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. G. B. Mendelssohn, 8 pts. in 7 vols. (Leipzig, 1843–5; repr. Hildesheim, 1972–5), 4:46–53. He writes (on p. 49): 'Since beauty is an immediate feeling... so too there is no error or bias with regard to it. Whatever occurs to someone and seems to be beautiful must contain a basis for pleasure.'

18. Designation of the science of feeling, specifically the sensible perception of what is beautiful, as 'aesthetics', came about with the 1750 publication of the unfinished Latin text *Aesthetica*, by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62). Aesthetics as a science was first developed in Baumgarten's *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnulis ad poema pertinentibus* (Halle, 1735); trans. into German and with an introduction, by H. Paetzoldt (Hamburg, 1983); see §§4 and 115.

19. Based on Kant's reserving the term 'aesthetics' for the 'science of all the principles of sensibility a priori' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, §8 = A 42 ff., B 59 ff.), the term 'callistics' was used tentatively to designate the aesthetic theory of the beautiful, as were the terms 'calliaesthetics', 'calology', and 'calleology'. (See Wilhelm Traugott Krug, *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1827), p. 569, as well as Gottlieb Ph. Chr. Kaiser, *Ideen zu einem Systeme der allgemeinen reinen und angewandten Kalliästhetik* (Nürnberg, 1813).) [Tr.] In Greek mythology, Callisto, a beautiful nymph, was associated with Artemis and was seduced by Zeus.



diverse matters, and so these forms are wholly abstract. Other sorts of feelings, such as anger or compassion, are of course all distinguished according to their content, but the distinction remains an abstraction. The Negro has religious feelings as does the Christian, who feels uplifted by the most exalted content. Thus the content of the religion is still wholly indeterminate. So if we dabble in these feelings with reference to art, we find ourselves with a universal that is contentless. The proper content of the work of art remains outside such an examination, else it is not what it should have been. The main thing is that emotion is subjective, whereas the work of art ought to have something universal, something objective, for its content. In viewing this content, I ought to immerse myself in it and, in doing so, to forget myself. What feeling maintains is always just my own particularity, and that is why people find it satisfying. The work of art, the religious treatment, must dispense with particularity. In a treatment coupled with feeling, the thing itself is not considered, for instead the subject is upheld in its particularity; that is the reason why this treatment has a tedious quality, because the attention is on one's own petty particularity. This sort of intuition is repugnant. [14]

## 2. The Sense for the Beautiful; Taste and Connoisseurship

The second consideration that can be brought to bear here involves the fact that the work of art exists for the senses, that it is supposed to arouse feelings, to be sure, although it shares this feature with many other things. | To be more specific on this point, it was said that the work of art is supposed to arouse the feeling of the beautiful.<sup>20</sup> So people spoke of one aspect of feeling as the sense for the beautiful.<sup>21</sup> The human being as such is said to possess this sense, albeit not as an instinct, not as ordained by nature (like, for instance, the eye). Instead the meaning is that this sense must be cultivated, and this cultivation is taste. So then taste is called the feeling for what is beautiful, an

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20. Herder is an example of those who define aesthetics as a 'science of feeling of the beautiful or, in the Wolfian expression, of sensuous understanding'; this is the basis for configuring the correlative works of art that give rise to it. See 'Kritische Wälder' (1769), in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan et al., 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877-1913; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1967-8), 4:22.

21. The characterization of feeling as 'sense for the beautiful', or feeling of the beautiful, is found, for example, in Kant's distinction of a spiritual feeling of respect for moral ideas from a merely sensible feeling or inclination (see *Critique of Judgment* §41; Bernard, pp. 138-40). The distinction of 'sensuous enjoyment' from 'ethical feeling', mediates between taste as a 'sense common to all' (§40), and as 'the feeling (of the inner sense)' (§15) (Bernard, pp. 135-6, 64). In any event Hegel is alluding to the reflections of Mendelssohn, who, with reference to Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*, defined cognition of the beautiful as 'sensible representation of perfection', and the fine arts as the 'sensible expression of perfection'.

apprehending that remains as feeling and that has formed itself by cultivation in such a way that it discovers what is beautiful directly, where and as it is. The aim of the theory of the fine arts and sciences is the cultivation of taste, and there was a time when this cultivation was especially called for.<sup>22</sup> So taste is a way that the senses apprehend what is beautiful, a way of relating oneself to it sensibly. Today we hear less talk of taste, for, as a direct apprehending and evaluating, taste cannot penetrate deeply; it is incapable of fundamental involvement with the thing itself. The subject matter makes a claim on reason in its depth; the senses point only to what is superficial in the work of art and to wholly abstract reflections. That is why taste holds fast to singular points; it agrees in this way with feeling, and it shies away from the profundity of the impression of a whole; that is because a sense of this sort proceeds only so far as externalities, which are just side issues for the subject matter. Hence there is nothing more uncanny for taste than when poets give expression to great characters, to great passions; taste's trading in petty issues finds no foothold, no longer any point of interest. Where genius comes on the scene, taste retreats. So people abandoned this intention<sup>17</sup> | of cultivating taste<sup>23</sup> and proceeded in the quest to have an educated judgment about the subject matter and its aspects. [15] Thus they went on to the next stage, that of connoisseurship, and the connoisseur replaced the person of taste.

Connoisseurship, then, can stick to mere externalities too, can stick to the technical aspect, to the historical aspect, with no notion of anything of a more profound nature.<sup>24</sup> It can even hold its historical aspect to be above

22. Hegel is referring to the definition of taste that was in vogue. Moses Mendelssohn, among others, links this definition of taste, as feeling for the beautiful, with aesthetics as the cultivation of taste. Mendelssohn refers to Enlightenment aesthetics, in calling for an education and development also of the feeling for the beautiful, of sensibility for the beautiful (in his 'Briefen über die Empfindungen'; see *Gesammelte Schriften*, 1:50–1, 53). Kant proceeds from the fact that taste is developed within a society, and is educable (*Critique of Judgment*, §§40, 60; Bernard, pp. 135–8, 200–2). Whereas Kant ties in with the empiricism of David Hume (1711–76), Herder sees the cultivation of taste rather as a process of natural growth. (See Herder's essay, 'Über die Ursachen des gesunkenen Geschmacks bei verschiedenen Völkern, da er geblühet', in *Sämmtliche Werke*, 5:599 ff.)

23. Hegel rejects Herder's equating of taste with genius, and evaluates aesthetic taste in the sense of the taste that Kant and Herder criticized, as habitual imitation of the 'taste that is fashionable' or the 'taste of the court', with reference to the Kantian opposition between 'spirit' and 'taste'. Spirit is capable of 'creating ideas', but taste is only in a position 'to restrict' ideas 'to the form suited to the laws of the productive imagination'. Kant opposes this taste to genuinely aesthetic taste, which can 'form... originally (not imitatively)'. See 'Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht', in Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 23 vols. (Berlin, 1910–55), vol. 12, §71, B.

24. The discussion characterizing the art connoisseur, or judge of art, underlies this distinction—the connoisseur as one who not only must have available the necessary historical

that profundity. However, connoisseurship does at any rate involve specific information about all aspects of the work of art, including reflection about a work of art, whereas taste just carries out a wholly external reflection. So the work of art necessarily has aspects that occupy the connoisseur; it has a historical aspect, a material aspect, and a lot of conditions involved in its production. The work of art is linked to a stage of technical development, and the artist's individuality is also an aspect that it exhibits. Connoisseurship makes these specific aspects its object: the technique, the historical occasion, and many external circumstances. All of these are essential for the fundamental knowledge of a work of art, and for its enjoyment. So connoisseurship accomplishes a lot. Of course it is not the greatest thing, but it is a necessary element. These are the ways of considering the work of art that are pertinent to the fact of its having a sensuous aspect.

### 3. The Relation of the Sensuous to the Work of Art, and to the Artist

Now we intend, in the third place, to examine in more detail the essential relations the sensuous aspect has, on one hand, to the objective work of art and, on the other hand, subjectively to the artist, to the genius. So the sensuous aspect is essential. Nevertheless we cannot yet speak of the sensuous as it is characterized based on the concept of the work of art, for we are still on the soil of external reflection. 18

#### a. *Sensible Intuition, Desire, and the Sensuous Shape*

The first observation we can make about the relation of the sensuous to the objective work of art is that the work of art exists for external or internal sensible intuition or representation, just as do external nature or our own inner

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information but, beyond that, is said to be a philosopher. The norms for judging what is beautiful are no longer 'mechanical laws' but instead 'rules called for by the nature of the subject matter'; see Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Paul Rilla, 10 vols. (2nd edn.; Berlin and Weimar, 1968), 6:171, 101; also 3:701. For Plato, everyone can be a 'connoisseur of beautiful art', because connoisseurship rests on being guided by pre-existing models, with reference to judging imitations and reproductions of them (*Laos*, 669a-b; see Plato, *Laos*, trans. R. G. Bury, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1926, repr. 1961), 1:142-5. But Kant, in a departure from empiricism, draws a distinction between evaluating products of the fine arts according to empirical rules (Hume), and an evaluation going beyond historical, technical connoisseurship, one calling for a 'shared sensibility' (*sensus communis*), a sensibility for beauty' (along the lines of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747). About judging by a connoisseur, Kant says that 'the universal communicability of a pleasure must not, in its concept, be a desire for enjoyment based on sheer sensation, but must be based on reflection'. For Kant, judgments of taste have 'as their standard the power of reflective judgment, not sensible experience' (*Critique of Judgment*, §44; Bernard, pp. 148-9, where the translation is a bit different).

nature respectively. That is because speech too exists for sensible representation. This sensible feature of the work of art, however, exists essentially for spirit, and spirit should find satisfaction by means of this sensible material. This feature explains the fact that the art work should not be any natural product, any naturally living thing. It should not, even though the natural product be a more exalted one. In no way is the art product's purpose [16] to be a naturally living thing. That is because the sensuous feature of the work of art is solely for spirit and should be for it alone. Upon closer examination of the sensuous as it exists for human beings, we see two aspects in the relationship. *The sensuous is intuited, and in this aspect it exists not for spirit, but for what is sensible.* So we set aside this aspect of sheer intuition. To be more specific, the sensuous feature of the work of art is for the inner nature of human beings, for something that we can also call spirit. The sensuous<sup>25</sup> exists for desire. We use external things, we consume them, we relate ourselves negatively toward them. In this relationship of desire we, as single individuals, relate ourselves to what is singular, and do so not as thinking, not according to a | universal determination. The single individual stands opposed to the singular thing and, in its individuality, maintains itself only by sacrificing the other. So desire consumes the objects, and what we have in this setting is an individual interest.

In this relationship, the single individual relates itself to things that are themselves singular, are concrete. Desire would not be served by mere superficiality, mere contrivance. As individual, concrete, natural being, desire relates itself to what is likewise naturally concrete. Desire wants what is concretely material. In art, human beings do not conduct themselves according to desire, hence they are not disposed toward what is naturally concrete. In contrast, wanting to say that natural products are superior to art because of their being organically alive would be to say that works of art in no way belong on the sort of soil that serves and satisfies spirit. Therefore works of art ought not be natural products. To be sure, desire ranks natural products higher because it cannot make use of art products. Art's concerns are devoid of desire and thus unrelated to what is sensuously concrete [as such].<sup>26</sup>

25. Hotho changed 'The sensuous' to 'Spirit in its naturalness, or the sensuous as such'.

26. Hegel is referring to Kant's distinction between interest in what is pleasing and interest in what is beautiful (*Critique of Judgment*, §§3–5; Bernard, pp. 39–45). He enlarges on this conception in a way that corresponds to his characterization of desire in the *Phenomenology* (GW 9:107, 114–15, 199; see *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford and New York, 1977), pp. 109–10, 118). In specifying his theoretical structure, Hegel links Kant's thesis of disinterestedness, in the sense of having no present interest in the object's existence, with the characterization of the work of art, in which Kant imputes such an interest in the object (*Critique of Judgment*, §52; Bernard, pp. 169–70). Hegel endeavors to solve, by means of the *Phenomenology's* reflections on desire, the difficulties that beset Kant's conception, by calling for a distinction as to practical interest in the object. See also G. W. F. Hegel: *Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft*,

The other aspect, then, is that works of art also exist for intellect, for spiritual consideration, not for what is merely sensible. Theoretical examination of sensible things has the need to gain cognizance of them, to become acquainted with their essential being, their inner nature. Thus theoretical [17] examination takes up what is universal in sensible things, not their singularity, not their immediate, determinate being. Hence theoretical interest leaves the things free, and in doing so it is freely disposed toward them. Desire is in thrall and is destructive, and pertains to what is singular as such; intellect pertains to what is singular as at the same time what is universal. *The interests of art parallel the interests of intellect; art too lets the objects be free,*<sup>27</sup> and is a free examination in the sense of letting the things exist over against itself. The concern of intellect, however, is to grasp the essential being or the universal feature of the thing, the concept of the object. | But 20 art does not have this concern, and to that extent it differs from science. Scientific knowledge has thought, the abstract universal, as its goal. It has a different object than what is given for it immediately in things; so it goes beyond what is immediate. Art does not do this, does not go beyond what is sensuous, beyond what is offered to it. Instead art has for its object the sensuous as it is immediately. So, in one respect there is the sensuous object of artistic examination, but in such a way that it is left free by the examination, not destroyed as desire does to its object. Accordingly, what is sensuous exists for spirit, but not in such a way that the thought of this sensuous existence, its essential or inner being, is art's object.

It now remains for us to state that art's object is the sensuous surface, the appearing of the sensuous as such, whereas desire's object is the outward, empirical expanse of the object's concrete materialization. In another

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Heidelberg 1817–18, with additions from the 1818–19 lectures, transcribed by Peter Wülfen, ed. Claudia Becker et al. (Hamburg, 1983), p. 116; Hegel: *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818*, ed. the staff of the Hegel Archives with an intro. by Otto Pöggeler, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995), §91, pp. 165–6. Also see G. W. F. Hegel: *Nürnberg Schriften: Texte, Reden, Berichte und Gutachten zum Nürnberger Gymnasialunterricht 1808–1816*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1938), pp. 183–4: 'It is also part of [theoretical] education that I... consider and treat the objects, as they are in and for themselves, in their free distinctiveness, such that I am interested apart from any particular use for them... Interest in beautiful art is an unselfish interest too.' This is the sense in which Kant distinguishes taking pleasure in what is beautiful from taking pleasure in what is pleasant or agreeable, which 'by sensation... excites a desire for objects of that kind' (*Critique of Judgment*, §3; Bernard, p. 41).

27. Kant develops this thought of an 'interest of the intellect' in his reflections on the 'intellectual interest in what is beautiful', though of course he does it with emphasis on interest in nature, not interest in artistic beauty (*Critique of Judgment*, §42; Bernard, pp. 140–7).

respect, however, spirit does not seek the thought of the sensuous, its universality or the configuration<sup>28</sup> [in general], for spirit is intent on the sensuous individual, abstracted from the framework of the materialization. Spirit is intent only on the surface features of the sensuous. So in art what is sensuous is elevated to being appearance, and art thus stands halfway between the sensuous as such and pure thought. The sensuous element in art is not what is immediate, not the self-contained autonomy of the material realm, as in stones, plants, and organic life. Instead the sensuous element exists for something ideal, albeit not the abstractly ideal aspect of thought. | [18]

There is the pure, sensuous appearance, and in more specific form, the shape. This shape relates outwardly to sight on the one hand, and to hearing on the other; it is the sheer look and sound of things. These are the ways in which the sensuous comes into play in art. So art has to do with the 'shadow realm' of the beautiful.<sup>29</sup> These sensuous shadows are the works of art. Herein lies the more specific necessity according to which the sensuous is the purpose of art. Hence the sensuous can come into play in the work of art only in accord with the two ideal senses. Smell, taste, and touch have to do with materially sensible things—touch with warmth and cold and the like, smell with evaporation of materials, and taste with their dissolution. So these senses have nothing to do with art. What pleases them pertains to the material aspect of things, to immediate sensibility, not to the beautiful, not to sensibility in the way that what is sensuous exists for spirit.<sup>30</sup> For its material art therefore has the 'spiritualized sensuous' as well as the 'sensualized spiritual'. The sensuous enters into art as the ideal sensuous, as the abstractly sensuous.

*b. The Spiritual Activity of the Artist; Talent and Technique; the Imitation of Nature*

The other aspect that we had to consider here was the subjective aspect of productive activity, or the question as to what must be established from it

28. In the manuscript, 'configuration' (*Gestaltung*) could perhaps instead be deciphered as 'worth' (*Geltung*).

29. This remark is an allusion to the poem 'The Gods of Greece', by Friedrich Schiller, to a passage from the second version of it in the first part of Schiller's *Gedichte 1800*. (See Schiller's *Werke* 1:190 ff. and, for the second version, 2, pt. 1:367.) The second version reads: 'Beautiful world, where you are . . . Alas, of that warm, living image, only the shadow remains'. Instead of to Kant, the context of the poem points to Plato's definition of art as the imitation of 'shadow images' or 'phantasms', rather than art's being an imitation of 'reality as it is', or 'truth'. See Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1935, repr. 1963), 1:430–1.

30. Hegel sets forth Kant's distinction of 'beautiful' from 'pleasant' (*Critique of Judgment*, §3; Bernard, p. 39): 'What is pleasant is what, in sensation, pleases the senses'.

regarding the activity of the artist. The very way the artist's product must be created is what the definition of the work of art calls for; it must be spiritual activity that at the same time includes within it the element of sensuousness, of immediacy. Thus the activity is not mechanical, not scientific, and does not involve anything to do with pure or abstract thought, for the spiritual and sensuous producing must be grasped in the form. It would be poor poetry to bring a thought, grasped prosaically beforehand, | into a pictorial form as decoration and adornment attached to the abstract reflection; instead the productivity is the spiritual and the sensuous as inseparable. We call this producing 'the producing of fantasy'. It [19] is spirit, the rational, the outward-pressing spiritual, and the pressing outward of what it contains brings itself to consciousness within the sensuous element. Therefore the activity has spiritual content, a content it portrays sensuously. The fantasy structures the spiritual content sensuously. This mode of production can be compared to the way in which an experienced person who knows what matters in life's circumstances, but does not know how to grasp such content himself according to general rules, instead always, with the representation, has singular instances that occur to him; one who therefore is unskilled at setting forth general reflections, but instead always just avails himself of a concrete mode of explanation.<sup>31</sup> So it can be that spirit becomes aware, as a reminder in specific examples, of what it has within itself. The same can be the case in devising a content that spirit cannot explain otherwise than pictorially.<sup>32</sup> This is the mode of productive fantasy. Anything can come into play in its contents, but the way of bringing it to consciousness is the specific sensuous portrayal. It follows directly from this that artistic talent is essentially natural talent. We can speak of scientific talent too, although the sciences presuppose | only a general ability for thinking and so we could say that there is no scientific talent as such. In contrast, one element in the product of a work of art is a producing of what is sensuous or natural; there is an element of immediate naturalness in it, whereas free thinking abstracts from everything natural and is not disposed toward the natural mode. But since productive fantasy has a natural aspect, it involves naturalness; and that is why fantasy's talent is a natural gift or talent as such, a way of producing instinctively. Of course it is not solely an instinctive kind of producing, for the natural aspect is only one element in it. [20]

31. Hotho added 'by an account of something singular'.

32. Hotho added 'that is, in a singular way'.

The spirituality is united with the naturalness. This is what constitutes the distinctive feature of artistic talent. Although of course every human being can exhibit talent to a certain degree, artistic talent nevertheless embodies a specific element, and no one can exhibit this element beyond a certain degree who lacks superior talent. For example, Friedrich von Schlegel also sought to compose verse when he was in Jena.<sup>33</sup> He succeeded, but anyone would have succeeded, for anyone can poeticize or otherwise be productive in a defined, already familiar way. Rising to higher levels, however, is the province of natural talent. As partly natural, artistic talent is for that reason evident even early on, and right away it is formative, internally driven, outwardly expressive, with the restlessness of what is self-explicating. This restlessness expresses itself in early pictures and figures: at an early age, to the sculptor everything becomes figures, to the poet everything becomes verses. Technical facility in particular is an early indication | of special aptitude. Everything becomes figure, poem, melody. And such a person becomes as easily adept with the technical side as with the natural side. These are the two aspects with reference to the fact that the work of art is suited to the spiritual sensibility that has an aspect of what is natural.

We said further that, in a principal aspect of its configuration, even the content of the work of art seems to be taken from the sensuous, from something immediately given—from nature or from human affairs. If we stick with the content being taken from the sensuous as such and cling abstractly to this point, then this suggests that the work of art ought to be an imitation of nature. This, accordingly, could have seemed to be the only characterization of the work of art. It must be conceded that art takes its configurations from nature, and later we will see the reason for this. [21] Within itself the content is so constituted that it portrays what is spiritual in the shape of what is natural. But stating abstractly that the work of art is an imitation of nature can mean that this activity and skill limits itself to this imitation, to a specific content depicted strictly according to nature, just as this is the principal aspect in the case of natural history topics or of portraits. Here there is a given, although with portraits of course sheer imitation is insufficient. The work of art can therefore confine itself to the imitation of nature, and yet this is not its essential character because, with a work of art, human beings have an interest and a content of their own, which they portray.

33. During his stay in Jena, up until 1801, Friedrich Schlegel published no verse except for occasional poems. Hegel could have been referring to the tragedy mentioned later in the lectures (p. 342 in this text): *Alarcos. Ein Trauerspiel von Friedrich Schlegel* (Berlin, 1802); see the *Kritische Ausgabe*, 5:221–62.



## C. VIEWS OF THE PURPOSE OF ART

## 1. The Imitation of Nature; Pleasurable Adornment

From this standpoint we wish to pass over to a third one, that people in fact also | speak about art's ultimate purpose, one it proposes to bring about. 25 The first thing that can occur to us in this context is the imitation of nature, thus that art ought to provide a faithful representation of what otherwise is already at hand.<sup>34</sup> The purpose would be to recall it. But art with this purpose cannot be free, beautiful art.

The purpose of this imitation could have seemed to be that a human being also seeks to demonstrate skill in bringing forth what nature brings forth. A famous story tells that people had high regard for Zeuxis because of how lifelike the grapes he painted were, grapes so magnificent that real doves flocked to them.<sup>35</sup>

34. Ever since Aristotle's *Poetics*, imitation of nature has counted as art's principle. Hegel sets direct imitation of nature apart from the later characterization of creative, idealizing imitation, namely, that of Charles Batteux (1713–80) in his *Les Beaux arts réduit à un même Principe, par Mr. l'Abbé Batteux* (Paris, 1743). Published in French and augmented with additions by Karl Wilhelm Ramler, 4 vols. (Vienna, 1770), it was championed by the author Karl Phillip Moritz (1756–93), or even by Moses Mendelssohn with reference to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81). The reflections that follow in our text allude to thoughts developed by Goethe in his treatise about *Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Stil* (1789); see *Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Werke*, ed. Erich Trunz, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1948 ff.; Munich, 1981 ff.), 12:30 ff.

35. Zeuxis (c. 460–390 BC) was a famous Greek painter. The example of the grapes played a decisive role in the debate about the imitation of nature. Aristotle (384–22 BC), in a critical comparison with Polygnotus (another fifth century painter), points to the individualizing portrayal of the subject (*Poetics* 1450a 24–27: '... in Zeuxis as compared with Polygnotus; for whereas the latter is strong in character, the work of Zeuxis is devoid of it.') For this quotation, see *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), 2:2321. Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, AD 35–100) points to Zeuxis having 'discovered the principle of light and shadow'. See his *Institutio Oratoria* (*Education of an Orator*), 12.10.4; *Quintilian*, vol. 5, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2001), pp. 282–3. The episode of the grapes is reported by Pliny the Elder (Gaius Plinius Secundus, AD 23–79). 'This last [Parrhasius], it is recorded, entered into a competition with Zeuxis, who produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented that birds flew up to the stage-buildings.... It is said that Zeuxis also subsequently painted a Child Carrying Grapes, and when birds flew to the fruit with the same frankness as before he strode up to the picture in anger with it and said, "I have painted the grapes better than the child, and if I had made a success of that as well, the birds would inevitably have been afraid of it"'. For the quotation, see Pliny, *Natural History*, vol. 9, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1952, repr. 1968), pp. 308–11 (= 35.65–6). See also Seneca the Elder (Marcus Annaeus Seneca, c.55 BC–AD 40), *Controversiae* (*Controversies*), 25.310. [Tr.] In German there is a noticeable alliteration involving the words for 'grapes' (*Trauben*) and 'doves' (*Tauben*).

Büttner, a famous man in Göttingen, took great pleasure in recounting how his monkey tried to consume a painted cockchafer from Rösel's *Insektenbelustigungen*.<sup>36</sup> Of course one can take an interest in also seeking to produce the semblance of such things as natural shapes. But this would be only the wholly subjective interest in which one seeks to demonstrate one's skill, apart from reflecting on the objective value of the thing portrayed. The value, however, must lie precisely in what the product consists of, which, according to its content, must also be something spiritual. [22] In imitating what is natural one sticks with what is natural, and the content ought to be something spiritual.

The second observation that can occur to us regarding the ultimate purpose is that the work of art ought to be enjoyable, to serve as adornment.<sup>37</sup>

## 2. Portrayal of What Proceeds from the Human Spirit; Moderation of Barbarity and the Passions

- 28 The | third more specific [interest we have in art] is the view that art ought, as such, to be human, portraying what proceeds from spirit, that therefore its content is the entire content of the human heart and spirit.<sup>38</sup> In general, art has the goal of making vivid what is within the human spirit as such, what human beings hold true in their own spirit, what arouses the human breast in its depths, what has its place in the human spirit. Art certainly

36. Christian Wilhelm Büttner (1716–1801) was a scholar of nature and of language in Göttingen, a man of independent means as a privy councilor in Jena, and possessed an extensive library. We find the episode Hegel describes in Goethe's 'Ueber Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit der Kunstwerke. Ein Gespräch (1789)', published in the periodical he edited, the *Propyläen*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 56–65, see pp. 62–3. (Goethe's *Werke*, 12:67–73, see pp. 71 ff.) August Johann Rösel von Rosenhof (1705–59), in his *Insect Entertainments* describes the life histories of native insects and various freshwater creatures; see *Insektenbelustigungen*, continued posthumously by Christian Friedrich Karl Kleemann, in 4 pts. (Nuremberg, 1741–61). [Tr.] A cockchafer is a kind of large European beetle.

37. Central to all of courtly culture was the view that art ought to be enjoyable, to serve as adornment. This view was first explicitly formulated in the Renaissance by Leon Battista Alberti (1404–72), and it remained very widespread into the nineteenth century. See Alberti's treatise *De re aedificatoria libri X* (Florence, 1485. VI/2). See also n. 1, p. 184 in this text.

38. Hegel points indirectly to Goethe's epic poem, *Die Geheimnisse* (*The Secrets*), to which he refers more explicitly in his characterization of the content of art (as the 'humanus' as the 'Holy One' ...); see Goethe, *Werke*, 2: 271–81, esp. 278. In the 1826 lectures Hegel refers to the familiar line from the Roman playwright Terence (*Publius Terentius*, c. 185–159 BC), 'I hold that nothing human is alien to me' (*homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto*); this statement is made by Chremes, an old gentleman, early in *The Self-Tormentor*, Act 1, Scene 1, v. 77; it is translated somewhat differently ('I am a man. I hold that what affects another man affects me'.) in Terence, trans. John Sargeant, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1912, repr. 1979), 1:124–5.

portrays this, and it does so by means of the appearance, which is inconsequential when the awakening for what is higher is the goal. To that extent art instructs human beings about what is human, awakening slumbering feelings, providing representations of spirit's authentic interests. However, in these human features, all these feelings, inclinations, and passions contain inseparably what is lower as well as what is higher, both good and evil. Art is capable of inspiring these human features toward what is highest, and of enervating and weakening them toward what is sensuous. And so people look about themselves for a higher purpose that ought to involve something existent-in-and-for-itself, something essential. That is because a very diverse content moves the human breast, and art ought to draw a distinction as to what it wants to arouse. So, in the third place, we relate art to a higher purpose and seek to define this purpose. It can be defined as a formal purpose that can be attained in each work of art.

This formal purpose would be the moderation of barbarity as such. At the beginning of a people's cultivation, this moderation is a chief purpose ascribed to art.<sup>39</sup> A higher purpose would be the moral purpose that people long held to be the ultimate purpose. | [23]

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The question, then, is: In what way does the distinctiveness of art involve this capacity for doing away with coarseness, or how does art contain the possibility of shaping the impulses, inclinations, and passions? We will examine briefly what this ethical moderation amounts to. Coarseness

39. Hegel could have been referring to Aristotle's characterization of catharsis in *Politics* 1342a16 ('The melodies which purge the passions likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind'; Barnes, 2:2129) in relation to the view that art operates as a means of healing, in *Poetics* 1453b11 ('not every kind of pleasure should be required of tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure'; Barnes, 2:2326). Equally suggested is an allusion to the debate about the significance of aesthetic taste. For Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–79), the development of taste can deliver human beings from their 'natural coarseness': see J. G. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1773–5), 1:465. Kant sees in taste 'a means of furthering that which everyone's natural inclination desires', and in the sociable exercise of taste, the 'beginning of civilization' (*Critique of Judgment* §41; Bernard, p. 139). We find similar reflections in Herder's critical debate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), in Lessing, and in others. Schiller relates this thought to the very art that makes possible a human being in the complete sense, that 'one cultivates oneself' so that, through 'beauty', one makes the journey 'to freedom'. See 'Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung', in Schiller, *Werke*, 20:438, and the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, in the *Werke*, 20:312; trans. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, *Friedrich Schiller: On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 8–9. Schiller says that, in doing so, art overcomes nature (*Werke* 20:336). 'Can it enchain nature in the savage, and set it free in the barbarian?' (Wilkinson, pp. 62–3). Accordingly, the discussion expressed the ultimate moral purpose of art, which is established along the lines of the Kantian characterization of beauty as 'symbol of ethical life' (*Critique of Judgment* §59, and §42; Bernard, pp. 198–9, 143).

consists of direct selfishness of the impulses, of the desire that proceeds to satisfy itself—and indeed to do so directly and exclusively. This satisfaction involves using the object, the making of it into a means. Desire is all the coarser the more it, as singular and restricted in scope, takes hold of the entire person, and a human being as universal has not yet parted ways with this specific condition. If I say ‘my passion is stronger than I am’, then of course I do distinguish my abstract ‘I’ from the passion; but this is only a general distinction, and it nevertheless expresses the fact that ‘I’ am in no way taken into consideration over against the passion.

28 So the savagery of the passion consists in my universality being at one with its restricted condition, and the result is that I can have no will apart from this particular will. ‘*Un homme entier*’ designates an obstinate person whose entire will is focused on this particular thing. This is the coarseness, savagery, and strength of passionateness. Art moderates it insofar as art makes representational for human beings the very passions themselves, the | impulses, and so in general what a person is. When art also just confines itself to creating a painting of passion, one that even flatters the passions, it is nevertheless able to portray the impulses, to make into one’s object what one just *is*, to bring it to consciousness. This is where the force of the moderation resides; for human beings now examine their own instincts, which are then for them, are external to them. They stand over against their instincts and, in freedom, already begin to confront them. So art indeed involves this liberating feature. That is why it is quite often the case that, beset by misfortune, artists moderate and lessen the intensity of their own experience via the portrayal. In tears there is surely [24] consolation; hence consolation when one is able to externalize this sheerly internal suffering instead of remaining wholly immersed in it and concentrating on it. The expression of suffering in words, in pictures, in sound and shape, makes it easier to bear. So it has been a beneficial ancient custom for condolences to be expressed by all sides in the event of death, because by much speaking about it, one’s suffering becomes something external. The suffering is confronted, one must reflect on it, and in doing so one finds relief. Human beings who can compose poems about their own suffering no longer find it so overwhelming. That is because, by making it objective, what is inward comes out and stands outwardly juxtaposed to the person. So this is the way in which art moderates the passions and savagery. On the other hand, we hear a lot of talk about how a human being ought to remain one with nature, and yet this very oneness is coarseness and savagery. Art is the very thing that portrays oneness with nature, and in doing so it lifts people above nature. This is the point at issue here.

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## 3. Moral Education

We now have to consider briefly the last perspective mentioned, that art should have moral education as its ultimate purpose.<sup>40</sup> In recent times there has been much controversy about this point, and this ultimate purpose was said to be an unworthy one for art. When it comes to an ultimate purpose in art, this purpose must be specified as something existent-in-and-for-itself. Pleasure is a contingent matter and cannot be the purpose of art. Religious, ethical, and moral objects are certainly existent-in-and-for-themselves, and the more art involves such characteristics the nobler it will be. Religious, ethical, and moral objects are the absolute standards for showing to what extent art's content [25] is commensurate with the concept of these objects. And art, as portrayal of this content, was the peoples' teacher.<sup>41</sup>

But in conceding that art has such content, people still contested the point that art ought to have such an object as its ultimate purpose. This reproach referred above all to the manner of portrayal. That is because the nature of the work of art certainly gets distorted if art's moral teachings are presented and expressed as abstract propositions, as reflections; or else if the prevalent way of doing so is that the sensuous element just gets tacked on as an accompaniment, and what is abstract<sup>42</sup> simply has shape as an outer shell so constructed that it appears merely as an outer shell. To be able to be pictorial the work of art, in keeping with its content, should be individual and concrete. Of course if the content of art is not pictorial in keeping with its nature, then what is pictorial is only an accompaniment and art's content is internally disconnected, is in one respect abstract<sup>43</sup> and in another

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40. Hegel refers to Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* and joins him in opposing Rousseau. Literature, not nature, is what ensures the 'development of humanity', the cultivation of ethical life (*Werke*, 20:337; Wilkinson, pp. 62–5). In his discussion with Hölderlin, Hegel broadened Schiller's conception into an 'ideal of a people's education', thus at the same time pointing indirectly to the conception in Lessing's treatise, *The Education of the Human Race*.

41. Already in the 'System-Program' Hegel integrated into his concept of philosophy Friedrich Schlegel's characterization of art as 'teacher of the people' (in his 'Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie', *Kritische... Ausgabe*, 1:217–367, esp. p. 351). In doing so, Hegel at the same time set out to develop his own attempt, linked to Schiller's, to set forth 'an ideal of a people's education'. See the preceding note, as well as *Briefe von und an Hegel, 1785–1812*, vol. 1, ed. Johannes Hofmeister (3rd edn.; Hamburg, 1969), pp. 20, 24–5; *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington, Indiana, 1984), pp. 35–6.

42. Hotho took out 'what is abstract', thus making 'the sensuous element' the subject of this clause—which makes more sense.

43. Hotho changed 'abstract' to 'disconnected'.

respect draped with outwardly pictorial adornment that is mere appearance. An abstract proposition can be grasped on its own without adornment of this sort that just prompts boredom, because content and form are not intertwined. From a genuine work of art one can also draw consequences and derive instruction, as one can from each event of actual, concrete life. People did this especially in an earlier time, as is evident from the prologues to Dante, which always state what the allegory is, which state the general teaching of each canto.<sup>44</sup> For then a teaching was drawn from such works of art. This can certainly happen, but there is a distinction as to whether an abstract teaching dominates the configuration and inherently bears the art form as just an adornment, one in which we see the artist's inferior workmanship, or whether the content is entirely one with the pictorial form and has its essential being in this oneness. [26] Therefore the reproach was directed especially at the fact that the sensuous aspect served only as an accompaniment to the moral proposition.

#### 4. Representation of Truth

If we wish to set forth an ultimate purpose of the work of art, it is this: to uncover and represent truth, what stirs in the human breast, and of course to do so in a pictorial, concrete way. Art shares such an ultimate purpose with history, religion, and other disciplines. We can say, in this respect, that in general the question about a purpose as such often involves the wrong-headed  
 31 view that a purpose stands on its own, and that art and the like | have the role of being a means for realizing this purpose. In this sense the question about a purpose parallels, in its meaning, the question about usefulness. This question about usefulness involves the circumstance that an object, a work of art, refers to something other than it, something presupposed as a validator and authorizer (*ein Geltendes und Sein-Sollendes*). The purpose is said to have the characteristic of legitimacy, of essentiality, and this characteristic is located outside the thing itself. So there is something inherently wrong-headed about this question. That is because each object that seeks to be something absolute is supposed to have the characteristic within itself. If the object relates to something other as relating to its own essentiality, then the object must have the features of being commensurate with

44. A reference to the introductory verses of the individual cantos of the *Divine Comedy*, which was composed by Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) between 1307 and 1321, and first printed in 1472. The term 'allegory' is perhaps an auditor's error; the correct term is presumably 'anagogy'.

that<sup>45</sup> essential factor; so then we will always in turn refer back again<sup>46</sup> to the object, and the work of art (as serving a moral ultimate purpose) must itself have moral content. Therefore the roundabout way of positing, as ultimate purpose, something other to it as essential apart from the work of art, is superfluous. Of course there are things that are mere means and have their purpose outside themselves, and the work of art can also in a certain sense be one of them, for instance, as bringing money and honor and fame, although these purposes have nothing to do with the work of art as such. [27]

If, then, we wish to consider an object according to its essential nature, we do not reflect about concerns that fall outside it and only come to the fore in other circumstances. Also, we are not considering here those objects involving | the sort of thing that finds its ultimate purpose for the sake of something other. We intend to consider the ultimate purpose not as something external but instead as a determination in-and-for-itself, within the object itself. So this leads us to an examination of the work of art in-and-for-itself, an examination of its own nature or concept. So far we have reflected just externally about the work of art and have linked to it further external points of reference. This is the usual way of considering objects, although, in the process, this reflection itself has made us obliged to delve into the object itself. So we have to pass over to this inner aspect, to this concept, after setting out the plan of the whole. 32

45. Hotho made several additions, so that instead of 'object must have the features of being commensurate with that', this passage would read 'object, which, as means, is to have the features of being commensurate with its other, in order to be commensurate with this its'.

46. Hotho changed 'in turn refer back again' to 'also in turn refer back again from this essential factor'.

### III. OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC AND ITS TREATMENT

#### A. THE CONCEPT OF ART

We must proceed with an overview of this kind so as to make evident, at least in a general way, how the parts present themselves as emerging from the concept of the whole. Therefore we cannot allow even this overview to appear to be random, for instead it must rest on necessity. But for that reason we must set out the concept in advance.

We already stated that what is portrayed, the content, must be such that it lends itself to the form of art. The content is the thought and the form is the sensuous, the pictorial shape. What is abstract ought to portray itself pictorially, so the content on its own account, in accord with its own character, must lend itself to this portrayal, otherwise we get only a shoddy amalgamation, in that a prosaic content, posited for its own sake, is supposed to be grasped pictorially. If this kind of conjunction takes place, the components are discrepant from one another and cannot enter into any suitable connection. So the first specification is that the content lend itself to the form. [28]

39 The second is that the content ought not, as such, be something abstract; | for every content that is true is no abstraction, even apart from being the content of art. Even thought as thought must be something concrete within itself, something subjective, individual. So, in order to be true the content must be concrete. For example, if we say about God that God is the simple One, then God is thought as sheer abstraction and is unsuited to art; accordingly, the Jews and the Turks cannot have any art.<sup>47</sup> But God is also not this abstraction of empty essentiality, is not the abstraction of reasonless understanding. In God's own truth God is internally what is concrete; God is person, is subject and, as person, is grasped in God's own determinacy, is spirit who is internally triune, who is internally determinate and is the unity of<sup>48</sup> this determinacy. This constitutes what is concrete. So God is what is concrete, what is true. In thought that grasps what is true there must also be progression to the concrete. So the content must be internally concrete, not only in order to lend itself to art, but as such in order to be true content.

47. Hotho changed 'art' to 'God in their artistic portrayal'.

48. Following 'of', Hotho inserted 'pure essentiality and'.



The third specification is that the sensuous is essentially something concrete too, something individual, something singular within itself. What is true in itself is something concrete. That the sensuous element of art is internally concrete too—this characteristic being the same for both aspects, the content and the portrayal—is the point in which content and form coincide. The concrete content lends itself effectively to this pictorial element; it has this feature of being concrete in its own character, just as its form is concrete. What is true is of course essentially to be grasped in a higher way than in the concrete shape of the sensuous, which is neither what alone is concrete nor what is supremely concrete. The higher mode of the concrete is thought, which is of course the element of abstraction but which must itself be concrete thinking in order to count as authentic thinking. The distinction is directly evident in the comparison of the Greek god with the Christian God. The Greek god [29] is not abstract, but individual; the Christian God is concrete too, not sheer subject in general but essentially spirit, and ought to be known in the spirit, as spirit. Here the content is what is concrete, and the element of this concrete content is knowledge, just as the element of art is the sensuous, the pictorial. So the Christian God's self-presentation, in thought, is as spirit to spirit. Accordingly, the Christian God and the Greek god have different ways of being. The Greek god has the image as its mode of existence; the Christian God has thought. 34

These are the abstract determinations of the concept of art, such that this content must be internally concrete in order to show that it is commensurate with the concrete form.

First, then, we will have a General Part and, secondly, a Particular Part. The General Part has to examine the idea of the beautiful as such. We said that beauty is the unity of the content with this content's mode of determinate being; it is reality 'being-commensurate' and 'made-commensurate' (*das Angemessen-Sein und -Machen*) with the concept. The modes of art can base themselves only on the relationship of the concept with regard to its 'becoming-imagined-in-the-reality' (*In-die-Realität-Eingebildetwerdens*). There are three of these relationships.

### B. THE THREE MODES OF ART: SYMBOLIC, CLASSICAL, ROMANTIC

The first mode is the seeking for this authentic unity, the striving for absolute unity, the art that has not yet arrived at this perfect mastery, that has not yet found its proper content and for that reason not found its proper form. So

35 this seeking consists in the fact that the authentic content and the authentic form, not yet having found themselves and been united, stand apart from one another and prove to be still mutually external. The content is more or less abstract, obscure, and not | truly defined within itself; and the shape, being still external and unimportant, is still the immediate, natural shape. So this is the first general characterization; the content is obscure and abstract, and the pictorial aspect is still derived from immediate nature. [30]

So this first mode is art's striving and seeking, which thus becomes evident more specifically in the fact that the thought that is not yet truly determined within itself still employs for itself external, natural subject matter. Not yet in harmony with this subject matter, it forms the natural images unnaturally and distorts them, introducing extravagant features into them. In these shapes we see something universal as what is intended. But because the content within itself is indeterminate, it also forces the expression of the content beyond the bounds of its determinateness. Therefore this art does indeed involve sublimity, but not beauty. The adequacy of this art must nevertheless rest upon the relationship of the content to the shape. The shape surely suffers violence, becomes distorted. Yet the character of this configuration nevertheless is that it can be suited to a grand content in a universal way. The content is not truly suited to the natural subject matter, because the content itself still does not lend itself to such compatibility. The adequacy can only be in an abstract determinateness. This first sphere can then provide symbolic or Oriental art. This art is the province of sublimity; and the character of the sublimity is that it is said to express something infinite. But here this infinite is what is abstract, and no sensible shape is suited to it; so the sensible shape is forced beyond its natural limits. Here we have only the attempt at expression. These giants and colossi, with a hundred arms, a hundred breasts, are therefore extravagant natural images of this sort. On the other hand, however, such natural images must have an element of suitability for their content, although this abstract universality is only something | inward.<sup>49</sup> For instance, when strength is imputed to the lion, this universality is<sup>50</sup> itself only something inward, abstract, symbolic. The animal shape, which has the universal quality of 'strength', therefore has an abstractly appropriate characteristic, of which it is said to be the expression. [31]

This art is therefore striving, and this striving is what is symbolic. This stage is therefore still imperfect with respect to its concept and its reality.

49. Hotho added 'has not yet arrived at definite concretion'.

50. In place of 'this universality is', Hotho put 'and it is supposed to express a god, the appropriateness is thus'.

The second mode is classical art. It is the free, adequate imagination of the configuration within the concept; a content that has the shape appropriate to it, a content that, as authentic content, does not lack authentic form. This is the locus of art's ideal. Here the sensuous, the pictorial, no longer counts as sensuous and is no natural being; it is of course a natural shape but, by removing the insufficiency of the finite, it is the kind of natural shape that is perfectly adequate to its concept. The authentic content is what is concretely spiritual, and its shape is the human figure; for this figure alone is the shape of the spiritual, the kind of shape in which what is spiritual can depict itself outwardly within temporal existence.

The third mode is a loosening of content from form, and therefore it returns to the antithesis of the symbolic but at the same time is an advance of art beyond itself. Classical art, as art, reached the highest level, and what it lacks is | only being art as such. So the third sphere is the art that positions itself as art at a higher standpoint. This art can be designated as romantic art or Christian art. In Christianity, what is true has withdrawn from sensible representation. The Greek god is bound up with intuition. The unity of the human and divine natures becomes intuited in the Greek god, and becomes the only genuine mode of this unity. But this unity itself is only sensuous. In Christianity the unity is grasped in spirit and in truth; but what is concrete, the unity, remains grasped in a spiritual way that withdraws from what is sensuous. The idea has made itself free on its own account. [32]

What is sensuous is accordingly something accompanying (*ein Beiwesen*) the sensuously subjective idea and is no longer a necessity, for the sensuous becomes free in its own sphere too. That gives this art the character of what is spiritually existent-for-itself, what is subjective, is congenial (*Gemütliche*). Here there is an indifference or arbitrariness, and an adventurousness, with regard to what is external. The outwardly determinate being is no longer in absolute unity with the content, for instead the sensuous, the subject matter as such, is rather something external that gains meaning only by way of the heart (*das Gemüt*).

This preliminary and general concept of the structure of art within itself, in its particular divisions, thus presupposes those art forms we mentioned. But this general concept of the forms of art has to be realized, to become specific, to posit its distinctions, to enter into determinate being, where, differentiating itself externally, it then exhibits its own immanent distinctions as emergent in it itself. But these, then, can be none other than the distinctions of the concept itself, which they portray. | In other words, the types of art have in them these same specific features as those we examined in the [three broad] genres. And so we intend then to become aware of these

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features at first abstractly, in keeping with the distinctions mentioned, and then to fix our attention on their concrete shape, with reference to both the technical aspect and the abstractly sensuous aspect, with reference to space and time.

The first way we encounter the internal self-determining (*Sich-bestimmen-in-sich*) of the general distinctions of art, or their immediate mode of realization, is with reference to the first art form already mentioned, what we in fact called the symbolic form. Externality constitutes its soil, since the form of its portrayal arrives at its content just externally. The god does not yet dwell in its shape, for instead, as an external shape, it [33] has not expressed the god according to his own specific nature, for the god himself still lacks concrete, internal determinacy. This first realization of art is architecture. The meaning of the content in architecture can pervade the material or the form of its expression to varying degrees, depending on how significant or insignificant, how concrete or abstract, this content is—how deeply it descends within itself or else how obscure and superficial it is. This art form itself can indeed seek to progress to making its content wholly adequate to its form, but then it has overstepped its own boundaries and made its way over to the next higher stage, that of sculpture. Its evident limitation then, in keeping with its nature, is having what is spiritual in an external way, and accordingly pointing to what is imbued with spirit (*das Seelenvolle*) as something other than it.

But when this spirit-imbued element, the spiritual content or the god, is no longer external to the art form but instead indwells it, and when subject matter and content (with its material and its form existing in absolute identity) enter into determinate being—in other words when the second general art form, the classical art form, realizes itself and determines itself—then we have sculpture as its determinacy. Sculpture portrays the divine figure itself. The god indwells its own externality in a placid, blissful, immobile repose. Form and content are absolutely one and | the same with neither aspect predominating, with the content determining the form and the form determining the content: oneness in pure universality.

In the third general art form, namely the romantic art form, however, we saw how the inwardness or the content, the subject matter or content of the work of art, emerges from the placid repose, from absolute oneness with its form, its material, its externality [34] and, withdrawing into itself, sets free the externality, which for its own part likewise withdraws into itself and relinquishes oneness with the content, becomes indifferent and external to it. The realization of this art form, however, is poetry. Subject matter and form in poetry go within themselves and particularize themselves.

Each of the three general art forms distinguishes itself or determines itself internally in keeping with [one of] these three aspects; each realizes itself in keeping with these three aspects; they are the modes of art's determinate being.

### C. THE WORLD OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARTS: ARCHITECTURE, SCULPTURE, PAINTING, MUSIC, POETRY

We now wish to examine this determinate being more concretely. The concept of art thus embodies itself for us in an internally organized world of art. A world of shapes rises up before us; temples surround us and their domes arch above us, gods gaze upon us in blissful repose—bound up in solid marble or as a bright, colorful, shadow world—or the nearness of the god resonates in our hearts, something we sense in anticipation, or else the god descends to us and reveals himself, proclaiming himself in words. For this world of deities has the beginnings of its determinate being in external, coarse materials, and it goes on to form itself into an increasingly spiritual determinate being. So we have the stages of spiritualization of the content and of the material, and the most spiritual form of the subject matter, as well as its portrayal, forms the conclusion.

The first form of art's determinate being we found, | in our abstract examination, to be architecture.<sup>51</sup> It starts from inorganic nature and realizes itself in it; however, nature remains external to it since architecture itself is nevertheless abstract content, and so, instead of letting the god appear it just points to him. *Architecture prepares [35] the way for the god, builds the temple for him, makes a space for him, purifies the ground for him; it reworks externality in the god's service so that it might leave nothing external to the god, instead all being fit to let the god appear, be expressed, be apprehended. It provides space inside for inward concentration and as an enclosure for the assembly of the collective body, a protection from the threatening storm, from rain, thunderstorms, and wild animals. It expresses outwardly, and reveals, the desire to gather together (das Sich-sammeln-Wollen). This is the character of architecture; it has to realize this content. Its materials consist of matter in its coarse externality as mechanical masses and weights. The presentation of these materials appears as the external display* 40

51. Here, instead of 'architecture', Hotho entered 'sculpture'. [Tx.] Perhaps he was thinking ahead, because the ensuing account of architecture sets it up as the site for placement of statues of gods.

of abstractly understood symmetrical relationships. Thus the temple is built for the god and stands ready as the god's house; inorganic nature is reworked and suddenly the lightning flash of individuality pervades it, the god stands there within it, is portrayed there, the statues are erected in the temple. Now what is spiritual has completely taken over the material, infinite form has concentrated itself in corporeality, in the inert mass built up into infinite form.

41 The inward god is set down into externality and the externality has drawn attention to, and individualized itself to, the god. The externality is utter inwardness and expresses the inwardness utterly. And here the material is no longer unimportant. It is of course sensible material, albeit pure and monochrome and not particularized within itself in contrast to the universality of its oneness with the content. This is the character of sculpture. | [36]

The third form in which we encountered the determinate being of the universal art forms, however, was the realization of romantic art. Architecture built its temple, the god sprang up at the hands of sculpture, and the community then stands facing the god in the expanse of the god's house. In contrast to the universal oneness of content and form, what comes to the fore now is singularization, the subjectivity and particularization of both sides. The community is the god withdrawn from its direct immersion in externality and turned back within itself. The god is no longer this one as in sculpture, for instead the oneness fractures and becomes fragmented into the indeterminate multiplicity of subjectivity. And so then, instead of this unitary content, the subject matter now becomes the subjective particularity of feelings, of actions, the multifariousness of the lively stirrings of individuality, with its deeds and its intentions and failures. On the other side, the material likewise splinters, particularizing itself in a comparable way and likewise becoming individual. Here there is no longer the massive scale as in architecture and no longer the abstractly simple appearance of the sensible into which sculpture's labor converts these masses. Instead there is subject matter having become particularized and subjective within itself, subject matter that becomes examined here in its subjectivity and receives only subjective significance. And so here what occurs is a far superior oneness of content with form, because the particularized subject matter serves to express the internally subjectivized content; what is particular portrays itself in something particular. [37] The contents adopt the mode of the material, and the material adopts the mode of the contents. But this intimate unity itself comes to light on the subjective side and, since form and content particularize themselves, it only comes about at the expense of objective universality.

The more specific point, then, is that this third mode of determinate being of the art form presents itself in turn as organized internally in a threefold way. | As the material for its realization, the first shape of this determinate being employs visibility in general, visibility as such. The material of sculpture and architecture is certainly something visible, but it is not abstract visibility. But now visibility is the means of portrayal, and of course it does not remain abstract visibility but instead, insofar as it is the determinate being of particularity, it becomes particularized visibility, subjectively in itself. More specifically, it determines itself in color; in fact as light that has the characteristic of darkness in it and that unites itself specifically with this darkness, particularizing it. This inwardly determined and subjectivized visibility no longer requires architecture's abstract, mechanical distinction of masses; nor does it require the distinction of the figure as the distinction of what is spatially material in the determinacy of its three dimensions, in the way that sculpture has this for its material. Instead, visibility has its own ideal distinction in itself, as the particularity of the colors. Here art therefore liberates itself from what is utterly material, and becomes free for the abstractly ideal sense of sight. On the other side, the content also acquires the most extensive particularization; what resides in the human breast, what it structures into deeds, all this manifold is the colorful subject matter here. Every sort of visible thing, the entire realm of particularity, [38] has its place here. Surely forms of nature can also come into the picture, to the extent that some kind of allusion to something spiritual connects them more closely with thought. The complete shape of this art form's existence is painting. 42

A second material through which the romantic form becomes actual, although it is a sensuous form, proceeds to still more profound subjectivity. We already termed color a kind of subjectivization. But this more profound subjectivity that we now have before us consists, in any event, in annulling and idealizing, in the oneness of the point, the inconsequential spatial separation that color still allows to persist. Yet as this annulment, the point, is | something concrete, and this determinacy within itself consists of the incipient ideality of spatiality in the movement, the internal vibration, of the material in its relation to itself, in the sound that exists for the second ideal sense, for hearing. Abstract visibility transforms itself into abstract audibility. The inherent dialectic of space carries over into time, into this negative sensibility that both is and is not, and in its not-being its being is produced once again; and accordingly it is incessant self-annulling and, in its self-annulling, it is its own arising. This material of abstract inwardness is the immediate medium of the inner, and at the same time indeterminate, feeling that has not yet been able to advance to its own firm, inward determinateness. 43

Music just expresses the sounding and resounding of feeling, and it forms the midpoint of subjective art, abstract sensibility's waystation to abstract spirituality. Music on its own terms has its material in keeping with an intelligible relationship, as does architecture, and as such it is expressed abstractly; it is the art of abstract, spiritual [39] inwardness, of feeling.

As for the ultimate, spiritualized presentation of the romantic art form, it characteristically consists in the sensible element that already began its liberation in sound now wholly spiritualizing itself here, no longer as the resonance of feeling itself but instead as reduced to mere signs devoid of content when taken by themselves. Of course these are not signs of nonspecific feeling, but rather signs of a representation that has become internally concrete. The musical tone, previously an abstract sounding lacking specificity, becomes the word—the articulated, internally defined tone with the sense of expressing representations or thoughts, of becoming signs of a spiritual interior. The sensible element in music, still united with feeling, becomes separated here from the content as such, while what is spiritual makes itself specific for itself and within itself, in the representation; its expression is supposed to be the sign that, taken by itself, has no value | or  
 44 meaning. Therefore the sound can just as well be a letter of the alphabet, for here the visible and the audible alike are reduced to being the mere signs of spirit. So this determinate being of art is, more specifically, how we find it in poetry in the narrower sense. Poetry is the universal, all-embracing art, is art ascended to the highest spirituality. That is because, in poetry, spirit is free within itself; it has cut itself loose from merely sensuous material, and has relegated that material to being its own signs. Here the sign is no symbol but instead is an entirely insignificant sign devoid of value, with spirit the decisive power over it.

At this highest level, however, art ascends beyond itself and becomes prose, becomes thought.

So this is then the general presentation of the determinate being of the art forms that become actual as architecture, as sculpture, and in the subjective arts. [40]

Now we still have to mention the mechanism of this determinate being. The abstractly sensible aspect involves the relationship to space and time, the abstract forms of the sensible. Space and time are the universal forms of the sensible, are that in virtue of which all that is sensible, is sensible; they are the universal abstraction of the sensible as such.

In keeping with this abstract aspect, architecture takes three-dimensional space as the material of its presentation, so that what determines the boundaries of this space—angles, surfaces, lines—belong to the understanding and



conform to rules. Here the forms of spirit are the simple, crystallized shapes in which the soul itself does not yet dwell; the pyramids have only | a departed spirit within them. As for sculpture, it has defined the entire space from within, in organic figures. In the third place were the romantic arts. What has its beginning in them is abstract space, externality become subjective. Painting deals simply with the flat surface and its figurations. This abstract space then completely reverts to the point, the point in time, to negative sensibility, to the mutual externality that is likewise the negating of this mutual externality. This sensible element of time belongs to music. The third romantic form is time or the point too, but such that it shows itself not as formal negativity but instead as fully concrete, as the mark of spirit, as the thinking subject that conjoins within itself the endless space of representation with the time of the musical tone. 45

The particular characteristics of abstract externality thus belong also to the particular arts. And this is then the overview of the whole, whose particular components we will now examine. We can also remark, about the relationship of the particular arts to the general forms of art, that symbolic art has its greatest application in architecture, [41] where it is integral and not yet relegated to being the inorganic nature of another art. In classical art sculpture is what is absolute, and architecture appears merely as a setting for sculpture. To romantic art belong especially painting and music, which become independent and absolute here. The | third romantic art, which consummates objectivity within itself, pertains to all and is continuous with all three art forms, giving itself this endless scope. It attaches to each art form, develops itself in each, and of course develops independently on its own account. 46

We now pass over to the General Part. 47



## THE GENERAL PART



## INTRODUCTION

The first division concerns the idea of what is beautiful.

This idea of the beautiful is itself organized internally in a threefold way, as:

- 1) The beautiful as such;
- 2) The particularization of this general beauty in artistic beauty; in fact artistic beauty is first of all what is beautiful in the proper sense; it is, in general, the ideal as such;
- 3) The existence or the portrayal of the ideal, or its singularization, its actualization.

## I. THE BEAUTIFUL AS SUCH

We called the beautiful the idea of the beautiful. That is to say, the beautiful itself is the idea, and of course in a specific form. The concept, the reality of the concept, and the concept's unity with its reality all pertain to the idea in general. So the idea is not the concept, and it is no merely unreal thought. [42]

### A. IDEA, CONCEPT, AND REALITY

48 As for the idea according to its own nature, as natural living thing as such, or the beautiful as such, what is beautiful coincides with the living thing. The idea is the unity of the concept and reality, the concrete harmony of these two sides. With respect to both sides it is a whole, and the unity of these totalities, therefore the idea within itself, is this | doubling of itself, which, however, is in turn no merely formal doubling.<sup>1</sup> As for the nature of the concept as such, it is quite distinct from mere thoughts, mere reflections. Thinking is the simple relationship to itself and for itself; thus it is not the abstract equivalence to itself on the part of light, but instead is being-for-self as concrete, the receiving-back of the going-outside-itself, not of anything spatially infinite but instead of<sup>2</sup> what is specifically focused (*das Punktueller*): utter presence-to-self in its being-outside-itself. The concept is *this same* absolute unity but different determinations. This is thinking's abstract concept, the fact that its distinctions are held in this unity, thus are ideal, having no independent subsistence vis-à-vis one another. If we take gold as an example of this unity, gold has a specific mass different from that of other metals, a specific color, a particular relationship to acids. These are distinct characteristics and yet utterly one whole. Each piece of gold has them in a unity, and indivisibly. Each finest particle has these characteristics in a unity. This is ideal unity, the fact that they do not reach the point of existing independently. We take these distinctions to be mutually external, but in themselves they are in an ideal, undivided, and inseparable unity. And the concept's distinctions are distinctions of just such a unity. Taking our own spirit as another example, [43] it is the pure concept in-and-for-itself. If we stick with the fact that spirit is actively representing (*vorstellend ist*), then

1. Hotho added to this sentence 'but instead a doubling that is concrete within itself'.

2. Hotho changed 'of' to 'thinking is'.

I am the one doing the representing, and all the myriad different representations are concentrated in this point of the I, in what is utterly onefold. So they have no independent subsistence on their own account; instead they are purely ideal. So it is the | nature of the concept as such to be the undivided unity of the distinctiveness, a distinctiveness that does not exist as such, that has not arrived at this independence.

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Yet if, on the other hand, we consider the aspect of the concept's reality, then, first of all, the concept is directly existent in it. For instance, the concept was directly in the gold, and the reality was directly the concept. In that case the manifold<sup>3</sup> is a merely formal multiplicity, for each piece of the reality is the existence of the entire concept. So here too we have a multiplicity that is but an abstract multiplicity, one in which the many elements seem to be of a perfectly uniform nature and can be distinguished only abstractly. However, the distinctions in higher natures exist independently, each one subsisting apart from the other, and it is the nature of the reality to be this mutual externality of the concept's distinctions. In gold the distinctions do not emerge as mutually external; each particle is the whole. In higher natures, distinctiveness first emerges as particular existence. That is how these higher natures become a system like, for instance, the solar system. In the solar system, sun, satellites, and planets are independent, are distinct, whereas in the concept of the solar system they are in an ideal unity.

The second point, then, is that in the reality not only do the distinctions of the concept acquire existence, but this mutual externality of the reality as such also distinguishes itself from the concept as such. [44] Furthermore, the distinction emerges therefore as the distinction of the reality (as the existent distinction of the externality) in contrast to the ideal totality of the concept. For instance, in the solar system the sun is the concept, over against which we always | set the reality, the other heavenly bodies. So this distinction of the inwardness of the concept, in contrast to its externality, comes into play.

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The third point, then, is that the concept and the reality involve the fact that these real differences (thus the reality as such and the distinction of the concept from the reality<sup>4</sup>), are themselves taken back into the unity; that such a whole, which exists as mutual externality,<sup>5</sup> returns into the unity, that the sun with its heavenly bodies is taken back into the unity. They are connected by its law, which as such does not have existence. Yet the various heavenly bodies of the

3. Hotho added 'of this being of the concept'.

4. Hotho changed 'thus the reality as such and the distinction of the concept from the reality' to 'the reality, namely, of the distinction as such and the concept as such'.

5. Instead of 'mutual externality', Hotho put 'idea'.

reality stand in a physical relationship, and in virtue of this relationship the existence of the reality becomes individual existence, and in referring to it we call the individual independent elements of the concept not 'parts' but instead 'members'; that is, they are not separately existent but instead have existence only as subsisting within this unity. They are members of an organic whole, and have truth solely as subsisting within it. The conceptual unity resides in the members; it is their substance, their support, their soul; it is immanent in them.

These are the characteristics of a living thing, and such a living thing is the idea. Each life is the idea. Philosophy considers the solar system as idea too, for this unity of the idea does not exist externally in the heavenly bodies; instead it is the inner nature of these bodies. The idea in natural bodies comes to existence only in thought; in nature only their mutual externality | comes [45] to existence. In living nature, therefore, the idea comes about as individuality, as subject, as oneness, existing as an individual. These are the abstract characteristics of the living thing as such.

## B. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE

### 1. Organic Life; Ideality or Unity of Distinctions in the Living Thing

We have, then, to characterize the concept of life such that it is mutual externality of the parts, and ideality or negative unity of this mutual externality, an externality that is only an appearing of what is subsisting. We have to consider where in an individual we recognize the existence of this ideality, or by what means the individual makes itself known as subjective unity, as something organized. In other words, we have to inquire where the ideality of the distinctions that seem to exist is recognized. The living thing presents this ideality to us; it has a soul, a concept, which has existence, corporeality and indeed has it not as something persisting, not as something constant in face of outward changes. This corporeality is instead always posited ideally, always as an appearance. This corporeality, which is thus always posited as something ideal, makes itself evident as the idealism of the vitality, as objective idealism. This idealism appears in such a way that a living thing is an individual, has members, has a material being but one that exists in an ongoing process, in continual perishing and renewal. In one respect the organism as its core also posits itself as rigidity, as lifelessness, as stillness, although on the whole it is constant process. Apart from this core, what is substantial in the living thing does not remain the same in any of its members; instead it brings itself forth by continually breaking itself down, by



changing itself internally. Each part sets itself | apart, maintains itself at the expense of the other; there is a constant becoming, and this becoming is the ideality of this subsisting being. Space, the spatial aspect, is no concrete being but is instead a sheerly abstract being. What is abstractly ideal (*das Ideelle*) does not become particular, but instead is absolute negativity: ideality, which has its ground in this subjective unity and forever posits the nothingness of its corporeal subsistence, constantly exhibits itself as appearance. [46] 52

The process intensifies for increasingly higher living things. The organic unity therefore subsists as ideality of the external subsistence of the distinctions, and thereby is the subjective, negative unity of what subsists in material neutrality; it is the negative unity of what is real, is material, namely, the positing as ideal of what is real and material. This is the principal aspect under which the ideality is present, in that the living subject downgrades the natural subsistence of its components to being appearance. Here essentially belongs self-movement, locomotion. The oneness (*das Eins*), the sensible thing, exists in space, has a specific space; but it does not exhibit any such merely external, sensible oneness of being tied to a specific space, for instead it is a negative positing (*Negativsetzen*) of the external unitary being (*Einsseins*), establishing its own inwardness by negation of the externality of the unitary being. Self-movement is the continuous liberation from place, from sensible unitary being. Thus the sensible oneness is always downgraded to appearance. Since the oneness has in it a spatial oneness—a shape—it moves | itself in its members and is all the more alive the more these members change themselves.<sup>6</sup> This is therefore the way in which what is abstractly ideal reduces its concrete, material existence to appearance. 53

We can say, then, that this idealism is an objective idealism; what is abstractly ideal makes itself appear (*scheinen*), continually making its own material existence into appearing and, in doing so, its freedom, its ideality, is evident (*erscheint*). Therefore this objective idealism makes material existence appear. We could have said, in other words, that it is a practical idealism, a purposive action, an effectiveness of the parts that produces this oneness—an action that is this oneness only as the continuous downgrading of the material oneness to being appearance. What is abstractly ideal thereby preserves itself, but it does not let its components stand fast, for this ideal exists only as nullification of material quiescence. This idealism of vitality, then, is *for us*, is evident for us; when we consider this idealism, its purposiveness, namely, its specific concept, [47] when we take a closer look at it, this is thus a consideration *for us*. So, when we examine the living thing

6. Hotho revised 'change themselves' to 'are able to change their location'.

in its practical self-production and self-preservation, we can say that this examination is not yet what is pertinent here, is not what we have to deal with here. When we look at the vitality, what we see is the random movement, the movement that appears as contingent. When we look upon this random movement from one angle as aroused by instinct, this instinct is a limited purpose; or when from another angle we consider it in a general way as movement, then it is the abstract freedom of moving oneself from one place to another. Music too involves movement; | but this movement is not random; nor is dance random, for it is instead something internally regulated, a concrete movement. Random movement, however, is abstract, is not internally determined. Likewise, when we then consider the fact that an animal maintains itself, eats, and digests, this is in turn on the one hand only abstract caprice or desire, and on the other hand it is inner activity: the activity of the organism that has no intuition at all or does not become the object of the rational consideration that exhibits internal purposiveness. Thought<sup>7</sup> grasps this purposiveness, or else we stick just to sheer external intuition. What constitutes objective idealism<sup>8</sup> is therefore this factor whereby the living thing exists, whereby it makes itself appearance—though not according to the aspect of appearing that is said to be for us;<sup>9</sup> instead we see<sup>10</sup> the living thing in the appearing as just something purposive within itself, as an appearing of this purposiveness. Thus<sup>11</sup> appearing-for-us does not involve this purposiveness; instead it involves the appearing of the shape as at rest and as self-moving. This shape exists for us as intuiting, as ones considering it sensibly, and in this shape what is objectively ideal must be for us—not therefore be utterly for us, but instead appear to us in this shape, a shape that must be for us directly as something existent and appearing. | The manifold character of the shape must be posited for us as appearance. [48]

The issue, then, is what this abstract character more specifically involves. The shape encloses space, is figuration, is distinct in color or in other features, in movements, in sounds. Such a manifold character is then said to manifest itself to us as appearing, that is, as soul-imbued (*beseelte*), namely, as something that does not have its true existence in this manifold. In practice this appearing takes place in such a way that the various components or forms, which for us are sensible components, directly comprise a

7. Hotho added 'as understanding therefore'.

8. Hotho added 'for the understanding'.

9. Hotho added 'in considering art'.

10. Hotho changed 'we see' to 'the understanding sees'.

11. Hotho added 'in considering art'.

whole, enter into an undesigned (*absichtslos*) accord; that these are thus components of a unitary individual with distinctions or components that, although not as one (*uneins*), not harmonious, are nevertheless congruous. As distinct, the components appear as contingently convergent, that is, a feature in one is not posited in the other, and one does not have a feature because the other has it. With uniformity [in contrast], each component is the same, for each has one and the same feature of temporal duration or spatial magnitude. The windows in a building are of equal size. In a military regiment each soldier wears the same uniform. In these cases the components do not look to be random, for one member has them in consequence of the other having them. So here the components do not converge by chance; they are not distinct from one another. In a structured organism it is entirely different, for there each component is distinct; the eye is distinct from the forehead and from the nose. In this distinctiveness the components are convergent by chance, or else the contingency in it is a contingency from our perspective. Their form does not involve a material connection. | Consequently the components seem free vis-à-vis one another; each is determined for itself internally and does not depend on the others. At the same time, however, there must be a unity subsistent-in-itself, an inner connection that cannot be posited externally as is the case in uniformity. The unity is not present sensibly, for it is inward, something to which intuition is privy. [49] Yet this connection of the components is essential, for it belongs to a soul; this is its necessity. If this inner necessity exists as inner for us, that is precisely to say that it comes to be thought, that we conceive such a shape. Yet the connection is not said to be solely inner for us, since it is also said to be appearing. Therefore, since there is an inner connection between these disparate components, this connection is their ideality, which causes them to subsist. For they subsist only as this unity; therefore, as disparate from one another, they have their subsistence in virtue of this, their *subjectum*, a substratum that sustains and supports them.

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## 2. Its Appearance (to Us) as Soul-imbued

This connection is said to appear to us, and indeed not as sheerly external or spatial but as essential, necessary, soul-imbued. This inner necessity therefore is not said to be thought or conceived in art. This subjective unity presents itself to us in organic life as sensation or feeling (*Empfindung*). For the living thing senses in all of its component parts. Here what is possessed of soul (*Seelenhafte*), without becoming spatial itself, has flowed

57 into every point throughout the entire corporeal being.<sup>12</sup> The spatial aspect or side-by-side subsistence has no unity for the soul in the way it does for thought; | instead the unity<sup>13</sup> exists only as this ideality, although the soul as such has no knowledge of this ideality. The soul is omnipresent in the body, that is, the plurality of the spatial aspect is not a factor for the soul as this subjective unity. The soul is essentially one, and the mutual externality of the subsisting components carries no weight with it. Sensation or feeling is this same unity as the unity we found it in the inorganic realm, as in gold. However, gold is something lifeless because the concept of gold is no subjective, individual unity; the concept of gold is not the unity in the diverse composition of its components that exist as members. Subjective unity presupposes diversity in the composition of the components, and it has its components as members. But this subjective unity is not present in gold. [50] In sensation as such, however, the members are not connected of necessity; the diversity of the arrangement as such, and the subjective unity as such, are still not related of necessity.

#### *a. Bodily Shape and Function*

The intuition of the shape, however, is said to be for us; it is an arrangement said to stand in a necessary internal connection. This connection can exist for us initially owing to the customary coexistence of such members. What is customary is subjective necessity. In keeping with this customary factor, we can find animals repugnant because they have an organization at variance from what is otherwise familiar to us. So we call animal organisms bizarre because they deviate from how we usually picture them; for instance, fish with huge heads and little tails, and with eyes close together. We are of course familiar with a greater variety of plants. However, cacti with their needles and straight rows can of course also amaze us. Educated persons who are knowledgeable about natural history have internalized models of what belongs together; they have solid familiarity with such shapes and  
58 exact knowledge of their parts, even though | they do not know how to account for the inner connection of the parts. Instead they have just internalized such models. For instance, Cuvier became famous because, from a fossil bone of an animal that no longer exists, he can tell what shape the

12. [Tr.] In the ensuing discussion there are echoes of Aristotle's treatise *De Anima* (*On the Soul*), with its doctrine of the three souls that account for the vital properties of living things: the vegetative soul found in plants; the animal soul (coupled with features of the vegetative soul) found in animals; and the rational soul (capping off the foundation provided by the other two souls in it) of human beings. See *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), 1:641-92.

13. Instead of 'unity', Hotho has 'truth'.

animal must have had.<sup>14</sup> Besides, what is purely customary does not guide an examination of this kind; here there is instead a singular determinant of thinking, one property. And this is the second point, the fact that the connection resides in some sort of particular attribute. For instance, in his examination Cuvier took as his foundation a significant characteristic, an attribute that has to be controlling in the other parts by, for example, determining whether the animal is a carnivore; an attribute that constitutes a law for the organization of the other parts.<sup>15</sup> [51] A carnivorous animal has quite different teeth. If such a tooth is evident, it follows that the animal is carnivorous, and the cheekbones, the vertebrae, and so forth are constructed accordingly, so that the animal would have no hooves lest it could not grasp its prey. Here therefore is a characteristic guiding the configuration of the animal. We too attend to general characteristics of this sort when we consider the lion and the eagle. Here we have the general attribute of strength, which is evident in the legs of the lion and in the beak of the eagle. We will call it an excellent and intelligent *examination* when we examine one component of an animal with reference to the animal's general character, since this acquaints us with a unity of the structure, a unity that does not replicate itself uniformly but instead leaves the members disparate, albeit bringing them into a unity. We can say, then, in examining such an intuition, that what predominates is not the intuition, for the guiding factor is instead a general thought. In this respect we will not say that we relate | to the object 59 as something beautiful; instead we will say that the examination of it is excellently done. In this case the general, guiding representation is only an individual, limited one, such as carnivorous, strong, or herbivorous. Yet these characteristics constitute what connects the parts, bringing what is independently and externally existent into a unity. However, this is a limited condition, and we do not yet have in view the whole concept, the entire soul.

*b. Inner Connection or Subjective Unity: The Soul Itself*

The inner connection is the whole, is the soul itself. In such an examination, therefore, what we become conscious of is not the whole soul but only a single aspect that we establish as the dominant one, as soul. The soul as such does not yet become clear to us in this way. If this whole is said to become a representation for us, it could have entered our consciousness in this sphere

14. Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), a comparative anatomist and pioneer in paleontology, is the author of *Recherches sur les ossements fossiles de quadrupèdes...*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1812). Hegel's remark here refers to pp. 3–4 of the introduction to vol. 3.

15. Cuvier, vol. 3, intro., p. 1.

only as concept, as something thought, for the soul as such cannot make itself knowable in the natural thing, since there the soul does not yet exist for itself. [52] Soul that is said to become for us can do so only via the concept. Could it have done this, we would have two sorts of things, the intuition and the thought. Yet this doubling is not said to exist in beauty. If we are said to become conscious of the whole of the subjective unity—and indeed not in the mode of thought—the second and remaining point is that we receive a sensible intuition of a natural structure. ‘Sense’ is in fact this marvelous word that has two opposed | significations: in one, ‘sense’ is the immediate organ of sensible apprehension, and in the other, we call ‘sense’ the meaning, that is, what is other to the sensible, what is inward, the thought, what is universal about the thing. One is the thing as immediate, and the other is the thought of the thing. And we call both ‘sense’. So a meaningful (*sinnvoll*) examination of nature is then on the one hand ‘sensory’, and on the other hand it involves the thought of the thing. The meaningful examination looks on with an intimation of the concept, of a concept that enters into consciousness not as such, but just as an intimation. For instance, in speaking about how many kingdoms of nature there are, we say there are three: the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. In this sequence of stages we have the intimation of an inner connection, one that is no mere external purposiveness but instead is the sort of connection intimating that it is something conceptual, something essential. Even with the multiplicity of plants one surmises that, as Goethe says, there is a spiritual ladder here, an external diversity that has an inner necessity.<sup>16</sup> The meaningful thing is to grasp the shapes and have an intimation of their conceptual order. Goethe conducted many an examination of this kind, with a presentiment of the concept, of a higher order than the external one.<sup>17</sup> This is Goethe’s great sensibility, with which, in a naïvely sensible fashion, he engaged in the examination of nature, with the presentiment of a conceptual connectedness. One can narrate history in this manner too, in such a way that an inner connectedness covertly shines through it. So too is the human [53] body a conceptual organism. Based on this fact, one can

16. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären* (Gotha, 1790). The introduction, §6, p. 3, says: ‘The uniform metamorphosis from the initial seed sprouts to the final development of the fruit can be seen continuously operating stepwise and, by the transformation of one shape into another, ascending, so to speak, on a spiritual ladder to that summit of nature, to bisexual reproduction.’ In addition to this text, Hegel possessed another by Goethe, ‘Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen’, in Goethe’s *Zur Morphologie* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1817), pp. 1–80. See Goethe: *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, Division One, vol. 9: *Morphologische Hefte*, ed. Dorothea Kuhn (Weimar, 1954), pp. 23–61.

17. This remark refers to Goethe’s concept of the ‘ur-phänomenon’, in which, according to him, abstract, regular features of the intuition are revealed.

have the dim presentiment, and can discover, that every organic body must be of a kind divided (*insectum*) into three parts. Of course the bodily senses at first appear to be an external, contingent multiplicity; but we can also have the meaningful intuition of this being a sphere of necessity. And what is natural appears as beautiful insofar as, in natural formations, we surmise such a | necessity of the concept. However, artistic examination of the natural figure does not go beyond this intimation. So there is only an indeterminate mode of connection, a sheerly inner unity that we surmise without knowing how to think it specifically. There is a connection that is the nature of the parts themselves, one that makes up the vitality, but this connection is only hinted at. This is the essential characteristic. What follows for us, then, is the fact that this indeterminate connection gets a distinctive content, determines itself internally.<sup>18</sup> At this point the soul is not yet rich in content, determinate, but is instead at first indeterminate, and the progression is that the soul gives itself a content concretely within itself.

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### c. *What is Natural as Beautiful*

In keeping with this character of its appearance as vitality, as the unity of the members, we call what is natural 'beautiful'. Natural things have a soul-imbued connection; the matter is identical with the natural thing; the form indwells the matter and is the proper nature of this material factor. This is the characteristic of beauty as such. The natural crystal does indeed amaze us because of its well-ordered shape, which did not come to be this way owing to any mechanical process; the natural crystal is formed in such a way that this form belongs to the matter; the independent force of the matter formed it this way. The matter works on its own, is active; it is not passive, so that we first had to have given it form; for here the matter exists in its own form, of its own accord. Still more beautiful is the organic living thing, in general everything that is marked by free internal activity. And yet this beauty is still indeterminate. At this point, however, we right away [54] draw a distinction as concerns vitality. We have in us a representation according to which we find a living thing to be not beautiful. For instance, the indolence of the lazybones displeases us because we view this figure | as not having been moved to activity. Likewise, many other animals do not appear beautiful to us: toads, amphibians, insects, and the kind of animal that is transitional from one specific form to another, such as the duckbilled platypus, which is a mixture of bird and four-footed animal. This is mainly a

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18. Added in the margin, presumably in Hotho's revision for publication: 'later on'.

matter of what is customary, although in this odd case we also have the active presentiment that the structure of a bird, for instance, belongs together in a necessary way, and that those mixed forms are just hybrid creatures. We will have the presentiment that an inner purposiveness underlies the form of the bird, with the result that to our minds such mixed forms seem strange and appear to be ugly. In the case of nature our sensibility is that there is a conceptual connection in the form of the bird.

Another sense in which we speak of nature as beauty occurs where we have no one organic shape as our focus. For instance, we speak of the beauty of a landscape, or of a moonlit night. Here there is no organic whole but instead a multiplicity, which comes together. The congruence is outwardly impressive, or contingent. But what interests us is that, both with organic shapes and with these phenomena of inorganic nature, what comes into play is something different, namely, characteristics that wholly concern the bearing such objects have on the heart and soul: the stillness of the moonlit night or the sublimity of the sea. All this has its significance in the mood awakened in the heart. Yet such a mood no more belongs to this shape of nature itself, but is instead to be sought in something else. By the same token we call an animal excellent when it has strength or is cunning. These expressions are also then characterizations that in part belong to our representation, in part portray only [55] one aspect of the animal's life. And each animal life is something limited, has a restricted quality. What matters for us, however, is for the entire soul-possessed condition to appear, to not be limited, } and we will consider this point later with reference to artistic beauty.

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### C. MANIFESTATION OF UNITY, OR SOUL

#### 1. General Points

What therefore matters in the present case is the fact that what is natural, the living thing, does indeed give hints of a soul, but in itself it does not reveal a soul; that is because the determining factor for what is natural is that its soul is something merely inner. The soul of an animal does not reveal itself as a soul in the animal; it is not for another, because it is not for itself. Consciousness alone is the *I* that exists for the *I*; the concept that emerges over against itself exists for itself, and so manifests itself also for an other. The animal does not have this manifestation, for its soul is just the breath that enlivens the whole, exhibiting itself in its natural condition (*habitus*), in the idealization of the parts. But this ideality does not yet appear freely on its own



account. The animal only exhibits the dim glow of a soul to us in a particular feature. The manifestation of the soul as such belongs to artistic beauty. Herein lies the transition to what then is to be called the ideal. We have already indicated what sheerly natural beauty lacks. The higher aspect, the genuine manifestation, occurs in the ideal. Two other characteristics intervene before we arrive at this point. They occur in characterizing the transition, since we said that the soul's connection appears just obscurely, not as a content-rich point of unity within itself but instead just as being abstractly, indeterminately, soul-possessed. Only the conscious soul is concrete, for it is for itself and is the unity of its being and its manifestation. In natural beauty, however, the soul appears just abstractly. We intend to examine briefly this characteristic, the abstract appearance on its own account. It is not an existing appearance of the concrete soul; it is an appearance, an existence, that is a specific one, and yet its unity itself is only indeterminate, is only external unity, is abstract. | [56] Because what is concrete does not occur 64 in this abstract unity, the concrete unity can exhibit itself here only upon analysis, that is, it shows itself just abstractly. Thus we have here on the one hand the aspect of form—the concept as sheerly abstract—and on the other hand the aspect of the sensible stuff. The two aspects are distinct and occur separately; in other words, there are two perspectives that we have to consider here. One is regularity as such and the other is the sensible material in its abstract unity. We can speak of beauty in each case, but then the expression 'beauty' is in fact used incorrectly. An example of abstract material is the purity of the blue sky, or of pure sunlight. This is sensible stuff in abstract unity by itself.

## 2. The Abstract Form of Unity

### a. *Symmetry and Regularity*

The first point is therefore the abstract form, the form thus deriving from the fact that a unity is posited in it, but an abstract, exterior unity. This is regularity as such or, more specifically, is symmetry. Sheer regularity is equivalence, the recurrence of the same configuration. Thus the straight line is the most regular line, abstractly having one and the same direction. A cube is likewise abstractly regular too, because it has equal surfaces and the fixed, abstract determinacy of its angles, of right angles. A poem too calls for regularity, an isomorphism or rhyming of the sounds. Symmetry involves regularity in a more broadly specified way. It is recurrence of a sort that is at the same time also dissimilar. For instance, a house that has three windows in the middle, then a recess and two windows on each side, and so forth.

65 Drama too has regularity when, for example, the acts are of equal length. Symmetry, | and regularity as abstract unity, as unity that is external, occur in the specificity of size or magnitude; as specificity that is itself posited externally, that is sheerly quantitative, not yet a matter of degree. Size is a specificity that is indifferent to the quality of the thing. [57] Because the size is itself external specificity, it is the case that abstract, external unity becomes visible in regularity and symmetry.

The second point to notice is the extent to which symmetry and regularity are called for in the work of art too. They emerge in what is organic. We see this in ourselves: we have two arms, two eyes, two legs. We know that other features are not regular in this way. We have one heart, one set of lungs, one liver. The issue here concerns the basis for this difference. This aspect where regularity comes into play is precisely the aspect of externality as such, in which what is organic is itself external or relates to what is external, has to do with externality. Regularity as abstract unity therefore emerges where what is objective as such is, characteristically, what is itself external, where the objects constitute the aspect of externality as such. In the solar system regularity is the basic characteristic; in what is spiritual, in organic life, regularity takes a back seat to subjective, living unity. Therefore as a rule, in nature, which is being external to itself, its character is such that regularity emerges within it where there is the purest externality as such. So, as we stated, in the sensible, physical system regularity is in order and law governs it as a regular system. To be more specific, when we go over the main levels, then the minerals, which are without soul or life, embody regularity. They have form as immanent in them; and, as the unity of what is external, this is the regularity, which is the inner master workman here but is more abstract, not as a living soul but solely as understanding that posits such relationships in the externality, whereby the understanding demonstrates that it is what is positing the unity. As abstract, this unity is merely understood; it is not the idealizing concept, which posits  
66 the subsistence of the independent elements as | something negative.

The plant stands higher than the crystal; a plant consumes material and develops itself into an organized structure. But the plant itself is still not vitality proper. The plant is structured and it has an organic character. In its activity, however, the plant is an activity continuously going out into what is external; [58] it grows continually, assimilating what is external to it, an *assimilation that is, however, no tranquil maintenance of what it is but instead is a constantly new emergence outward*. An animal grows too, but it sticks to its specific size range. A plant grows constantly and when it ceases to enlarge itself it is lifeless. Its life process is caught up in externality; its self-maintenance continually realizes itself outwardly. A principal element in a

plant is regularity, is unity in externality, because of this character of constantly pushing out beyond itself. What it produces is always an individual version of itself. Each section is a whole plant. It is not a member in the way that an animal organism has members, for each part of the plant is an individual, is a whole. So the plant has this individuality, maintaining itself as distinct individuals. Therefore this unity of the plant is marked by externality, and this characteristic appears as regularity. This is no longer as strict a regularity as in the mineral world, yet the regularity is still what predominates. A tree trunk is straight, the growth rings are circular, most lines are symmetrical, and the leaves approximate to crystalline form, being predominantly regular.

In animal life, however, distinction appears as a doubled organism. | There is the inner organism, which is self-enclosed in the way that a sphere has its source within itself, relating only to itself. Then there is the external organism, as external process and as process directed outwardly. This is an essential distinction within the animal nature. The primary organs are the internal ones: liver, heart, and brain, the ones on which life depends. There is regularity in the members that belong to the organism's externality. These members are of two kinds: ones for the theoretical process and ones for the practical process. The sensory organs carry out the theoretical process. [59] What we see we leave just as it is, and likewise with what we feel or touch, and what we hear. In doing so our behavior is purely theoretical. The senses of smell and taste are of course the beginnings of practical activity. We can taste something only by destroying it; the sense of taste is what is theoretical in the practical domain. What we smell is likewise something being consumed. The aroma is the abstract process of consuming the thing. We have just one nose, but it is divided into two nostrils. The sense of touch or feeling is the wholly general sense possessed by the doubled members [the hands]. The main point, however, is that the wholly ideal senses are entirely theoretical, and this sensible aspect, what exists for the eye and the ear, is the material of art. Here regularity comes into play and the sensory organs must be doubled. Arms and legs are the members of the practical process, the members for changing one's place and for changing external things. These members too are regular. So regularity also has its place in the organic realm, and where it is in order is a matter of some consequence.

As for works of art, regularity is in order in them too. If it takes the place of the living soul, then the work of art becomes lifeless. Yet it has its specific place. For example, regularity came to the fore particularly in architecture, | since architecture is the art of externality,<sup>19</sup> and in architecture immediate externality, or inorganic nature, displaces what is

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19. Hotho changed 'is the art of externality' to 'is the externality in art'.

soulful. Regularity is the unity in the inorganic sphere. It also has its place in music and in poetry. Sound is music's sensible element. The musical sound exists in time, and time is in turn abstract sensibility. The way in which unity can subsist in relation to time is regularity, and this same regularity is to be sought in the sounds of speech, since this resonance too exists in time. Thus the meter also has a beat that, as such, is the regular unity. [60] Poetic speech occurs in time, is a resonance, and must have regularity, which is evident in the rhyme scheme: in the resemblance of the sounds.

*b. Regularity and Lawlikeness*

So we now have to show the extent to which regularity also comes into play in the living thing as such, as it does in the work of art. We have observed, moreover, that symmetry is to be distinguished from regularity, although the distinction is not of any great import. We stated that symmetry involves dissimilarity within likeness. A pair of things must be alike within themselves but can be unlike something other, and can vary in the same way with respect to this other. Lawlikeness is to be distinguished more specifically from symmetry and regularity, insofar as lawlikeness is something higher and then signifies the transition to the freedom of the living thing as such, of the physical and spiritual living thing. This lawlikeness for its own sake is as such not yet the freedom of what is subjective, is not yet subjective, spiritual unity; but it is still understandable although it is the unity of what is diverse in such a way that the unity conceals itself as a hidden connectedness. This lawlikeness is therefore present for us—as a matter of custom and partly as a matter of intimation. We stated previously that we have an intimation of the concept, but partly so in the intuition of it as custom. To make this distinction clear, | we can introduce the way in which the absolute colors of  
 69 yellow, blue, red, and green constitute a totality, are the law of colors.<sup>20</sup> We are familiar with these colors, and are content with them as a group. How many of them there are can seem inconsequential, but ordinary sensibility has the wisdom to be content with this totality. We know, then, that there are a great many blends and nuances of colors. So lawlikeness is to be distinguished from the free subjectivity that, in another regard, is contingency. We are pleased with a historical painting when none of these basic colors is omitted and they are there in their distinctiveness. [61] The arrangement that the image of the totality produces is the foundation of what we call the

20. [Tr.] There are actually three primary colors: red, yellow, blue. The secondary colors are orange, green, and violet. Below our text recognizes that green is a 'mixture', but continues to call it *einfach*—'primary' or 'simple'. We will continue to render *einfach* by 'primary'.

harmony of the colors: their totality and their specific positioning.<sup>21</sup> In church paintings, for example, there is an ancient tradition that Mary be painted with a blue garment and Joseph with a red one. The four colors create the law of colors. In music the first, third, and fifth constitute the law of the tones, and its further elaboration is a matter of the figured bass, which is what is lawlike.

Lawlikeness is therefore a unity in which the parts exhibit a different specificity, although these differences have their basis in a determinacy of the law (as colors do, in blue, yellow, red, and green) that is no merely regular repetition of the one determinacy. This unity, the lawlikeness, is however a hidden although essential unity. The eye finds it pleasing to see the four colors together and, as Goethe says, this can go so far that, in seeing one color, one also sees the others.<sup>22</sup> Therefore this lawlikeness must underlie them all; it is what is substantial, and yet | it still lacks the higher freedom of subjectivity.

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We intend to make clear, by an example, what this transition from regularity to lawlikeness more specifically involves.

In the case of lines we in fact readily distinguish regularity [from lawlikeness]. For instance, lines of equal length are defined merely uniformly by specifying the length that is repeated in all of them. Likewise, a cube is a regular body. A second step involves the similarity of figures, namely, similar triangles, when the measurements differ and only the relationship is the same—the relation of one line to another, the angle of their intersection. A similar relationship exists in curved lines and in the circle. The circle does not have the regularity of the straight line for, in comparison with it, the circle is irregular. However, the circle still stands under the law of equality; it has an irregularity that stands within the law of equality, because the radii are still equal. [62]

For this reason the circle is a curved line of minimal interest because it is still the abstractly curved line. The ellipse and the parabola of course have less regularity and are only knowable in virtue of their law. Their equality is no longer posited; when I adopt a focal point, then the radii are unequal vectors, albeit lines that confirm to laws. In their inequality each kind of figure (ellipse and parabola) has an equality, the same law, which is not, however, outward

21. Hotho added 'or the law of colors'.

22. This view was first published in *Goethe's Farbenlehre* (Tübingen, 1810). See *Goethe: Werke*, ed. Erich Trunz, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1948 ff.), 13:339, 341, 343–4. Along with examples about color, Goethe demonstrates 'how, for the observer' who has an intense impression of color, 'the productive demand of this lawfulness' can 'bring about, in a lively intuition,' the eliciting of its complementary colors.

equality. If we subdivide the ellipse along its major and minor axes, then we have four equal parts; so here there is, on the whole, still equality.

71 A greater | inequality as to its inner lawlikeness is found in the egg-shaped or oval figure (*Eilinie*). Until now people have been unable to furnish its law, and yet it is lawlike. It is not an ellipse, for it has a different relationship in the curvature on each side. So the oval is a line whose law cannot be given mathematically; it is a free line of nature. If we bisect this line along the major axis, we obtain two equal parts as well. There would be an even greater inequality if we had a line whose halves, also divided along the axis, were unequal, and an example would be wavy lines. Hogarth established the wavy line as the line of beauty.<sup>23</sup> The wavy line is present especially in the organic realm as such; an ovate line, so to speak, that does not repeat itself on the other side, but instead curves differently there. The heart, for example, is shaped in such a way that the roundness on one side is different from the roundness on the other side. The arm, likewise, is not the same on the two sides of the body, but is only similar; the exterior features of the two arms are not the same and are not determined in the same way. This is lawlikeness without regularity; it is the form evident in endlessly manifold ways in the living thing, and the beauty of the design depends on these wavy lines, on this curvature poised between the straight line and the circle, but standing under a law. [63]

This, then, would be the form of the abstract aspect; it finds its limit in law, and it proceeds on to free subjectivity.

### 3. The Abstract Content of Unity: Matter, or the Sensible Aspect as Such

The second aspect of abstract unity involves the matter, the sensible aspect as such. Insofar as it exists for its own sake and is abstractly harmonious internally, what is material is something purely sensible that presents the unity to which it, as sensible, is receptive. Quite clearly drawn straight lines or wavy lines are sensible aspects of this kind. When they continue quite

72 uniformly, when their continuation is not sharply interrupted, then | we take delight in their clarity, their uniformity, their self-contained unity. The English have invented machines for making straight lines wholly uniform.<sup>24</sup>

23. William Hogarth (1697–1764), an English painter, copperplate engraver, and art theorist, developed his doctrine of the 'line of beauty' in his work of art theory, *Analysis of Beauty* (London, 1753; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1974).

24. Perhaps Hegel is alluding to the engraver's ruling machine, invented by Wilson Lowry about 1790, which underwent continual improvements. Instruments of this kind were

We are likewise delighted by a sea clear as a mirror, the smooth surface of the ocean, on account of the abstract unity. In the same way the clear sound of the voice is endlessly pleasing and appealing, whereas an unclear voice loses the ear's attention; however, the clear voice does not by itself make the material understood, for the sound alone is clear and one's relationship is to the sound by itself, the unity of the sound with itself. Pure colors are likewise delightful—pure blue, pure red. But they seldom are pure, since blue usually grades off into red, to green and yellow. A pure red of this sort is primary of itself. A violet color can be pure too, but only outwardly pure, unadulterated, for it is no primary color on its own. In contrast, the primary colors are determined by the law or the concept of colors, and our sensibility is well aware of the primary colors. They contrast with one another in a more dazzling way and their harmony is more difficult to achieve. That is why in pictures painted thirty or forty years ago we always see mixed colors, subdued colors, since they are easier to bring into harmony because they are not so very distinct from one another. Yet pure blue, like that of lapis lazuli, was used in earlier times. Its primary character consists not in its being unadulterated but instead in its nature of being unmixed as belonging to the law of colors. [64] Green is certainly a mixed color, combined from yellow and blue although its appearance is primary, and it catches the eye less as the neutral color, as the uniting of opposition in a primary appearance. So the primary status of colors depends on their position in the law of colors. The sounds in language are likewise pure, as in the vowels a, e, i, o, and u, and combined as in ä, ö, and ü. Various vernaculars have a number of impure sounds, intermediate sounds of 'oa'. The purity of sounds nevertheless involves the vowels being surrounded by consonants that do not attenuate the purity of the vowel—as in Italian, whereas the Nordic languages encroach upon the pure sounds of the vowels.

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The sensible realm, inherently embodying abstract unity, is the pure realm to which the arts too have to pay attention.

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constructed to engrave either equidistant consecutive straight lines or successive lines at increasing intervals, or else correctly to mark out, in mechanical fashion, elliptical, parabolic, and hyperbolic curves of all sizes. The machines were mainly suited for mechanically producing the background (for instance, the sky) on copper sheet engravings, but also for engraving banknotes. See *Ree's Cyclopaedia*, vol. 13 (1819); Anthony Dyson, *Pictures to Print: The Nineteenth-Century Engraving Trade* (London, 1984), pp. 126–30.

## II. ARTISTIC BEAUTY AS THE IDEAL

### A. SUBJECTIVITY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND VITALITY

These, then, are the two abstract unities [i.e., the form and the matter]. Neither of them is living or actual; they are merely abstract. Since we have characterized unity more specifically, as to how it constitutes the nature of the living thing, we now pass over to beauty proper, to the ideal in its distinctiveness as opposed to natural beauty. Our topic is artistic beauty, and we have to see in more detail how artistic beauty sets itself apart from natural beauty. Doing so will explicate the nature of the ideal with more precision. We can say, abstractly, that the ideal is what is perfect. But an abstract predicate of this sort does not express anything specific. The issue directly concerns the specificity of that which is what is perfect, and the question is why nature is necessarily imperfect. The necessity of artistic beauty first arises from this imperfection.

The first thing in this examination for us to emphasize is subjectivity, the element of individuality, of vitality. In speaking of the beautiful we speak of it as the idea, as when we speak of the good and the true as what is substantial. These ideas—the good, the true, the beautiful—are [65] themselves a unity of the concept and reality. Each is singularity, and this is the concept of the idea. But these ideas themselves are nevertheless something universal, and the ideal is nevertheless something other than the idea. Plato was the one who established the idea as what is true and substantial, as is the concrete universal.<sup>25</sup> However, Plato's idea is nevertheless not ideal, not actual, not for itself, but instead is still only just in-itself.

74 However, what is true must proceed to actuality. The species exists only as a free individual; the species as such is just something merely external or merely internal. Truth, as what is true, exists in the knowing individual; the good becomes actualized through human beings, and this individuality | belongs to the good. All that is true exists only as something individual, as unity existent-for-itself. This being-for-self, this subjectivity, is

25. At this point the 1826 transcripts of these lectures introduce a reference to Plato's *Sophist* or to his *Parmenides*, and this point could be expanded by referring to the *Symposium*. Hegel integrates into the later lectures on aesthetics reflections from his 1825–6 lectures on Plato. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Platon* (1825/26), ed. Jean-Louis Viellard-Baron (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, and Vienna, 1979), pp. 92–3. These lectures are in Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6*, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2006, 2009), 2: 175–225.



the essential point to hold to firmly. This point involves negative unity, the ideality of what is subsisting, the unity of the concept and the reality, a unity that, however, must be thought as negative unity of these two. Their unity is therefore the being-annulled of their posited difference, is unity existent-for-itself, infinite unity. This unity is what we can call the soul, and we have to examine the way in which this unity is present in what is natural. With subjectivity, the idea enters into existence. Subjectivity is the negative unity with itself, the oneness whose further determination is the single individual. By the subject itself positing itself as the negative unity, the subject becomes something simply immediate, something singular. The single individual is set apart (*ausschließend*), and with this immediacy, which is negative toward the other, it comes about that the idea enters into existence, into the endlessly manifold relation with what is external and is other. The spiritual, then, is subjective too; it has in it the mode of singularity, and this singularity is linked to the fact that what we can call natural beauty is distinguished from artistic beauty. The substantial content is the same. What is natural is life within itself; spirit as immediate is the same; in both there is what is substantial, what is eternal, what is divine. [66]

### B. THE INDIVIDUAL AS AN ORGANISM IN RELATION TO THE EXTERNAL WORLD

So natural beauty and the ideal have the same content, and what determines the distinction resides in the aspect of the form as the singularity. We now have to consider what the specifics of this determination are, what features in fact constitute the deficiency of the natural sphere. The first aspect of this imperfection concerns the living thing in general as an organism. The living organism is being-within-itself and being-for-itself; it maintains itself and it is internal process, negative relation to itself; it assimilates to itself what is external and is the constant process of assimilation, of conversion of the external into something internal. This process of the living organism is a system of activities, and of particular | existences in which these activities are at work: a system of internal organs. Its vitality subsists in such an internally self-enclosed system, and we stated previously that this system makes the living thing to be for-itself. The living thing is purposively organized in this manner; all its members are means for the one purpose of vitality, of self-maintenance. Its life is immanent in its members, they are bound to it, and its life is bound to them. We do not catch sight of this feature in its life; we see only the manifold character of the organism, not the unitary

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point of its life. The main thing about the animal is its consumption of what is other to it and its self-maintenance, or [what we call] desire; the soul of the animal is just desirous, and the outcome of desire is a system of the organism's structure.

In comparing the animal with the plant, we found the plant to be the constant propagation of itself as individuals, whereas the animal simply is one individual. The plant is an individual everywhere; each leaf is the whole plant, and the trunk, the wood, the center, is something inanimate that just constantly sends its tendrils forth from itself, toward the light. So the plant does not maintain itself as [one] individual. The animal is the opposite, is a unitary thing (*das Eins*). When we speak of this aspect of the animal, we look upon the animal as an individual within itself. [67] It does not have its bodily nature everywhere individually, all over it, as the plant does. For that reason what we consider in the animal case is that we see the whole body covered with feathers or scales, or with hair or fur or a shell. Covering of this kind belongs to the animal nature, although there are things animals produce along the lines of vegetation. So we notice in those animals something vegetable-like, and in fact that is because the animal is just being-within-itself and we do not see its vitality everywhere in it. This is the direct defect of the animal's organization as we see it—the fact that its organization does not appear everywhere about it as vitality, as something individual; instead, the exterior of the animal is a lower stage than animal vitality.

In comparison with animal vitality, human vitality then stands higher in that the human being presents a graphic picture of what it is to be a unity of feeling overall. That is because the blood pulses over the entire surface, and heart and mind (*das Herz, das Hirn*) are present, so to speak, in every part. In its appearance the human body indeed exhibits itself as vitality; the blood is visible everywhere and the skin is sensitive all over, whereas with the animal the surface is of a vegetable nature. In the animal, the living organism's supporting framework is covered over by a lower stage of organism. In a human being, in contrast, the pulsating heart is apparent everywhere, as is the nervous system too. This indeed constitutes the endless perfection of the human body in contrast to the animal body. So the blood appears in the skin, and the sensibility, the color of the nerves, the complexion, constitute the most difficult thing for the painter, the artist's burden. In its appearance the human body is thus demonstrably sensitive. Yet natural needs are evident in the pores, in the fine hairs; the skin is a covering exhibiting natural exigencies, a covering serving the need for [68] self-preservation. Sensation is present in the skin, although there is still an emergent separation, nothing concentrated within itself. The human body has the greater superiority even though

needs still make their appearance in it too. The superior feature is that the soul or spirit exists within the human body. What appears especially in the natural shape as such is necessity. However, what also appears in the human being is feeling, the focal point of individuality. This is the first aspect. |

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The second aspect is the fact that the single individual exists as set apart and thereby as involved with the external world, is dependent on external purposes for which it is an instrument; or else that it has need of what is external as its own instrument. The relation is therefore a manifold sort and constitutes the aspect under which the living thing shows that it is not free. For example, the animal is directly tied to a specific natural element, to air, to land, or to water. These are the major distinctions among the animals. Then of course still other intermediate kinds of animals come into play; birds that swim and mammals that live in water, although these are only mixed forms. With respect to human beings, moreover, they are also<sup>26</sup> dependent in various ways owing to disposition and natural conditions, owing to need, to the state, to law. Individuals so situated are not active, and not to be grasped, based on themselves; instead they are to be grasped based on other factors, that is, not as the independent vitality that underlies the concept of beauty. So individuals appear as dependent, not as free on their own account. All that we assign to the prosaicness of life and of consciousness belongs here—the feature of not being determined from oneself but instead being posited and determined by something other than oneself. All finitude of purpose belongs here. The entirety<sup>27</sup> of any sort of event and transaction involves many individuals who play small parts in this single activity. As a system of activity, an event is an entirety involving a number of separate individuals. [69]

These separate individuals do of course also take part purposefully; they participate in line with their own interests, although | they determine the circumstances and natural conditions more or less only in a formal volition. This is therefore the sphere of entanglement in what is relative, the prosaicness of the human world insofar as it appears to consciousness. To ordinary reflective consciousness the world appears to be this host of finite factors. This second aspect therefore also involves the spiritual world, and the fact that this second aspect is an imperfect one is decisive in comparing this dependence with the freedom of spirit. The vitality exists in this contradiction, when the vitality itself—this oneness—is dependent on what is other,

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26. Hotho changed 'they are also' to 'the organism is'.

27. Perhaps 'entirety (*Ganzes*)' could be read as 'givenness (*Gegebenes*)'. Hotho's marginal correction includes the word 'entirety'.

and there is a constant struggle to do away with this contradiction. This is the picture of finitude, of constant combat. This is how the world appears.

The third characteristic that comes into play here is the fact that, in its dependence, the living thing not only appears as limited, but is also particularized within itself—the fact that the living thing has within itself a set limitation, that it is one kind. We know that naturally living shapes involve, first of all, the fact that all of them are kinds of beings in keeping with their physical and other aspects. Their nature is essentially always of a specific kind. The picture of general vitality, of developed organization, presents itself to spirit. Of course in themselves human beings have the most vital organization, and hence must find animal species to be imperfect. That is because there are also inferior vitalities, and it is erroneous to take all vitalities as the same, similar though they may be. The human organization is rudimentary too and is not instantaneous, for this rudimentary condition persists. Children are most attractive because all particularities still are dormant within them and no passion has raged. But the specific nature also becomes something set, something hereditary; and one's character is likewise limited in various ways.

### C. ART PORTRAYS SPIRITUAL VITALITY IN ITS FREEDOM, MAKING THE SOUL EVIDENT

79 What we could say, directly to the contrary, is that the business of art is to portray the appearance of | vitality, and most especially that of spiritual vitality too, outwardly in its freedom; to make the sensible appearance commensurate with the concept, [70] to lead the indigence of nature, of the appearance, back to truth, to the concept. And this would then be the more specific task for artistic beauty. Such a natural condition as a whole does indeed correspond to a concept although the single individual does not; and since the concept thus remains only something inward, this whole remains something solely for us, for our knowledge,<sup>28</sup> and does not appear as a whole. The multiplicity is then embraced in one expression (in such a way that there is still a mutual externality, but each part in it points to the whole as grasped in unity, or in such a way that the whole presents itself as imbued with soul). This whole is the more specific characterization of the ideal: beauty as it ought to be as artistic beauty. At this point if we take the human shape as an illustration, this shape is still an externality, a number of

28. Hotho added 'as thinking'.

organs into which the concept has dispersed itself, and each component exhibits only a partial stirring. But if we ask for one organ in which the soul as such appears, we will think directly of the eye, in which spirit is visibly concentrated. We did say previously that the pulsating heart is evident everywhere in the human body, in contrast to the animal body. In the same way we can say about art that what appears at all points on the surface art has to raise up to the eye, the seat of the soul, which allows spirit to appear. In a distich, Plato speaks to his 'star': Plato wishes to be the heavens, to see with a thousand eyes.<sup>29</sup> We could say, *vice versa*, that art gives to the object a thousand eyes, in order [for art, or spirit] to be seen everywhere in it. For the soul not only sees by the eye but also becomes seen in the eye. | The appearance is manifold; art makes appearance into the sort of thing that everywhere in it would be the organ of the soul, the manifestation of it. All that is external—speech, figure, and so forth—pertains to appearance. Art has to make transparent everywhere what for prosaic consciousness is just present as finite, and to do so in such a way that it reveals in every organ the tenor of the soul, what is spiritual. [71]

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We stated that art is supposed to make the soul evident, and so the question becomes: What is the soul that is by its nature capable of becoming manifest? For we speak of the soul of metals, of rocks, of heavenly bodies, and we also speak of the soul as of the particular features of the specifically human character. It is not a literal expression when we use 'soul' for a natural thing, because natural things have at best *just* a living soul; that is, the determinate, specific individuality of the natural thing does indeed manifest itself in its finite appearance. This appearance just presents something limited; its elevation to infinite status is then due to a resemblance that is indeed attributed to it, but then attributed only externally. That is because what is natural is not infinite in itself. What such a thing that is 'just living' manifests is, on the one hand, just formal vitality, and the content of this form is, on the other hand, a merely finite inwardness. Only the soul of the spirit, the consciousness of existent being, is soul's infinity. Existent being as such is always limited. Only spirit, the self-knowing of the finite, is what is free, is what in existent being is existent-in-itself in such a way that its existent being remains present to it

29. The reference is to an epigram ascribed to Plato by Diogenes Laertius that concerns Aster (a name meaning 'star'), a young man Plato loved. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938), 1:302-3. The epigram reads: 'To the stars thou look'st, mine Aster. Oh, would that I were the sky, with as many eyes to gaze on thee.' See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 1825-6, 2:176-7.

81 although it is ideally posited. Insofar as spirit is consciousness, the fact is that its expression, although a passing over into limitation, nevertheless has in it at the same time the imprint | of infinity, the return to itself. Because of its freedom, spirit is capable of being deformed, of existing as deformed. If spirit embeds content of this sort in its existent being, then its own manifestation is merely formal, expressing the freedom of infinitude but as an empty form of consciousness the content of which is not commensurate with its form. Existent being has substantiality only in virtue of worthy content; only in virtue of legitimate content does existent being in its limited condition maintain a true content, so that specific and substantial content are as one. Art accordingly has for its object the portrayal of the truth of the existent being that, insofar as it is commensurate with the concept, must be in such a way that it [72] is in-and-for-itself. Therefore truth has to be other than mere accuracy, for instead what is external must harmonize with something inner that in itself is something true. This is the nature of the ideal as such, the fact that the external, existent being corresponds to what is interior and has led back to it, although not in such a way that it has progressed to thought as such, but only progressed to the focal point of individual subjectivity. Thought, what is substantial, must still be caught up in individuality and not emerge abstractly, such that what is substantial coincides with a specificity of existent being that is, so to speak, relieved of its thinghood, is raised up to what is inward. In this subjectivity the extremes of sheer externality and sheer inwardness coincide.

82 Schiller composed a poem entitled *The Realm of Shadows*, later called *The Realm of the Beautiful*.<sup>30</sup> The beautiful is a shadow, is spirit relieved of the finitude of external contingency, relieved of the deformities of the concept's existent being. The traces of such | influences have been wiped away, and the mechanism that nature employs has withdrawn to the place at which it can be a manifestation of spiritual freedom, [of spirit] having departed from externality but living within itself, in the stirring of an authentic content. This is the nature of the ideal as such. The ideal is something spiritual. And if the ideal is also the ideal of something natural, this natural reality as it is immediately is not art's object; for only insofar as something

30. Schiller first published *Das Reich der Schatten* (*The Realm of Shadows*) in *Die Horen*, 1, 9 (1795), pp. 1–10. In 1800 Schiller actually gave the title *Das Reich der Formen* (*The Realm of Forms*) to a revision of this poem, and from 1804 on it bore the title *Das Ideal und das Leben* (*The Ideal and Life*). See Friedrich Schiller: *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, ed. Lieselotte Blumenthal and Benno von Wiese (Weimar, 1943 ff.), 1:247–51 and 2:396–400.

spiritual has been instilled into the object does spirit somehow find its own characteristics in it, be aroused by it, recognize itself.

Therefore the ideal involves the fact of its being, in the sensible world, at the same time caught up within itself. Spirit sets its foot into what is sensible but withdraws it and rests on itself, is free, enjoying itself in the externality conjoined with itself. As sensible, spirit is blissful within itself, having itself in what is external, enjoying its own self, letting the sound of bliss resonate throughout everything in the way that everything also extends out from it, and never losing itself but always remaining present to itself. [73] This is the most general characterization of the ideal in contrast to what is natural as what is beautiful.

It is easy to grasp the ideal on its own account. The most difficult thing to grasp is the fact that, since it is not merely idea<sup>31</sup> but also has actuality, the ideal with its existent being enters into externality although, in this going out into finitude, the ideality still preserves itself.

31. Hotho changed 'idea' to 'abstract idea'.

### III. THE EXISTENCE OR ACTUALIZATION OF THE IDEAL

#### INTRODUCTION

83 After the concept of what is beautiful, and after considering artistic beauty as the ideal, we now have to examine still more closely this aspect, the third one. The issue now is the extent to which | existence, as finitude, can receive ideality into itself. Had we limited ourselves to sculpture we could easily have passed over this aspect, for sculpture portrays the simple ideal. Sculpture of course has its gods in motion too, although its chief characteristic is nevertheless to have its gods at rest, as self-enclosed, as not giving themselves over to finitude. Art must not remain static with its motionless figure, for it also has to portray the movements of what is spiritual. That is because art's object is above all what is spiritual, and is spirit only as stepping forth into finitude, as activity and, as such, entering into what is unlike it, going so far as committing crime! Hence the Greeks, who envisioned the ideal above all in their gods, also represented the gods as having passion and divisiveness. Passing over into the harsh agony of finitude is a chief characteristic of the Christian God too.

So at this point we have to speak about the circumstances of existence,<sup>32</sup> insofar as existence is capable of portraying the ideal. The various points here are the examination: first, of the external world as the condition within which what is individually ideal presents itself; second, of the particular condition, or the situation; third, of the reaction to the situation. A fourth point is the aspect of wholly external specificity in which the ideal then exists; namely, the point that, because art is set apart, art confronts us, comes into a relationship to us, thus has not only a relationship to its own world but also a relationship [74] to a specific, subjective world. These are the points to be examined.

#### A. THE EXTERNAL WORLD AS OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR EXPRESSING THE IDEAL

Specificity is where finitude begins. Since what is ideal is subjectivity, the issue thus is how finitude must be constituted in order to be the expression

32. Perhaps Heidegger's illegible 'existence' (*Dasein*—'being there') could be read as 'standing there' (*Dastehen*).



of the ideal; under what conditions can the ideal come forth. As individuality, the ideal presupposes an environment; it must bestir itself, | must act, and the surrounding world is the soil for this action. How has this soil to be constituted? The surrounding world is what is objective over against the subject. The ideal is free subjectivity, and for that reason the surrounding world must not essentially be a world objective for its own sake, must not be a condition justified and true for its own sake. For free individuality ought instead to be determined within itself, and the objectivity of the condition ought not yet be apparent apart from the condition; the subject ought not yet have separated itself from what is objective, else subjectivity is only something subordinate in relation to this world. Therefore power ought not yet have existence for its own sake, but instead ought still reside within individuality, and what ought to carry weight must not exist for its own sake, but instead must be posited by subjectivity. So the condition is a general mode of existence and even more so of the spiritual world. The various aspects of spirit are only aspects of one and the same spirit. When we speak of the condition with reference to free subjectivity, this means that, insofar as the condition relates to a will, spirit enters into actuality via the will.

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### 1. The Ethical Order, the State, and the Self-reliance of Heroes

The objective condition of the will is then a condition when the ethical concept is present and realized in a social order. Justice with respect to individual persons or whole organizations is the sort of condition we call a state as such, in which laws are in force so that existence is justified within itself because it is something statutory. Individual matters are not the concern of the state; what is universal, the ethical | concept, [75] appears as an existent world. On one side is order, and on the other side the subject who just conforms to this order, in a free manner, either<sup>33</sup> acknowledging the laws as one's own or else as being subservient (*als Knecht*), because the laws are in force and are powerful. So here the ethical powers have come into existence and the individual is only one instance within this ethical realm that is in place, in which case the individual can willingly fall in line with it or else be opposed to it. In an ordered community, in a legal condition, individuals have a wholly different relationship than they do in a condition prior to a state. In a state the individuals are not what is important; in

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33. Hotho eliminated 'either', so that it reads 'in a free manner, acknowledging...'; hence 'in a free manner' could no longer be construed as applying also to a 'subservient' person.

themselves, apart from the state; they have no substantiality, the substantiality that exists not as particular willing on the part of individuality but exists for its own sake. In a condition contrary to this, what is substantial is still invested in the individuals, and the fact that one thing or another is right comes about from the subjective free will of the individual. In that kind of condition individuals, even in their own external existence, appear as relying on themselves. In the state the individual's external existence is secure and extant for its own sake; in a stateless condition, what is one's own property depends on individual caprice, and legal right in its actuality is therefore left to individuals, who are free and independent in outward existence too. In the state human beings are only free with respect to their own conviction, to their judgment. As for their existence, it is protected by what is other, which they can identify with and not.<sup>34</sup> Where there is thus no state, outward existence depends on the individual.

- 86 This stateless condition is | the condition of the heroes as such; so, only in the heroic age is there this independence, this self-reliance of untrammelled existence. One example that of course occurs to us when speaking of heroes is the figure of the Greek hero. The romantics had at once their native land, their city, surely something universal subsisting on its own account. [76] Some of the Greek heroes exist in a condition prior to laws; others are founders of states. Hercules was one of the principal heroes, and his virtue was greatly renowned.<sup>35</sup> The free will of this individual was his virtue, the independent energy and the strength of uprightness in one individual. Such a condition is also still more or less that of the Homeric heroes. They are united under a king, although their having joined together is no legal bond, nothing already existent beforehand on its own; instead it is the free choice of the individuals. Each of the participants in the band takes his own counsel. When Achilles wants to he goes his own way; he can proceed

34. [Tr.] The 'and not' to end this sentence could perhaps have the sense of 'or not'; or perhaps it could serve as a segue to what follows: 'and not protected where there is thus no state, where outward existence...'

35. This description of Hercules may refer to the third edition of Karl Wilhelm Ramler's *Kurzgefaßte Mythologie oder Lehre von den fabelhaften Göttern, Halbgöttern und Helden des Alterthums*, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1816), pp. 277–318. Another possible source is the transmission of the myths about Hercules by Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History* 4.8–39; see *Diodorus of Sicily*, trans. C. Oldfather, 12 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1935; 4th edn. 1967), 2:364–469. Also, the *Bibliotheka* of [Pseudo-] Apollodorus, 2.4.8–7.7; *Apollodorus: The Library*, trans. Sir James George Frazer, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1970), 1:174–273.

when it suits him. Participation in battle is an independent, free choice.<sup>36</sup> However, a feature of dependence also emerges in the case of these heroes. Hercules is in the service of the king and carries out his labors at the king's behest. Yet this dependence is only a wholly abstract bond, not a concrete, wholly legal and established relationship.

This very thing marks the feudal relationships of knighthood. El Cid has a king, is a comrade at arms in a band, has the obligations of a vassal; yet the knights' independence emerges over against these obligations, taking the form of the law of honor, whether formally so or with more concrete contents.<sup>37</sup> The vassals do not submit to the majority, for each one stands on his own. Charlemagne, like Agamemnon, is surrounded by his vassals; he thunders like Jupiter on Olympus, and yet the vassals, who are unwilling, abandon the undertaking.<sup>38</sup> Comparable figures are the Saracen heroes who | stand still more inflexibly. The most splendidly independent self-reliance is evident in these heroes; it is the soil on which they appear and accomplish their deeds.<sup>39</sup>

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This soil constitutes an essential characteristic in the ideal. In the circumstances of our own states in contrast, we see that ideals exist here within a much more limited sphere, [77] one in which human beings nevertheless can, in subjective freedom, be effective with respect to their own existence. This is a very delimited sphere. The ideals here are those of a good father of a family, of honorable men whose conduct relates to a sphere still left open to free choice. Such a sphere of contingency always still remains. Ideals of

36. At the beginning of *The Iliad* Homer describes a council meeting of the Greeks that makes clear the status of the heroes (1.54–305). Achilles' action is described in this context; on his free choice, see 1.488–92. For these passages, see *The Iliad of Homer*, trans. Richmond Lattimore, intro. and notes by Richard Martin (Chicago, 1951, 2011), pp. 76–83, 88.

37. Presumably Hegel is referring to a translation by Herder of a later edition of the fourteenth century verse epic, *Cantar de Rodrigo o mocedades del Cid*. See J. G. Herder, *Der Cid, Geschichte des Don Ruy Diaz, Grafen von Bivar, Nach spanischen Romanzen*. The translation first appeared in Herder's publication *Adrastea* (1803/4), and then in vol. 3 of his *Sämmtliche Werke* (Tübingen, 1805), which contains his writings *Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst*.

38. A parallel passage in the 1826 lectures makes it likely that Hegel is referring to some version of either the *Rolandliedes des Pfaffen Konrad* (ca. AD 1170) or to its prototype, *The Song of Roland* (ca. 1100), which is traditionally ascribed to Turolde (rendered in French as Théroutle), a Scandinavian name Hegel uses in the 1826 lectures. 'Turolde' appears at the end of *The Song of Roland*, and is presumed to be the author's name. The material was known in Hegel's day via these editions: *Das Tal von Ronceval* (1819), by Karl Leberecht Immermann (1796–1840); *Romanzen vom Thale Ronceval* (1805), by Friedrich Heinrich Karl Baron de la Motte Fouqués (1777–1843).

39. Hegel bases this description on the text by Joseph Görres, *Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdusi*, 2 pts. in 1 vol. (Berlin, 1820); see Görres' *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 12, ed. Willibald Kirfel (Cologne, 1942).

magistrates or of princes were something that made no proper sense, for these persons do their duty by carrying out what is appropriate for their specific rank, which is not<sup>40</sup> a matter of free choice although it is of course valid for its own sake. In our states the role of the monarch is spelled out so that he has relegated to others the most important of the sovereign affairs; he does not administer justice and does not supervise the finances himself but decides on them only formally, whereas their contents are determined in part by the existing order or by foreign affairs. What the monarch does is thus more or less a formality, and its contents are not the result of individual choice.

## 2. Portrayal of the Heroic Condition

From this it is directly evident that in ancient art, as in modern art, the world to which the ideals are transferred is an ancient time. The subject matter of the ancient time always belongs to the condition of an ancient era, of a  
 88 bygone age. Recollection does not grasp such a time | in its finitude, but instead retains only a general picture of it. In recollection, as a rule, the local circumstances are effaced, are not recalled in immediate specificity; to recollection the whole of the external environment is evidence of universality. So then, in virtue of its content, the ancient time is a soil for heroes, at a time in which the need or necessity for legal order, for state institutions, is not yet present, does not yet exist.

Also equally to be considered is how the champions of the ideal are drawn from a particular social class, namely from princely rank. [78] In ancient tragedy we saw a chorus serving as the condition, as a soil devoid of individuality. Standing above the chorus are the individualities who are ruling over this soil. The representation of princely status includes consummate freedom of will and of deeds. When a different condition, such as our own, is set up and such figures manifest themselves in turn we see them everywhere as suppressed; everywhere they are dependent and are curbed in their passion and free choice, which are subject to legal justification and have the irresistible power of the civic order in the background. We will of course find this condition in modified form in the case of the romantics. But when we bring in Shakespearean figures, their condition is one in which the legal bond

40. Hotho changed 'not' to 'no longer'.

is still a looser one and still allows more free choice to subjectivity.<sup>41</sup> The characters are indeed independent, though not wholly concretely so but instead more formally independent in the realization of their character and in the downfall attendant upon this realization.

The heroic condition is one that corresponds especially to the time of youth seeking early on to fashion such a condition for itself. The initial, youthful products of Goethe and Schiller do not involve such a condition, but instead treat the antithesis between-independence and constraint within the unity of the state.<sup>42</sup> When an individual stands within this antithesis, has to accept determination based on the laws, and is secure only through them but is opposed to these laws, then we have the further stage of the situation. *Götz von Berlichingen*<sup>43</sup> takes place in the era of knighthood's downfall, right at the onset of civic, objective order, where the chivalrous heroic age borders on civic objectivity. This is one of the greatest themes. The subject matter of Schiller's *The Robbers* is that the individual—offended by the prevailing order [79] and by the human beings who misuse it—appears as an enemy of the social order and, by his own strength, assails this order, seeking to establish what is right and to put an end to the injustices of this order. Moor becomes a robber and creates for himself a heroic condition.<sup>44</sup> But since the two sides are antithetical and this antithesis itself constitutes the soil of the portrayal, this is indeed part of the setting or situation.

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41. On this point, see Herder's treatise on *Shakespear* (1773), in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan et al., 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1967–8), 5:208–57, esp. pp. 222–3, 226, 251. Herder writes: 'So Shakespear also created a new era in accord with the events of his new world, and the feeling of this new, if I may call it, "Shakespearean era", is just as important' (p. 251).

42. This remark refers to both Goethe's play *Götz von Berlichingen* (1773) and Schiller's play *The Robbers* (1781).

43. For *Götz of Berlichingen With the Iron Hand* (1773), the full title, see *Werke* 4:73–175. In Book 13 of his *Aus meinem Leben, Dichtung und Wahrheit*, some forty years later, Goethe is doubtful as to whether in the original treatment he provided his work with sufficient 'historical and national content', and may have confined himself too narrowly to a 'description of the life of Götz and of German antiquity'; *Werke* 9:571. In the journal *Über Kunst und Altertum*, Goethe published a German translation he made of a review of his dramatic works, written by J. J. A. Ampère, which corresponds in part to Hegel's interpretation in our text. It reads: 'The Middle Ages wholly infuses this "Götz with the Iron Hand"; here there is the power, the integrity, the independence of this epoch, speaking through the mouth of this individual... underlying him and dying with him'; Vol. 5, pt. 3 of *Über Kunst und Altertum* (Stuttgart, 1826), p. 144. Later Goethe repeated the gist of this interpretation in Book 17 of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (1831, published in Tübingen, 1833); see *Werke* 10:116.

44. For *The Robbers* (Stuttgart, 1781), see Schiller's *Werke*, vol. 3. The criticism that the individual misinterprets the modern world along the lines of a heroic condition is also found in

B. THE SITUATION: THE RELATION OF HUMAN BEINGS  
TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIME

1. The Situation as Such

The second point we have to take up is the situation. The condition is the general mode of spiritual self-consciousness, of the ethical sphere; it is the way that spiritual self-consciousness takes hold of itself, the inner concept human beings have of themselves, the manner in which they become conscious of themselves in their conditions. In this comprehension there is of course also fluidity, the complication of individuality, although it is more a comprehension via reflection and abstract representation and art cannot stay put with this, for art instead has to proceed on to the particularity of character. In speaking of the condition we also highlighted the aspect of the externality of what is substantial. This substantial content is present partly as unconscious custom, partly in the form of contingent existence. This substantial content consists of the general powers that exist within the condition and govern it. They are portrayed initially as harmony. But a custom is no worthy mode of substantial power, insofar as  
90 custom essentially belongs to self-consciousness; hence the inner powers must appear in a more worthy shape than that of the sheer condition. Since they themselves come to appearance as *powers*, they must take on shape, maintain their existence, and appear in specificity vis-à-vis one another—and in doing so come into mutual opposition. The situation begins in this appearing. [80]

The situation involves the circumstances at the time and a human being's relation to them. A person activates those at first merely inner powers, bringing them to appearance. The circumstances are of interest not for their own sake but only as they are existent for spirit and in relation to the powers opposed to the circumstances, a relationship in which the powers are what is substantial.<sup>45</sup> We can call this relationship [to the powers] one of

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Hegel's 1800 treatise 'Wallenstein'. See Hegel's *Werke*, vol. 17, pt. 2, ed. Friedrich Förster and Ludwig Bowmann (Berlin, 1834), pp. 411–13. Of interest is the self-interpretation of Moor, the protagonist, which underscores Hegel's interpretation of the great individual of modern times as a criminal: 'And I, so hateful to this beautiful world—and I, a monster to this magnificent earth' (in Act 3, Scene 2; Schiller's *Werke* 3:188).

45. Hotho changed this portion of the sentence ('in relation . . . substantial') to read: 'as relation of the various powers opposed to the circumstances themselves, in which they are what is substantial'.

need. The situation as such offers a large field to be considered, and it is always essential that an interesting situation be found in a work of art. Situations differ for the different arts; sculpture is limited with reference to them; poetry and painting are freer.

## 2. The Substantial Powers Portrayed as Gods

Here we can offer only a general perspective. The gods in their static rest, the ancient temple images, are images apart from any situation. For instance, *The Apollo of Belvedere*, a figure we apprehend in his repose, gazing upon the dead Python,<sup>46</sup> is indeed a situation, and this figure was also executed later than these static figures. In the Christian religion, God the Father is such an unchanging being (*solches Prozeßloses*). Portraiture images also are likewise devoid of situation. But art must move on from this to more concrete portrayals; what is onefold or simple must become active, and so we have, in the second place: specific situations. The first situation | is just the transition from repose to motion as the expression of activity—partly movement out of necessity, partly mechanical motion. This is signified by the transition from ancient Egyptian figures to Greek figures. The Egyptians portrayed their gods with their legs together. The Greeks first freed the arms and legs from the body and gave the figure a striding posture. Repose and sleep are simple situations and they belong above all to sculpture. [81] By such a minimal act the Greeks emphasized more directly the loftiness of their ideal; for a wholly innocuous movement brings home the silent grandeur of the gods, precisely by the insignificance of the action, and so such innocuous action is more suited to the portrayal than is a specific, concrete action. For instance, in Potsdam there stands a Mercury who is fastening his wings to his sandals.<sup>47</sup> This is a superfluous action, for the god needs no wings.

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46. This statue of Apollo, in the Belvedere court of the Vatican, is a copy in marble, made in the Roman imperial period, from a bronze statue of Apollo ascribed to the Greek sculptor Leochares (ca. 370 BC). The art historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68) considered this statue to be ‘the highest ideal of art among all the works of antiquity that have escaped its destruction.’ For a description of the statue, see Winckelmann’s *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums* (Dresden, 1764), pp. 392–4; the quotation, from p. 392, is also found on p. 394 of the edition by Ludwig Goldscheider (Vienna, 1934; repr. Darmstadt, 1982). For the English translation of the quote, see Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *History of the Art of Antiquity*, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles, 2006), p. 333. [T:] Python was a huge snake that Apollo killed at Delphi.

47. This statue, *Mercury Fastening His Sandals*, is by the French sculptor Jean Baptiste Pigalle (1714–85). Hegel also mentions it in the lectures of 1826 and 1828–9. August Wilhelm Schlegel had already treated it in his *Kunstlehre* (1801–2); see A. W. Schlegel: *Kritische Schriften und Briefe*,

Thorvaldsen<sup>48</sup> too made a Mercury who, in contrast, is seated. Here the action Mercury performs is indeed too dramatic to belong to sculpture; he in fact waylays the satyr Marsyas, gazing at him craftily, lurking so that he could wound him by taking hold of a concealed dagger.

This is of course the full representation, no longer motionless simplicity, with the result that the grandeur of the gods seems indeed to have diminished, a grandeur that appears instead in the simple action. Wilhelm Schadow's *Sandalenbinderin*<sup>49</sup> also has Mercury's simple action, but it is no longer of such great interest, for it loses the interest we have when Mercury does it innocuously. In this action as performed by a young girl there is nothing but the action itself, what she does. The ancients have an abundance of such unself-conscious situations, in devising the portrayal of games, and so forth. This point pertains especially to the character of Greek art: through such insignificant action, it shows clearly the calmness and childlikeness of the gods. In fact these situations are | nevertheless no action proper, for action involves an ethical purpose. The actions properly first constituting what is of genuine interest are actions in which the substantial aspect of spirit expresses itself. These actions have external circumstances to which they have reference. [82] They must involve an essential need that impels to

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ed. Edgar Lohner, 7 vols. (Stuttgart, 1963-74), 2:159. The statue Hegel mentions is a large-scale replica of one of the artist's principal works (1744), which is in The Louvre, in Paris. This replica, a gift from Ludwig XV to Frederick the Great, was brought to Sanssouci, Frederick's summer palace in Potsdam, in 1748, and later placed in the National Museum, Berlin. Its counterpart, the portrayal of the *Seated Venus*, is also in The Louvre.

48. In the spring of 1818, Bertel Thorvaldsen (1770-1844) prepared a model for *Mercury as Slayer of Argus*; Duke von Austenburg commissioned it in marble in 1819. The finished exemplar was sold to England, and today it is in the Thorvaldsen Museum in Copenhagen. A second marble version of *Mercury as Slayer of Argus* (one lacking a cap, owing to a defect in the marble) Thorvaldsen kept, and in 1849 it was sold to Spain, where it is in the Prado in Madrid. A third version went to Poland, to Count Leon Potocki, and today it is in the National Museum, Cracow.

49. This *Sandal-Fastening Girl* is in fact one of the best-known works by Wilhelm's brother, Rudolf Schadow (1786-1822), who was decidedly influenced by Thorvaldsen. Work on the execution in marble began in 1814 and was completed in 1820; it was done by commission of Frederick-William III, King of Prussia, together with *Die Spinnerin* (*The Spinning Girl*). Rudolf Schadow is said to have redone the *Sandal-Fastening Girl* seven times in marble; a plaster cast for one of these versions already existed in Berlin in 1816. The completed sculpture arrived in Berlin on 4 November 1820 and was installed initially, at the beginning of 1821, in the studio of Rudolf's father, Johann Gottfried Schadow, subsequently in the Berlin castle, then in 1824 in the 'Palais unter den Linden', and finally was brought once again into the castle. (This account is from p. 253 of the exhibition catalog, *Johann Gottfried Schadow, 1764-1850, Bildwerke und Zeichnungen*, Berlin, National Gallery, October 1964 to March 1965.)



action: the circumstances must be a precondition that stands opposed [to the essential need]. So they are not circumstances in general, but only circumstances in relation to an essential need. This conflict can involve a physical evil, as in the sickness of Admetus in the *Alcestis*. It is an evil, a circumstance in relation to the couple.<sup>50</sup> It is the same with the pestilence in the camp of the Greeks. This pestilence is indeed portrayed on its own account as the consequence of an offence, as punishment.<sup>51</sup>

### 3. Action, Reaction, and Conflict as Situations

However, the conflict can also be of a different kind, albeit a physical one too. An example is when there are two sons in a royal house and it is undecided who comes to rule, such that each one is equally entitled. So the strife can emanate from the family, and this is a very ancient situation, one already beginning with Cain, one running throughout the Theban wars, and one prominent in Ferdusi's heroic sagas of the Persians where it is a principal feature, is the occasion for a series of battle scenes of various nations.<sup>52</sup> There is an antithesis of the same kind in *The Bride of Messina*.<sup>53</sup> But the situation can also be occasioned by a chance passion such as love, as well as by the passion for dominance; in general by a passion that pertains to duty or is related to another passion. | However, the principal circumstances with reference to a situation are that such a passion gives rise to ethical or religious offenses; in general, that there are circumstances that occasion a reaction. If the offense is in fact of an ethical nature, then there must be a counteraction to it, because what is necessary must reinstate itself. Here grasping the circumstances is then not a contingent matter; instead this grasping is essential, the reaction necessary. And this is the authentic situation. Thus in the Christian religion the occasion is the sinful state of the

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50. See lines 1–76 in the prologue and the exposition of the *Alcestis*, the earliest surviving drama by Euripides (485–406 bc), in which Alcestis, the wife of Admetus who is soon to die, consents to die in his place. See *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, ed. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, 4 vols. (Chicago and London, 1992), 3:11–14.

51. An allusion to the speech in *The Illiad* by Kalchas (1.93–100), who interprets the sickness as punishment for the offense of one of the priests of Apollo (1.10–11), and to the nine days of pestilence sent by Apollo (1.8–9, 43–53); Lattimore, pp. 75–6.

52. See, for instance, 'The Saga of the Conflict of the Three Brothers and of the Death of Jredsch', in Görres, *Das Heldenbuch* ... (a copy of which Hegel possessed, now found in vol. 12 of Görres, *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 136–9.

53. An allusion to brotherly discord between Don Manuel and Don Caesar in Schiller's drama, *The Bride of Messina* (Tübingen, 1803); see Schiller, *Werke*, 10:5–123.

human race; and the reaction, salvation, is a reaction grounded in the nature of God. We can remark, nevertheless, that here no specific beginning [83] is to be posited. If the circumstances are sheerly natural, then this is an initial beginning; however, what is a relative beginning can then also be the result of prior complications and actions. For example: a first offense has taken place; it is annulled, and yet this annulling itself can be in turn an offense against which there must in turn be a reaction. Based on this we see in many circles a series of dramas, for instance, trilogies. In the house of Agamemnon, *Iphigenia in Tauris* reconciles the ill fortune of the house.<sup>54</sup> The stay in Tauris sets the stage for the final drama. But this beginning is the result of a prior complication, namely, the deed of Orestes, who took revenge on his mother to avenge his father, and by doing so is to be punished himself because, as her son, he took revenge on his mother for her crime. The initial  
 94 beginning | is Agamemnon's sacrifice in Aulis, which was in turn conditioned by the kidnapping by Paris, and so on from one action to another. It is the same in the Theban cycle, of which the *Antigone* marks the conclusion and is a result of prior complications.<sup>55</sup> So what in one respect is a beginning has arisen from something prior to it.

If we wish to have just such a sequence portrayed for us, then the poetic art preeminently can do so, although—proverbially—such a performance has become a long drawn-out affair, and it is an age-old challenge for the poet to guide the reader in presenting the matter (*in rem praesentem*). Fullness of detail from the beginning is a subject matter for prose. The fact that art is not concerned to start from the beginning has as its basis that such a beginning is a merely natural, external affair; that such a beginning is rather an apparent unity and nothing necessary for the content. The individual is the thread of the happenings, which do not cohere because of their content. The circumstances are of course formative for the individual; [84]

54. Hegel's formulation of the following sequence of events suggests that he refers not to Euripides' version (in which Athena establishes the reconciliation), but instead to Goethe's drama *Iphigenia at Tauris*, written in 1779 and published in a revised version in *Goethe's Schriften* (Leipzig, 1787), 3:1–136; see *Werke*, 6:7–67. Hegel alludes to the final scene of Act 5 (pp. 63 ff.), which refers to the fate of the dynasty of the house of Atreus in Scene 5 of Act 4 (pp. 53–4). See also Euripides' version, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 1313 ff.; Grene and Lattimore, 3:407.

55. Analogously to his interpretation of the dramas about the House of Atreus, Hegel points to the essentially older *Antigone* (442 bc) of Sophocles (496–406 bc), which, however, presents the result of his *Oedipus Rex* (425 bc) and *Oedipus at Colonus* (posthumously performed in 401 bc). Hegel possessed two editions of Sophocles: *Sophoclis tragoediae*, VII (Frankfurt, 1555); *Sophocles cum interpretatione vetustis*, by Prof. ap. P. Brubachium (1554). Karl Rosenkranz reported on Hegel's intensive occupation with Sophocles and a lost translation of his tragedies into German, which Hegel had undertaken; *G. W. F. Hegel's Leben* (Berlin, 1844), p. 11.

however, in the case of a major action and situation, what the individual's nature is, and how it has formed itself, comes to light apart from those formative circumstances.

For example, in *The Iliad* Homer commences quite specifically with the subject matter, with the wrath of Achilles.<sup>56</sup> He does not narrate Achilles' life story but instead tells directly about a specific action, and of course so that a major concern forms the background of his portrayal. So the occasion for the situation is a relative beginning and, in the second place, it must involve an essential justification. For example, in the | *Antigone* of Sophocles the introductory setting is the king commanding that the brother shall not have the honor of burial.<sup>57</sup> Not fulfilling the family obligation goes against Antigone's piety, and she acts contrary to the state's command. So she has a worthy cause for her action, and Creon's command is likewise justified, inasmuch as the brother came as an enemy of their native land and sought to destroy it.

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To introduce a contrasting instance, we can take the following one from India. There it is in fact an episode from the *Mahābhārata*. The hero marries a king's daughter and, in doing so, has made enemies of those who wish to marry the same maiden. These enemies are genies who now watch out for him to commit a transgression. Two demons lie in wait for a long time. The transgression he commits consists simply in the fact that with his foot he steps on his own urine. This in itself is something absurd that only the Hindus can justify as a transgression.<sup>58</sup> Equally repellent is the complication in an old German poem by Hartmann von Aue.<sup>59</sup> The hero is ill and turns to

56. The allusion is to the very first lines of *The Iliad*; Lattimore, p. 75.

57. *Antigone*, v. 21–79; Grene and Lattimore, 2:162–3. [Tr.] Creon forbade the proper burial of Polyneices, the rebel brother of Antigone.

58. This episode concerns prince Nala and his bride Damayanti. Hegel also recounts it in his philosophy of world history; see *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Vol. I: *Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3*, ed. and trans. Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford, 2011), pp. 268, 270–1. Probable or possible sources of this story for Hegel include: August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Indische Bibliothek* (Bonn, 1820), pp. 98–128; Georg Friedrich Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2nd edn., 4 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–21), 1:634; Franz Bopp, ed. and trans., *Nalus, Carmen Sanscritum e Mahābhārato* (London, Paris, and Strasbourg, 1819). Also informative for the interpretation is Hegel's review of the book by Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Maha-Bhārata* (Berlin, 1826), a review that Hegel published in 1827 in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* and which can be found in G. W. F. Hegel: *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956), pp. 85–154.

59. The poem, composed about 1190–1220, is *Der arme Heinrich* (Poor Henry). It was published in a new edition by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (Berlin, 1815). In the poem, Heinrich is a leper healed by the maiden's willing self-sacrifice for him.

the monks of Salerno. To help him they require that someone freely sacrifice himself in place of the hero.<sup>60</sup> A maiden who loves Hartmann resolves [85] to do this. To us this is wholly barbaric, and that is why the placid submissiveness of the maiden cannot have the desired effect on us. Many different situations could of course be introduced, although the necessity of the reaction must be caused not by something bizarre or loathsome, but instead by something justified in itself.

### *C. INDIVIDUALITY, SUBSTANTIALITY, AND ACTION*

#### 1. Action and Individuality

We have seen, therefore, that circumstances as such, insofar as they are grasped by the heart, produce a reaction. This grasping is the other aspect to the circumstances, and the action is only produced by this aspect. The action is one by which individuals show themselves to be what they are; the action is the authentic | actuality of spiritual individuality. The series of deeds exhibits  
 96 the nature of the individual. Portrayal of this nature is especially the province of speech; that is because the other arts can highlight only a single element, having for their medium the entire figure, the expression of its demeanor and of the whole body. But this expression is a less clear mode than is speech. Actions are the most transparent disclosure of the individual. What one is at root first appears through action. Action, then, brings forth a reaction to the circumstances. In speaking of actions as such, we represent them to ourselves as extremely diverse, although the sphere of action is limited by the necessary idea. Here we have to deal only with what is universal. In considering what is universal in action, with respect to art, two aspects are evident in action: the essential need from which one acts, and then the particular individuality of the one who acts. For only the concrete individual can act.

#### 2. Gods as External, and as Human Inwardness

First we have to examine what is substantial in this individual, what sets the action in motion, and then examine what is particular to the individuality.<sup>61</sup> As for the substantial feature, it is any sort of universal power grounded in

60. Hotho added 'since a remedy for him could be procured only based on a human heart'.

61. Hotho changed 'what sets the action in motion, and then examine what is particular to the individuality' to 'what 1) the substantial activates; 2) is activated, and then examine what is particular to the activating individuality'.

the nature of spirit and of its forms. [86] This content, singled out by itself, makes the subject matter into what the gods were especially for the Greeks. This subjective content that the action has is what is inherently ideal. In regarding it, we do not need to cast about for how finitude gets stripped away here, | because the content, in and for itself, is ideal. These are eternal elements, absolute relationships, which lie at the foundation of the gods. In their case a part of the content is also the natural element; yet for the Greek gods the ethical element constitutes the principal foundation. An ancient one said<sup>62</sup> that people have taken the gods from what is their own, from the *πάθος*, the powerful element that constitutes what is substantial for individuality: such powers, for instance, as the family, piety, state authority or power, honor, friendship, love of the sexes, love of the native land, property, and wealth. These powers are what is substantial in an action and are the subject matter for the ancient gods. They are the justified elements as such, what is ideal in-and-for-itself, the essential aspects of spirit as willing, what is affirmative as such.

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There is, then, something negative in spirit; and if this negative aspect is elevated to being the shape of an independent power, it is of no intrinsic interest. Therefore when, in modern times and alongside the gods, people set up figures that are just something negative, these figures involve something repugnant—for example, jealousy or hatred. In and for themselves these figures are a nullity, and introducing them is vacuous prose. The devil is an extremely prosaic person. The essential elements [in them] must not be taken for what is universal, because as a rule these are pure thoughts or abstract representations that are not the forms of art, not the forms that portray what is universal as individual, immediate, existent being.

Therefore the universal powers must become independent figures, must become gods, just as they are for the ancients. They must represent an essential element, and no capriciousness of fantasy. This individuality belongs to [87] the figure; and it extends no farther than<sup>63</sup> what is involved in the characteristic of subjectivity. Subjectivity is the emergence out into what is external, and with this | therefore into all its complexities. Yet the gods are indeed individualities, universal characteristics with specific significance, in such a way that the individuality is not taken in complete seriousness.

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62. See Herodotus, 2.53; Herodotus, *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago and London, 1987). '... I believe that Homer and Hesiod... created for the Greeks their theogony; it is they who gave to the gods the special names for their descent from their ancestors and divided among them their honors, their arts, and their shapes' (Grene, p. 155).

63. Hotho changed 'and it extends no farther than' to 'but it does not extend as far as'.

That is because, within themselves, the gods are blissful. As specific individuals they do indeed get involved in conflict, although at the same time this involvement must not become serious because the gods must instead remain eternally cheerful; they must never involve their entire individuality in a specific concern, but instead must remain always cheerful within themselves. And this is the irony displayed about the Homeric gods. They intervene here and there, but even so they leave matters alone once again and wander up to Olympus. Aiming at a specific result and coming to naught cannot happen in the case of the gods. Yet further particular factors also come to the fore with these gods, and we do not know how we are supposed to attribute them to the concept that the gods involve; such particular factors are Jupiter's love-affairs, and the like. These particular factors do not primarily concern the essential being of the gods, but are instead incidental features. We have to speak further about their broader origins. They are left over from an earlier dispensation. In the case of these ideals it is not difficult for art to stick to ideality.

In the second place, however, a distinctive difficulty does come into play in the individuality of the gods because, since they are individual, are individually set apart, they enter into an external relationship with human beings. The gods as such are universal with regard to their content, and this universal element or this idea becomes realized in action; this realization of it belongs to human activity, to subjective individuality. This individuality has the stuff of the gods, the *πάθη*, for its substantial content. These, the driving powers, are what is of interest in the human being who acts. On the one hand they provide the subjectivity of a human being; [88] on the other  
 99 hand they are free | attributes, subsisting-in-and-for-themselves. Insofar, then, as they belong to the human being and are the human being's own attributes, ones driving him, there comes into play the contradiction that these very same attributes are represented in their independent individuality over against the human being, and so they clash with human freedom. This is the same relationship that comes to the fore in issues having their setting in the Christian religion. For instance, God's Spirit is said to lead one to God. If this be true, then a person appears to be the merely passive soil on which this Spirit works, and in this case human freedom or human will seems to have no place; instead, the fact that the Spirit works within an individual seems to be an arbitrary decision of God, a kind of fate in which one plays no part oneself. The same clash occurs in relation to the gods. If the relationship is portrayed in such a way that the human being stands externally over against the god, as external to what is substantial, this is thus a wholly prosaic relationship, because the god commands and one simply has to obey. We see

a relationship of this kind in several Greek tragedies, for example, in the *Philoctetes*.<sup>64</sup> Philoctetes persists in his character. After Ulysses' deceit had come to ruin, Philoctetes would not join them in the camp; Heracles, who came there to Lemnos, commands Philoctetes to go to Troy. Such a resolution by means of a god always leaves us rather cold. Frequently appearing in a different fashion is a virtue portrayed in a hero as a sheer state of being. For example, Achilles was said to be invulnerable, except on his heel.<sup>65</sup> If we portray things in this way, then any notion of bravery vanishes; that is because he is invulnerable, and the essence of the hero is no spiritual activity but is instead a merely physical quality. This clash presents a difficulty for the poet; and the prosaic outlook of the Greek portrayals is happy to stop short with such a [89] sheerly external relationship of gods and heroes. The poet solves this difficulty simply by, in one respect, individualizing the ideal, but by exhibiting this externality as likewise something immanent or spiritual that belongs to the person's character. The external appearance must at the same time exhibit itself as something inward in the person.

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When we heed the ancients speaking of Eros as an independent god, we have at the same time the image of this Eros as not sheerly external, as indeed a *πάθος* but an immanent stirring in the subject. Thus for Sophocles the Eumenides often appear within Oedipus himself when the father curses his son. We represent the Eumenides to ourselves initially as Furies that pursue the criminal in external fashion; yet for the poet they are at the same time called *Ἐὐμνίδες* [τοῦ] *πάρος*, the father's curse, his offended heart's power over the son; they are therefore powers of the heart.<sup>66</sup> In interpreting a poet, it is quite incorrect to interpret the gods prosaically by saying they are something sheerly inward; yet it is at the same time also correct. That is because, although in one respect external, the gods are nevertheless also within the heart or soul.

64. What follows is Hegel's paraphrase of a passage from Sophocles' tragedy *Philoctetes*, v. 1409–51; Grene and Lattimore, 2:464–5. [Tr.] In the play, Philoctetes had been abandoned on Lemnos as the Greeks made their way to Troy. Unable to defeat the Trojans without the aid of Philoctetes and the bow and arrow he had acquired from Heracles, Odysseus (called 'Ulysses' in our text) returned to implore Philoctetes to rejoin the Greek forces, which he refused to do until so commanded by (the now divine) Heracles.

65. [Pseudo-] Apollodorus reports that Thetis sought to make her son Achilles immortal by placing him in fire, but was thwarted by Peleus, Achilles' father (*Bibliotheka* 3.13.6; Frazer, 2:68–71). According to a later story, Thetis immersed her son in the river Styx to make him invulnerable, but the heel by which she grasped him remained dry. See, for instance, Servius' commentary on Virgil's *Aeneid* (here on 6.57): *Servii grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilii carmina commentarii*, ed. G. Thilo and H. Hagen (Leipzig, 1878–1902).

66. Oedipus invokes them (under the name *δαίμονας*), together with Ares, in cursing his son Polyneices, in *Oedipus at Colonus*, v. 1389–92; Lattimore, 2. 141. For the Greek, see *Sophocles*, trans. F. Storr, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1912), 1.272–3.

In Homer's case it is constantly one way and the other. In one respect the gods bring about something external to a human heart, although at the same time they also bring about what can likewise be something inward.

It is often difficult to grasp the inwardness of what subsists as external. For example, in the quarrel in which Achilles seeks to draw his sword against Agamemnon, Minerva [Athena] restrains him. This is readily represented as at the same time something inward, an internal suspension of anger, an internal brake on the heart or soul. This brake is something other than the anger, something over against it, and so the poet can portray it as external.<sup>67</sup>

101 At the same time, however, we represent to ourselves that this | Athena, this circumspection, is something inward. [90] In *The Odyssey* we see Minerva as mentor to Telemachus.<sup>68</sup> This is of course more difficult to grasp as something at the same time inward, although there too we see the connection between the external appearance and what is inward. If the gods are just stage machinery, functioning to command from without, then that is of no interest, is an interest unrelated to art. In this respect Goethe's *Iphigenia at Tauris* is a very interesting portrayal. Goethe in fact constructed the drama in such a way that what in Euripedes' play appears as something sheerly external gets converted into a relationship of soul to soul. This is one of the finest topics of Goethe's creations. In Euripedes, Orestes and Iphigenia together steal the image of the goddess, with the result that the circumstance is just a robbery. Thoas gives the command to pursue the robbers. Athena then comes and commands Thoas' to let the fugitives escape. With that, Thoas decides to acknowledge the divine command, to carry out the matter-of-fact command.<sup>69</sup> With Goethe the turning-point is entirely different. Iphigenia becomes the goddess who, trusting in the power of spirit, addresses Thoas, and Thoas' change of mind occurs inwardly, because of the substance of Iphigenia's reproach to him. In this case, therefore, something sheerly external for Euripedes gets reconfigured into something inward.

The fantastic beings of modern times are numbered among these gods too. Often what emerges is an external, childish relationship to them, and there is always the risk that such a relationship will not be a free one. The witches in

67. *The Iliad*, 1.1 ff.; Lattimore, p. 75. Hegel repeats this interpretation in his *Bhagavad-Gita* review: '... so when Pallas, at the beginning of *The Iliad*, stops Achilles from drawing the sword, we take it at the same time to be a circumspection taking place within Achilles himself' (*Berliner Schriften*, p. 137).

68. *The Odyssey*, 2.393-406; *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York, 1965, 1967), p. 49.

69. [Tr.] See n. 54, p. 260 in this text. At this point in the text Hegel provides a fuller account of the events at Tauris.



*Macbeth* and the ghost in *Hamlet*, for instance, have representations that are more or less just an objective form of what is inward. When they appear characterized as commanding merely externally, that is a shortcoming. In *Macbeth* the witches foretell the fate of Macbeth; yet we view what they say as simply [91] Macbeth's own inner awareness, which he arrives at in this way. We see Hamlet coming on the scene with a gloomy feeling of something monstrous; | then his father's ghost appears to him and discloses to him an ancient misdeed. After this discovery one can anticipate that Hamlet will forcefully avenge the deed.<sup>70</sup> Hamlet's melancholy character is not inclined on its own to hasty action, and Goethe has soundly portrayed this image of a great demand that has a destructive effect in someone too weak to bear it. Hamlet is a noble but weak nature.<sup>71</sup> This is certainly the impression, that we could have expected that Hamlet ought not to hesitate. A more subtle feature is that Hamlet first of all says the ghost could also have been the devil, and that this is why he wants to let the play proceed and by it to reassure himself about the matter.<sup>72</sup> Here we see that Hamlet does not place his complete faith in any appearance, but requires a different means of confirmation.

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We said that, as a rule, having gods external to a human being is an extremely tricky relationship for the poet, since they ought not be sheerly commanding, ought not be mere stage machinery. What is objective must also be subjective within the soul, must show itself as immanent to it.

### 3. Concrete Human Individuality as Action

Now we have to proceed to the second point concerning action. It concerns concrete human individuality as such. The circumstances become grasped

70. See *Macbeth*, Act 1, Scene 3, and Act 4, Scene 1, for the witches' part. See *Hamlet*, Act 1, Scenes 4–5, and Act 2, Scene 2, for Hamlet's foreboding and the ghost. *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare* (New York, 1994), pp. 858 and 873–5 (*Macbeth*), and 676–9 and 681–7 (*Hamlet*).

71. Hegel's remark accords with the sense of the second book of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*). In chapter five Goethe describes Hamlet as a noble human being, 'a delicate soul' (*Werke* 7:218). In chapter thirteen we find the corresponding formulation: 'a great deed laid upon a soul that is not a match for the deed. . . . In this case an oak tree is planted in an exquisite container that should have received into its bosom just lovely flowers; the roots spread out, the container is destroyed. A fine, pure, noble, highly moral being, lacking the physical strength that makes up the hero, is destroyed by a burden it can neither bear nor cast off' (*Werke* 7:245–6).

72. A reference to the concluding verses of Act 2, Scene 2: 'The spirit that I have seen/May be the devil . . . the play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king' (*Complete Works*, p. 687).

and the human being reacts to them. As authentic, this concern constitutes the foundation for what is portrayed in outward appearance. The antithesis to *πάθος* is human character; and the issue is what the ideal consists of here. The human being comes on the scene here essentially as subject. What, then, is the point that matters? It is the freedom of subjectivity. A god is rather just an attribute, a substantial aspect. [92] A human being is subjective totality, and all the gods belong to a human being; all the powers dispersed within the circle of the gods are powers comprised within one's own breast; a human being is the abundance of the whole of Olympus. What defines the status of the subject is that in fact the subject proves to be the abundance | of these multifaceted relationships. A human being in a passion is in a *πάθος*, has been overcome by *one* god, is no longer a free subject as such, is outside the self, whereas presence to self is freedom. Sheer passionateness, in which the entire consciousness has gone over into a passion, is an impotence, a one-sidedness. Here too there is, to be sure, a way in which the poet can nevertheless preserve subjectivity. Subjectivity, for itself and in its abundance, forms the distinctiveness in which a great subject presents itself. A weak subject is one in whom nothing specific emerges, no intense concern; it is a character lacking interest. However, the subject must demonstrate the capacity to be a whole of many aspects, in such a way that all these different facets come to life.

The Homeric heroes are characters of this sort. Achilles appears in the most disparate situations. He loves his mother Thetis, as well as Peleus, the aged father who is at home. He stands in a relationship of trust with his aged servant. He loves Briseis, and the love for her and his easily-aggrieved honor drive him into conflict with Agamemnon. Achilles is likewise the closest friend, loving Patroclus and Antilochus and revering the aged Nestor, to whom he gives a gift at the funeral rites of Patroclus. Achilles is likewise charming, brave, fleet of foot, and someone who advances with the greatest ferocity in hostility toward his foe. Harsh as he is, he is equally gentle when Priam approaches him and grasps the hand that killed Priam's own son.<sup>73</sup> [93] All the many-sidedness of human nature resides in such an individual. The grandeur of this figure resides in its | many-sidedness. The other characters in Homer are likewise diverse; each one is a whole, a world. Such an abundance in an individual cannot be portrayed in every mode of art.

73. Hotho added here 'Achilles is an authentic human being (*wahrhaft ein Mensch*)'. [Tr.] On this cast of characters, see the following passages in *The Iliad*. Peleus, Achilles father: 9.252, 288-90; Lattimore, pp. 224-5. Thetis: 18. 35-64, 368-467; pp. 397-8, 406-9. Briseis: 1.184-5; p. 80. Priam: 24.468-571; pp. 509-12. Patroclus: 16.1ff.; pp. 351-5. Antilochos: 18.1-34; pp. 396-7. Nestor: 23.618-50; pp. 488-9.

The tragic shape is simpler, is animated by a concern although even in it such shapes are rather closer to the simplicity of the sculptured image. However, they are not just the abstract form of a passion as that indeed emerges in French tragedies, where each figure always exhibits just one aspect. In contrast, the tragic figures of Sophocles, albeit plastic figures, nevertheless exhibit this many-sidedness too, even though only in the present moment of spirit's circumspection, in the richness of the speech with which they justify themselves and reach a resolution, and so forth. In *Romeo and Juliet*, Romeo too exists in multiple relationships; with friends, with the monk, with pages, with an apothecary, with Juliet; and he is always noble and dignified, albeit within a particular concern.<sup>74</sup> Even when art is not permitted to exhibit the entire abundance in a subject, it has a medium residing in beauty itself. The plastic figure in its stillness makes visible the freedom of such a shape, the possibility of entering into the most diverse relationships; we see the reposeful depth that comprises within itself the possibility of<sup>75</sup> all sorts of powers. The other aspect is a raging passion in which the character just plunges into one thing, whereas the stillness of sculpture portrays the forceful naturalness that calmly embraces all powers within itself. This is the general point about subjectivity.

#### D. SUBJECTIVITY AND SPECIFIC SETTINGS

##### 1. Congruence of the Subject with External Nature; Natural Needs

We still have to mention subjectivity's aspect of wholly external specificity. In fact | what also comes into play in the subject—as singular—is the whole of shared actuality, [94] a being-conditioned from all sides. The individual appears within a finite world, in a specific locale and time of the action, in definite living conditions with their equipment, physical needs, kinds of weaponry, and other amenities of life; more specifically, the individual has the obligatory or duty-bound circumstances of family, of wealth, of social custom, of contingent relationships—and all of this in multifaceted diversity. This is the aspect in which the ideal comes into contact with the prosaicness of ordinary life. If in fact we have a nebulous image of the ideal, we could have supposed that all this must be stripped away. Then the ideal

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74. Romeo's relationship with Friar Lawrence is presented in Act 2, Scenes 2 and 5 (*Complete Works*, pp. 256–7, 260). His conversations with his servant Balthazar and with the apothecary are in Act 5, Scene 1 (p. 274).

75. Hotho added 'actualizing'.

ought to be removed from the entire sphere of everyday needs. This illusion exists especially in the images of the modern era, in which the ultimate thing is the heart's longing, is inwardness, and the 'higher sorts of knowers' look only to the heavens and disdain all earthly being, elevating themselves above it. But this is then a false way of grasping the ideal, is a sickly ideality. That is because a human being is subjective totality and, as this totality, one sets oneself apart from inorganic nature, from what is external, and in setting oneself apart from it one relates oneself to it. A surrounding world belongs to the subject the way a temple belongs to the god. This surrounding world is not something contingent but is instead an internally consistent, coherent totality. Human beings must be portrayed in relation to it, for they stand within this relationship.

However, this relationship must not be merely a negative one, because freedom of that kind is a sickly freedom, is just renunciation; the malady of longing, of the vanity that deems itself too good for the world. Human beings must be at home in the world, making their home freely in it, finding themselves settled.

106 Ideality involves [95] the human being as settled in this world, moving freely within it. This | aspect involves multiple relationships, and we will highlight their elements. An art more or less portrays these relationships. The poetic art must be most complete in this regard, especially epic poetry, and painting too; sculpture can involve only individual indications of these relationships, although it has the kind of external features needed for more specific determination of its own shapes. So the relationships as such are multiple, partly essential or necessary, and the portrayal of them must be specific. The dignity of the great master is precisely in being faithful in the portrayal, whereas street minstrelsy is a poor excuse for it.

In Homer we see the external world described with the greatest precision; the Scamander and the Simois and these inlets of the sea are designated with the greatest accuracy, as are the house of Ulysses and the weapons of all the heroes.<sup>76</sup> In contrast, we see that the *Book of Heroes* and the *Nibelungenlied* include locales in very nonspecific terms—particularly so the *Book of Heroes*.<sup>77</sup> But the great poets portray the natural, surrounding world in

76. On the Scamander River and the Simois, a stream that runs into it, see *The Iliad* 5.773–7; Lattimore, p. 167. Further description of the Scamander occurs at 22.147–56; p. 461. On Achilles' shield, see 18.468–608; pp. 409–13. The descriptions of the house of Odysseus (Ulysses) occur in *The Odyssey* 17.85–100 (Lattimore, p. 255), 18.302–11 (p. 278), 19.53–64 (pp. 283–4); of his bed, in 23:190–201 (p. 340).

77. The German *Heldenbuch* (*Book of Heroes*) passed down the epics and internecine feuds of the Merovingians, and the epic cycle about Dietrich von Bern (a heroic figure apparently

specific terms. Yet this specificity must not descend to the level of prose. Its main characteristic is precisely an essential congruence prevailing between subjectivity and the world by which it is surrounded, a congruence that can be more or less inward and covert, one in which much that is nevertheless contingent takes place but in which the foundation of both [subjectivity and the world] is identical. Two aspects are pertinent to what the individual is: the individual in his own immediacy, and the individual's relation to the external world. About the latter aspect we can remark, first of all, that | historical subject matter has the great advantage of already having within it this congruence of the subjective and objective aspects, and it sets it out in detail. It is not desirable to take this congruence a priori from fantasy, and no matter how minimally this congruence is developed conceptually in the greater part of a subject matter, [96] we still have a presentiment of it. A tenor of congruity is always present and given through the historical subject matter. That is why this subject matter is so advantageous. People reckon a free product of the imagination to be superior, and they find it instead in fairy tales and the like. Yet in works of art of a higher kind—in sculpture, painting, poetry—we demand the specific congruence that historical subject matter surely provides on its own. The imagination cannot express itself to the point of providing what is specific so firmly and accurately. This is the general principle for this aspect.

As for the particular aspect, a congruity is evident in it with regard to the subject and the whole of nature that surrounds the subject. In the essential being of the hero there is a harmony, a strain of affinity, with surrounding nature. We can understand an Arab only by having information about the sky, the desert, tents, the climate, the way of life. Arabs are at home in their surroundings and are at home only in such surroundings. Ossian's heroes are heroes of a very subjective sort; they are very inward and melancholy, yet still bound to their moors, to their clouds, mists, hollows, and hills.<sup>78</sup> The

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based on the Ostrogothic king, Theodoric the Great, who ruled Italy, AD 493–526). It was published in two volumes, ed. Friedrich von der Hagen and Anton Primisser (Berlin, 1820, 1825). For the *Nibelungenlied*, see *Der Nibelungen Lied in der Ursprache mit den Lesarten der verschiedenen Handschriften*, ed. Friedrich Heinrich von der Hagen (Berlin, 1810). Johan Jacob Bodmer (1698–1783) had already edited and published part of it, under the title, *Chrimhildens Rache und die Klage: Zwey Heldengedichte aus dem Schwäbischen Zeitpunkte* (Zürich, 1757). Christoph Heinrich Müller (1740–1807) published a complete edition, *Der Nibelungen Liet: ein Rittergedicht aus dem 13. oder 14. Jahrhundert* (Speyer, 1782). See Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 4:294–314, for a commentary on the *Heldenbuch*.

78. See Herder's 'Homer und Ossian', *Die Hören*, Year 1, pt. 2 (Tübingen, 1795), V. 86–107; in *Sämmtliche Werke*, 18:446–62. The description of the locale occurs on p. 88. Hegel is apparently citing Herder's characterization of the heroes: 'With Ossian, everything emanates

specific description of this region makes the very subjects themselves clear to us, because they are in harmony with their surroundings. In virtue of this congruence, the characters prove to be at home in their existence. So the first congruence is the one with elemental | nature.

The second one is a congruence insofar as a human being brings it about. What determines it is the particularity of human beings and their needs; so this aspect involves how one humanizes natural things, how one uses them, exercises power over them and, at the same time, how they are suited to one's satisfaction.

If we speak of impulses, then the first human impulse is the theoretical impulse to adorn oneself with external things; [97] by doing so to show that the most precious thing nature provides, what in natural things draws attention to itself, is not of interest for its own sake and should not remain as natural for its own sake; instead, on human beings, it should appear as belonging to them. Because of this people say that natural things are supposed to show off themselves, not show off the natural things. They show off themselves in this fashion, not the natural things. In the same way people adorn what they revere: gods and princes. So, as befitting their various subject matters, artists do not fail to lavish the precious things of nature on their figures. Such external things get their greatest specificity from the fact that human beings use them for their own adornment. We do not have to go into which things are nobler than others.

A further point is that human beings draw upon particular natural things for their own needs; they make prominent a practical connection and have what exists not only for adornment but also for sustenance. Here we have labor and necessities and human dependence on finite things. This is where prose, the understanding, has its place. The first way in which art accounts for this aspect of need is, as you well know, that in the representation of a golden age human beings are transposed into an idyllic condition. We happily regard such a condition as an ideal one in which | they find immediate satisfaction with what nature provides them, and so all the passions of ambition and of avarice vanish—inclinations that appear contrary to the higher nobility of human nature. This readily seems to be an ideal condition, and a certain circle can restrict itself to such a state of

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from the harp of feeling, from the soul of the singer. . . . His figures are misty figures . . . created from the delicate touch of feeling, and they glide along like zephyrs' (pp. 96–7; 18:453–5). [Tr.] Ossian is the name of a legendary Irish warrior and poet of the third century AD. He was presented by James MacPherson (1736–96), a Scottish poet, as the author of a poetic cycle of heroic poems, some of which were created by MacPherson himself—poems highly regarded by early romanticism.

affairs. But for us such a life soon becomes boring. Gessner is seldom read, or else is read as a setting in which we are not at home.<sup>79</sup> That is because such a limited kind of life also presupposes a deficiency in spirit's development. [98] A feature of human beings is that they have higher impulses than those nature satisfies for them. Such an idyllic life is deficient in spirit. Human beings must labor. Physical needs stimulate activity that provides the feeling of inner strength upon which more profound strengths can develop too. Human pleasure must not be lacking in deeds; it must appear in circumstances that no longer belong to an idyllic condition of that kind.

At the same time, however, congruence of the external with the internal must still remain the basic characteristic. Hence it is repugnant when art portrays physical need in the extreme. Dante portrayed Ugolino's death by starvation movingly but just in brief passages.<sup>80</sup> It is a different matter when Gerstenberg makes it into a tragedy, showing the way in which Ugolino's three sons died in his presence and he himself finally died.<sup>81</sup> Physical exigency taken to this extreme loses the characteristic basic for art: congruence of the internal with the external.

The most advantageous condition for art is the one intermediate between the natural condition and this complete involvement in ordinary life. It is reasonable that, by laboring, human beings have what they need in the way of physical necessities; but, for the setting in art, labor must be a moderate sort and not constitute the principal point of interest, for human beings must instead labor with contentment, must exhibit prosperity. There are many examples of this. The enjoyment of wine is more poetic than are coffee and tea; and milk and honey are more poetic too. Whiskey and coffee directly call to mind the host of dependencies to which they give rise. Something in between is what is best. Of course setting social classes apart can remove from view what the sight [99] of deprivation would otherwise bring to our attention. In the higher social classes the assumption is that here it takes less

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79. Hegel owned a copy of his 1756 publication, *Idyllen: Gessners Idyllen, aus den Sämmtlichen Schriften der 2te Band* (Karlsruhe, 1775). Salomon Gessner (1730–88) was a Swiss pastoral poet, landscape painter, and book publisher, who issued his own volumes of poetry and etchings.

80. Dante describes the death of Count Ugolino in the thirty-third canto of the *Inferno*, verses 1–90. See Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (Everyman's Library; New York, London, and Toronto, 1980), pp. 204–6. [Tr.] Count Ugolino Della Gherardesca (d. 1289), an Italian despot, was imprisoned and starved to death by his enemies.

81. The longer account is in *Ugolino*, published anonymously by Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg (Hamburg and Bremen, 1768), and then in his *Vermischte Schriften*, collected and edited by himself, 3 vols. (Altona, 1815), 1.379–510 (repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1971).

effort to secure physical existence, that the sphere in which human beings operate is not hampered by concern about, and need for, what is external.

The heroic condition is still more advantageous [for art] than is the upper class. In the heroic condition the means of satisfaction have not yet descended to being a sheerly external affair, for we still see the genesis of these means themselves and the value that human beings set on them. These means of satisfaction are still imbued with this consciousness of their worth; they are not yet lifeless. We see how Odysseus does his own carpentry; how the heroes butcher and roast.<sup>82</sup> Here these occupations and their implements are not sheerly external, lifeless, habitual things, for in them human beings are still in their element. The entire environment appears to be something humanly prepared and utilized. These are the principal elements with regard to physical needs.

111 Associated with this particularity of needs are practices of a manifold sort; human needs are not sheerly physical but are needs of a higher, more spiritual kind. When it came to fulfilling | these substantial needs, however, particular factors of a conventional sort were also evident. They involve an aspect of contingency; what is contingent has become customary, and this aspect took the place of the nature of things. On the whole, and in keeping with this entire aspect, the foundation is the congruence of the human being's inner nature with what is external.

## 2. Congruence of the Work of Art with Us

We still have to speak about the fact that, when human beings live in congruence with naturalness, there remains a third aspect: namely, for human beings<sup>83</sup> with this way of being in congruence to be congruent with us, since every era has its specific customs and usages that are foreign to later time periods. [100] The work of art does not exist for its own sake; instead it exists for us, and we should be at home with it. Playwrights not only speak for themselves but also speak to us, and this is the case with all works of art. The aspect of the ideal entering into existence involves personal or particular elements, and so it distances itself, and distinguishes itself, from us. Whatever time period a work of art comes from, it has particular features suited to that period. We find nothing foreign to us in many of these features; we

82. The reference is to *The Odyssey* 23:182–204 (Lattimore, p. 340), a passage in which Odysseus describes to Penelope how he constructed his own bed. See also 14:414–38 (Lattimore, p. 221), which tells how Odysseus and his companions killed and roasted a pig, and portioned out the meat.

83. Hotho changed 'human beings' to 'the work of art'.



accept them and are at home with them. When heroes appear in ancient weapons, we make allowances for that. We do this with many things. One art is also more or less free of such unfamiliar features; the lyric, for example, which lingers within the innermost feelings that are at the same time most universal, will be the freest from the kind of circumstances related to an external existence. Thus the Psalms of David are still suited for us. We can for the most part be fully present to the way in which the Prophets express the profound sorrow of the individual. We are accustomed to taking Babylon and Zion symbolically.<sup>84</sup> Tragic art and painting, however, contain many distinctive features | in customs and in character, ones generally having to do with human beings' external relationships and the natural environment. Tragic art adapts alien materials from ancient times, and the poet himself always belongs to a distinctive culture that is more or less not our own. Homer, for instance, is centuries distant from the events he describes, and it is likewise with the *Nibelungenlied*; so the culture of the poet's own ancient time appears in the distinctiveness of the material.<sup>85</sup> In the third place, what additionally comes into play is our own cultural distinctiveness.

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This raises the issue as to whether the artist must as a rule portray the subject matter in such a way that the portrayal fits the people and the culture of the time [101] from which the subject matter is taken, so that the artist's work is a faithful picture of that time; alternatively, that the poet has to adapt the material in accord with our own perspectives, which are linked to the particular features of our own time. Based on the latter perspective, the poet ought to make it so that we have our own present time in that subject matter. This dual (*gedoppelte*) requirement can be expressed as follows: the subject matter should be treated either<sup>86</sup> objectively, or subjectively with reference to our own culture and customs. To speak more specifically about this, our German demands placed on a work of art can be antithetical to

84. This characterization of the Psalms refers to that of part two of Herder's *On the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* (1783), in which he describes the Psalms as 'expressions of the innermost, most individual, language of the heart'; *Sämmtliche Werke*, 12:232.

85. The time interval between the historical Troy at the time of the Trojan War (ca. 1200 BC) and the epics of Homer (ca. 700 BC) parallels the temporal distance that the thirty-nine adventure tales of the *Nibelungenlied* (ca. AD 1200) have from their subject matter (ca. fifth century AD), but also their temporal distance from Hegel's own time. Allusion to the distinctiveness of 'the culture of the poet's own ancient time' points, in the case of the *Nibelungenlied*, to the intermixing of the subject matter with the set of ideas from the Hohenstaufen era. In his critique of efforts to make German epic contemporary, especially the *Nibelungenlied* (see p. 426 in this text), Hegel elaborates the reflections on the 'particular features of our time' that follow here in the text.

86. Hotho deleted 'either', perhaps so that the two possibilities need not be mutually exclusive.

those of the French. We fault the French for the fact that in their portrayals everything is supposed to be Frenchified, since we want to have everything just as the occurrence was objectively and we make great efforts to accommodate ourselves to a foreign world. We regard ourselves as versatile in our comprehension. To the French, everything not French is uncongenial. It is well-known that they cannot abide any Shakespearean plays in the theater. They entirely dismiss what we love most in these plays. Voltaire goes on with endless merriment about Pindar, who says: ἀριστόν το ὕδωρ.<sup>87</sup> We, on the contrary, are on the one hand very tolerant, putting up with what is most foreign; we acquiesce in it and demand, on the other hand, that everything in the portrayal be faithful and objective. The coronation procession in *The Maid* has called for extensive study in this regard.<sup>88</sup> The French call for the opposite: everything must be done as it is for French princes. [In French theater,] without the aid of the name Achilles we would never in turn discover the hero. Achilles has appeared there with a peruke, with colorful ribbons and the like. The entire outer appearance is portrayed in a familiar fashion, with respect to its outward demeanor, representations, and so forth.

We have also had this subjectification<sup>89</sup> in Germany [102]. For instance, Hans Sachs, who treated spiritual subject matter, portrays God the Father, Adam, and Eve. God the Father teaches the Lord's Prayer to Cain and acts like a schoolmaster in his school.<sup>90</sup> In Southern Germany, until quite recently, people portrayed the passion of Christ in this way. Along with this tomfoolery the folk are nevertheless pious and devoted. We see subjectivity prevalent in such portrayals, and we will recognize it in the fact that how we otherwise represent topics gets distorted into the way in which our own culture is constituted. Here what is objective goes missing, and because of that the topic does not have the shape suited to it; how the topic bears on

87. The correct Greek quotation is: Ἀριστόν μὲν ὕδωρ. See Pindar's *First Olympic Ode*, line 1; *The Odes of Pindar*, trans. Sir John Sandys (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass. and London, rev. ed. 1919), pp. 4-5, where it reads: 'Even water is most excellent'.

88. The coronation procedure referred to is in Schiller's play about Joan of Arc, *The Maid of Orleans* (1801), Act. 4, Scene 6; see Schiller's *Werke* 9:278.

89. Hotho just has 's' here; the word has been erased.

90. These things occur in *Comedia, Die ungleichen kinder Eve, wie sie Gott, der Herr, anredt*, a five act play by Hans Sachs (1494-1576). He published it in *Sehr herrliche schöne und wahrhaftige gedicht...* (Nürnberg, 1558); see Hans Sachs, ed. Adelbert v. Keller, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1870), published as vol. 102 of the *Bibliothek des Literarischen Vereins Stuttgart* (repr. Hildesheim, 1964), p. 78. Act Four is entitled 'The Testing and Lord's Prayer Parody of Cain'; Act Three is 'The Catechism-examination on Adam's Other Sons' (see pp. 68-76). [Tr.] Hans Sachs, a master shoemaker and prodigious writer of plays, stories, and songs, was the model for the main character of Richard Wagner's nineteenth-century opera, *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*.

us becomes predominant instead of the objective subject matter being the main thing. In contrast to this circumstance, however, one could also find the subjective element missing in the depiction of the topic. When *William Tell* was performed for the first time in Weimar, no Swiss person was satisfied with it.<sup>91</sup> This can happen in another way, for instance, by the poet depicting love and the readers not recognizing their own feelings in the depiction. Or, vice versa, one can form images of oneself based on such depictions, with the result that one pictures oneself according to these images and believes that one has never before fallen in love—as though one should feel a certain way in accord with that portrayal. So, the subject cannot find its own subjectivity in the objectivity, since the subjective aspect is missing.

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The two aspects can be conjoined and yet the work of art nevertheless be unsatisfactory and inartistic and prosaic, despite its objectivity and its subjectivity. Many of Goethe's earlier works that had great effect are of this kind, works in which subjectivity rediscovers itself and what is objective is found too. [103] There are such instances right at the beginning of *Götz von Berlichungen*, which commences with: 'Hänsel, another glass of spirits' and so on.<sup>92</sup> This is a faithful, objective depiction, and also one in which subjectivity rediscovers itself. Likewise in the third act, in the scene between Gerge and Lerse, Gerge arrives with a grooved device for the purpose of melting lead.<sup>93</sup> Here everything is described in a very lively way and objectively: in the characterization, the situation, and the device.<sup>94</sup> Despite this, these portrayals are extremely prosaic, extremely trivial, and tedious.

In recent times, in Friedrich Schlegel's day in particular, objective portrayal was assumed to be in the fidelity of the imitation.<sup>95</sup> This fidelity is supposed to give pleasure in the work of art and to be its principal feature.

| Subjective interest in the work of art should confine itself to discerning this aspect. Making such a demand expresses the fact that we ought bring in no

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91. This first performance of Schiller's play with this title was on 17 March 1804. The play was published in October of that year, by Cotta. Hegel's letter to Schelling of 27 February 1804 refers to it being in rehearsal in Weimar. See *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Friedhelm Nicolin, 4 vols. (Hamburg, 1969–81), 1:80; *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington, Indiana, 1984), p. 71. In the margin, adjacent to this point in the manuscript, Hotho later added 'objectivity'.

92. Act 1, Scene 1 (Schwarzenberg in Franconia, at an inn): 'Hänsel, another glass of spirits and an honest-to-god measure' (*Werke*, 4:74).

93. For the depiction, see *Werke*, 4:139–40.

94. Hotho changed his previous marginal notation 'end of false objectivity' to 'medium of true objectivity.'

95. This is a general reference to the reflections by Friedrich Schlegel in his *On the Study of Greek Poetry*; *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean-Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner, 35 vols. (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1958 ff.) 1:217–367, esp. p. 347.

interest of a higher kind and no private concerns, and that the content ought not be something weighty and substantial within itself. Faithful portrayal alone is set up as the basic principle. This view sticks to the wholly formal aspect, that the work of art just be portrayal of some content or other, and be drawn (*abstrahiert*) from the content's inherent import as well as from the content of the heart's subjectivity. However, one can draw as little from one as from the other, and the proper objectivity of the work of art is to be located in what we have stated previously. The work of art must have for its content the higher interests of spirit and of the will. These interests must pervade its external existence; their tone must resonate throughout all its efforts.

If it this be the case, if substantial interests are the foundation, then the work of art is inherently objective and also speaks to our subjectivity. For we are familiar with genuine interests. This is the congruence of the work of art with our own interests. If this congruence is great, it has its effect. [104] The portrayal is only a framework within which the content is grasped, and the framework is something nonessential, is needed only for the expression and so reduces to a means. This spiritual element is what is truly powerful and enduring. Although this subject matter be taken from times long past, the basis is nevertheless the human element of spirit that is expressed in it, is the effect that this objectivity is also our own subjectivity. | We must  
 116 reconcile ourselves with the externality in this portrayal, for it gets overshadowed by the import to which we are responsive. The demand rests on us to attune ourselves to this objectivity. The aspect constituting what is authentic, the genuine aspect of the work of art, constitutes what is objective in the work of art: it has to make the claim upon us that we be present to it. That is because the subjectivity that we otherwise find wanting could have been the ordinary prosaicness of everydayness, and the subjectivity is to be drawn from it. Kotzebue has had such a great effect because he portrayed the everydayness in the way all things exist.<sup>96</sup> When such circumstances are brought to the fore, each one has a view of one's own, although in art we ought to be free of just this sort of subjectivity. If subjectivity lacks receptiveness to what is objective, then subjectivity does not have to face the demand to seek to discover itself in the work of art. Of course there always still remains an aspect in virtue of which the work of art remains ever alien to us, because we must make allowances for, and presuppose, many

96. August von Kotzebue (1761–1819) composed numerous stage-plays that, from 1795 to 1825, made up about twenty-five per cent of the German theatrical repertoire. In the later lecture series Hegel criticizes Kotzebue together with his contemporary and rival dramatist, August Wilhelm Iffland (1759–1814).

circumstances. This alien aspect can remain. However, it constitutes the mortal aspect of the work of art, which is unable to portray truth in the most authentic way.<sup>97</sup> For we require a higher form for that purpose. Not only do the situations as such inadequately measure up to the highest standard in us; the art as such is insufficient too.

### 3. The Subjectivity of the Artist; Originality

We still have to mention briefly the fact that the subject matter has a relationship to the subjectivity of the artist. This aspect includes style and originality. The artist [105] has a relationship to the subject matter. The artist must have mastery of it, must have experienced it in its depth, must know it sensitively and imaginatively. That is because otherwise the artist just sticks to the external aspects, can of course convey the subject matter in rhymes, but can produce only a mediocre work of art. | If the artist is truthful with respect to the material, a distinctiveness on the artist's part can still come into play in the portrayal. We call this distinctive feature the manner as such. If the artist is truthful, then the manner confines itself just to the particular mode of execution, to the externality as such. Manner is also more specifically called 'style', and the French say '*c'est l'homme même*' ('it is the man himself').<sup>98</sup> This particular feature of manner is something more or less contingent, rests on fashion, and ultimately can supplant art as such and spoil its subject matter. Manner can predominate in art mainly where the external aspect allows for much contingency. Manner is not equivalent to originality, which is the distinctiveness of the artist as such and refers to the distinctiveness of the whole of the work of art, not to what is sheerly external.

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97. Hotho changed 'is unable to' to 'does not'.

98. Hegel draws upon the famous pronouncement that '*le Style est l'homme même*', made by Georges-Louis-Leclerc de Buffon (1707–88) in a 1753 lecture to the French Academy. 'Style' signifies a kind of (scholarly) expression that is suited to the portrayal of what is authentic. In this sense, giving precedence to style over manner, the concept of style carries over to the domain of art. In his allusion, and in the critique of an interpretation of Buffon's pronouncement that reduces style to 'manner' tinged with subjectivity (as perhaps is the case for Friedrich Schlegel or Friedrich Schleiermacher), Hegel aligns himself with Goethe's view expressed in his treatise *Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Stil* (1789): 'Just as simple imitation rests on tranquil existence and an affectionate presence, and manner apprehends a phenomenon with a readily capable soul, so style rests upon the deepest foundation of knowledge, on the essential being of things insofar as we are allowed to recognize it in visible and tangible shapes' (*Werke*, 12:30–34; here p. 32).

Genuine originality is the originality in which the artist makes representational just the subject matter and nothing of the artist's own personal features. The grand manner is that in which nothing of the distinctiveness of the poet<sup>99</sup> gets perceived, so that the artist appears merely as a passive channel through which the content presents itself. In every<sup>100</sup> accomplished work as such there is that through which what is substantial is the empowering factor, and the individual is only the formal activity of the producing. Likewise in Homer and in Sophocles—and in Shakespeare too—we see portrayed just the subject matter itself, whereas Euripides is of course eccentric and personal. Genuine originality presents the subject matter as something unitary within itself, as a whole. By the same token, something  
 118 cobbled together externally is unoriginal. | [106] In many of Goethe's earlier works of art we see how, with meager subject matter, he combined the material externally. There is a diverse combination in *Götz von Berlichingen*. For instance, a topic frequently included at that time was the pitiable state of monks. Brother Martin appears along these lines in *Götz*. He counts Götz as fortunate.<sup>101</sup> Contemporary pedagogy likewise appears in *Götz*, the pedagogy in vogue principally owing to Basedow.<sup>102</sup> In short: many external aspects are introduced, ones that do harm to the subject matter. Concerns of that time are also brought together in *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*. These include, for instance, the fact that the literary portrayals involve depictions of living persons, as well as sentiments about water and metal.<sup>103</sup> As a work,

99. Hotho changed 'poet' to 'artist'.

100. Hotho added 'authentically'.

101. The ironic critique of monasticism is found in the first act ('Inn in the Forest') of the play, in the dialogue between Götz and Brother Martin (*Werke*, 4:78–82).

102. In 1774 Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723–90) opened the Philanthropium, a model school for children, in Dessau; its pedagogy reflected the educational views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) and John Amos Comenius (1592–1670). Also in 1774, Basedow published his principal work on pedagogy, *Des Elementärwerkes 1.–4. Band*: An orderly supply of all the necessary information for the instruction of the young person from the outset up to university age... (Dessau, 1774). Hegel's remark refers to the contrast between the courtly education of Götz's son Karl, and the experience-oriented education of the stableboy Georg. On this contrast, see also the treatise by Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848), *Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unserer Zeit* (Jena, 1808).

103. Hegel's reference to Goethe's novel *The Affinities*, pt. 2 (Tübingen, 1809), is to chapter five, with its description of the 'natural artistry... in imitating painter-like movements and postures' and 'portraying actual, familiar portraits' (*Werke* 6:392). Also, chapter eleven, with its description of Otilien's receptivity to the 'feel of metal' (6:444–5). Hegel was familiar with this phenomenon from the description of the sensibility for 'water and metal' in Schelling's essays in the *Morgenblatt* (nr. 26, p. 180) and in the *Intelligenzblatt* of the *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* (nr. 36, 1807); see F. W. J. Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, 14 vols. in 2 divisions, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), 7:487–97. See Schelling's letters to Hegel

this novel takes up the latter aspect too, as well as several other subject matters of contemporary interest, concerns of that present day. Such situations do not emerge naturally from what is internal to a literary construct.

Therefore genuine originality coincides with genuine objectivity, although people often understand originality to be the opposite, with the result that much craziness has been produced through originality that is spurious. For what is inferior belongs just to the private or personal aspect.

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of 1 November 1807 and 22 March 1807, as well as Hegel's letter of 23 February 1807 (*Briefe*, 1:135, 158, 150–1, as well as the note to Goethe, p. 142); *The Letters*, pp. 75–8. [Tr.] The three letters in their entirety can also be found in *R. W. J. Schelling: Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 3 (1803–9), ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn, 1975), pp. 405–13, 415–17.

## IV. THE GENERAL ART FORMS

### INTRODUCTION

Thus far we have examined the perspectives that bear upon the work of art insofar as its beauty is supposed to be ideal beauty and insofar as this ideal beauty comes into play in the usual ways. From this general nature of the work of art as ideal we pass over to the general art forms. These are the symbolic, classical, and romantic art forms. [107]

119 What is beautiful is at first sought after, is achieved, and then is above and beyond the achievement. In symbolic art the subject matter is what predominates, and the form for what is inward is sought after and not yet achieved, | because the inward aspect is not achieved. In classical art this achievement occurs. In romantic art the content surpasses the form, calling for more than the art work's portrayal is capable of providing. In the work of art, the concept is substantial subjectivity and the portrayal of this subjectivity for sensuous representation. The differences among the art forms pertain to these two aspects.

### A. THE SYMBOLIC ART FORM

The first form is the symbolic form.

#### 1. The Symbol as Such

A symbol is a sign that embodies a meaning and a way of portraying it. A mere sign (*das Zeichen als solches*) has no relationship to itself, but instead has significance only as the meaning given to it. This is the case with the sounds or signs of speech, the names of individuals, and much else too; the sensible thing whereby the representation presents itself has, in its distinctiveness, no actual relation to this representation. A symbol, then, is a kind of sign that, in its externality, directly embodies the content of the representation, a content it is supposed to portray. Therefore the symbol at the same time represents itself. For example, the lion is the symbol of strength. The lion, on its own account as lion, is strong; it embodies within itself the meaning it makes apparent. The symbol is an existence said to portray a representation, although in itself it already embodies the representation it is supposed to portray.



*a. Adequacy to the Meaning*

The second thing about the symbol, however, is that the symbol is not yet wholly adequate to its meaning. The image embodies within itself still more than that whose meaning it should represent. For instance, the bull is an ancient symbol of strength and fertility—of multiple qualities. [108] Hence the symbol is essentially ambiguous. When we behold such configurations, we are at the same time unsure whether the configuration is a symbol, or else is posited explicitly as a symbol. Something can be a symbol but not be posited as such. If it is posited as such, then we must entertain both aspects: on the one hand what it generally represents, then on the other hand the image. If reflection | has not yet progressed to the point of maintaining within itself independent, general representations, if reflection is not yet able to hold fast to thought by itself, then the inner thought is not yet set forth by itself, and so the sensible shape is not yet thought of separately from its meaning; instead the two are as one.

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It is another matter, therefore, when the distinction is posited explicitly. This is the case in comparisons. When Karl Moor sees the sun setting, he says: 'This is how a hero dies'.<sup>104</sup> Here the two, the meaning and its sensible portrayal, are explicitly distinguished. In contrast, when we see a triangle, it can be a symbol of the Trinity, or it can not be one. In a simile it is entirely clear that the sensible existence as such ought not be what counts as such. The connection can of course be quite direct, as when, for example, Luther sings, 'A Mighty Fortress is Our God'. Here, however, we see right away that the fortress only counts as a symbol.<sup>105</sup> The intent is the same when it says in the Bible: 'God shatters their teeth in their mouths'.<sup>106</sup> We see that in this case it does not mean the actual teeth, for instead the expression is symbolic. If we see a triangle in front of a church, by the same token we see that in this case it counts not as a geometrical triangle but as a symbol.

In many poetic portrayals, many symbolic elements are prominent. There are, however, also other portrayals in which we do not notice right away the symbolic aspect, and in those cases, as a rule, we can be unsure whether

104. Moor, the protagonist, says this in Schiller's drama *The Robbers*, Act 3, Scene 2; see *Werke* 3:77–86.

105. This well-known hymn (composed c. 1526–8) refers to Psalms 46:7 and 11 ('the God of Jacob is our refuge'). The hymn was first printed in the *Klug'schen Gesangbuch* 1529; see *Luther Deutsch: The works of Martin Luther in a new selection for the present day*, ed. Kurt Aland, vol. 6, *Kirche und Gemeinde* (2nd edn., Stuttgart and Göttingen, 1966), pp. 276–7 (= no. 23 of the *Geistlichen Lieder*).

106. See, for instance, Psalms 3:7 ('For thou dost smite all my enemies on the cheek, thou dost break the teeth of the wicked').

such a portrayal is, or is not, supposed to be symbolic. Where the portrayals [109] are the kind in which we see the symbolic element, it can be the case that abstract thought on its own account is not yet something to which spirit has access; instead the pictorial mode of portrayal is evidently still the only portrayal in which spirit can represent its content to itself. These are not just isolated instances; instead we encounter this situation in extensive areas of art, in fact in the whole compass of Oriental art. In the Oriental area we have before us shapes and images that, however, involve nothing directly uncanny to us. | We wander about resignedly, seeing right away that these shapes not satisfy us as they stand on their own; instead we see that we ought to go beyond them to the meaning of these images, which is something other than what they are themselves. This is especially the case with Indian art.

But we find the same thing too in the area of classical art. In itself classical art is not symbolic but is instead clear and intelligible on its own; and so, when our sense of the meaning is none other than what lies in the shape itself, the portrayal is the shape adequate to the concept. In what is properly symbolic there is always an aspect that is not adequate to the meaning. Classical art is, on the whole, clear art. In the symbol, the image still presents something other than the representation. However, classical art also has an aspect of this ambiguity, since we are in doubt as to whether we should stick with the image, or whether the content is something further still. If the latter is the case, then what matters is the content that an image preserves for its own sake. One can take the image as sheerly idle play, in the way that people regard mythology as fables. Yet in the case of such content we can still ponder whether something further is meant by it than what its shape expresses. This is especially so when the content proves to be something divine, so that the expression readily appears to be unworthy of it. [110] For example, when we read that Jupiter hurled Vulcan down onto Lemnos and as a result Vulcan became lame, we can take this as a fairy tale.<sup>107</sup> But at the same time, since this statement is made about the supreme god, we can nevertheless suppose that we are to understand it in a different way. This gives rise to two sorts of representation: such images taken as purely prosaic, or else taken as having a still further sense behind them.

We also find this double perspective in the case of classical art. A protracted controversy in more recent times turns on whether to take a great

107. [Tr.] For the account of how Zeus—angry at how Hephaistos sought to aid his mother, Hera, after Zeus had rebuked her—hurled Hephaistos down from heaven to earth, where he landed on the island of Lemnos, suffering injury so that, as he says, 'there was not much life left in me', see *The Iliad* 1.568–610; Lattimore, pp. 90–1.

deal as external history, or as a symbol. In his | *Mythology*, Creuzer<sup>108</sup> goes through all the representations of the ancients but not in the usual sense, for he has sought a deeper significance in them, has taken them as something rational. That is because such tales come from people who are of course able to make-believe, but in the interest of religion have something higher—reason as deviser of frameworks (*Gestalterfinderin*)—although they still lack the adequate skill to explain their own inwardness to themselves. Yet reason is always the shaper of images (*die Bildnerin*), and always gives rise to the need to recognize rationality. And this recognition is to the credit of human beings. One can stick to the information of the representations and take them prosaically, as fables. Then one has idle information. The more creditable assumption is that rational human beings produced those images, and so the images express reason. We must dig deeply based on reason, and demonstrating this assumption justifies the mythology. Justifying is a noble occupation for human beings. People have attacked Creuzer and said [111] that he is someone who just read the meanings into the mythology; or else that he follows the Neoplatonists. They say it is not historical fact that the images have such meanings; that those folk amused themselves in this way without intending anything at all by it, and in doing so they were not thinking what people today impute to them.<sup>109</sup> It is true, to be sure, that the mythology is not historical and that for those peoples the images did not yet count as symbolic; but these are two different issues, whether something is in itself a symbol, and whether it is posited as a symbol. To this extent it is entirely historical fact that the ancients themselves did not think about their images what later times now see in them; but it does not follow from this that such images are not in themselves symbols, and so must be grasped as such.

A symbol is the pictorial portrayal of a general representation, of something inward. If we demand that it should be historical fact that the peoples

108. The following account outlines the starting-point for the interpretation of mythology, according to Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858), in his essay, 'Idee und Probe alter Symbolik', found in *Studien*, ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer, vol. 2 (Frankfurt and Heidelberg, 1806; r. p., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1969), pp. 224–324. Creuzer also later published this position in his *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, 6 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–22).

109. Johann Heinrich Voß (1751–1826) was the foremost critic of this position, in his *Antisymbolik* (Stuttgart, 1824), although earlier he had criticized it in 'Beurtheilung der Creuzer'schen Symbolik', published in the *Jenaischen Allgemeinen Literatur Zeitung* (1821, nos. 81–7, pp. 161–216). In his *Mythologischen Briefen* (Königsberg, 1794) he brought the reproach of 'Platonism' against the classical philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812), among others, and later he directed it against Creuzer.

123 themselves had been aware of the symbolic content, that would require that they already would have had the thought of its content. But this is just not the case, for they employed such images simply | because they were still in a poetic condition; they were habituated to becoming aware of what is inward in the mode of fantasy, not in the mode of thought. But this is a necessary stage. So it is certainly not historical fact that these peoples on the one hand had the mode of sensible imagery, and on the other hand had abstract representations. They did not yet understand abstract representation from this imagery; but that is something entirely different from saying that the abstract representation as such is not concealed or embedded in the image. So what Creuzer says is that this symbolism is no poetic fabrication, for it is embedded there and was so among the peoples who were not yet capable in this way of placing the representation before their consciousness as separated from what is pictorial.<sup>110</sup> This is the distinctive view of the symbolic. At this point we have to introduce for its own sake the development of [112] the symbolic method of portrayal. We are not going into the historical aspect and our interest is not in explaining mythology, for instead we have to examine the shapes of the symbolic itself.

*b. Symbols in Art and in Religion*

With the symbol we have a double mode. One mode is the symbol proper, in which the meaning is not explicitly expressed apart from the portrayal. Then there is the symbol in which one aspect is the expression, what is sensible, and the other aspect—explicitly expressed—is the meaning. The first type of the symbolic is of greater interest; the second mode is a less significant one. Since, then, we are examining the symbol proper, our interest is in seeing how art has come into being. The symbol is the first mode of art and comprises in turn several modes within itself. We are not taking them up historically, not explaining the mythology of peoples; instead we have only to examine the stages themselves in their general character. To know more precisely what we are talking about here, we have to recall the goal of art. The content of art is a spiritual content, is what is substantial, appearing outwardly and not given in an immediate natural shape, for instead it is  
124 something produced by spirit. This is the chief characteristic of | art.

110. In his early essay, 'Idee und Probe alter Symbolik', Creuzer had already developed the thought that symbolism is to be considered as a work of 'free construction . . . in which, after the inner world has opened up to them, human beings, impelled to express its meaning, . . . seek assistance in the broader expanse of intuition' (*Studien* 2:225).

Our initial point of departure cannot yet involve the fact that spiritual content as such and, more specifically, substantial subjectivity on its own account, grasps itself and forms itself in imagery. The first stage cannot have free content of this kind. Free spirituality is not what is first, but instead is result. Since consciousness does not initially grasp itself in that spiritual way, the advance with respect to the content is weaker, and with respect to the shape it is incomplete, because the two—the higher concept of self-consciousness, and the portrayal—are essentially interconnected. The higher concept is a substantial spirituality; for its appearance this spirituality has [113] the human figure, in which the arbitrariness of the configuration is superseded. This figure alone is commensurate with the concept, and art has to adopt it. If the shape is of a different sort than the human figure, this shows that the concept is not yet substantial spiritual subjectivity, for the content corresponds to its configuration and vice versa. The authentic concept as such determines itself freely from itself. This self-determination has a greater scope; it involves the positing of the mode of its own existence. This existence is determined by the concept itself and accordingly is no longer something arbitrary. Only the mode of existence that is adequate to the concept is the more authentic mode. If the appearance is inauthentic, then the concept has not yet grasped itself.

The examination of the beginnings of art coincides closely with the examination of religion. The first works of art are mythologies. In them the explication of what is substantial is, at the outset, solely art. When prose comes on the scene the method of examination is different.<sup>111</sup> | When it examines the world, prose is understandable, external examination, and it presupposes that human beings indeed are, on their own account, free.<sup>112</sup> Where this separation is not yet made, human beings are in a condition intermediate between the natural mode and spirit's freer mode. Prose in the proper sense comes on the scene only together with absolute freedom and absolute religion, for prose involves the free subjectivity of the individual. If we wish, then, to designate the modes of the beginning simply, we can say that art, religion, and scientific knowledge begin with wonder, as Aristotle puts it.<sup>113</sup>

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111. Hotho added 'from that of art'.

112. Hotho added 'from immediacy'.

113. This is a reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 982b.12–15: 'For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and stars, and about the genesis of the universe'; *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), 2:1554.

In relating themselves to nature, human beings do not take nature to be merely external but instead have a presentiment of the reason, the universal character, the thought in the objects of nature; they are on the one hand repelled, on the other hand drawn in, and the two aspects—the presentiment of something higher and the consciousness of something external—are not yet separated. The prose of their separateness is only a later phenomenon. [114] At first there is immediate nature, that in which human beings have a presentiment of the needs of spirit, and in which they seek satisfaction.

The first product is a religion that is simply a reverence for the natural body as such and is still nothing symbolic. There is a fermentation, a bifurcation, because what is higher is sought in what is natural. What is at hand, is first and immediate, is the unity of the intuition of finite nature with the knowledge of what is universal. Such a religion can be mythological but not yet symbolic. Here 'God' does not yet have genuine content, but instead has the nonspecific sense of the universal substance of the whole, a substance immediately present in all that is finite, with the result that the finite, within itself, is at the same time what is infinite. The concept of God (as distinct from God's existence) is left with just the concept of sheer power. What fills out the concept consists of what the natural things are, their arising and perishing and their relationships. The content of the divine is immediately present. | Therefore there is not yet any thought unconnected to nature, and the portrayal of this thought is nothing thought has produced, for instead the natural things are this portrayal.

This was the standpoint of the religion of the ancient Parsees. It is pantheism, with the manifold led back to a unity that is a physical unity: the light. This light is immediately the divine; it is goodness, and this attribute of goodness *is*, existing sensibly and naturally in the light.<sup>114</sup> The universal essence is, to be sure, called Ormazd, although Ormazd is the light. The stars, all light, are ways in which Ormazd appears, so that he is what is present within them.<sup>115</sup> This representation involves nothing symbolic.

114. Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil du Perron (1731–1805) in 1771 published a French translation of the ancient Persian text, the so-called *Zend-Avesta*, attributed to Zoroaster. Hegel knew it, perhaps via Creuzer's *Symbolik*, in a German translation from the French made Johann Friedrich Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta, Zoroasters lebendiges Wort, worin die Lehren und Meinungen dieses Gesetzgebers von Gott, Welt, Natur, Menschen...*, 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–83).

115. Hegel's characterization of Ormazd refers indirectly to Anquetil du Perron, in Kleuker's translation, but possibly references Creuzer's portrayal of Medean-Persian religion, which relies on Kleuker; see Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 1:650–799, esp. 693 ff. [Tr.] Hegel discusses the ancient Persian religion of light, or Zoroastrianism, much more extensively in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Vol. 1 (pp. 310–16), and in the philosophy-of-religion lectures. For the latter, see *Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans.

Goodness is immediately itself the light-essence; thought and reality are not yet separated. So all else that exists is a part of the light, has a share in the light; all that has life belongs to the realm of Ormazd. The light is everywhere, providing radiance to all beings; [115] every power is the light. The goodness and truth of every animal, every human being, is its radiant light. Hence the Parsee reveres everything living as the creation of Ormazd. This is not yet a symbolic unity. It is indeed interwoven with symbolic representations, yet not as its fundamental determination. For example, it is represented that Ormazd gave a dagger to Dschemschid, the king of the realm of light on earth. By wielding the dagger, Dschemschid cut the earthly realm into three-hundred parts, and he said: 'The spirit of the earth rejoices'. So his passage through the earth became a blessing for it.<sup>116</sup> This is symbolic. What it signifies is agriculture; the image is the cutting open of the earth with the dagger. Agriculture is not yet anything spiritual; but it is also nothing natural, for it is a human activity and is an operation of what is spiritual, and indeed an institution with the most far-reaching consequences.

*c. The Universal Element and the Spiritual Content*

Therefore art cannot yet lay claim to this initial mode, | and what is 127  
symbolic first comes on the scene when the representation of something universal breaks away from the particular mode of existence. This universal element, ascending higher, has the spiritual as its authentic content. If this content positions itself firmly over against immediate existence, then the need arises for this content to appear also for the senses. The vast range of what belongs to India and Egypt falls principally within this stage. These mythologies and the associated works of art from these lands belong in the symbolic stage. That is because no work of art here is something free; instead each one is symbolic, expressing the fermentation directed toward a not-yet-existent art form. Everywhere something is sought that is not yet the free concept, the concept as substantial subjectivity; something is sought that is still natural or is only intended as spiritual. And that is why the portrayal is imperfect, because what it signifies does not yet have the absolute content.

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R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, 3 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984-7; repr. Oxford, 2007), 2:352-8, 609-24.

116. Compare to this account the presentation by Creuzer, to which Hegel presumably refers: 'Dschemschid, the first agriculturalist of Persia, was thus symbolized in myth as the mirror of the sun, or as the solar year itself, which of course is connected with the agrarian system. Dschemschid first cut open the earth with the golden dagger; hence the representation of Iran as the image of Ormazd's realm of light' (*Symbolik*, 2:714).

What the content represented here more specifically involves, then, is [116] in part a greater natural object, one captured in a representation, in something universal. As existence, such an object is manifold; as universal representation, it is onefold. A natural object of this kind can be a flood of the Ganges or of the Nile, or, more abstractly, it can be the year and its seasons. These are universal objects that become universal in virtue of being represented, with the result that it now becomes necessary that they should appear as these universal objects. Other such universalities include the sun as life-giving, agriculture, and metalworking.

One could also have supposed that such universalities and their portrayal even include, for instance, the *Feruers* of the Parsees, the subjectivity of human beings, its general actuality. But we can say that universal representations of the latter kind are not the sort able to become the object of a symbol.<sup>117</sup> That is because these spirits, these angels, are wholly the same content as | the individualities themselves; and subjectivity, which is the mode in which such spirits exist, of course exists within human beings themselves.

So there are universal objects: nature itself, as well as more abstract objects such as power, goodness, and love, which are portrayed symbolically. A principal sphere of symbolic portrayal, however, is the universal as process, as change, not as abstract representation. Change, the dialectic of living things—origin, growth, perishing and reemergence from death or destruction, and procreation—is the kind of content suited to the symbolic form. This universal change has a great many portrayals in the particular domains of existence. Particular locales enter the picture here. The Nile exhibits change of this sort, as does the sun that stands low in the sky in winter, rises high in the spring, reaches its apex in the summer when it bestows its greatest blessings or exercises its destructiveness, and then sinks lower once again. [117] Thus plants originate from their seeds, grow, blossom, produce fruit, and in dying these fruits produce new seeds. The ages of life, and life as such, portray the same universal processes.

A more abstract process is of course that involving light and darkness, involving matter and spirit: the spiritual breaking free from what is natural,

117. The term *Feruier* is evidently taken by Kleuker from the French *Ferolier*, Anquetil du Perron's term for the *fravasis*, spiritual copies or counterparts of physical beings, copies that make up a separate, spiritual world. Hegel's source here is presumably § 6 of Creuzer's chapter on Median-Persian religion, which discusses 'demonology, cosmogony, and eschatology'. See *Symbolik* 2:704: 'The third order of spirits consists of the innumerable *Feruers*. Thought to be among them are the ideas, the prototypes, the models of all beings'.



resurrection into the light, reconciliation in the good, and so forth. This process too falls under the general heading of change and has the more specific character of being a passing over into antithesis, into the enmity of what is distinct, together with a pressing toward unification. This transition is evident within the universalities themselves, within all the major elemental objects of spirit and of nature. And so the representation of such antitheses extends | to cosmogonies and theogonies, to representations of the origin 129 of the universal nature of the world and of spirit. These are spheres of the principal representations that are suited to being meanings in symbolic portrayals.

The second point about them is the fact that this universal representation is given shape. As symbolic, the shape here is initially imperfect, and it is imperfect because these thoughts, these representations, are themselves still subordinate ones and are no free spirituality. The content is not yet free, authentic content. Two shapes result from the need for the configuration. One is the natural existence in which the meaning is present. For example, the sun is first taken as existing and then taken in its meaning, and the same occurs with the Nile. The other shape, however, is the shape devised by spirit. What remains of immediacy can be utilized in conjunction with this second shape. The principal adornment of Ceres consists of ears of corn, that of Bacchus is vines, and the river god has reeds and dripping hair.

In the symbolic case a second shape is therefore formed, [118] although this shape is still not free and independent but instead is taken over from some kind of singular, existent shape or an aspect of it, and a universal significance is given to this shape. The natural existence embodies the character of the meaning only within a limited sphere. The symbolic factor is the meaning's existence, insofar as this singular existence is said to have universality. For example, the egg contains the bird and, as such, is no symbol. But since what is intended by the egg as symbol is not the enveloped life of the individual bird but instead the enveloping of universal life, | the 130 egg, as world egg, becomes the symbol of the divine concept, of the beginning of all being. In the same way the Indians represent the physical member<sup>118</sup> for the power of procreation as the universal power of procreation. Such immediate existences can be utilized as symbols for universal representation. In expressing the relationship in such a way that the universal representation comes first, the second step would be to look around for a portrayal of it. But this is not the way it happens; the natural image is not

118. Instead of 'physical member' Hotho has 'image'.

utilized so as to be a symbol, for instead imaginative fantasy begins with the natural image and expands this image to universal meaning. Spirit, which presses on to universal representations, finds support in the particular existence, which, because of this, acquires the character of the universal meaning. The connection, then, between the natural shape and the meaning as universal can be manifold, partly external and partly fundamental, so that the universal representation is also what is essential to the natural shape, in the way we find this in the case of the egg as symbol. Symbolic mythologies fall under this heading, and the fundamental nature of the connection makes it much easier to grasp the symbol. The most varied existences, and the human being itself, are utilized as symbols. [119] Interpretation of the existing systems belongs to a history of mythologies. Much that is specific can be said about them, but much remains problematic. For instance, the lotus flower is an extremely common symbol. The interpretation is that the lotus flower closes its petals in the dark and opens them at sunrise, so people say | it reveres the sun, and the lotus flower then comes to serve as a sign of prayer. In another respect, however, it is also in turn a different symbol, having the meaning of universal natural procreation.

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#### *d. Some Forms of Symbolic Expression*

The handiest expression of symbolism is number, when the meaning itself involves a numerical feature. For instance, the numbers twelve and seven crop up often in Egyptian architecture, for twelve is the number of the moon, or the months, and the number of feet that the Nile rises at its flood stage. Seven is the number of the celestial bodies [sun, moon, and the five planets visible to the naked eye]. Such a number is then said to be felicitous (*selig*), insofar as it is a numerical feature of the great elemental relationships. Twelve levels and seven columns are to that extent symbolic. The twelve labors of Hercules even appear to be derived from the twelve months of the year, since Hercules is in one aspect a hero, but in another he is also evidently a personification of the sun's course [through the zodiac].<sup>119</sup> We also find

119. The fetching of Cerberus from the underworld is one of the twelve labors of Heracles (or Hercules) that were imposed on him by king Eurystheus (*The Iliad* 8.366–9; Latimore, p. 210; *The Odyssey* 11:621–6; Latimore, p. 184). Hesiod mentions the slaying of the Nemean lion, the slaying of the Hydra of Lernia, and the seizing of the giant Geryon's cattle. See *Theogony* 287–332; *Hesiod*, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2006), pp. 26–31. The twelve labors, recounted by Pindar and the tragedians, were first arranged according to the number twelve in the *Hérakleia* of Peisander (ca. 7–6 bc). Hegel's source is Creuzer's *Symbolik*, which refers to Dionysus of Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo: 'So then we take note of the annual cycle of 365 days, personified

such symbols with respect to what is spatial. The passageways of the Labyrinth are said to be the circular paths of the planets. Dances too, in their twisting movements, had the secret sense of being symbolic of the movement of the great elemental bodies.

The foremost shape for the symbol is the human figure. It can be a sign of the movements of natural objects—just as we already noted that Hercules is a symbol of the sun's course. So the Nile too is portrayed in a human figure, [120] in how Osiris is the symbol of the Nile and Isis the symbol of the earth.<sup>120</sup> Use of the human figure is, as such, personification, and it constitutes the transition to classical art because the human figure is utterly significant by itself and because, as shape of free spirituality, it expresses nothing other than spirit itself and | it is degrading for it to signify mere natural objects. If the human figure is nevertheless utilized as symbol, that is in fact beneath its dignity, and here confusion comes directly into play, because the human figure is the very expression of the spirit that gives itself existence within this figure, the spirit that is present to itself within it. The human figure's being has no particular meaning but instead is what is free of every specific symbolic meaning. Spiritual subjectivity stands above being the expression of just *one* characteristic that constitutes the inner aspect of a symbol. That is why personification involves rather the expressions and the actions that can be taken symbolically, because actions consist in giving oneself a character; they consist of willing to be something particular. Action involves an interest and indeed a particular interest, and this interest can be the meaning of a symbol. That is why the actions of a subject, such as the labors of Hercules, can be taken symbolically. Osiris is symbol of the Nile, of the sun; however, as subject he stands forth as a free god, and only the various actions are set forth symbolically.

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But confusion arises here with the fact that the subject as such cannot be symbolic, for instead only the subject's action can. Accordingly, however,

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as Som-Heracles, as the warrior on the sun's path. From this perspective he is the son of the light-giving Ammon, who appears in the sign of Aries and carries out the year under various labors. For the twelve labors portray for us the very course of the sun through the zodiac' (*Symbolik* 1:456).

120. 'Osiris is the Nile and Isis is the fruitful land of Egypt' (Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 1:334). For the characterization of Osiris as the 'lingering, languishing, nearly dried-up Nile' and of Isis as the 'grieving consort', see 1.269: 'Isis... is the sister-land bound to the Nile, the consort and brother, a sister-land that now experiences the consequences of his debilitating death'. See also 1.268, where Isis is called the 'land of Egypt'. For further characterization of Isis and Osiris, see also Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*; see the essay, 'Isis and Osiris', pp. 3-191, in *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. 5, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1936, repr. 1969). For the identification of Osiris with the Nile and Isis with the earth, see, in particular, Plutarch's commentary in chapter 32 of his essay, pp. 76-81.

that characteristic of subjective free choice is in contradiction to the consistency said to be displayed in a series of symbolic actions. An example is the sun, which shines weakly in winter, breaks forth newly born in the spring, [121] then has intense and certainly destructive effects each summer, and then in turn wanes in the winter—and this is | a consistent sequence. If, on the contrary, the symbol is a subject, then this subject involves free choice and contingency, the possibility of proceeding according to a number of aspects that are not mainly aspects of what is symbolic. This aspect of free choice produces actions that do not pertain to the meaning of the symbol. For instance, we see gods portrayed in their deeds and situations. A number of these expressions are symbolic, and a number of them are produced by free choice. Ceres embodies the relationship of the universal process of arising and perishing. One part of the story of this goddess can be interpreted along these lines. But all else that she does pertains to her as subjective free will and no longer belongs to the symbol. So we see a going back and forth between the symbolic and the nonsymbolic.

A third aspect nevertheless enters the picture with this personification, the fact that reverence for a natural figure—whether a human being or an animal—as immediately divine links up directly to what is symbolic, such that the act of the human being or the animal is not taken as a symbol but instead, in its existence, is taken as immediately divine. An immediate shape and subjectivity are united in the personification, which is symbolic, and this comes very close to taking what naturally exists for what is universal, as in the worship of lamas and the worship of Brahmā. Indian pantheism, which grasps everything living as divine, is especially inclined to revere animals and human beings as thinking, as a higher, universal power, because they are subjectivity and have vitality. So this third aspect partakes of the symbolic: [122] the immediacy of the figure is revered as divine. The first point is therefore the personification, the second its contingent aspect of expression, and the third the immediate reverence.

We find this unruly hodgepodge especially in the Indian case—as well as the fact that still other natural figures | besides the human figure are used as symbols. External, abstractly natural shapes, which get expanded beyond their immediate character, are carried to monstrous extremes, in gross images. Here the grandeur as such appears in their shape and number. In addition there are persons who are the basis of a symbol. But then they are way beyond their own significance.

Worship of the sun is the foundation for the Indians, and in their poetry we find a number of symbols for the sun and its effects. That is because the process of change and that of the sensible, in abstraction from what is

spiritual, are meanings underlying a number of Indian portrayals. Here the meanings are confused, and the human figure, which does not portray itself, is distorted, distended, carried to extremes. The sensible aspect of the Indian portrayal transposes the human figure into something monstrous; the shape as such is not sufficient for portraying itself because—in having its universal meaning apart from itself—the figure seeks to achieve this meaning by going out beyond itself. A figure with three heads points to the trinity. Brahmā is the abstract essence, Shiva is the negative, and Vishnu is the preserver.<sup>121</sup> But the meanings are not fixed. Shiva is then in turn mountain and river and many other things. [123] Midst all this is reverence for something immediate, reverence for the Brahmans who, as the twice-born, are declared, in-and-for themselves, to be god. Other Indians seek to become Brahmans by means of the most extreme penances. In contrast, the Tibetans have only *one* lama; the Hindus have the presence of endlessly many gods. Animals are revered too, apes and cows. In this instance there is then nothing symbolic, for instead the figure itself is what is divine. | Ultimately what is quite ordinarily human is then interwoven with the symbolic. So this poetry is the very embodiment of confusion. For example, in the *Rāmāyana*, the introduction begins with the fact that the hero,<sup>122</sup> immersed in deep meditation, has become Brahmā. It then says that Brahmā himself came to examine the sage. Seeing Brahmā, the sage gives him a seat and offers him water. The god seats himself and then also requires his host to sit down. They sit for a long time, until Brahmā says to the poet that he should write the poem. But the poet says he cannot, for he is distressed about the death of a bird. So everything proceeds in a confused way.<sup>123</sup> The great power and deep meditation and penances of the Brahmans are always a principal topic.

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121. The characterization of Brahmā as the abstract essence is found in Hegel's review of Wilhelm von Humboldt's paper, *Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahā-Bhārata*, which Humboldt read to the Academy of Sciences, and then published (Berlin, 1826). Hegel's review, published in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* in 1827, is reprinted in *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956), pp. 85–154; see p. 111. Further characterizations of Brahmā are as 'the pure being' (p. 138), and as 'abstract self-consciousness' (p. 144). See p. 149 for the portrayal of Brahmā in relation to Vishnu or (his avatar) Krishna. In this relationship, Brahmā is portrayed as a 'figure of the Trimurti, the Indian Trinity'. See also Creuzer, *Symbolik* 1:626, 634.

122. Hotho put 'poet' in place of 'hero'.

123. Hegel mentions this episode in his *Bhagavad-Gītā* review, p. 133. A translation of the opening passages of the *Rāmāyana* is also found in the appendix to Friedrich Schlegel's treatise, *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808); *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:327–31.

The *Shakuntalā* too has this feature of alternation between the wholly prosaic and what is most beautiful.<sup>124</sup> Furthermore, we know that the king is only an ordinary human being, although he is then also in turn an incarnation. Then the relationship to *Shakuntalā* is once again purely prosaic; then again we can see something symbolic in it. There is constant alternation between what is wholly fantastic and what is most charming. All specificity is effaced; it all vanishes. On the one hand there is [124] the greatest sublimity, on the other the greatest banality.

The sublime is of course to be distinguished from the beautiful. In the sublime, the figure stands for a universal representation. Yet this figure is disproportionate and is posited as not measuring up to the content. The sublime always involves the appearance of something inadequate, to draw attention to the fact that the expression does not measure up to the content. It is this way, for example, with unity. The representation of unity becomes  
 136 sublime when time is said to express it in such a way that the | characteristics of time must in turn be expressed as incapable of measuring up to the content. Thus it is said of God: 'A thousand years to Thee are one day'.<sup>125</sup> So, symbolic portrayals are indeed sublime, but not beautiful, because in them the sublime and the banal alternate.

#### *e. Egyptian Symbols and the Transition to the Classical World*

The Egyptian symbol of course goes further than the Indian symbol. We will examine it in reference to the transition from the symbolic to the beautiful. Two characteristics matter in this regard. Spirituality as such is foundational as meaning for the classical sphere; its character is subjective totality, to which all particular characteristics are subordinated, and which contains them as ideal. There are, then, two characteristics related to this concept, ones that in the Egyptian case embody the transition. One relation is that with the Egyptians there is a mixing of the connections and the symbolic; specifically, the fact that a symbol is a whole of symbols, such that what in one instance is meaning becomes in turn the shape of a meaning. Particular

124. *Shakuntalā* is the main female character of a play (the *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*), in seven acts, by Kālidāsa (3rd–5th centuries AD); the play is usually just referred to as the *Shakuntalā*, and it is based on a story in book one of the *Mahābhārata* epic. Georg Forster rendered into German (Mainz and Leipzig, 1791) the English translation by William Jones. Hegel possessed the second edition of it, entitled *Sakuntalā*, *Indische Drama*, ed. J. G. Herder (Frankfurt am Main, 1803). See Herder's 'Ueber ein morgenländisches Drama' in *Zerstreute Blätter*, fourth collection, pt. 6 (1792); Herder, *Sämmtliche Werke* 16:84–104.

125. Psalms 90:4, 'For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, or as a watch in the night.'

deities are prominent for the Egyptians: idols, graven images, although we are still very unclear about many of them. One aspect, however, stands out about them, and it is the one I mentioned, the multiple meanings of their symbols and [125] the interconnection of the symbolic in diverse ways, what the subjectivity indeed amounts to—an interconnection that can be oriented in so many directions. For the Egyptians, the meanings and the shapes are thoroughly intertwined. This makes the interpretation of the images more difficult, although the foremost feature of these images is in fact the signifying of many things or alluding to many things.

Thus Osiris in one instance unites within himself the meaning of the sun's path; his story is a symbol of the sun's birth, ascent, and descent, and everything to do with the sun.<sup>126</sup> This is the meaning | of Osiris. Additionally, however, he<sup>127</sup> is also in turn the Nile in the same cycle of change. So then, if the process of the sun and of the Nile is the meaning, then this is itself only in turn the symbol of the universal process of all that is finite as such. What is more universal is, within itself, the same process, and it comes to the fore from these various meanings of Osiris himself, which are then reduced to symbols or shapes of the universal. Osiris then also appears as judge of the underworld, and with this he is transposed into a different realm than the natural one.

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In the Egyptian images we also then find the curious intermixing of the human element with the animal element. In one respect animals have value in their immediacy: Apis, dogs, cats, and several others. But the Egyptians do not stop with this animal worship. In animal worship proper the actual vitality of the animal counts as god. They posit no separation between what is immediate and a universal, higher meaning, for the existence is immediately what is divine. Yet the Egyptians also downgrade the animal shape to a symbol. They affix animal masks to human figures as mere images of the signification, not as direct validation of it. Animals in turn have human heads and animal bodies have human limbs, and vice versa. [126] This linkage of manifold images and shapes is the first aspect, which leads to the rich subjectivity that is internally diverse and is simple in its multiplicity.

The second aspect we have to speak about here is the intuition of a realm of the dead as such. In Egyptian fantasy there is a realm of the sun, the earth, and the state. But apart from this earthly realm there is a realm of death, a realm under the earth. The Egyptians procure a permanency for the dead;

126. When he composed the marginal notations Hotho crossed out 'and everything to do with the sun'.

127. Hotho removed 'he', so that the sentence would read 'the Nile is also in turn in ...'.

they make provision for an ongoing, permanent state. For them death has taken the form of something autonomous, with a tribunal in which Osiris is no longer immediate existence but instead | is the negative of this existence, is the lord of the lower realm. The Egyptians have a doubled architecture, above ground and below ground. The Egyptian pyramids are renowned, and they are specifically to be housing for the dead. It is well-known that they have just this purpose; they are the tombs of kings. Herodotus says that the Egyptians are the first ones who taught the immortality of the soul.<sup>128</sup> They introduced the disengaging of the natural from the spiritual, which obtained an independence. Immortality of the soul comes very close to freedom of the spirit, since the self (*das Ich*) takes itself to be dependent on itself, removed from naturalness. The principle of freedom is self-knowing. This is the intuition that established itself in the Egyptian mode of representation. That is not to say that the Egyptians arrived at the freedom of spirit. Yet they did already have the intuition of the spiritual; they accepted a realm of spirit, although a realm chiefly of empty abstraction from the natural, a realm of death. It is nevertheless notable that this realm [127] was not, however, an intuition of what is abstractly negative; instead this realm is a concrete realm of the soul.

The Indians only rose as far as this abstraction of empty negation. We find no Indian Brahman in the case of the Egyptians, for instead the invisible has concrete meaning; souls have an ongoing existence, and there is a realm of departed spirits. This establishing of what is concretely invisible, as opposed to immediate externality, constitutes the passage of consciousness over to its liberation. The Egyptians arrived at the threshold of the realm of freedom. The Indians too go beyond naturalness, but attain only the abstract extreme of the negative. We see the Egyptians establishing subjectivity in the characterization of the departed spirit, which does not acquire its shape as freer spirit but instead rests within the chamber of the pyramid, | which it neither pervades nor moves. We see the powerful, manifold connection on the symbolic side.

The transition to the classical world is portrayed for us in a symbol of the symbolic itself, in a Greek myth. The symbol is what is configured as such, what has a meaning. It can of course be satisfying on its own, in its own

128. Herodotus, *The History* 2.123: 'The Egyptians are the first who have told this story also, that the soul of man is immortal and that, when the body dies, the soul creeps into some other living thing then coming to birth; and when it has gone through all things, of land and sea and the air, it creeps again into a human body at its birth. The cycle for the soul is, they say, three thousand years.' (Grene, p. 185.)



shape, but it can also be said to have a meaning, and this symbol must then be designated more specifically in the shape, according to which we perceive that we ought to proceed further, to a general representation. This is especially so in the Egyptian portrayals, which we find to be problematic. The immediate shape on its own is not what matters; instead the shape is linked to something extraneous. For us, what the meaning is can only be partly as clear as it was for those who had the symbol. But there could also have been only an attempt at explication, in the sense of becoming clear itself. The labors of the Egyptians display something implicit; they are not something explicit. [128] In them we see a striving for what is clear in-and-for-itself; in other words, we see the Egyptian works of art as containing enigmas, on the one hand enigmas for us, on the other, enigmas for the people themselves. Free spirit alone is what is manifest; the Egyptians have not yet arrived at this spirit, at grasping self-consciousness. They have a representation of it in the departed spirits. Hence the Egyptian works are enigmas, appearing themselves to be objective enigmas. It is in this sense that the sphinx appears to the Greeks as this poser of riddles. The Egyptian has not expressed the higher word, but has only the impulse toward what is true. The goddess Neith, at Sais, herself says: 'My offspring is Helios; no one has lifted my veil; I would give birth to the light.'<sup>129</sup> She herself was veiled. As the Greek myth tells it, the sphinx posed this riddle: 'Who or what goes on four legs in the morning, on two legs at mid-day, and on three legs in the evening?' Oedipus solved this riddle<sup>130</sup> and shattered the sphinx. | This myth is the highest symbol and constitutes the transition to self-clarity, to spirit as freedom. This spirit is the principle of the Greek world and of classical art. In it the symbolic element is set aside. The human, the spiritual, is represented in human shape, in the very shape that can have the spiritual as existence.

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129. The reference to Neith instead of Isis points to the Isis cult at Sais, Hegel's source being Creuzer's *Symbolik* (1:530), especially his note 325, which introduces the well-known inscription. On Sais, see also Herodotus, *The History*, 2:169–76; Grene, pp. 205–8. Herodotus identifies Neith with Athena. [Tr.] *The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* give the inscription as: 'I am what was, what is, and what will be; no mortal has yet lifted my veil. The fruit of my body is Helios.' (The last sentence was added by Proclus.) See *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 152, 639, and 746; *Philosophy of World History*, Vol. 1, p. 367. Elsewhere in these lectures on art Hegel mentions Schiller's poem, 'Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais'; *Werke* 1:254–6.

130. Hegel introduces this ancient hypothesis alluded to by Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, v. 130 (Grene and Lattimore, 2:16. [Tr.] Oedipus correctly guessed the answer—a human being, because an infant (the 'morning' of life) crawls on all fours, a grownup (the 'mid-day') walks on two legs, and an elderly person (the 'evening') adds a cane to make three 'legs'.

## 2. The Meaning as Separate: Sacred Poetry

The main thing in the symbolic form is the configuration, which is supposed to have a meaning without the meaning being capable of complete expression. The meaning, or the representation as such, stands over against this symbolic feature in which the configuration is the main thing. With this meaning the work of art is the outpouring of pure signifying, of essential being. Here the universal representation exists on its own account; it is the pure thought [129] as such, the thought of the highest essential being. The expression of essential being is possible above all in speech alone; thus this aspect belongs preeminently to poetry. This is sacred poetry. (Symbolic art too can as such be called sacred art; it is assigned to the religious sphere.) This poetry has for its content the most universal element of meaning, the meaning of the essential being who is related to existing being as its lord. This essential being is not incarnate in what is external, for instead it is portrayed as thought free on its own account, and what is other to it is portrayed as subservient. At the same time we must note that, since the intuition is so pure by itself, the meaning accordingly breaks down into two aspects: what is abstract, and concrete existence. In the symbolic proper these aspects are still bound into one. But here this unity breaks down into the two aspects. On the one side stands the most sublime poetry, with the other side constituted by finite poetry. In relation to what is symbolic, we can say that in finite poetry nature is divested of divinity; that the world, natural objects, worldly circumstances, as finite, are set over against essential being. The

141 Greeks tell | about the voyage of the Argonauts that the rocks of the narrows of the Hellespont, which at other times opened and closed like scissors, became stationary.<sup>131</sup> Here<sup>132</sup> we are dealing in the same way with the finite becoming fixed, whereas in the symbolic intuition nothing is fixed, the finite changes over into the divine, and the divine enters into existence.

The aspect of sacred poetry is a form sufficiently familiar to us from the Bible. The Bible's chief contents are its praises of God's majesty, in contrast to which what is outside of God is just ornamentation, is something that has

131. Hotho added 'when the heroes were sailing through them'. These rocks are the Symplegades, which are at the entrance to the Bosphorus (the Black Sea), not at the Hellespont, which links the Mediterranean to the Sea of Marmora. Hegel's sources here are: Pindar's *Fourth Pythian Ode*, 210–11, and Apollonius of Rhodes' epic, the *Argonautica* 2.604–6. See the Loeb Classical Library volumes: Pindar, vol. 1; *Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes*, ed. and trans. William H. Race (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1997), pp. 286–7; Apollonius Rhodius, *The Argonautica*, trans. R. D. Seaton (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1912, repr. 1980), pp. 142–3.

132. Hotho added 'in sacred poetry'.

to worship God. All living things owe their strength to God's goodness alone and become as nothing in face of God's power. The Old Testament contains many examples for us of this grandeur; these descriptions involve God's majesty and grandeur. The finest examples are found in the Psalms, for instance Psalm 104. [130] The One is the Lord over all things; natural things are not God's presence, but instead are powerless, non-essential beings (*Akzidenzien*). This is indeed a prosaic relationship of separation; the separation of the essential being, on one side, from the natural thing as only appearance in contrast to it, as just something it allows to appear. In this portrayal of the Lord, finitude stands on the other side but in such a way that inward individuality has its beginning. The Indian, as a person, is nothing. In sublime poetry individuals do indeed feel themselves to be dependent on the Lord, but in another respect also to be independent. This independence is evident in the spontaneous bravery of the Arabs. This outgrowth of existence is one of its chief features—delight and enjoyment as gifts of the Lord, and their passing away. Here there is the same limited sphere of the symbolic as such. | In Psalm 90 in particular this content is transitoriness, in the way transitoriness is also expressed in the book of Job,<sup>133</sup> where the sudden reversal is directly linked to the fear of the Lord. Here the content is, on the whole, even more limited than in the symbol proper with its striving toward the spiritual. The separation is completed in the sphere of sacred poetry; the spiritual stands on one side and the finite in its fixity on the other side. This relationship of the human being to God is the simple one of fear, and extolling it simply means obedience. The relationship no longer has the infinite extent of the conversion of the spiritual into what is material.

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### 3. The Figurative Shape of the Meaning

Now we have to speak about the connection of the meaning with the outward shape, such that the meaning is now set, as is the sensible shape, which is more or less adequate to it. This sphere is something symbolic only in a figurative sense. It is, to be sure, the third sphere as distinct from the first two spheres. So this connection is indeed totality, although these two aspects are not yet reciprocally pervasive; instead each is posited on its own. [131] This relationship is more prosaic and provides only figurative forms of art.

133. See n. 125, p. 296. However, the content fits better with, for instance, Psalms 102:11, 'My days are like an evening shadow; I wither away like grass.' The parallel allusion could be to chapters 1, 2, 6, and 9 of Job.

The content can only be a limited one. In sacred poetry there is the infinite aspect on the one hand, and the finite aspect on the other, and this finite aspect is expressed as something transitory. Yet should the spiritual aspect have its likeness in the other aspect, which is posited as finite, the meaning too can only be of a limited kind, for the infinite does not yet have its adequate shape in what is pictorial. This entire sphere can be called the sphere of the simile. The meaning is expressed by itself, just as is the aspect of the expression of this meaning. Here the forms are just subordinate ones | and, in the greater works of art they are to be used only for singular instances. Subordinate art forms therefore belong to this group. It is often difficult to classify these art forms. For example, where should we put the fables of Aesop, the didactic poem, and so forth? These are hybrid kinds, and they express no necessary aspect of art. The procedure in aesthetics is like the procedure in natural science, where one must not establish subdivisions according to what is simply there; instead, the concept must be established and the particular cases must arrange themselves in accord with the concept. It is then evident that many of the particular cases are not commensurate with the concept, and this is not the concept's fault. We cannot be definitive about these hybrid natures. The fables of Aesop are one such hybrid form. Also belonging here are parables, comparisons, and images; and at this point one has to speak about such things. Therefore we have to speak, first of all, about these forms.

#### a. Fable and Related Forms

We are familiar with fables. Yet fable is for the most part erroneously defined. Lessing too scarcely grasped the correct concept, as we see from the fables of recent times.<sup>134</sup> It is not in fact the case that Aesop's fables set forth a moral proposition in an example involving animals.<sup>135</sup> [132] Originally

134. See Gotthold Ephraim Lessings *Fabeln*, in three books, together with treatises having content related to this literary art (Berlin, 1759); Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Paul Rilla, 10 vols. (2nd edn.; Berlin and Weimar, 1968), vol. 5.

135. The fables attributed to Aesop (who is said to have lived in the 6th century BC) were compiled in the late 13th century by the Greek Orthodox monk, Maximus Planudes, in his *Corpus Fabularum Aesopiarum*. See the edition *Aesopische Fabeln*, in Greek and German, ed. A. Hausrath (Munich, 1940). Lessing translated into German a 1757 work by the English novelist Samuel Richardson, on 'The Fables of Aesop, with Moral Teachings and Considerations'. Despite his criticism of Lessing, Hegel's interpretation of Aesop's fables reflects Lessing's interpretation of the use of animal figures. According to Lessing, the animal figures encompass 'the little sphere of those sorts of beings...from which one knows reliably that these and no other ideas originate, even without knowing what to call them' (*Gesammelte Werke* 5:390). The linking of animal figures with a moral message gives rise to Lessing's definition of

fable took up some kind of natural occurrence insofar as it relates to animals' instincts, and interjected a general moral sense so that a phenomenon of animal life is therefore transposed into a moral sensibility. Let us take, as an example, a more recent fable that depicts two marmots, one of which gathers food while the other one does not and, reduced to begging, starves. This involves a falsehood, for there are no marmots that supposedly do not store up food. So this runs counter to the ancient sense of a fable. For the portrayal | must only portray what is present in actual facts about the animal.<sup>136</sup> Aesop's fables interpret an actual natural phenomenon, and that is why they are of interest. For example, swallows depart in the autumn when the hemp seed ripens, for in winter birds are captured in nets made of hemp. The clever swallow flies away then, and other birds are captured.<sup>137</sup> So here the bases are natural phenomena. These phenomena need not even be taken solely from the animal realm. It is not even necessary for the natural circumstances to appear directly, as they do for example in the fable of 'The Fox and the Raven'.<sup>138</sup> For it is a well-known instinct of the raven that it begins to croak when it spots an animal or a human being. We do not know which fables are in fact from Aesop; often Aesop is cited without specific narratives being ascribed to him. Only the fable of 'The Scarab and the Eagle' is specifically ascribed to Aesop.<sup>139</sup> A great many fables are poorly devised and worked out. As a rule, this form is meager in its scope; it portrays a general reflection in something naturally existing. This is not a free form; it is even ascribed to a slave<sup>140</sup> as its author. [133] The subject

fable as facilitating the recognition of a 'universal moral proposition, intuited' in a 'particular instance' (S:385).

136. Hegel is describing the theme of the first fable in the first of the books of fables produced by Jean de la Fontaine (1621–95), entitled *Fables choisies, mises en vers* (*Selected Fables, Set in Verse*), six of which were published in 1668, five in 1678–9, and a final one in 1694. The characters there are actually Grille and Ameise, in the fable of 'The Cicada and the Ant'.

137. See the eighteenth fable, 'The Swallow and Other Birds', in Richardson's collection (pp. 34–6 in Lessing's translation).

138. The thirteenth fable in Richardson (pp. 26–9 in Lessing's translation).

139. Aristophanes appears to make this attribution in his play *Wasps* (v. 1446–7), where he says Aesop speaks of 'the beetle'. See Moses Hadas, ed., *The Complete Plays of Aristophanes* (New York, 1992), p. 182. There is a paraphrase of the fable in J. H. Voß, *Aristophanes* . . . , vol. 2 (Braunschweig, 1821), p. 11. The fable also appears in Planudes, *Corpus Fabularum*, 3.1.c.

140. After 'slave', Hotho added 'to a misshapen hunchback'. Aesop is presumed to have been a manumitted slave from Samos who later won great respect as an envoy of king Croesus. Also a slave was the Roman fabulist Phaedrus (died c. AD 50), who came from Macedonia to Rome as a slave, was freed there by Augustus and, borrowing from Aesop, independently compiled his five books of fables (in iambic hexameter, corresponding to the Greek trimeter). The 'application' Hegel mentions in the following sentence in the text is a later addition to Aesop's fables as first compiled in the eleventh century by Byzantine writers.

matter is given,<sup>141</sup> and the general proposition is given out to be understood only in a physical<sup>142</sup> sense, or else it is expressly added on in a practical application. The fable has merit when the phenomenon is in accord with nature. If it is just a general reflection dressed up, then the configuration is mere means and the animal or the figure acts not in its own characteristic way but instead as mere means. And this is antithetical to art. |

145 'Reynard the Fox' is no fable but is instead a fairy tale, and it is dressed up ingeniously.<sup>143</sup> It portrays comical wickedness. We see a court with an infirm king. In this case the animal figure is highly appropriate, and the animals directly come on the scene depicted in their distinctiveness. So an amusing portrayal derives from the mixing of animal actions and bamboozled human beings; it is a jest of a genuine kind. Together with the fable we can mention the riddle or conundrum. It can be the topic of sculpture, of painting, or of speech. In the East there was an earlier form, which was very popular. Ordinary riddles are still widespread. In the verbal conundrum as it was in the East, features and qualities are juxtaposed in such a way that they exhibit something distinctively incongruous, and so they intimate that they involve a deeper meaning. Such a portrayal is self-destructive, since its truth is its meaning alone.

The parable is directly related to the fable, for parable differs only in that its portrayal is taken from ordinary life, in such a way that this portrayal is said to make vivid a general meaning. There are numerous parables among Aesop's fables. One practical parable is the story about Cyrus, who assembled his Persians with spades and hoes to clear a field of thorns, and on another day gave them a sumptuous feast; he made the comparison that a day of servitude is like the field-clearing, and a day of freedom is like the day of feasting.<sup>144</sup> [134] There are also many parables in the narratives of the

141. Hotho added 'is an existing natural phenomenon'.

142. Hotho changed 'a physical' to 'an artful'.

143. Presumably the reference is to Goethe's character, Reynard the Fox, who first appeared in *Goethes Neue Schriften*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1794); see *Werke* 2:285–436. Goethe knew this subject matter from the edition of Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–66). Reynard was the hero of satirical medieval animal stories, in many of which his cunning allowed him to outwit Isengrim the Wolf. An early version, by one Heinrich, is a poem of 2,000 lines in Middle High German. Gottsched, drawing upon a text from 1498, as well as Protestant glosses on it from the sixteenth century, published his *Heinrichs von Alkmar Reineke der Fuchs...* (Leipzig and Amsterdam, 1752). Hegel's characterization refers to Herder's sketch in his *Reinecke, der Fuchs*, which first appeared in *Zerstreute Blätter*, fifth collection (Gotha, 1793), pp. 219–28; *Sämtliche Werke* 16:218–22. Hegel's reference is also specifically to Goethe's version, which portrays Reynard as a 'scoundrel', not as a trickster.

144. This story is in Herodotus, *The History* 1.125–6; Grene, pp. 92–3. [Tr.] There the story tells of how Cyrus persuaded his fellow Persians to revolt against rule by Astyages, king of the Medes.

New Testament. Goethe too has many parables.<sup>145</sup> The apologue is likewise related to the fable, with the difference that the story itself conveys the teaching. One such apologue is that of 'The God and the Bayadere', in which the bayadere can be viewed as the Christian Mary Magdalene.<sup>146</sup> 'The Digger for Treasure' is likewise an apologue.<sup>147</sup> A people's proverbial sayings can also be viewed as brief fables or parables; they express particular features and teachings with a general significance. Examples are 'One hand washes the other', and 'Grill me a sausage and I will quench your thirst'. Goethe too has coined a number of them, sayings of endless charm and often replete with great profundity.<sup>148</sup>

In all these forms, therefore, a general meaning is portrayed in something natural, and such a portrayal constitutes a whole by itself. The portrayals belong, for the most part, to verbal art. Attaching itself to them is a form more suited to pictorial art. This is allegory. It has a sensible subject matter with a meaning that in this case is an abstraction, a general representation that portrays itself sensibly. The individual figure here is the portrayal of a subject, but the meaning by itself is an abstraction; it is no individuality for its own sake, but is an abstraction such as war, peace, hope, religion, faith. Sculpture must often have recourse to allegory. Yet on the whole sculpture is cold because its content is just something intelligible, is an abstraction, not a full-blown subjectivity. But sculpture also uses allegory more as an accompaniment, not taking it as the main thing. Poets do wrong in having recourse to allegory. [135]

### b. Comparison

After allegory we mention, in addition, metaphor and comparison. A *metaphor* is a quite brief symbol concentrated in an image. Speech is, as a rule,

145. Presumably this refers to the materials under the heading *Parabolisch* ('figurative' or 'allegorical') in Goethe, *Werke* 2:193–208 (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1815–19), 2:193–208; see *Sämtliche Werke* 1:396–406, 569–78. Also, on 'Parable', see *Werke* 1:354.

146. See Goethe's poem, 'Der Gott und die Bajadere. Indische Legende', in the *Musenalmach* für das Jahr 1798, ed. Friedrich Schiller (Tübingen, 1798), pp. 188–93; Goethe, *Werke* 1:354. [Tr.] The bayadere is a dancer in a Hindu temple, evidently a person of low social regard like Mary Magdalene in the Bible. An apologue is an allegorical narrative with a moral message.

147. This narrative, 'Der Schatzgräber', also by Goethe, appeared in the same *Musenalmach*; see *Werke* 1:265–6.

148. The second of these aphorisms in the preceding sentence has more punch in its rhyming form in German: 'Brätst du mir eine Wurst, so lösch ich Dir den Durst'. Mention of Goethe perhaps refers to the rubrics he adopted in the second volume of the *Werke* of 1815–19: 'God, Heart, and World', and 'Proverbial'. See also, in vol. 3 of his 1827 edition of his own works, the collection of 'Worldview-like Poems' under the general heading 'God and World' (*Werke* 1:357 ff.).

147 metaphorical. Examples are the words 'conception' and 'grasp'. From the sensible | meaning, what is spiritual has extrapolated an analogy to that meaning. In metaphor, what it is supposed to signify must be given via the interrelationship. It is noteworthy that modern style and the style of classical antiquity are distinct in particular because of the use of metaphor; since the style in antiquity, especially the prosaic style, called for the actual expressions, whereas more modern authors are replete with metaphors—especially in poetic works. The metaphorical does of course become more frequent in Roman works. The *comparison* is a more developed metaphor; it is the unity of an image and a meaning. The meaning need not be added on as such but instead can become clear of its own accord. For example, 'Muhammad's Song' by Goethe is self-explanatory. The entire poem is a comparison; the title exhibits the meaning.<sup>149</sup> There are a great many such comparisons in which the meaning is given in a simple fashion. In a more specifically executed comparison the meaning is given as distinct from the image.

One can ask, then: What need is there for comparison? Comparison can become tedious if the meaning is already clear by itself; and if comparison is used excessively, it is tasteless—the excess of a poet who is, on the whole, mediocre. So in Ovid we find an excessive number of comparisons.<sup>150</sup> Often comparisons are excellent and witty. The chief concern of the comparison is that spirit or the heart not stay too attached to concern for the topic that progresses of its own accord. This progression is [136] interrupted by the comparison. This interruption often ought to be the aim, in order to bring  
148 spirit out of its practical concern and into a | theoretical state, into a contemplative state that distances one from immersion in that concern, a state in which the content becomes objective. So comparisons are important in the case of passion. In comparison, much can be said that is formal and external, much that is not just one's own circumstance. The main thing is that comparison pulls us away from practical concern and transposes us into what the poet has interjected for us, so that we participate in it ourselves with our whole being. We are caught up in the subject matter ourselves. The comparison interrupts the topic's progression. It can be difficult for us because it limits us to, and transposes us into, the distinctively artistic temper of interest-free, theoretical consideration.<sup>151</sup> Comparison leads us away

149. This reference is not to the first version stemming from 1772–3 and appearing in the 1774 *Musenalmanach* under the title 'Song', but instead to the 1777 manuscript, 'Muhammad's Song', revised for Frau von Stein and then preserved; *Werke* 1:42–4.

150. The reference is to the *Metamorphoses* of Publius Ovidius Naso (43 BC – AD 17/18).

151. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 2 and 5; vol. 5 of *Immanuel Kant: Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 23 vols. (Berlin, 1910–55); *Critique of Judgment*,



from the inward and leads us outwardly to the shape, to lingering with the outward appearance of this content. So it produces the effect that constitutes artistic sensibility, namely, intuiting free of interest, theoretical intuiting.

In leading us over into the theoretical sphere, comparison can<sup>152</sup> also lead to something lifeless, since it can neglect the topic and proceed to another content. We see this with the greatest frequency in Ossian. He sings of times that are no more. The entire portrayal is inspired by this sadness about what is bygone.<sup>153</sup> He very often repeats a comparison to the sun at twilight. This is a turning-away from the topic itself, a freeing of oneself from it.

Most interesting to note are comparisons with respect to dramatic art. Drama's topic is struggle, the passions—activity, acquaintance | with accomplishment and action, pathos, the accomplishing of what is sought after. The characters themselves appear directly; no third party—the poet—portrays them; there is no narration, for the characters themselves portray themselves. [137] Here even more naturalness seems to be called for. After people in Germany had become bored with French taste, they cried out for naturalness. They looked upon the Spanish and the Italians as mere performers who gave voice, in the characters and situations, to their own subjective power of imagination and wit right where the mightiest passions rule. People also found fault with this aspect in Shakespeare, the fact that in the characters' greatest distress he has them speak in comparisons. An epigram in *Der Wandsbecker Bote* expresses this point by comparing Voltaire and Shakespeare.<sup>154</sup> 149

trans. J. H. Bernard (New York, 1951), pp. 38–9, 43–5. Hegel's characterization of aesthetic consideration as 'theoretical' refers to Kant's definition of the judgment of taste as 'sheerly contemplative'.

152. Hotho added 'seem to'.

153. Hegel follows Herder, who characterizes Ossian as 'the last voice of heroic times for feeble posterity... the voice of previous times; yet a mournful voice'; see 'Homer und Ossian', in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan et al., 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1967–8), 18:100.

154. [Tr.] *Der Wandsbecker Bote* was a popular journal, edited during 1771–5 by Matthias Claudius (1740–1815); prominent writers (Herder, Klopstock, Lessing) contributed to it. The journal advocated a natural, rather than a rationalist or classical, approach to literature. In it the epigram reads: 'Comparison / Voltaire and Shakespeare: the one / Is what the other seems / Master Arouet [Voltaire] says 'I weep'; / And Shakespeare weeps.' See Matthias Claudius, *Asmus omnia sua secum portans, oder Sämtliche Werke des Wandsbecker Boten*, pts. I and II (Hamburg, 1775), p. 153; *M. Claudius: Sämtliche Werke* (Munich, 1968), p. 69. In the German, the last words of the two lines rhyme: 'seems' (*scheint*) and 'weeps' (*weint*). Instead of 'the other' in the first line, Hotho has 'the one'.

*The one is what the other only seems,  
Master Arvelle says: 'I weep', and the other weeps.*

One makes the feeling just something rhetorical; the other portrays it.

In another respect, however, people also reproached Shakespeare because his comparisons, his dialogue, could not be called the immediacy of feeling. We have to examine in particular the sense of comparisons in this regard. What is noteworthy here is that the Spanish, especially Calderón, and the English, especially Shakespeare, use figures of speech but do so precisely to represent the noble nature of those carrying out the action.<sup>155</sup> Although they are caught up in interests, the characters are portrayed in exalted language, for they | stand above their interests and relate to them as to something objective. This is the disposition of a noble nature, upholding itself<sup>156</sup> within its own circumstances. It is portrayed above all formally, by a simile. The characters themselves are portrayed as poets, as shapers of the subject matter. Shakespeare in particular is rich in such aspects. One example is *Romeo and Juliet*. [138] Juliet says to the night: 'Come, propitious night' and so on.<sup>157</sup> This is a notion of love that does not merely express longing as such, but occupies itself objectively with it.

To be more specific, we can bring in three characteristics. First of all, when we have before us a heart grasped by profound feeling, we can represent this to ourselves as its crying out in its distress. This can appear to be the ordinary response. Second, when such a heart is aware of its distress it can, so to speak, be immobile, be unwilling to express to itself the pain of its distress, and instead it remains caught up within itself. So long as the heart does this, the subject and the feeling are still two different things; if the heart cries out it is directly overcome. Third, when the heart suppresses the pain it stands above the pain, and it can still occupy itself with something other that relates to the feeling and is a form of it. In *Henry IV*, for instance, Percy is at odds with Henry, and Henry kills him. The messenger from the battle reports this slaughter to Percy's father, Northumberland.<sup>158</sup> 'Thou tremblest,' says the

155. We find an example comparing these two, William Shakespeare (1564–1616) and Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–81), in August Wilhelm Schlegel's *Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur* (1809; 2nd edn. 1817); *Kritische Ausgabe*, introduced and with notes, by Giovanni Battista Amoretti, vol. 2 (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923), pp. 109–14.

156. Horho added 'as being-present-to-self'.

157. *Romeo and Juliet*, Act 3, Scene 2, lines 10–13: 'Come, civil night, / Thou sober-suited matron, all in black, / And learn me how to lose a winning match, / Play'd for a pair of stainless maidenhoods. ...'; *Complete Works*, p. 263.

158. These statements, and those in the following sentences of the text, refer to Shakespeare's *King Henry the Fourth Part I*, Act 5, Scene 4, and *King Henry the Fourth Part II*, Act. 1, Scene 1. The stage direction to line 76 (in *Part I*) says 'The prince killeth Percy', and lines 86–8 say 'Percy,

old man, 'and the whiteness of thy cheek' is a | sign, and so forth. He does not allow the messenger to speak out; he sees his own distress and does not cry out but instead makes it vivid in a simile with Priam. The soul still recoils from the distress, and this provides a representation of the higher nature of such a character. A different example is in *Richard II*, when Richard 'meets with Henry IV before the nobles of the realm. Henry says, 'King Richard, give me your crown.' Richard replies, 'Take it, grasp it with the other, I with the one hand. It is like a deep well where water is dipped out alternately, one bucket [139] below, full of water, the other dancing in the air' and so on.<sup>159</sup> In his grief Richard also thus proves to be a noble nature.

The English art critics reproach Shakespeare for these features, the very ones that demonstrate how great is his talent. Since the comparison thus occupies a position where the heart still does not wish to be one with its distress, the other aspect is that in which the heart, in its distress, frees itself by a comparison. In Shakespeare this is usually the case with wrongdoers, those he portrays as endowed with great freedom of spirit. For example Macbeth, who commits a series of horrible acts, finally seeing that he is done for, | cries: 'Out with me, brief light! A light is only a poor shadow, a player who knocks about for an hour and then is heard no more.'<sup>160</sup> It is likewise in *Henry VIII*, with the cardinal who is deposed from his high position, and at his end declares: 'I say to you a long farewell, all my greatness. The human being sprouts today, blossoms, and on the third day

thou art dust, / And food for— / For worms, brave Percy'. The marginal note in the German translation of Shakespeare references *King Henry the Fourth Part II*, Act 1, Scene 1, lines 68–75. Lines 68–9 read: 'I ran from Shrewsbury, my noble lord, / Where hateful death put on his ugliest mask. . . .' See *Complete Works*, pp. 446, 450. [Tr.] In these passages, Henry, Prince of Wales, kills Henry Percy (Hotspur), whose father, also named Henry Percy, is the Earl of Northumberland. The Earl turns (lines 74–80 in *Part II*) to comparing his distress with that of Priam (see below in our text), a distress recounted in numerous passages of Book 24 of *The Iliad*; Lattimore, pp. 497–518.

159. See *King Richard the Second*, Act 4, Scene 1, lines 181–9, which reads, with Richard speaking: 'Give me the crown—Here, cousin, seize the crown; / Here, cousin: / On this side my hand, and on that side yours. / Now is this golden crown like a deep well / That owes two buckets, filling one another; / The emptier ever dancing in the air, / The other down, unseen, and full of water: / That bucket down and full of tears am I, / Drinking my griefs, whilst you mount up on high' (*Complete Works*, pp. 379–80). Hotho's citation in the margin is to the Schlegel/Tieck translation of Shakespeare.

160. This is a paraphrase of *Macbeth*, Act 5, Scene 5, lines 23–6: 'Out, out, brief candle! / Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player, / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, / And then is heard no more. . . .' (*Complete Works*, p. 882). In a marginal note Hotho added a citation from Schiller's theatrical adaptation of *Macbeth* (Tübingen, 1801), Act 5, Scene 6, lines 24–8, with minor departures from the punctuation; Schiller, *Werke* 13:156 (lines 2156–60).

a frost of the roots approaches and he falls as I do'.<sup>161</sup> By such a treatment the poet at the same time lifts the base character above his passions. In this same play Queen Catharine says: 'I am the unhappiest one: like the lily that blossomed as queen of the field, I will lower my head and die.'<sup>162</sup>

The English art critics find this unnatural; yet precisely by such comparisons the poet portrays the characters for us as making their situation into an object. In the same vein, Brutus says splendidly to Cassius: 'O Cassius, you are paired with a lamb; you nurture the fire no differently than a flint.'<sup>163</sup>

In being able to make a comparison, Brutus demonstrates the very same transition [by making his situation into an object for himself]. [140]

We could have mentioned at this point other works of art of this kind, ones that are imperfect. In them we see reality and meaning posited on their own. When the two are separate, when an abstract meaning is taken on its own and furnished with artistic | adornment, then the result is what we call didactic poetry. Hesiod is an example of it, and Virgil is too.<sup>164</sup> Here an abstract meaning is made an object on its own and the configuration is in verse, is an elevated speech, progressing briskly and interwoven with narratives. The portrayal is merely external adornment and the meaning is a content of intellectual reflection. The descriptive poetry stands over against this content. Immediacy ought to be portrayed in the way it would appear to ordinary consciousness. Such sensible content belongs to the aspect of external appearance, an aspect that ought only appear in the work of art as form or as image of the spiritual, or else, in the case of subjectivity in action, as conditioning its reaction. When this subject matter in keeping with its immediacy is made the topic, all sorts of adornment can also be applied to this form but that is no true work of art. These are hybrid kinds of art forms.

161. In *King Henry the Eighth*, Act 3, Scene 2, lines 351–8, Cardinal Woolsey declares: 'Farewell, a long farewell, to all my greatness! / This is the state of man: to-day he puts forth / The tender leaves of hope; to-morrow blossoms, / And bears his blushing honours thick upon him; / The third day comes a frost, a killing frost, / And—when he thinks, good easy man, full surely / His greatness is a-ripening—nips his root, / And then he falls, as I do' (*Complete Works*, p. 1182).

162. *King Henry the Eighth*, Act 3, Scene 1, lines 143–51: 'What will become of me now, wretched lady! / I am the most unhappy woman living. / ... like the lily, / That once was mistress of the field and flourisht, / I'll hang my head and perish' (*Complete Works*, p. 1177).

163. *Julius Caesar*, Act. 4, Scene 3, lines 110–13: 'O Cassius, you are yoked with a lamb / That carries anger as the flint bears fire; / Who, much enforced, shows a hasty spark, / And straight is cold again' (*Complete Works*, p. 603).

164. Hegel is presumably referring to Hesiod's *Works and Days*, and to Virgil's *Georgics*, a didactic epic in hexameter verse. See *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia*, ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2006), pp. 86–153; *Virgil*, ed. and trans., H. R. Fairclough, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1916), 1:80–237.

## B. THE CLASSICAL ART FORM

Now that we have examined the nature of the first form, we turn to classical art.

Previously we characterized classical art as the consummate art form, the one in which content and form themselves are adequate and in which they correspond to what is universal and its particularization. Symbolic art struggles for content and form, neither of which is free. For the whole to be free it is necessary that the different aspects by themselves be an independent | totality, because both aspects are then identical and they are only formally distinct. [141] 154

### 1. The Presuppositions of Free Art

The whole is free too because its parts are themselves<sup>165</sup> adequate. The reality is commensurate with its concept, with the concept that, in the reality, just passes into a new form. In symbolic art the content is not free, nor is the shape free that is said to be just signifying, that has aspects suited to the concept but others that do not conform to it. For there to be meaning there must be distortion; for the subject matter to be regarded as meaningful, violence must have been done to it. In the case of sacred poetry the shape is just non-essential (*Akzidens*); the supreme being is power and the shape of the poetry is just external embellishment, is a matter of indifference and is negligible. There is always a mode of the reality in which the absolute content as such does not appear. In the relative forms of the symbolic the relationship is only external. Classical art is the absolute union of both aspects. This unity is no original unity, is not the idea as natural existence but instead is a unity engendered from spirit; the work of art is produced from circumspection. Classical art is freedom within the content. Its content is spirit in its freedom. Spirit exists only as freedom and is free only in the shape appropriate to it, the shape in which it itself appears, and in no other. So the shape is free too, since in the concept the shape has nothing that is other to it.

The artist of this free art is, | by the same token, the free artist. The artist knows what he wants and is capable of what he wants. The artist knows what he wants, and in the substantial content can no longer be unclear to himself; he does not struggle for the absolute content, and is not 155

165. Hotho changed 'its parts are themselves' to 'the whole is'.

something fermenting from which the meaning just issues forth. The free artist is formative, whereas the symbolic artist is fanciful. The content is already complete and the free artist need [142] not struggle for it. In symbolic art, the artist runs through all sorts of forms and sets no limits for himself. The free artist is internally resolute and must also be technically prepared.<sup>166</sup> He always has for his object a content that is existent-in-and-for-itself, for there is an ideal that is suited to the concept. The concept is determined in-and-for-itself, and so too is the shape. This rules out caprice on the artist's part because the content is present at hand for the artist, who comes upon it, and the artist is only the subjective activity of portraying, is formative as such. In this formative activity the artist certainly also gives the content further shape, but imperceptibly so, inconspicuously, by seeming only to execute what is already complete on its own. The Greek artists took their subject matter from the people's religion. Phidias took his Jupiter from Homer.<sup>167</sup> In the same way the Christian artists Raphael and Dante just represented what was present in the church.<sup>168</sup> The subject matter is something already complete on its own; the artist works on it, portraying it sensuously.

166. Hotho later added in the margin:

- a) freely formative in the content
- b) shape
- c) technique

167. The reference is to the *Olympian Zeus*, a statue executed prior to 432 BC by Phidias (ca. 460–430 BC) and described by Strabo (ca. 63–20 BC) in C353 of Book Eight of his *Geographika*: see *The Geography of Strabo*, trans. Horace L. Jones, 8 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927, repr. 1968), 4:86–9 (= 8.3.30). Its image was reproduced on coins. The *Olympian Zeus* ranks second only to the *Athena Parthenos* among the works of Phidias. These two gigantic statues were fashioned from gold and ivory, and the Zeus statue at Olympia was counted among the Seven Wonders of the World. According to a legendary tradition from late antiquity, the originals of these works were said to have been transported to Constantinople; they have not survived. Pliny the Elder (AD 23–79) also reports, in his *Natural History*, 36.18 about the colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia; see *Natural History*, vol. 10, trans. D. E. Eichholz (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1962, repr. 1971), pp. 14–15. Hegel possessed an edition of Pliny's *Historiae naturalis libri XXXVII* (Leyden, 1635; repr. Stuttgart, 1967). See also the *Description of Greece*, 1.18.6–9 by Pausanias (2nd century AD), trans. W. H. S. Jones, 5 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1918–35; repr. 1977–9), 1:88–93. Hegel possessed this work in a three-volume edition, *Pausaniae Graeciae descriptio* (Leipzig, 1818). Hegel's reference to Homer is to be understood in the general sense of Herodotus' statement that the Greeks took the representations, and accordingly the pictorial portrayal, of their gods from the poets Homer and Hesiod; see Herodotus, *The History*, 2.53 (Greene, pp. 154–5).

168. On Dante, see n. 44, p. 208 in this text. Raphael—Raffaello Santi (1483–1520)—produced numerous madonnas as well as other paintings on biblical topics.

The other aspect is that for the classical artist the technical aspect must be complete too. A feature of free art is that the sensible material in which the artist works must be responsive to the representation; the material effect must be subject to the representation; it must contain nothing resistant on its own but must instead subordinate itself to the conception. The artist attains this submissive material efficacy, or skillfulness, solely by practice. To be of service, these technical preparations in which the individual trains must have already reached a high level. They permit the artist to bring about only what is required. This perfection of technique is achieved by [143] workmanship (*das Handwerksmäßige*); and the development of it merely by workmanship takes place in a static art. Egyptian art is this kind of art. Their pictures and statuary involve a specific and constantly repeated model. This period of workmanlike art is an aspect that must precede free art and is possible only in earlier periods. In more modern times painting has advanced so far that static practices are a thing of the past.

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## 2. The General Character of Classical Art

The presuppositions of free art are that, within itself, it achieves its content and the aspect of reality. But the practice of free art is then at the same time an advance in both of these aspects. After these observations we have then to ask more specifically (while confining ourselves at this point to its substantial element): What is in general the character of classical art? The gods are this substantial element. This divine element in its supreme freedom must then also be reflected in the particular art forms. We will consider their variety only later on. Here we have first to consider what is substantially beautiful. We have already examined the nature of this beauty. For its absolute content it does not have the spiritual in its abstract spirituality of thought; instead it has the spiritual as spiritual subjectivity. This is already declared in the myth of Oedipus.<sup>169</sup> Spirit is self-revealing and self-manifesting in a revelatory way; it is the self-determining, free universal. But its determination involves the aspect of existence, of being-for-another. In its determination, in its existence, spirit is what is existent-as-present-to-itself.

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169. The interpretation of the myth refers to Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, v. 449–62, the speech of Teiresias, who presents Oedipus' fate as already known to the gods and to the seer. The first indication came in v. 362, where Teiresias revealed to Oedipus that he himself is the murderer whom he seeks. See also verses 711–25, 788–93, and 1170 ff., which highlight the unconditional desire of the tragic figure to know the truth about himself; Grene and Lattimore, 2:26, 42–3, 45, 62–3.

Therefore spirit is as such the concept in its reality, the reality that thus has its meaning in itself, the inwardness that enters into externality and, in this externality, is present to itself. [144]

*a. Spiritual Subjectivity in Its Appearance: The Human Figure and Anthropomorphic Mythology*

Subjective spirituality is what until now we called the meaning, and here the meaning has the power to exhibit itself in its appearance. More specifically, this appearance then determines itself in such a way that the shape can only be the human figure, because what is spiritual can reveal itself in the human figure alone. Here the shape is no longer symbolic but is instead the appearance of spirit, the determination of spirit, its emergence out into existence. The sensible shape of the human being is alone that in which spirit is able to appear. The sensible shape is significant in itself; what it signifies is the spirit that emerges within it. The sensible shape is something bodily, something material, and in this aspect it is different from spirit; yet this form of what is material is the appearance of the spiritual. The human figure is not only living, like the animal, for this figure is the mirror of spirit. The eye is not only outward-looking, for by the eye we see into the single soul. The development of this nucleus (*Keim*) is the living formation of the configuration, and the body is therefore not only a symbol of spirit; instead, in the body spirit is directly present for others. So the other aspect is that the content [for classical art] is complete and, as such, only can appear in the human figure. Demonstrating this would be the business of physiology. The human figure is the necessary shape of the spirit that appears within sensible existence. From this perspective we can also consider the view | that art has taken the human figure it happened upon and has replicated it, so that this replication appears to be a matter of chance. However, the human figure is the only necessary and possible one. The spiritual presents itself in it alone. That is because in the human figure, as in a mode of the sensible aspect of spirit, the body is no longer a symbol. The body expresses nothing other to itself, signifies nothing foreign to it, for instead its meaning appears on the surface itself. In a symbol, only a [145] part of the meaning corresponds to the symbol. This is not so with the human body. The whole of the physical body is of course not so significant for the expression of spirit as is the face.

The Greeks have been severely reproached for their mythology being anthropomorphic; Xenophanes of course opposed anthropomorphism, saying: 'Were lions the depictees, they would have given their gods a lion



shape'.<sup>170</sup> But we can say right away that Greek religion is not sufficiently anthropomorphic for a religion, since in the Christian religion God is a wholly immediate, single individual within all the conditions of existence and is no mere ideal. If we have only an abstract representation of the absolute, defined just as the One, then its configuration becomes a non-issue. However, appearing as a human being belongs to God as spirit, else God is not spirit. The anthropomorphic element is therefore something essential in the true concept of the divine nature. For religion, the Greek god is not sufficiently human. Greek religion proceeds only to the point of initial spirituality and not to infinite spirituality; for infinite spirituality involves the spiritual itself having purified and mediated its spirituality, whereas | Greek spirituality is an immediate spirituality and so is something intermediate between what is absolutely free and what is merely natural.<sup>171</sup> Absolute spirituality involves the fully complete antithesis. With this antithesis it is necessary for the aspect of the singularity of subjectivity to have proceeded to the point of the temporal, full externality of existence, for God to be represented as existing human being, although not as merely an ideal human being. Instead, in order to draw back from this extreme state of the antithesis, the aspect of subjectivity involves its being immediate, natural existence. For the Greeks the sensible feature did not die, was not put to death, but instead remains, since they have not proceeded to the point of free spirituality, have not driven the antithesis to its depths and reconciled it. [146] Thus the anthropomorphism is no accidental feature. Nevertheless there is always opposition to it. In this regard the French say, wittily: 'God has created human beings in God's own image, and human beings have played the same game and fashioned God in the image of a human being.'<sup>172</sup>

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### *b. The Transition from Symbolic Religion to Classical Art*

Therefore classical art as such is the focus. We have to explicate the content of classical art more specifically, in its elements. So far we have spoken about

170. The Greek philosopher Xenophanes (6th century BC) is reported by Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 5.109.3) to have said: 'But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves'; quoted from G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983), p. 169. Hegel possessed an edition of Xenophanes.

171. Hotho added 'is not subjective'.

172. No specific text could be cited for this statement attributed to French wit.

the presuppositions of this content. The content itself has these presuppositions; in part they point to the transition [from symbolic art], in part they themselves are a part of the content. The reason why the presuppositions are necessary is that the abstract form of being-for-itself—namely, subjectivity, infinity within itself—belongs to what is spiritual, and this involves the fact that, in virtue of the sublation, there is an other to this subjectivity that exists in time and is therefore something past. The moments unfold in time and so fall outside one another. What being-for-self has for its object, what by its sublation is for the first time subjectivity, this first moment, is then not nature as such. Instead there is indeed a first that is the existence of the spiritual content—what, partly as pantheism, we considered to be symbolic art. It is the first form of art, the fermentation of the unity that is not yet absolutely determined and settled. What is first here is thus not nature as such, but is instead the art forms we touched upon. They had as their content the unity of the spiritual and the natural. All the objects were immediately gods and held the presence of these gods. Or else the unity existed as symbolic, as struggle, as task. This initial unity does not satisfy spirit. The natural things are the existence of spirit, a configuration still unripe, rough and wild, because here spirit is not yet infinite within itself. What is subjective, however, is determined within itself and securely for itself.

The general point<sup>173</sup> is that symbolic religion leads the way to classical [147] art;<sup>174</sup> religion is the content of classical art. Here we have the answer to the question as to whether the Greeks took their religion from foreign peoples. It is necessary that the earlier standpoints existed, that classical art proceeded from them, recast them, and reacted against them. This is also proven historically. The relationship of the Greek spirit to what was earlier is therefore essentially a relationship of recasting it; were this not the case, those shapes would have had to remain the same. Yet this did not happen, for from the earlier shapes something different had to come into being. Herodotus says that Homer and Hesiod gave the Greeks their gods.<sup>175</sup> But this is not to say that the Greeks did not receive their gods from others, for their handiwork is a recasting of something earlier. Herodotus also says about individual gods how certain ones are Egyptian and others

173. Hotho added 'about this'.

174. Hotho added 'as well'.

175. Herodotus, *The History* 2.53: '... for I believe that Homer and Hesiod... created for the Greeks their theogony; it is they who gave to the gods the special names for their descent from their ancestors and divided among them their honors, their arts, and their shapes' (Grene, p. 155).

are African.<sup>176</sup> | This is the general point with respect to the transition to Greek art. 161

1) *Devaluation of the Animal Shape* However, this transition at the same time provides elements of the content of the Greek images, for in fact in every transition the result has within it essential traces of that from which it results. This is the first point with regard to the content, a point relating to the recasting or to the negation of what was earlier. A chief part of what is antecedent relates to the animal shape, the divine in the form of the natural or the natural viewed as what is divine. What is natural is, in the first instance, organic vitality, as well as elemental nature taken as a whole. Insofar as the natural involves the animal nature, it is notable that the Egyptians, the Indians, and Asiatics in general, especially revere the animal because living things are something higher than what is nonliving. This respect shown toward the animal nature is devalued because of the self-consciousness of what is spiritual. Thus this devaluation occurs in this transition and at the same time it makes up a part of the content of classical fantasy. This respect shown toward the animal nature still exists [148] to an extent in the Jewish religion. This religion forbids as impure the eating of certain animals. Yet human beings can eat what is wholesome for them. Moses forbids eating the blood of animals because the life is in the blood.<sup>177</sup> We see the diminished status of the animal above all in the sacrificial offering, in the eating of the sacrifice. The Indians eat no flesh of sacred animals. The Greeks sacrificed bulls and consumed them.

We see a further devaluation in the great hunts of the Greeks that were ascribed to the heroes.<sup>178</sup> This hunting or slaying of animals counts in this case as something exalted, whereas the Indians punish it as a crime, with

176. *The History* 2.50 states that the names of 'nearly all' the gods came from Egypt, although Herodotus mentions quite a few that did not and supposes that the latter names came from the Pelasgians, except for Poseidon, whose origin is Libya (i.e., 'Africa'); Grene, p. 153.

177. Leviticus 17:11 ('For the life of the flesh is in the blood...'), and Deuteronomy 12:23 ('Only be sure that you do not eat the blood; for the blood is the life, and you shall not eat the life with the flesh'). See also Genesis 9:4, and 1 Samuel, ch. 14.

178. One of the most famous hunts of antiquity, in which a great many heroes participated alongside Theseus, is the hunt for the Calydonian boar. In *The Iliad* 9.529-99, Homer tells of the sending of this boar by Artemis (Diana), of its killing by Meleagros in company with many others, and of the ensuing battle; Lattimore, pp. 230-1. A fuller account of the hunt and the participants is in [Pseudo-] Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* 1.8.2-3; Frazer, 1:184-7. See also Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.260-444; Ovid *Metamorphoses*, trans. Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington, Indiana, and London, 1955), pp. 190-5. Also see *Diodorus Siculus* 4.34; Oldfather, 2.452-5. The killing of the Nemean lion, the first of the twelve labors of Hercules, is also one of the famous hunts; see n. 119, p. 292 above.

162 death. The heroic deeds of Heracles can of course also involve a different symbolism,<sup>179</sup> although they likewise devalue the animal nature. There is a further devaluation mentioned in Aesop's fables, in the fable of the scarab, which is a sacred symbol among the Egyptians. Aristophanes subjects the fable to ridicule.<sup>180</sup> So the sacrificial offering is the first aspect of the devaluation, and the hunt is another one. A third occurs in the stories of the many metamorphoses. A main feature of their content is the fact that the animals have their origin because something spiritual was put into this animal shape as punishment for wrongdoing. So here the animal is posited as degradation; as something unlike what is divine, thus precisely as antithetical to something divine. And this is the true position. It is depicted explicitly in the *Metamorphoses*. Ovid has put the two, animal and divine, side-by-side in his own fashion, in part pleasingly and in part verbosely. For example, one of the first tales in Ovid is the story of Lycaon. Ovid represents him as being a king, and this directly involves a connection with the sun. The wolf was an image of the sun. In Ovid's representation, after the downfall of the giants the earth produced a race of human beings who were contemptuous [149] of the gods. Then Jupiter assembled the gods, paid a visit to the human beings himself, and was worshipped by some of them, including Lycaon. Lycaon sought to test whether Jupiter was a god, by offering him human flesh for food. Then Jupiter transformed Lycaon into a wolf and turned his house to ashes. So here the animal shape is something degraded because of an offense.<sup>181</sup> The transformation of Philomela and of Procne into swallows is the same sort of thing.<sup>182</sup> In a different setting we then also

179. See the description of the twelve labors of Heracles as a symbol of the annual cycle, in n. 119, p. 292 above.

180. Hegel mentions this fable above in our text (p. 303). Aristophanes subjects it to ridicule in his comedy *Eirene* (*Peace*), in which Trygaeus rides up to visit Zeus in heaven, not mounted on Pegasus the flying horse but instead riding on a dung beetle (v.1-178); *Complete Plays*, pp. 187-91. J. H. Voß, in his *Aristophanes*, renders 'dung beetle' (*Mistkäfer*) as 'scarab' (*Rosßkäfer*), pp. 239-44, esp. 243-4.

181. See *Metamorphoses* 1.163-252; Humphries, pp. 8-10. [Tr.] The 'wicked revels of Lycaon's table' are included in the evils that Jupiter observed. Our text omits the crucial point that Jupiter came to earth in the form of a human being. Lycaon, as his host, had a hostage slain and his flesh served at table, to test whether this human visitor might in fact be a god. Jupiter's angry reaction included transforming Lycaon, king of Arcadia, into a wolf.

182. *Metamorphoses* 6.424-674; Humphries, pp. 143-51. In Ovid each sister is transformed into a Barn Swallow (*Hirundo rustica*), which has a reddish-brown throat. In Ovid the sisters murder Itys, the son of Tereus, by cutting his throat and serving his flesh, unbeknownst, to his father. So the throat color of the Barn Swallow points to this crime. In the version of the story by [Pseudo-] Apollodorus (*Bibliotheka* 3.14.8; Frazer, 2:98-101), Philomela becomes a swallow and Procne becomes a nightingale.

see animals in a different position. The Egyptians revered some animals as divine and assigned animal masks to some spiritual figures. But now animals become just attributes | of spiritual figures,<sup>183</sup> having value neither immediately nor as symbols, but bearing the meaning of a sign. So we see the eagle alongside Jupiter, the peacock next to Juno, the dove next to Venus. We can also bring in the fact that transformations of a different kind appear in Greek mythology; Jupiter changes himself into a bull or into a swan, but only for disreputable purposes, as means of deception, for a dishonorable end.<sup>184</sup> So here the disposition of the animal configuration is wholly altered. This is the first element of this inversion, the devaluation of the animal nature.

2) *The Titans and the New Gods* The second point to be examined is the inversion of the natural aspect within the mode of the spiritual. The Greeks represent this inversion to us as the war of the new gods with the old gods, the overthrow of the Titans by the new gods. First we saw animals, the apex of vitality, as what is divine. The other aspect in nature is the universal power of nature, which was elevated to divine status both in pantheism and in the symbolic as such. [150]

This was no prosaic natural power, for it appears as something universal, as spiritual within itself, as unity of the natural and the spiritual; but a unity that, as itself immediate, has the natural aspect as its chief characteristic. So earth, sun, and sea were revered—the universal natural process of arising and perishing, nature's becoming in general. We can also still add, about these ancient deities, that nothing is represented about them with regard to the ethical aspect, for they have right only as revenge. | Nemesis is the power of humbling the exalted, of bringing down the fortunate, of establishing a parity. But Nemesis is wholly external right. The status of the family, as opposed to the commonweal, is the province of the ancient powers. These are the universal powers. By their personification, these ancient powers were, in part, exalted over against what is spiritual; but this still does not make for the existence of what is spiritual as such; that is because the role is only a formal one when the meaning is still something wholly universal, is a universal power of nature or is universal right. The inversion in classical art

183. Horho added 'no longer', which (in English) would change 'neither ... nor' to 'either ... or'.

184. For Jupiter's transformation into a bull, see: [Pseudo-] Apollodorus, *Bibliotheka* 3.1.1 (Frazer, 1:298–9); Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 2:833–75 (Humphries, pp. 54–6). On his transformation into a swan, see: [Pseudo-] Apollodorus, 3.10.7 (Frazer 2:22–3); Lactantius, *On False Religion*, 1.21, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 6 (Paris, 1844), pp. 230–42; Euripedes' play *Helen*, v. 17–22 (Greene and Lattimore, 3:417).

involves subjectivity becoming the chief characteristic. Yet in this subjectivity the god must not at the same time cease to have within itself the character of a universal power, for in this case the god is not yet free spirituality. Only when the spiritual has been raised up quite freely into its own universal element does nature receive the meaning of something produced; only then can the god be posited as lord of nature. But here the god is not lord of nature, even though being the abstract One, for the god is lord of nature only as free spirituality. Both the natural and the spiritual must have their basis in God. We represent God as lord of nature and lord of [151] spirit. Spirit, infinite of itself, is unlimited, is speculative (*theoretisch*); lordship over nature belongs to it, and spirit brings about the harmony between the spiritual and nature. Both aspects belong to God, and the ways in which this harmony is brought about constitute the various modes of art and religion.

- 165 In classical art the god is a particular natural power. [ The other aspect pertinent to this particularity is that the god does not yet stand above nature and still has nature as an element within itself. For instance, we said that Helios is the god of the sun and Neptune is the god of the sea. The Greeks did not express things this way. It is incorrect that, for instance, Diana was goddess of the moon, for such a natural element is instead identical with this individuality. Oceanus itself is the god;<sup>185</sup> divine and natural are not yet distinguished. The necessary advance was for the meaning of these powers, the powers of nature that heretofore constituted what is substantial, to be transformed into the representation of spiritual subjectivity. In Greek mythology this transformation with respect to the concept was portrayed necessarily and naively and expressly. This transformation retains what is ancient, as must be the case in this sphere. Only the One God can tolerate no other forms alongside it, but the classical god is something particular; its particular character results in part from having a sphere of the particular around it, and in part from having its other over against itself.

Although the animal is the truth of the plant kingdom, this plant kingdom nevertheless still subsists as something beyond the animal. What is ancient nevertheless remains, and a particular way in which it remains is the one preserved in the mysteries. These mysteries were nothing secret. In more recent times people wanted very much to search out the contents of the mysteries, [152] although the mysteries are no special wisdom, no profound knowledge. Instead they contain what is ancient, the basis of what has been

185. [Tr.] For the Greeks, Oceanus was a river surrounding the (supposedly flat) earth. Hesiod personified Oceanus as a Titan.

recast. The Greeks express the transition from the old gods to the new ones in the struggle with the Titans and their downfall. We see the ancient gods—Uranus, Chronos, Gaia, Dike, and others—as belonging to the Titans. These are Titans and they have been overthrown: Chronos or abstract time, Uranus or the heavens, the sea, the earth, the nature-beings as such. The new gods are no such nature-beings but instead | are gods of a wholly different kind; they are individuals in which a spiritual element is the salient feature. Athena is the goddess of art, of beautiful art, and in another aspect she is the spirit of Athens, the peoples' spirit, as the substantial element of this spirit represented for its own sake. So Athena is something spiritual and has only the distant echo of a power of nature. Apollo, however, is thus in one aspect of course the sun, and he retains this solar aspect although he is the power of knowing and the expression of this knowledge. In his case knowing, intelligent spirit, is the chief characteristic and the sun, the natural aspect, moves to the background. Thus Zeus is the supreme god and of course is connected with the heavens, with lightning and thunder, but he is chiefly the power of the state and is spiritual power generally. A passage in Plato is of interest in this regard.<sup>186</sup> He speaks of Prometheus. This Prometheus is a Titan, but a Titan who took an interest in human beings. Plato states explicitly that Prometheus stole fire from the gods; however, he was unable to bring down to human beings the institution of the state, for this institution resided with Zeus, and Prometheus could not prevail upon Zeus. [153]

We now intend to be more specific about this transition by introducing examples of it. As one instance we can cite the transformation of the Pierians into woodpeckers. Ovid says that the Pierians sang of the battle of the gods in a way that glorified the giants and disparaged the great gods, since they said that the gods fled to the land of Egypt and hid there in false guises: Jupiter as a ram, Apollo as a raven, Diana as a cat, Juno as a white heifer, Venus as a fish, and Mercury in the feathers of the ibis.<sup>187</sup> So the Pierians

186. See Plato's *Protagoras* 321d–322a; see *Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1924, repr. 1977), pp. 132–3. Plato is drawing upon Hesiod's *Theogony* 565–70 (Most, pp. 48–9).

187. See *Metamorphoses* 5.294–678; Humphries, pp. 116–28. These verses include: the song of the daughters of Pierus (v. 294–331); the song of Calliope, one of the Muses, in praise of Ceres (v. 341–611); the transformation of the daughters of Pierus into magpies—not woodpeckers, as in our text (v. 669–78). [Tr.] This was a singing contest in which the Muses defeated the daughters of Pierus. Transformation into a woodpecker occurs to Picus, son of Saturn, in 14.312–96, in 'The Story of Picus'; Humphries, pp. 348–50. 'Picus' is the Latin for 'woodpecker'. In Ovid, Apollo disguised himself in crow feathers; Mercury disguised himself in flamingo feathers.

167 sing the honor of the ancient gods and the humiliation of the new gods. In contrast, the Muses sang the blessings of Ceres, giver of the meadows and liberal nourishment and laws; thus agriculture, | fecundity, and laws.

A second example is in Aeschylus' play *The Eumenides*,<sup>188</sup> which begins with the Pythia's prayer to Apollo. She commences by invoking the earth, for the earth first oversaw the oracle. Themis was the second to do so, after the mother, Gaia. Then Hebe, as the third, possessed the holy place, and then Phoebus. In *The Eumenides* the ancient gods also stand generally opposed to the new ones.

This whole setting is remarkable. The Eumenides pursue Orestes on account of his matricide. Apollo, to the contrary, had ordered him to commit this deed; Apollo is the new god, and commanded him to avenge his father.<sup>189</sup> There is general discord between the ancient gods and the new ones, and Athena is supposed to decide matters. The Eumenides defend the family relationship and punish the offense. So they are the substantial element of the family as the relationship of children and parents. Apollo represents the relationship of man and wife. The distinction seems primarily external. However, the relation of children to parents is sheerly natural; the marriage bond is a matter of the will and must be entered into as wedlock, not [154] mere love. Conscious will belongs to the new gods, the sheerly natural relationship to the ancient ones. Marriage is the beginning of the state and belongs to the sphere of conscious willing, to perspicacious ethical life and accordingly to Apollo. Apollo says that if Clytemnestra's crime were not avenged, then the bonds of Hera and Zeus would perish.<sup>190</sup> So here there is a specific distinction between the ancient gods and the new gods. The drama concludes with the Eumenides ceasing to beset Orestes, but with an altar being erected to them in Athens. They then utter a blessing concerning Athens. This is a natural blessing: protection from the vicissitudes of the natural elements, the warding off of crop failure, of infertility, and so forth. Pallus, for her part, takes over the struggles of warfare, takes over what is  
168 conscious or is human as such.<sup>191</sup> |

188. Hotho had 'Oedipus', instead of 'Aeschylus' play *The Eumenides*. See *The Eumenides* v. 1-20; Grene and Lattimore, 1:135. [Tr.] The mention of Hebe just below in our text is an error; the third in the sequence, according to Aeschylus, was Phoebe, a Titan daughter of Gaia and the mother of Phoebus (Apollo).

189. *The Eumenides*, v. 84; Grene and Lattimore, 1:137.

190. *The Eumenides*, v. 614-733; Grene and Lattimore, 1:157-61. [Tr.] This is not an exact quote, but it seeks to capture the sense of Apollo's defense of Orestes against the Chorus' accusation on behalf of the older gods, before the judgment seat of Athena.

191. [Tr.] *The Eumenides*, v. 881-1047; Grene and Lattimore, 1:166-71.



This same opposition also is prevalent in Sophocles' *Antigone*. The two ethical powers there are the family and the state; the community or the state's interest, and the will of the family. Everything in this drama is consistent with them: the woman, Antigone, involves the interest of the family and the man the interest of the state. Antigone expresses preeminently the fact that she has revered the ancient gods. Her stance is expressed as what is inward, subjective, natural. We can also state in this regard that the supreme oath of the gods was the Styx, was what is innermost, the conscience. What is consciously known is the stance of the new gods.<sup>192</sup>

What is attributed to Prometheus does not at first shed light on why he is counted among the Titans.<sup>193</sup> Together with his brother Epimetheus, he too at first appears befriended by the new gods, who authorize him to furnish the new human race with various capabilities. The story tells that Prometheus had given everything to the animals. When human beings emerged he had nothing left, [155] and that is why he fetched fire, the holy object of Hephaestus. What he gave to human beings was not political life but instead merely artistic or technical skill, the advantages and self-seeking of personal gain that involve no universal interest—thus what in this aspect is indifferent to ethical life and, as personal gain, stands on the side of what is natural as such. So, also attributed to Prometheus is his teaching human beings a new and useful mode of the sacrificial offering. The ancients had in fact committed whole animals to the sacrificial flames. Prometheus requested permission from Jupiter to allow only part of the animal to be sacrificed. So in sacrificing, Prometheus himself set the liver and the flesh to one side, the bones to the other side. Jupiter chose the latter portion. This practice is once again something useful | that involves nothing ethical but instead serves 169  
 needs. Prometheus stands out then as the punished Titan; his punishment is portrayed as an eagle tearing his flesh. Likewise punished was Tantalus, another giant, who had an eternal thirst.<sup>194</sup> Both punishments involve the longing for what ought to be, are the boundless, the bad infinite.

192. [Tr.] For the opposition, see the account in *Antigone*, beginning with Antigone's opening speech (v. 25–43), and reaching its full expression in the speeches of Antigone and Creon (v. 494–543); Grene and Lattimore, 2:162, 178–9. See also Hegel's fuller discussion of the issue in *Phenomenology* §437; Miller, pp. 261–2. The Styx is one of the rivers in the Greek underworld. In *The Odyssey* (5.184–6; Lattimore, p. 93) the gods ('the blessed immortals') are said to swear 'their most formidable oath' by invoking the Styx. In *Antigone*, Creon says to her (v. 577–8): 'Go then to the world below, yourself, if you must love. Love *them*. When I am alive no woman shall rule' (Grene and Lattimore, 2:181).

193. Hegel finds the myth of Prometheus in Hesiod's *Theogony*, v. 507–616; Most, pp. 42–53.

194. The myth of Tantalus is reported by Homer in *The Odyssey*, 11.582–92; Lattimore, p. 183.

Correct divine sensibility looked upon this going-into-the-far-off, this longing, as an accursed condition, and saw in it nothing of a highest sort for human beings.

These are the principal elements whereby the ancient gods stood opposed to the new ones, to those possessing free ethical self-consciousness. We can find these proffered examples inconsistent, in that Prometheus was the benefactor of human beings just as was Ceres, since she brought agriculture, so there was no difference between the two. Yet agriculture involves a quite different principle, for Ceres is at the same time the foundress of property and, together with it, of law. So the difference is very essential. The one mode, which involves something ethical, is ascribed to the new gods, [156] the other to the Titans.

The main aspect of the content of classical art is therefore ethical substantiality or spiritual individuality that at the same time has an element of natural power. Apollo is in one aspect the power of the sun and in another the one who knows. Diana is likewise Luna, the moon goddess. However, those who are Titans for their own sake are either thrown into the abyss or else banished into the twilight at the edge of the world. The contemporary world is the world of knowledge.

*c. The Shape of Subjective Spirit: The Human Figure as Idealized in the Singularity of the Gods*

170 The shape of spiritual individuality is the human figure as idealized, not as natural. We have to examine the specific features of this ideal. The content is what it is heretofore; it is spiritual individualities, the new gods. Its presentation has several forms. The most austere | mode is the one of resting in oneself. Yet this configuration passes over into particularity and external development.

The ideal in its simplest, most sublime form is being-present-to-self, being motionless, set apart from externality and contingency. So the supreme form is simple resting in oneself, and the supreme expression of it belongs to the ancient, original sculpture. The ideal is immersed within itself. Later sculpture then becomes dramatic as well; externality and finitude come into play. However, the basic feature of the austere portrayal is the resting in oneself—not static rest but spiritual, thoughtful repose: the sublimity that has fused with beauty. This eternal repose is the supreme mode of this classical ideal. There is also negation involved in this austere repose; there is an abstract, indifferent repose that is elevated above what is particular, a renunciation, a transcendence. We certainly feel this transcendence when we

view such works of art. This austerity can seem to be a sadness about remoteness from everything outward; cheerfulness is the beginning of outward expression (*Äußerung*).

[157] Since this unity of the spiritual and the natural exists directly in an immediate, sensible way, it cannot remain with this feature of divinity in general, for the shape of the god must become a figure of a particular god. Polytheism is essential in beautiful, classical art, and it would be foolish to portray the One God of spirit in this plastic form. The god must come on the scene as particularity that fragments the conceptual unity into a circle of gods. The ideal of classical art exists as a more particular divine character. This circle of gods is primarily a totality, a whole. Yet we must seek no systematic totality in this sphere. It breaks down into male and female, with the distinctions playing upon conceptual distinctions but without giving rise to the concept. That is because the god, as particularity, appears in the characterization as having contingency. In this particularity the basic characteristic must of course | remain the universal divinity, this seriousness that can from its austerity turn instead to cheerfulness. Yet by their very nature the distinctions do not lend themselves to strict systematization, else these shapes would be more like allegories instead of being personages, a subjectivé determinacy in which contingency has to play a part. The main characteristics of course come to the fore: Jupiter is the power of the state, and Apollo and the Muses are consciousness. The female deities have their respective particular characters. Juno is the arranger of marriages, Diana is the outward-striving one, and Minerva is the contemplative, warlike maiden. The Diana of Ephesus has more the general motherly character of nature. Aphrodite is love.<sup>195</sup> They have distinct characters, but one could not say that they would be a systematic whole. The character of the gods constitutes the particularity of divinity. The austere, serious sculpture had some difficulty in expressing this particularity. In many ancient pieces [158] we find it difficult to discover the particularity of the god. The individuality and its portrayal, then, cannot stop with the abstract particularity of the character. The stone is worked to the limit within its simple law.<sup>196</sup>

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195. The oldest evidence for the mythical matchmaking of Hera (Juno) with Zeus is found in Homer, *The Iliad* 14.292–6, 346–51; Lattimore, pp. 323, 324. Possibly Hegel based his description of Juno as ‘arranger of marriages’ (*Ehehelferin*) on *The Iliad*. See also *The Eumenides*, v. 214–15 (... the sworn faith of Zeus and of Hera, lady of consummations ...); Grene and Lattimore, 1:142. Hesiod mentions ‘arrow-shooting Artemis’ (= Diana of Ephesus) in *Theogony* 918–20; Most, pp. 76–7. For Minerva (= Athena) and Aphrodite, Hegel finds his descriptions also in *Theogony* 187–206, 318, 924–6; Most, pp. 18–21, 28–9, 76–7.

196. Hotho added ‘and makes this law apparent’.

A few specific characteristics exhaust the mineral kingdom, but the organic realm involves various reciprocal actions, and spiritual nature is even more capable of appearing in endlessly manifold ways. The singularity of the classical configuration is this self-disclosing particularity. Here the contingency and caprice of externality come into play; the characters appear in manifold ways. The question here is: Whence comes the subject matter for the divine figures? How do they further determine themselves? With human character, with a humanly actual individuality, the subject matter of the action or of the appearing is provided by the existing conditions and locales. The world at hand contains this subject-matter. The life stories of human beings will always be | highly distinctive. We can suppose that the subject-matter of the Greek<sup>197</sup> figures of the gods depends on the subjectivity of the one doing the poeticizing. But we have seen that, on the whole, the principle of classical art is reacting against something else, has its presuppositions, and the material for the more specific history of these shapes is accordingly something essentially presupposed. We have indicated the main elements of these presuppositions [or antecedents]. One is the earlier symbolic form itself. With the Greeks it loses its position of being symbolic and is no longer supposed to signify what would be different from the shape itself. Since the content of the symbolic becomes the content of a spiritual subject, this content is thus relegated to being an external history ascribed to the will of subjectivity. So here [159] all the symbolic traditions of earlier sacred history come into play, and since they become the action of subjective individuality, they take on the mode of an external, human history.

So we hear a host of stories told about the gods, stories that cannot be ascribed to the caprice of the poets. They are the remains of symbolic portrayals. Thus in Homer we find that the gods went to Ethiopia for a twelve-day feast.<sup>198</sup> This would be poor as a poetic device. These are echoes of an ancient tradition, a residue in which the symbolic becomes external history. What stands in the background, the historical aspect of the fantasy, can be indicated in the fewest words. Likewise, when we take the stories of Jupiter we see the symbolic element peeking through, but reduced to external history. It is told that Cronus had three sons and three daughters born to him, and he devoured them.<sup>199</sup> Time (Cronus) is the dominant one among

197. 'Greek' could perhaps also be deciphered as 'free'.

198. As reported by Thetis, in *The Iliad* 1.423-5; Lattimore, p. 86.

199. See Hesiod, *Theogony* 453-506; Most, pp. 38-43. [Tr.] Cronus devoured the daughters (Hestia, Demeter, Hera) and two of the sons (Hades and Poseidon), but the third (Zeus) was saved with a ruse by Cronus' consort, Rhea, that the continuation of our text describes. 'Chronos' ('time' in Greek) is usually rendered in English as 'Cronus' when referring to the god.

the ancient gods. | The devouring by Cronus is symbolic. Rhea, pregnant with the youngest child, went to Crete, gave birth to Jupiter there, and instead of the child she gave Cronus a stone. After taking an emetic, Cronus later vomited up all the children. This is the sort of narrative in which we see the ancient symbolic element peeking through.

Heracles too is in particular a fully human figure with many features having symbolic origins. For instance, his twelve labors refer to the sun's course through the zodiac, as also does his journey to the Hesperides. However, this symbolic factor was recast into being the deeds of an individual.<sup>200</sup> It is the same with the story of Ceres and Proserpina. Here there is the ancient symbolic element of the disappearance and germination of the grain seeds. Proserpina plays in a valley with flowers, is abducted and goes missing.<sup>201</sup> In short: a symbolic element is recast into being events.

The same circumstance [160] applies to Jupiter's infidelities. The general theme of procreation is the foundation, and the particular stories are local and symbolic, are stories gathered from many places.<sup>202</sup> So this ancient symbolic element is as such a principal subject matter for events involving individual gods, who are portrayed as expressing themselves in various ways. Other features in these stories of the gods—traditions of ancient kings, of ancient heroes—are obviously historical too; and these features are woven into the stories since the religions were at first local until they coalesced into the universal character of the artistic fantasy. It is one-sided to want to interpret the Greek mythology historically, as [for example claiming] that in fact the ancient kings were divinized.<sup>203</sup> People do not

200. For these features of Heracles, see Ramler, *Kurzgefaßte Mythologie* . . . , pp. 277–318. [Pseudo-] Apollodorus reports about the labors of Heracles (*Bibliotheka* 2.5.1–12) and specifically about the journey to the Hesperides (2.5.11); Frazer, 1:185–237. [Tr.] The Hesperides ('daughters of evening') were maidens who guarded the tree from which came the golden apples that figured in the story of Atalanta.

201. Presumably this refers to Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 5.351–661; Humphries, pp. 118–28.

202. In *The Iliad* 14.312–28 (Lattimore, pp. 320–1), Zeus mentions to Hera a number of his amours with others. Hesiod's *Theogony* 886–944 calls attention to the amours of Zeus with the first two of his consorts, Metis and Themis, as well as those with others; Most, pp. 74–9. See also [Pseudo-] Apollodorus, *Bibliotheka* 1.3.1; Frazer, 1:14–17. More detailed examples are in the story of Io, in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, v. 561–886; Grene and Lattimore, 1:332–44. See also [Pseudo-] Apollodorus 2.1.3; Frazer, 1:130–5. Further examples are found in: [Pseudo-] Apollodorus 2.4.8 (Frazer, 1:172–5); *The Iliad* 19.95–133 (Lattimore, pp. 416–17); Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 9.275–323 (Humphries, pp. 217–19).

203. Hegel presents this connection systematically in the *Phenomenology* chapter on religion, as the transition from symbolic religion to the Greek religion of art. See *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (Hamburg, 1980), as *Gesammelte Werke* 9, pp. 375 ff.; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), pp. 424 ff.

understand the classical-religious sensibility when they seek to explain all the representations historically. And yet the legal<sup>204</sup> element too is not entirely to be cast aside. The family is the primary element in the state: the family has Penates | or local gods. All of this has a local color. When the multiplicity of localities is brought together in one pantheon, in one circle of the gods, the local colors always shine through.<sup>205</sup> The local features also persist in virtue of the fact that each city-state has its own local deity, one it especially honors.

A third source for the singularities of the gods is then certainly the fantasy of the poets themselves, for the artistry consists precisely in the inclusion, under the universal deity, of what is singular in events—for instance, when we say that this or that destiny comes from God. We see something like this particularly in Homer.

In the context of this third source we should recall that, in their needs and circumstances, human beings have recourse to the gods. And the priests have to interpret contingent [161] events as omens, as signs, as the higher meanings the events have. If exigency, need, or misfortune is at hand, the priest has to indicate how to deal with the misfortune. The poet is the expositor, is the priest himself. The poet has to make clear, with regard to the circle of the gods, which god is manifest in this or that event. This is how the scope of what is told about the gods, what they have willed and done, expands. The subject matter is taken from ordinary conditions that poets and priests expound in their own way. We saw this especially in the case of Homer. Right at the beginning of *The Iliad*, when pestilence breaks out, Kalchas interprets it as Apollo being angry because his priest was dishonored.<sup>206</sup> In the mythology this can then be recounted as the action of Apollo. So, when Patroclus is slain by Hector, Homer has Apollo tearing off Patroclus' helmet | and shield. Patroclus says: 'Apollo is the first to slay me, Euphorbos the second, and you Hector are the third.'<sup>207</sup> Even in the decisive

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Mentioned in Hotho's published edition of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, in addition to Pausanias, as sources for this view but without further specification as to their writings, are Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812) and the French historian Nicolas Fréret (1688–1749). The *Aesthetics* states there that this is a 'plausible but superficial view'; see *Aesthetics* 2:88–90, in G. W. F. Hegel: *Werke*, vol. 10 in 3 parts, ed. H. G. Hotho (Berlin, 1835, 1842).

204. Hotho changed 'legal' to 'historical'.

205. Hegel's sources for this general observation are various passages in the *Description of Greece* by Pausanias, a text he possessed and one to which Creuzer refers in his *Briefe über Homer und Hesiodus* (Heidelberg, 1818), pp. 150–1. See also n. 167, p. 312 in this text.

206. *The Iliad*, 1.8–100; Latimore, pp. 75–7.

207. *The Iliad* 16.793, 802–4, and, for Patroclus' dying speech, 849–50. See Latimore, pp. 372–4, where the speech (p. 374) reads: 'No, deadly destiny, with the son of Leto, has killed

battle the Greeks and Trojans first fight as individual champion against individual champion. Yet in the general milling-about, universalities battle one another; Homer describes this as Ares himself coming on the scene, as do all the gods; and gods fight with gods.<sup>208</sup> This is a fine enhancement, that what is universal ultimately does battle itself; as if the concept of the divine itself is expressed in such features. This is what provides further subject matter for the deeds of the gods. In the final canto of *The Odyssey*, the shade of Agamemnon interprets the upswelling of the sea as Thetis come to the festival of mourning for Achilles.<sup>209</sup> So, human events can be looked upon as the more specific subject matter for the outward existence of the gods. Passing over into another domain is linked, then, to this externality in which the divine figure emerges. For the externality involves the various ways in which the gods are made finite, and this externality stands over against the inner idea, or thought; [162] and that arouses thought's displeasure about the reality of the finitization.

### 3. The Transition to a More Human Appearance

The general development of art proceeds from the tranquility of the ideal to the manifold character of its appearance, to the detailing of occurrences and actions that become ever more human. So, with respect to its content, art proceeds to singularization, to a congenial form. What is congenial is the development of the external aspect at all points, in such a way that it has everywhere a relation to its audience. Art passes over into this outward relation and so to affording pleasure. This finitization of existence | involves a more specific connection with the subject as such, which now discovers itself, just as it is, in the artistic image. The beginning of beautiful art is the undoing of religion. Piety is satisfied with any sort of image. The most humdrum image suffices for it. As soon as the image becomes the beautiful figure, as soon as fantasy frees itself, the earnestness of piety begins to disappear and the concerns of sensible being, of what is inward, come into play and become the topic to be elaborated. The meaning, what is substantial,

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me, and of men it was Euphorbos; you are only my third slayer'. Through an error of transcription, or one on Hegel's part, the name Euphorbos got changed in the manuscript to Phoebus. Euphorbos was a Trojan who struck Patroclus with his javelin (16.806–9) before Hector finished him off.

208. This battle scene, including the gods, is in *The Iliad* 4.439–526 (Lattimore, pp. 142–4). A full-fledged theomachy is described in 21.385–520 (Lattimore, pp. 450–4).

209. *The Odyssey* 24.48–56; Lattimore, p. 346.

remains, but there is progress not in the concept of the gods, of their universality; instead it is only in their outward aspect with reference to the finite relationship. In Christian art what the faithful seek are not beautiful images but instead the old standard (*statarischen*) ones. Owing to the attractiveness of the existence it portrays, beauty is at a remove from universal thoughts and from what satisfies deeper devotion. This antithesis is, on the whole, what emerges here and allows the splendid world of the gods to perish. Romantic, Christian art must come on the scene in place of classical art. [163]

177 Later on we have to speak in even more specific terms about what content is involved in the transition. Before that we still have first to discuss which art form is able to find its place within the transition. In the transition to classical art we examined the separation of the shape from the meaning; the fable, the parable, and so forth. Such forms also fit in here, or at any rate a few of them do. On the whole, the transition consists of the emergence of a distinction of the shape from the meaning. This dismantling of the ideal of course had a prior basis. Xenophanes and Plato were indignant about the stories of the gods. Plato banned poetry because it is inclined for the most part to make the gods finite.<sup>210</sup> This external feature of the gods contradicts the thought or the universal | aspect of them, and so an opposition comes about between what ought to be and what has entered into existence. In this case, however, the separation of shape from meaning—contrary to what was upheld previously—must appear hostile. In the prior setting the thought and the shape were in fact not hostile but instead in an amicable relationship, with the basic assumption that natural images have a higher meaning within them and the fact that the two were separate; this was just a prosaic relationship. But now it becomes an antithesis of a higher kind.

#### 4. An Intermediate Form; the Antithesis of a Shape Hostile to the Ideal Meaning; Merriment and Satire

An intermediate form intrudes itself, the form for the antithesis that has not yet reconciled itself. What is called for above all, what is substantial, is for the spiritual element that has achieved the ideal to be independently thrown into relief. The sense of Greek art is that what is subjectively spiritual is the

210. Xenophanes criticized the Greeks' anthropomorphic representation of the gods; see Kirk et al., pp. 168–9. Plato was especially critical of the stories about the gods in Homer and Hesiod; see *The Republic*, trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930–35, repr. 1963), 1:176–235 (= 377c–395b). In his manuscript, after 'poetry' in this sentence, Hotho added 'from his state'.



main point, although its reality nevertheless appears as immediate existence. What counts now is portraying a subjectivity that predominates over the shape. In Greek art the god has its existence only in the sensible shape. Hence this unity of the ideal has to dissolve itself, and indeed in such a way that, initially, what is spiritual [164] becomes a world on its own account, absolutely peaceful, withdrawn from what is sensible. The sheerly natural figure, the figure of the god, is now separated off, left behind as something lifeless, because the god gives itself an existence in what is spiritual. External, finite actuality thereby becomes free itself, but precisely in doing so it becomes a godless actuality, an existence gone bad (*verdorbenes*). Since initially both sides now stand characterized in this way and their reconciliation has not yet emerged, an art form can belong to this antithesis. The reconciliation is not yet at hand; the spiritual aspect is not yet totality, is not yet spirituality giving an existence to itself within itself; instead it is a merely subjective spirituality, one that is unsatisfied, is abstract. A thinking spirit, a soul noble on its own account, a subject as subject, the kind of subject reposing subjectively within itself, not yet grasping the idea, stands over against what has gone bad. | This is initially a prosaic relationship. Noble spirits detest what exists for its inadequacy to their abstract idea of the good, of virtue; the content that has to do with facing an extant world gone bad. So the soul is angry about such a present situation, and this is the more specific standpoint of this transition.

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Among the Greeks themselves we see on the one side Aristophanes, who verbally skewers the Greek gods with great frivolity.<sup>211</sup> This is no anger, but is instead a cheerful relationship of merriment. The distinctive standpoint is rather that of the Roman world, where we see lifeless law predominating over beautiful ethical life. Individual feeling must subject itself to this standpoint. This is no spiritual relationship that incorporates the ideal into itself, that makes the ideal into what is beautiful. That is why the Romans have taken everything from the Greeks, and only the essential form is indigenous to them. So the Romans only have satire. [165] Satire is now a matter of shattering the unity of the beautiful, and so we have, on the one hand, abstract thinking, abstract willing, virtue, and on the other hand a humdrum actuality devoid of thought. To the extent that this antithesis is capable of presenting itself as an art form, it is then the form of satire. Satire is typically at home with the Romans. It is virtuous peevishness, in part a hollow declamation. Tacitus is in the same way an ill-tempered fellow; and

211. See, for instance, his plays *Birds* (414 BC) and *Frogs* (405 BC); *Complete Plays*, pp. 229–86, 367–415.

the displeasure of this era is justified.<sup>212</sup> Recollection of a past state of the world gets set alongside this state of abstraction, without a final, authentic reconciliation of spirit within itself. This antithesis, skillfully presented, is perpetually prosaic. We can count it as poetry only insofar | as the ruined  
 179 figures are portrayed as destroying themselves, and collapsing, internally. The other aspect can be the portrayal of the right, of virtue, juxtaposed to the depravity. The satires of Horace<sup>213</sup> give us lively examples of the customs of the time, which he portrays as a foolishness that, unskillful in its means, destroys itself. Later on the satires of Lucian<sup>214</sup> became well-known, satires that range over all sorts of topics and in particular point out the contradictions of the ancient gods and their actions, something Aristophanes already had done merrily. Lucian often sticks garrulously to the sheer externality of the figures and in doing so becomes tedious. On the one hand we are over and done with what Lucian sought to portray; on the other hand we know that these features of the gods—considered from the perspective of beauty—have their validity. It is noteworthy that in our day there is no longer any satire.

So we now proceed to the third form.

### C. THE ROMANTIC ART FORM

Here too the form is determined by the content. In the first one, the symbolic form, what predominates is nature, in which spirit seeks to envisage itself. [166]

212. This is presumably a general reference to the *De origine et situ Germanorum* of Publius Cornelius Tacitus (AD 55–115), and perhaps also to his *Historiae*, only the first few books of which have survived. The former essay, part of his *Germania*, juxtaposes the idealized virtue of the Germanic peoples to the decline of the Roman imperial era.

213. For the satires of Horace, see *Horace: Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929). Christoph Martin Wieland translated the satires into German (1786), together with cultural-critical annotations: *Horazens Satiren aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt...* (1786), rev. edn. (Leipzig, 1804). See *Christoph Martin Wieland: Übersetzung des Horaz*, ed. Manfred Fuhrmann (Frankfurt am Main, 1986).

214. The satires of Lucian of Samosata (ca. AD 120–180), to which Hegel is referring, include his *Jupiter Confutatus*, his *Jupiter Tragoedus*, and his well-known *Dialogue of the Gods*, a treatise found in vols. 2 and 3 of *Lucian*, trans. A. M. Harmon et al., 8 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913–67). Hegel possessed an edition of *Luciani opera*, Greek and Latin, ed. in accord with the edn. of T. Hemsterhus and J. F. Reitz, 9 vols. (Zweibrücken, 1789–93), as well as a *Luciani opera* (1526).

This envisaging or imagining is consummated in the classical form. In the third art form what is spiritual exalts itself within itself and has its own reality within itself, a reality that in the first form is still external. Classical art realizes the concept of the beautiful; nothing can be more beautiful than it. However, the realm of beauty itself is still incomplete by itself, because the free concept is only sensuously present in it and has no spiritual reality within itself. This inadequacy requires of spirit that it rise up and live *within itself* and in nothing *other* to it. Spirit must have itself as the ground of its existence, must itself produce an intellectual world. Here inwardness completes itself within itself. And this freedom | of spirit is what now constitutes the principle. Through this principle the appearance too receives a different relationship, one going beyond beauty.

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### 1. Its General Character: Inwardness or Subjectivity, Knowing Itself as Infinite

First of all we have to characterize in a general way this content and its form. The principle is that of absolute inwardness. Initially and abstractly, this inwardness is subjectivity knowing itself as infinite. Here the subject is no longer particular, for instead subjectivity has grasped itself infinitely within itself and is this infinite identity with itself; in this identity all diversity is reduced to something ideal. In this pantheon all the gods are swallowed up; the blaze of subjectivity has overthrown them as particular gods and there is only one God, one spirit, one absolute autonomy, and divinity is not situated in particular roles and functions. This absolute subjectivity eludes art and is solely the object of thought. Yet the absolute subjectivity does not remain this inwardness, for it appears; it is not the jealous God in whom all distinction is swallowed up; instead it is the self-disclosing God. However, this existence is within the subject itself, is what appears in outward shape, in the spirit that appears as existence, in [167] human nature. The divinity, the absolute subjectivity, appears in subjectivity itself as immediacy. Art comes into play here, in this aspect too. The actual subject is now the existence of the divine—as the subject become aware of itself. We can compare with it the sculptured figures of the gods. These sculptures do not portray knowing and willing in their figures. The ancient images of the gods lack the light of the eyes; the god does not know himself. The eye, through which the soul sees and is seen, is dark; in the austere figures the eyes are closed | and not outwardly directed. But now the god appears as seeing, as self-knowing, in human shape. This human figure is interconnected with the whole world; all diversity is linked to it. It has three ways in which it is present and is known.

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*a. Three Ways of Connecting With the World*

In the first way this humanity proceeds from the abstract subjectivity of the divinity itself; the human figure is directly known as having the divinity within itself. This is the story of Christ, the portrayal of the human figure as having the entire divinity present within it. Because the human actuality belongs to God's own self, it has the significance of being universal humanity. God is self-reconciled in this figure and is so from the outset; for the origin of the human figure is in God's own self.

In the second way the human being begins from itself as finite, natural spirit, as originating not from God but instead from finitude. Since the human being originates apart from God, it has the characteristic of elevating itself to God by becoming, just through itself, what it at first originally possesses, something posited as beginning from God. [168] The second way, then, involves the possibility of elevation. This requires that it separate itself from itself, break loose from itself. Accordingly it relinquishes the natural state. This sacrifice is the infinite suffering or the infinite feeling of one's nothingness as something finite. Suffering and death are excluded from classical art because in that art the spiritual unites itself with the natural. Here suffering and death receive profound significance and are an essential element. Death, which heretofore is just abstract negation, now means that the soul can perish, can undergo eternal damnation; it means that the soul will be absolutely miserable. Immortality, previously just an image of fantasy, receives a wholly different meaning here. |

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In the third way the human being, here too beginning apart from God but not elevating itself to God, instead remains situated in finitude. This natural state is reduced here to something sheerly contingent that is not valid in and for itself, but instead is the kind of natural state in which spirit does not discover its existence, since this state is something evil, something finite.

The externality appears here within these three shapes. Here we have the soul's inwardness with itself, which is in the intellectual world, exists within it, and has its beauty in this inwardness. Here the soul's beauty is linked to indifference toward the immediate world's configuration, since the immediate world is unworthy of the soul's own internal blissfulness. Because of this, the subject matter is let go and is free for its own sake. Within the ideal, spirit rules over it. Now the subject matter does not have to express inwardness, for instead the inwardness is supposed to appear within the subject matter, that is, the subject matter is supposed to express concurrently that what is external is not something satisfying. The inwardness introduces within itself an opposition [169] to external existence. Romantic art has a musical

foundation, a hovering and resonating above a world that can contain only a reflection of the soul's being-within-self and that is always a heterogeneous material, as opposed to what is true. Hence this heterogeneous material is set free to come forward in a personal (*partikulär*) way. It is now permitted to appear as not-beautiful. This is the abstract, basic concept of romantic art. It follows from this that existing humanity alone is the soil of this art.

*b. Implications for the Subject Matter*

In virtue of this, the content of romantic art seems narrowed. Nature is divested of divinity; ocean, mountain and valley, rivers and springs, can no longer be grasped as divine on their own account. Even the broad circumstances of nature's becoming—the passing-away and coming-to-be | in its universality, the process of all things—has lost its standing here. Questions about the whence, the whither, and the why of the world and of humanity are silenced and the puzzles are answered. Everything now concentrates on the one history of redemption, and the only thing that can interest the will is locating itself with reference to this story and portraying it. The particular features of the divine sphere have come together into a unity; the bright, colorful world is comprised in this one point of light. And so this sphere now appears extremely narrowed. Yet since the entire content is held together in the focal point of the subjective human heart, and every process is transferred to within the heart, the sphere [of art] is, in another respect, thereby also endlessly enlarged once again and embraces the most boundless diversity. For, although that objective history constitutes the heart's substantial element, the heart nevertheless goes over that history in all its aspects, portraying single foci from it or else portraying these foci themselves in constantly changing variety, in ever new features that constantly configure themselves anew in contrast to nature, which remains ever the same. Moreover, the heart is even able [170] to treat all natural subject matter with reference to that grand content and to utilize that subject matter for its own purposes.

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The more specific characteristics, involving the further internal ramifications of this basic concept of romanticism, are set forth in the following three elements:

- 1) In the portrayal, namely, of the substantial element itself as the objective history of redemption, therefore within a religious sphere.
- 2) This religious sphere, divesting itself of its inwardness, takes on a worldly mode of portraying its own subjective spirituality and accordingly steps over
- 3) into expression apart from itself as such. |

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## 2. Specific Characteristics of Romanticism: Three Elements or Foci

### a. *The Religious Sphere*<sup>215</sup>

1) *The Ideal: Inwardness Related Spiritually to Something Other* Since this sphere portrays the divine in the way it has developed itself up to this stage, and since the divine is the substantial element as such that emerges in the expression, it seems that here the ideal is quite properly at home. Yet the ideal, in the way it is capable of appearing here, must be of a wholly different kind than the ideal we came to know in classical art. An essential feature of inwardness, as the principle of spiritual subjectivity, is that the soul not be poured forth directly into its bodily figure as in the Greek god; that it not lend itself to expression wholly through that bodily figure and live blissfully within it and express itself in keeping with its<sup>216</sup> totality. Instead, in contrast, it is essentially necessary that, while the soul appears in a body, it at the same time proves to be withdrawn from the body into itself and to live within itself, not within its body. Accordingly, the soul exists within itself; it has its reality within itself, and the body is capable of expressing it only insofar as the body makes it apparent that the soul has its reality not in the body but in the soul itself. [171] This proves to be a completely changed relationship in contrast to classical art. | That is because here in romanticism the soul no longer pictures itself in the body; romantic art does not idealize the body but leaves it be, just as it immediately is, for the soul has its authentic existence within itself. Accordingly, instead of idealizing, romantic art approximates

215. Hotho later inserted in the margin this outline:

#### 1) *The religious sphere*

- a) Story of Christ
- b) Penances
- c) Inwardness of the processes

#### 2) *Worldly subjectivity*

- a) Honor
- b) Love
- c) Faithfulness

#### 3) *The formal character*

- a) *Character as independence*
- b) *Independence of expression*
  - α) Adventurousness
  - β) Naturalness
  - γ) Skill as subjective aspect of the [indecipherable word, perhaps 'artisans']
- c) *Humor*

216. Hotho changed 'its' (*ihrer*, that is, 'the bodily figure's') to 'its own' (*seiner*, that is, 'the soul's own').

more to the portrait, for classical art's concern to appear wholly in corporeality goes by the wayside; and the externality accordingly is something rather inconsequentially external that is no longer needed to idealize the soul and so is left just as it is found immediately, in its contingency. Hence the marks of temporality, the natural necessities, the externality of existence, are able to be accepted more for their own sake; that is because the soul's being-within-itself is, in contrast, rather indifferent to the externality and allows for deficiency and deterioration, leaving it to the shape to configure itself.

Consequently, the laying open of existence as what is external acknowledges a third factor, the beholder or the audience. It is an imparting to, a commonality with, a third factor. The existence is something relinquished. The classical ideal is cold, by itself, closed off within itself, its shape its own; there is nothing free about it. Its specific character governs all its features. The ideal is distant, unreceptive, a unity closed off by itself and therefore dismissive of what is other. But now, in romantic art, externality exists not for the sake of the ideal but instead for others, and inherently involves the element of accessibility to everyone. The audience approaches what is familiar with the confidence that matters are laid open to it. Accordingly the figure participates more in ordinary humanity. This no longer calls for the austere sensibility of the ideal, but instead calls for the height of inwardness. With the figure not portrayed in this arrested manner, [172] the inner subject is not solitary within itself like the Greek god, wholly complete within itself and abiding in the blissfulness | of its isolation. Instead the expression of the romantic ideal discloses a relationship to something spiritually other, a relationship bound up with inwardness, so that only in this other does the soul live in inwardness with itself. But this living within itself in an other is the relationship of love. So if we take the figure as our point of departure, then doing so involves the universal idea of divinity, the idea that God is love.

This covers the shape of the ideal.

2) *The Content: The History of Divine Reconciliation* The more specific content is, first of all, the history of divine reconciliation, the portrayal of Christ in his own history, his own figure. This figure must not express any more particular characteristic; it must have no special significance. And so heads of Christ are no classical ideal. It would appear highly improper to envisage them as the beauty of Apollo. Human seriousness must express itself in Christ, as well as the love that finds the mean between the beauty of the ideal and the natural figure. Ugliness may not be a feature of this figure, even though it disavows ideal beauty and sublimity. So, the skill of the artist comes

to the fore in this figure, because it is difficult to find the fitting mean for it. The figure may neither descend to the commonplace nor attain classical beauty.

Further content here involves the absolute history of the divine appearing, and portrays the inversion in which God endures suffering, distress, and death and, through mediation, through this negativity, reinstates immediacy, comes forth alive from the negation of death, is resurrected and exalted [173] to the proper status of God. This history grounds itself in the concept of spirit and is represented to the religious consciousness in this manifest way. Its content is the divine | love or the idea of love. Actually existing  
 187 human love is displayed in a different figure, one portraying blissful inwardness in not merely a sensuous way. This is mother love, Mary's love, the most successful topic of romantic art. This love is devoid of agony and death, devoid of outright injustice, though of course not without suffering and grief. However no martyrdom, no penance, comes into play. Ultimately, then, Christ's friends and disciples are linked with him and with Mary, as a larger company. They too have experienced the historical inversion (*die Konversions-Geschichte*) within themselves, albeit without its external brutality. This constitutes the first sphere.<sup>217</sup>

The broader point is that this same history presents and repeats itself in other individuals. The reflection of the divine process is mirrored in other individuals. Through it these individuals themselves are received into the community of the godly. In the process, by tearing themselves away from naturalness they part ways with something negative, and by self-subjection they undergo the pain of this separation and so arrive at reconciliation, at the spirit and, in the spirit, at inner peace. But here, in this domain of renunciation, this divine history within its own sphere, the portrayal in one respect offends our concept, and in another respect it also offends our sense of beauty. Where offense of this sort is to be avoided, the turnabout and its process take place within, abstractly, and so this is not at all a topic of art, or  
 188 is so in just a minor way. |

When this suffering by separating oneself from the natural, by 'tearing-oneseif-loose' [174] from the finite, becomes in fact external history, it

217. Hotho later inserted in the margin this outline:

c) *The community*

1) Martyrs—martyrdom

2) Inner repentance

3) Miracles, and marvels of virtue



portrays itself as a submission to brutality and injustice brought down upon the subject from the outside by others, or else by oneself. Through this submission the spirit becomes transfigured and gains peace and reconciliation with itself; in other words, it becomes conscious of living in this blissful unity. So the martyrs become a topic of romantic art in this religious arena. They appear here as self-torturers, and by voluntarily inflicting on themselves pain and torment of every kind, they demonstrate that they posit their natural will as negative, and the transfiguration of the spirit shines forth from their will having been broken. The magnitude of the holiness in this arena is then gauged by the horrible things one has endured. However, this horror itself is an offense to our concept, as it is likewise an offense to our sense of beauty. The romantic portrayals, especially those of more distant times, are then replete with such penances and martyrs, and old legends continue to provide more recent times with a mine of information for portrayals from this sphere. This long-suffering is carried to the point of crudeness and to vapid, extreme abstraction. Although ethical life and duty contain absolutely substantial elements, they are often looked upon as something negative and to be disavowed because, as situated within the world, they fall outside this sphere (although they do have their root in God himself), and that is why they are to be dismantled, demolished, stamped out. However, this is only a barbaric violence on the part of the heart and therefore on the one hand it contradicts the concept. On the other hand, the portrayals of this sphere also outrage our sense of beauty. The sufferings are horrors endured by others, and the heart does not accomplish within itself the breaking of the natural will. Here we see executioners, torments of all kinds, bodily mutilations, with the result that the portrayal is too far removed from beauty for the sorts of topics that a sound art should be able to choose. | Another aspect is that the artist's treatment can indeed be excellent, although with that remaining always just a subjective concern and the treatment striving in vain to bring itself into unity with the subject matter.

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A third feature that nevertheless falls within this sphere is the turnabout inwardness accomplishes within itself. [175]

Human beings conquer sin and wrongdoing, and by doing so they demonstrate the faith that spirit possesses the power to posit these things too as nothing. The third factor is therefore the sinner's inner conversion. Here the eternal history is repeated by individuals; they carry it out within themselves. Here it is accomplished simply within the heart; the casting off of sins takes place inwardly, as does salvation; the suffering is preparation for the reconciliation within. A subject matter of this sort falls within this domain. As

depicted, the outward action is hardly a beautiful one, for sins and wrongdoing and evil must be portrayed. One example is the story of the Prodigal Son.<sup>218</sup> It is most advantageous to portray the eternal history in a single image, as in the image of Mary Magdalene.<sup>219</sup> Such a conversion can also be portrayed in still a different way, as by the appearance of angels, or of Christ. What is divine appears within contingent actuality. In this case the entire situation can either be not beautiful, or be unsuited to the concept. Belonging here also is a topic, portrayed as Calderón does in his *Devotion on the Cross*, in which the evil, the passion, finds its outlet, its ultimate salvation, a topic in which the soul does not go astray but instead is rescued in the infinite power of faith.<sup>220</sup>

190 These are the principal elements of this romantic domain. In all of them there is this rather symbolic relationship in which the shape of the meaning is inadequate. What it signifies is a devout, yearning heart—by itself, an infinite totality within | itself. But here the relationship remains one in which what appears is more or less something external, is thus not in harmony within, and this is an inconsequential, often contradictory, subject matter. With such a topic the overriding concern is the art that appears here, and indeed art as the skillfulness of the artist. With classical art the concern is with the medium and procedures the artist has used, with the adaptations for reaching his goal, the portrayal of divinity; how the artist has adapted the general model. [176] In romantic art there is no such concern, for the shape can now be an ordinary one, its model can be ordinary natural things, and the concern is what the artist has done, not to make this external shape divine but instead to make it vivid for us; how he has caused the shape to

218. See Luke 15:11–32. Presumably Hegel is alluding to the picture by Wilhelm von Kügelgen (1802–67) with this title (1820), which was in the Dresden Picture Gallery but is now lost; see Rosenkranz's report about Hegel's review of von Kügelgen, in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 351–2. There is a picture of the painting in Werner Busch, *Die notwendige Arabeske: Wirklichkeitsaneignung und Stilisierung in der deutschen Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1985), p. 21 (illustration no. 2).

219. The widespread theme, in Christian iconography, of the repentant Mary Magdalene does not go back to a biblical tradition, but instead to one of the widespread legends from Italy associated, since the tenth century, with the legend of Maria Ägyptiaca. The biblical motif of the unnamed, beautiful sinner (Luke 7:37–50), which Hegel takes up several times, gets linked by the exegeses of the Church Fathers with the person of Mary Magdalene. See also n. 54, p. 395 in this text.

220. In addition to his many secular plays, Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–81) also composed stories about religious martyrdom and conversion, as well as many morality plays. See *Die Andacht zum Kreuze* in the translation by August Wilhelm Schlegel, in Schlegel's two-volume German work, *Calderón de la Barca: Schauspiele* (Berlin, 1803–9), 1:1–152. See also n. 155, p. 308 in this text.

stand out. The forms are particular, and here we come to examine the particular character of the artist.

*b. The Worldly Portrayal of Subjective Spirituality:  
Chivalry as Honor, Love, and Fidelity*<sup>221</sup>

Here the soul's inwardness steps down from its heaven, from its substantial domain, and becomes worldly. The principle of infinite subjectivity within itself for the first time has what is objective as its object; it has faith, objective history. This inwardness of infinite subjectivity is separate from what is worldly and stands above it. Human beings have no direct relationship with worldliness but instead unite in faith, in the community, in a third thing. The clear spring in which their image is reflected is not themselves, their own eyes; instead it is a third thing. Their stance is faith with regard to the actuality of the world, and so not the certainty as to present existence. However, when the kingdom of God has gained a place in the world, actuality comes into play. Christ says: 'To be my disciples, you must forsake your father and mother.'<sup>222</sup> After a thoroughgoing struggle with this saying, the negative attitude toward actuality, | toward worldliness, comes to an end. The human being maintains a worldly heart and has in it something affirmative. So what now ensues is the domain of chivalry, which presents itself more specifically in the three forms of honor, love, and fidelity.

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So these are not ethical motifs, are not virtue. Honor is not bravery for the sake of a community. Love is passion [177] and thus not conjugal, ethical love. Fidelity likewise has no community basis for its content, but instead has a personal object: fidelity is a renunciation of self-seeking, the surrender of one's particular will to another who is the more dominant one.

When we examine these motifs more closely and compare them with classical art, then the honor of the ancients is something unfamiliar to us. Achilles' anger is the topic of *The Iliad*.<sup>223</sup> He is not dishonored, for *τίμασθαι* does not involve our sense of honor. Instead, an actual possession is snatched from him, and he is appeased by the mere return of the possession. Because of an affront, the heroes sit down in anger. The romantic principle involves

221. Hotho's heading in the transcript at this point is: 'The Worldly Sphere', which corresponds to his (and our) previous heading of: 'a. The Religious Sphere'.

222. A direct reference to Luke 14:26 ('If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, even his own life, he cannot be my disciple') and to Matt. 10:37 ('He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me'). See also Luke 9:59-62 and Matt. 8:21-2.

223. See n. 56, p. 261 in this text.

the infinity of subjectivity, whereby honor maintains a stance in which the subject invests its infinite personality, so that the harm done infinitely offends against the subject himself.<sup>224</sup> The harm in itself can be insignificant, and it becomes magnified because the reflection of one's entire personality is invested in this particular thing. The content can be invested with honor based on the subject's point of view, and hence can be | something contingent and remote: wealth, birth, social standing. My own caprice is not an absolute content, a content existent-in-and-for-itself. I am not, by my reflection, posited in such an absolute content, and I do not bring it about. Yet in the case of honor I as subjectivity am what is primary, I am what gives weight to the content. That makes it the content of my honor. Hence in the circumstances the man of honor looks to himself first, as to whether matters suit him. We see this kind of honor emerge as a principal motif in the romantics. Honor can have an authentic content as well as a capricious content; it can be pure and substantial, but it can also involve the contrast between what the circumstance is in itself and the belief that the subject has about it with reference to himself. In the latter case the motif is cold, harsh, and lifeless. Honor can make base passions its own. A famous play of this kind is Schlegel's *Alarcos*. [178] Alarcos murdered his noble wife for the sake of the honor that consists of being obliged to marry the King's daughter. The play's motif is the aristocratic man and the law of honor governing him.<sup>225</sup>

We named love as the second motif. It plays an overarching role in more recent art. Love involves the surrender of the individual to the other's consciousness, in such a way that the individual has his own consciousness foremost in this surrender. Honor and love stand directly in conflict when honor in fact resides in belonging to a certain social class, having a certain status by birth. This honor can be in contradiction to the heart. Various other relationships can also stand opposed to love. These clashes constitute a major concern of this portrayal. They are partly external—in the view | of others—and partly internal to oneself—the clash of duty with love. In one

224. Added later in the margin:

a) Honor as such

aa) Concept; ββ) Content; γγ) Offense

β) Impulse of honor

γ) Restoration

225. *Alarcos. Ein Trauerspiel von Friedrich Schlegel* (Berlin, 1802); *Kritische Ausgabe*, 5:221–62. Schlegel's tragic play is based on the *Romance del Corde Alarcos* (Seville, 1515). The conflict in the action arises from the confrontation between the Spanish nobility's code of honor and the sacrament of marriage as interpreted in Catholic dogma, a conflict Hegel criticizes as 'cold and lifeless'.

respect love is contrary to the self-seeking of honor, since love does not have to do with one's own personality, for the main concern of love instead consists of a mutuality of being-for-self. But love is at the same time a private matter, the concern of this particular individual. The clashes therefore are a function of the fact that the individual loves precisely this particular individual. So one's interest is linked to a subjective particularity. Therefore the subject matter is at the same time somewhat inconsequential, for this subject matter is legitimated but not absolutely legitimated, since it rests upon a feeling that can either be or not be. That is why love is not in the forefront in the exalted tragedies of the ancients. When Aeschylus and Sophocles portray love, they do so only as something secondary. In the *Antigone*, the love for Haemon is presented too, but only as a secondary component [179] of the plot's complication.<sup>226</sup> Two wholly different forms of *πάθη* are still juxtaposed: the interests of piety and the interests of the state. These are the principal powers that collide here. The ancients of course knew about the concerns of love, but tragedy has for its topic the most exalted subject matter, and love, which involves contingency, therefore takes a back seat in tragedy.

The third motif, fidelity, differs from the classical friendships of Theseus and Pirithous, of Orestes and Pylades, of the Pythagoreans, and so forth.<sup>227</sup> Individuals have to make a way of life for themselves. Hence youth is the time of friendship, whereas adults separate, going their own particular ways in their particular affairs and activities, not together. In romantic art fidelity is fidelity toward something higher. In chivalry this principle of fidelity is, in the first place, the support of community, of substantial | ethical life. It is no patriotism but instead it is bound and conditioned in a particular subject by that one's own honor. The subject freely wills to place itself in this relationship, and this will nevertheless involves further characteristics.

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226. See the dialogue between Haemon and Creon, and the pronouncements of the Chorus (v. 626-800; Grene and Lattimore, 2:184-9).

227. The friendship of Theseus and Pirithous is mentioned in Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* (v. 1593-4; Grene and Lattimore, 2:149, lines 1814-15), and by Diodorus Siculus, 4.63.1-5 (Oldfather, 3:16-19)—see also 4.8-39; Oldfather, 2:364-469—and by Ovid, in *Metamorphoses* 8.303, 403-6, and 12.226-9 (Humphries, pp. 191, 193-4, and 292). See also Ovid's *Tristia* 1.9.31-2, and *Ex ponto* 2.3.43; Ovid, trans. Arthur Lesley Wheeler, 6 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1924, 1975), 6:44-5, 334-5. Pylades and Orestes appear as companions in Aeschylus, *The Libation Bearers*, v. 898-905 (Grene and Lattimore, 1:124-5). Ovid reports on their friendship in *Ex ponto* 2.3.45 and *Tristia* 1.5.19-22; Wheeler, 6:334-5, and 6:30-1, 44-5.

So fidelity also becomes precarious and contingent. It too has the free will of subjectivity as its ultimate principle.

In all these three stages the soil is the particular soul as beautiful, noble, self-reconciling. Here we find the finest parts of what stands outside religion, involves entirely human concerns, and does not conflict with our own concepts. This domain stands by itself; the subject matter can be related to religion, yet can also remain independent on its own account. Here everything pertains to the particular heart, which moves itself within itself. This stage is to be compared to that of classical art. [180]

### c. Formal Subjectivity

1) *Particular Character* Here subjectivity exists in its contingency. There is formalism of the subject matter, is character as formal subjectivity. The earlier character, in which we find love, honor and fidelity, is still beautiful, is still not abstractly for itself. Now we have the personal or particular character that wills to be the way it is. Just as animals differ, so too here one's character, without having within itself, or seeking to portray, what is higher or ethical, is character unbowed, and it establishes itself successfully or destructively. The characters of Shakespeare are especially like this. They are particular characters who distinguish themselves by the abstract firmness of their will. Macbeth is one such character. To gain the throne he forces his way by all sorts of horrific acts.<sup>228</sup> This firmness is what interests us. This is the opposite to the Italian maschera with its characters signified as lacking individuality.<sup>229</sup> The characters | of Shakespeare are what they are; they contend with what confronts them in keeping with their own specific character. There is no specific connection between what they are and what confronts them. There is no resolution [based on their] origins (*Woher*) or destination (*Wohin*). Fate as abstract necessity has returned. Yet the formal character can nevertheless appear otherwise.

The first formal character we mentioned was an abstract, firm will without substantiality. A different form is a beautiful heart that is internally

228. See n. 160, p. 309 in this text.

229. This statement refers to the lack of individuality in the Italian *Commedia dell'arte*. Hegel plays on the criticism of the typifying rigidity of Italian dramatic characters in the eighteenth century. This criticism was directed in particular to the masks employed in the *Commedia dell'arte* in the comedies of Carlo Goldoni (1707–93) as one example, and it relates to the German debate involving Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–66), who sought to eliminate buffoonery from German comedy. After Shakespeare's day the typifying conception became displaced by the elaboration of individual character, especially in the realm of comedy after Molière (Jean Baptiste Poquelin, 1622–73).

profound' but moves itself just inwardly; a precious jewel that makes itself known by sparkling only now and then. Here the formal aspect resides in an enclosed state, in the depth that is not pictured and mutely makes itself just barely recognized. This is the opposite of the first character. These formal characters of the second kind are evident more by what they do not will—by the fact that they cannot [181] bring themselves out and are like the ocean, which is silent where it is deepest. These characters express themselves only quietly and naively. These expressions dare not be insipid; they must show the full depth, and yet portray it as the heart being unfamiliar with particular interests and their execution, as undistracted. When a spark falls into such a heart it takes hold of the heart, and that heart is in danger of becoming burst by this spark, since it knows not how to help itself on its own. Juliet is the kind of childlike heart that is unfamiliar with the world; a single passion has ignited this heart, and the heart has the strength to sacrifice everything for it.<sup>230</sup> It knows no other bonds, and surrenders itself to this one. It is the same with Miranda<sup>231</sup> and others. Enclosed hearts of this sort also appear in German portrayals of profound souls, with this enclosed state linked to an inability to gain self-clarity and to act, and that gives rise to the greatest misunderstandings. Goethe's poem about the shepherd on the mountain is also one of such portrayals.<sup>232</sup> The shepherd knows not how to explain his passion, and draws attention to it only in relation to outward circumstances. It is the same with *The King of Thule*,<sup>233</sup> in dying, the king makes known his love. It is a silent way to express his love—the opposite to the forthright demonstrations of the beautiful romantic and classical art forms. Such a heart cannot take on shape, cannot communicate its feeling and its life; the circumstances become overwhelming and destroy it.

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230. See *Romeo and Juliet*, Act One, Scene Three, v. 1–108, for the portrayal of Juliet's childlikeness; *Complete Works*, pp. 249–50.

231. Miranda is the daughter of Prospero in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, which was published in 1623, with its first performance in 1631. In Act One, Scene Two, v. 18, Prospero characterizes his daughter as 'ignorant of what thou art' (*Complete Works*, p. 1136). This appraisal fits Miranda's action and self-understanding; see Act Three, Scene One (*Complete Works*, pp. 1148–9).

232. See Goethe's *Schäfers Klagelied* (*Shepherd's Lament*), in *Taschenbuch auf das Jahr 1804*, ed. Wieland and Goethe (Tübingen, 1804), pp. 113–14. Hegel's copy of the poem is in the city library of Nuremberg (Autograph no. 1500). See 'Hegel's Abschrift von Goethes Gedicht "Schäfers Klagelied"', by Helmut Schneider, *Hegel-Studien* (1978), 13:77–84.

233. A poem of Goethe's by this name, first published in *Volks- und andere Lieder*, was set to music by Siegmund Frhn. von Seckendorf (Dessau, 1782), where it is no. 3, on p. 6. See *Der König von Thule. Aus Goethens Dr. Faust* (Goethe: Werke, 1:79–80).

2) *Contingency in Actions* The other factor pertinent here is the contingency with regard to the actions that take the shape of romantic adventure (*Abenteuer*). It is of no consequence to the reserved heart in what subject matter it presents itself; it gives itself over to chance. This contingency is common to all the characters. For the romantic character it is not a matter of producing a work, for the subject [182] wants only to act. The romantic world has only one absolute work, the spread of Christianity. The legends are taken from this. The worldly work is the expulsion of the Moors, is the Crusades. However, the deeds of these works too are instead adventures, and the remaining subject matters consist of adventurous deeds of the heart as such, dedicating itself to one thing and another, to rescuing innocence and performing acts that involve only the subjective interest of exhibiting themselves. So their designs involve caprice and delusion. Such adventurousness inherently reduces itself to aimless action, and it is presented in a comical treatment. | Ariosto and Cervantes portray the disintegration of chivalry.<sup>234</sup> In *Don Quixote* a noble nature carries chivalry to the point of madness. To us Don Quixote exhibits a genial nature, although we see his folly. Don Quixote marks the end point of the romantic outlook. On the one hand chivalry is ridiculed; on the other hand his story is a series of authentically romantic novellas.<sup>235</sup> What is ridiculed is at the same time portrayed most beautifully.

The novel or romance (*Roman*) follows in line here, and it is acknowledged to be a special art form. Romanticism has found its place here in our own time and circumstances. The soil of the novel is no longer the contingency of external existence, a contingency now transformed into a higher order, that of the state. All the relationships lacking in chivalry are established. The novel has a soil in which the main elements of ethical life are established; ethical life no longer rests upon caprice, for the scope of caprice is now narrow. This narrow scope embraces the private concerns of an individual as such, the standpoint that individuals occupy in the world. Here one speaks about the concerns of one's own heart. As free subjects

234. *Orlando Furioso*, an epic in verse by the Italian poet Ludovico Ariosto (1474–1533), was first published in 1516. It appeared in a revised version, enlarged by six songs and a portrait by Titian, in 1521. A final version appeared in 1532. Hegel possessed a later edition, *Ariosto: Orlando furioso* (Venice, 1570).

235. Romanticism highly prized the work of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547–1616): *El ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha*, Part One, 1605, Part Two, 1615. The German translation, by Ludwig Tieck, is *Leben und Taten des scharfsinnigen Edlen Don Quixote von la Mancha* (Berlin, 1799–1801); repr. in 2 vols. (Berlin, 1982), from the 1852–3 edition.



knowing themselves within the objective world, individuals [183] perchance appear in their contrasting fancies and the plans they make for themselves or for their activity within the world, the ideals that they undertake to realize. Some of these ideals can be of a general kind and others can have particular contents. Individuals set out in chivalrous fashion and seek to accomplish what is good for the world, to satisfy their own ideal of love. Individuals engage in struggle with established actuality, and the only possible outcome is that they make the world no different, for they draw in their horns and yield to what is objective. The outcome will be that the individual enters into the fabric of the world, acquires a family, a standpoint, and a wife who—however idealized she was—is a wife no better | than most others.

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3) *Contingency of the Subject Matter* After the character and the circumstances, we still have to mention the complete contingency of the subject matter as such. All kinds of prosaic subject matter come in here, the ordinary, contingent objectivity and subjectivity that seeks to portray itself in its contingency. Romanticism accordingly ends in humor. All kinds of topics have a place in romanticism. If the heart is outgoing and is supposed to take shape in externality, then this externality is so divergent that the most exalted domains have their place and the most lowly ones do as well. In Shakespeare we see portrayals of knights, heroes, and ladies, and portrayals ranging down to servants and fools. In *Hamlet* the range extends down to sentries,<sup>236</sup> just as in Christianity the portrayal descends to the ox and the ass. We have yet to speak about how it is suitable to adopt this subject matter only in virtue of the treatment.

In romantic art we found this same point, that the subject matter is inadequate to the inwardness of the heart. Subject matter and subjectivity are separate, and the progression is to envisage them as one until they diverge once more. Their absolute unity does not come about in art. [184] Inwardness elevates itself to pure thought, where alone the true unity can occur. Thus far we have the real aspect of their divergence. We can characterize this<sup>237</sup> resolution as the existence of different elements which, in separating, become independent. What is authentically substantial vanishes here as it did in the transition from the classical art that does not resolve itself internally but instead rests in unresolvable images. The transition consists of moving on to what is congenial and, in keeping with it, just changing the style of the art although the subject matter remains the same.

236. See *Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, Act One, Scene One (*Complete Works*, pp. 670–2).

237. Hotho added 'real aspect, then, this'.

199 This was also the case in the ideal sphere of romantic | art. The resolution still involves the same topics, but the art has descended to mere style. The universal progression is, on the contrary, the resolution of the subject matter into its elements so that the components become free. Subjective skill consummates itself for its own sake.

We have already spoken in a formal way about this separation. It involves the formal features coming to the fore, actions becoming adventures, and the subject matter reducing in the end to ordinary, natural existence. In the romantic art that still keeps to the substantial sphere, externality of course comes into play and is said to be inadequate to what is inward, since the inwardness presents itself as indifferent to the externality. In the resolution, ordinary externality becomes free on its own account. In its representational aspect, art proceeds to portray objects as they are; in another aspect it passes over to humor, to disrupting everything substantial by adopting a subjective perspective. As to the former point, the imitation of nature, the objects are not the objects of the idea but instead are the objects of the immediacy with which spirit has reconciled itself and, in doing so, has relegated what is substantial to the beyond. Preference is given to ordinary present reality. [185] Here the portrait as such necessarily makes its appearance. Here poetry takes up scenes of familiar circumstances, scenes of the middle and lower classes. Diderot, for example, sought to introduce this emphasis among the French.<sup>238</sup> Goethe and Schiller validated it for us and paved the way for Kotzebue and Iffland.<sup>239</sup> Goethe and Schiller then transcended these beginnings, to be sure, and yet they have given voice to this emphasis. German art especially has immersed itself in this mode; other nations have instead scorned it, viewing such matters as not belonging to the domain of art. Our German art, however, has delved into the sphere of  
200 immediate actuality. | This change of direction involves the need for the

238. Possibly a reference to the dialogue *Dorval et moi*, appended to the *Entretiens sur le fils naturel* (*Discussion on the Natural Son*, 1757) of Denis Diderot (1713–84), as well as to his *Discours sur la poésie dramatique* (*Discourse on Dramatic Poetry*, 1758). These texts from the *Théâtre de Diderot* (Amsterdam [Paris], 1759) were known to Hegel via Lessing's translation in *Theater des Herrn Diderot* (Berlin, 1760).

239. See Goethe's drama *Götz von Berlichingen*, Acts 1.1, 2.10, and 5.1–2, 5–6 (*Werke* 4:74–6, 119–21, 157–61, 163–6). Presumably Hegel is also referring to the crowd scenes in *Egmont* 1.1, 2.1 (*Werke* 4:370–7, 389–95) and possibly also to *Clavigo*, Act 5 (*Werke* 4:302–6). See the corresponding scenes in the acts of Schiller's play *The Robbers*, Acts 1.2, 2.3, 3.2, 4.5, and 5.2 (*Schiller: Werke*, 3:20–33, 53–73, 77–86, 103–16, 127–35). Also see n. 96, p. 278 in this text, for more specific descriptions of Kotzebue and Iffland, the two poets of tragedies involving the common people.

subject matter of art to be something immanent. Instead we received this art as something foreign. The general endeavor was the struggle to gain something of our own, something immanent. The impulse to make it our own has continued and produced such a result. This point has been reached, but by sacrificing beauty. So romantic art has ended up where it began.

### 3. Concluding Observations

#### a. *Being at Home in the World; Dutch Art*

Christian art has not received its contents from fantasy, from the unity of the configuration and the content. In ancient art the worldly feature, the actual subjectivity, was from the outset an element of the art; its content was affirmative. In Christian art this being-at-home (*Zu-Haus-Sein*) was at first something otherworldly; human beings were reconciled only implicitly; in other words, immediate, present existence ought to be sacrificed. Present existence becomes something affirmative only at the end; and one should hold fast to this ultimate point that the end will be something affirmative. In the domain of art, being at home in it (*Einheimischsein*) is now for the first time the keystone of art's edifices. Poetry, sculpture, and especially painting have adopted this orientation. Painting in particular portrays present existence. [186]

The Dutch school of art is noteworthy for this. The Dutch cities liberated themselves from worldly and ecclesiastical domination. They acquired their political freedom and their livelihood on their own, through civic virtue and Protestant piety. The principle here is knowing oneself as satisfied within ordinary actuality. Such ordinary objects cannot satisfy a more exalted sensibility, but closer examination reconciles us to them. The object itself does not satisfy us, but the limitless art of the painter does. | We must concede that these painters understand how to paint. Their art is the art of appearing, the art that exhibits and manifests itself. It is not that the object should be made known to us, or that anything divine should become clear to us. The objects depicted are familiar ones: flowers, deer, the things we all of course have seen before. In this case the appearing is what is of interest, the appearing intensified within itself. In their beauty, the aspect of appearing has been made prominent. The Dutch have achieved mastery in doing this. The objects are from everyday actuality, but all these immediate phenomena that are depicted have achieved the highest degree of appearing. Some paintings are still lifes and some involve all sorts of vitality: an old woman

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beside a window, threading a needle.<sup>240</sup> They capture something quite ephemeral and fix it in time. A single pose that one adopts in drinking and other momentary depictions of this sort.

The quite ephemeral, fleeting nature of something changing is made the object of contemplation; this is the triumph of art over transitoriness. What is substantial is, so to speak, tricked out of its power over what is ephemeral. The appearance is reproduced in the most ingenious way. The art of the Dutch is just as important with regard to the brilliance of the colors. It grasps and captures single bright flashes of illumination. [187] This is an appearing studied in the profoundest way. In the landscape paintings, what is always of interest too is the tenor of the heart, the mood. Here the objects themselves are not the concern; what is substantial has flown away and the appearing is captured.

#### b. Humor

In humor the person of the artist, the artist's own subjectivity, presents itself. An objective content is no longer the issue, for instead the artist's own self emerges; and in the emergence | what the artist produces is only the irony of himself, a dissolution of what starts out to become objective. It is a portrayal of the subject that relinquishes itself and all the subject matter that it employs. We have had our own famous humorists. Our humorist is Jean Paul.<sup>241</sup> In his case the story is the least point of interest. The main thing is the demonstration of his own humor in how he incorporates various subject matter, by not leaving it as it is but instead only employing it in whatever way finds the wittiness in it. So what is humorous reverts, so to speak, to the symbolic realm. He singles out one aspect, although its significance can be far afield from the subject matter. What is amazing in Jean Paul's portrayals is his stringing together of the most heterogeneous things. However, this ranging about in all areas of the subject matter at the same time wearies the imagination, with the result that these fancies soon become tedious. The artist produces something distinctively his own, by ruling over

240. In the summer term lectures of 1826 Hegel mentioned in this context the woodcut *Alte Frau mit Garnspule* (*Old Woman with a Spindle*) by Gerhard Don (1613–75), completed about 1660–5 and now in the Dresden Picture Gallery. So perhaps he has in mind the same work here. Or perhaps an oil painting on wood (1759) with the same title, by Johann Jakob Dörner the Elder (1741–1813), also in the Dresden gallery.

241. Johann Paul Friedrich Richter (1763–1825). Hegel emphasizes Jean Paul's relationship to the humorous narratives written in the tradition of Lawrence Sterne (1713–68) and Henry Fielding (1707–54), and characterizes him as a representative of subjective humor.

the subject matter that he pulls together in a disorderly fashion and by giving it an arrangement foreign to it, just as in the symbolic realm. Often in Jean Paul's case even the subject matter is then brought in quite externally. He has filled entire copy-books with his compilations, with all sorts of different things.

This last point about humor is that all the subject matter is just subordinated to one's own fancies, with the result that no longer is any content in the subject matter respected; [188] the subject utilizes this content capriciously and it in fact falls into disarray. So this is just the art of the appearing that displays itself, since the interest does not lie in the content as such. That is because, by cancelling out everything seeking to shape itself to the subject matter, this humor characteristically portrays the subjectivity of the artist. In this position we get a closer look at the general relationship of art to our time.

*c. Summary: The General Relation of Art to the Present Day*

What we in fact considered up to now has for its foundation the unity of the concept and reality. This unity is the concept of art itself. Art's concern is | to portray the substantial mode of the consciousness of a people. So, the Oriental worldview was the first mode. In this worldview what is natural is, in itself, the divine. Thought is not free within itself but instead stays within natural existence. The Greek god is the unself-conscious, subjective spirituality that has what is natural as the positive element. Romanticism is spiritual being-within-self and has worldliness as something negative posited over against it, whereas with the Greeks worldliness is still affirmative. These are worldviews, are religions of a people. These religions are the spirits of peoples. The artist belongs to a people; the content portrayed is an absolutely serious matter. However when a Protestant portrays Mary, for example, there is no genuine seriousness in doing so. The self or the innermost subjectivity of the artist, and such a content, are not as one (*identisch*). When individuals of more recent times portray such objects, this is not the authentic mode in which individuals become conscious of them. For instance, the Greeks, the Indians, and the Europeans become conscious of love in different ways, and that is also the case with other *πάθη* (passions). The artist who portrays such a topic must have been inspired by such an object, must be at one with it, so that the artist's activity would only be to make one aware of such a substantial feature by means of the art. Producing it is then no caprice of the artist; [189] the substantial feature is the artist's belief, is the substantial way of knowing what is true, and the artist's activity

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is only the formal activity of making it representational. That this is a truly serious matter for the artist, that the work proceeds from the artist's own self, necessarily involves an identity with the subject matter, all the more so since the artist's genius rests upon an element of naturalness. The artist must believe in his subject matter; the artist's natural self is at one with the subject matter and the work of art comes forth from this undivided inwardness. This is the basic relationship for the existence of art in its entirety. A great period of art calls for such inwardness.

204      In contrast, the relationship is different in the position | with which we concluded. The subject matter has emerged out of the self; the reasoning has become free and the subject matter external, so that art becomes free, subjective skillfulness that is indifferent to the subject matter. Criticism has come on the scene, and in his subject matter the artist is a *tabula rasa* (blank slate). What remains of greatest interest is *Humanus*, universal humanity, the human heart in its fullness, its truth. Yet this interest is not primarily tied to any shape. In such a case art is indifferent toward the subject matter, is the art of the appearance, whatever object is treated. The only precept is the formal one that the portrayal be beautiful. This is more universal. The artist is, as it were, a dramatist who lets foreign shapes come on the scene and embodies his genius in them, making them the instrument but in such a way that they are at the same time foreign to him. So this is then the modern relationship as such—abstract skillfulness not bound to the subject matter. Dramatic poetry, for instance that of more recent times, takes in all periods and peoples. With this, art is brought to a close. Art no longer exists in an inwardness with the subject matter; art is indifferent to it. The subject matter is introduced for a purpose. That is also why portrait painting is on center stage. [190] Art is accordingly tied to specific time periods; a government or an individual cannot awaken a golden age of art. Art is part of the overall condition of the world. And at this point we intend to conclude the General  
205      Part and to pass over to the second one, to the Particular Part. |

## THE PARTICULAR PART





The General Part concerned the contents of the work of art, and we need to know what forms this content-rich subject matter necessarily must traverse. So far, therefore, we have had the nature of the idea of art, the content of the idea that determines art's general form. The Particular Part has to do with the phenomenon or appearance of the work of art. The first part had its contents internal to it; the second part is the existing work of art, whatever its contents may be. All three forms [symbolic, classical, romantic] appear, and we have to grasp the specificity of this appearance. This is not the specificity of the appearance as such; instead the mode of the reality portrayed constitutes a specificity of the content, a specificity of the concept itself.

### INTRODUCTION: THE ARTS AS SENSIBLE APPEARANCE

The appearance of art is sensible; it is not the element of thought as in philosophy. So the more specific characterization of the appearance is taken from the modes of the sensible realm. We already noted that the sensible has the double mode of sensible intuition and sensible representation, immediate external consciousness or what is sensible but in a mode already beginning to be internal. These are the two forms of the sensible. The representation does indeed vacillate between sensibility and thought, and so it already takes up thought; in other words, no boundary is to be set between [191] thought and the sensible aspect, in the way that the two go together in the representation. | The sensible aspect determines itself more specifically from the way in which we apprehend the objects, namely, with the senses.

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Here we consider the theoretical senses alone. Smell, taste, and the sense of touch do not belong here; they can be called the practical senses. They relate to things as singular and as offering resistance, insofar as the subject is a single individual too and so comes into contact with individual things in such a way that it negates (*vernichtet*) them. In art, however, spirit stands related to the objects, to what is beautiful, to what appears. In this case the objects exist within a free relationship. They are just examined, and this examination involves the theoretical senses of sight and hearing. Thus what is sensible in art is visible and audible. This gives us a division of art into three kinds: the arts of visibility, the art of musical resonance, and the art for representation as spoken art. The first kind consists of the plastic and graphic arts, the second is musical art, and the third is poetry. The first group in turn subdivides in a threefold way. Visible art is the kind in which the content is set forth externally, whereas musical sound coheres subjectively. What exists for the eye is spatially extended.

This spatial extension in its specificity constitutes the content of the visible. Its specific characteristic is that the individual figure constitutes the focal point. In one aspect this figure is surrounded by an inorganic nature, and the other aspect is the subjective, inward one of the heart going within itself, particularizing itself within.

207 Thus we have three arts [of visibility]. Architecture constructs the external surroundings of the focal point and in itself involves only their external linkage, one in which spirit reflects itself. [192] Here the form is not what is subsistent-within-itself but instead is external organization, | external congruity. This external art is only an aspect belonging to the rest. But architecture can also become fundamentally independent. And so architecture is at first independent on its own account, and then, for instance, it is intermixed with sculpture, and is essentially in this sense symbolic. The shape is not spiritual, for the spiritual shape signifies itself, whereas in architecture the signification and the shape are separate.

The second art is the art of spiritual subjectivity in its ideal mode, the sculpture that has the ideal god as its chief object.

The third art determines itself as what is congenial (*das Gemütliche*), what is subjective, what no longer has ideality as its focus but instead is the light that particularizes itself within itself, darkens itself, imparts color. This art is the painting that belongs to romantic art. The divine image itself belongs to the community, stands on the community's side, is itself human.

We commence, then, with the examination of the plastic and graphic arts. There are also particular arts that are only aspects of another artistic purpose, that are not independent. And they are to be introduced in the way they come into play as crossovers between arts. We are dealing with the true arts that are determined by the concept. The first one is architecture.

# I. ARCHITECTURE

## A. VIEWS OF THE ORIGINS OF ARCHITECTURE

Architecture forms the beginning as such of existing art. The beginning is the simplest mode of being. People of course then suppose that they have architecture in simple shape in its concept, a concept that advances slowly, little by little. [193] However, such a sheerly quantitative self-enhancement provides only an inconsequential distinction and not the genuine one. But because their impulse is to look at the subject matter in its simplest shape, they also hold the view that such a subject matter is something | contingent and easy to grasp. So they declare, for example, that painting took its beginning when a lover outlined in the sand the beloved's shadow while sleeping. The Greeks have many stories of this sort. In like fashion people say that in the beginning architecture was something hollowed out (*eine Höhlung*), that architecture was a block of wood. Such concepts do not get us very far, for these are not characteristic features and such beginnings are also not historical; instead they are poetic images one forms for oneself, based on their plausibility.

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We say that architecture forms the beginning of art with respect to the concept, and it does so historically too. But what we must consider here is where architecture actually emerged as the beginning of beautiful art. A wooden house or hut, or a cave, is no architectural beginning, despite all the rhetoric about this point. In commencing with architecture and in thinking directly of a temple, it does not seem appropriate to put the temple (the means) prior to the purpose (the image). In the case of the house there is of course a human being present whose need for shelter exists prior to the existence of the hut. Nevertheless a hut is no object of beautiful art. A building said to be a work of beautiful art is at the same time a means, and we say that the means presupposes a purpose, that it envisages the image of enclosing. With architecture we initially have to think of the house, for it is the means for meeting the need. The architecture is only the delimitation of the measureless space, a particularization of the general space. [194] The concept of architecture is that of enclosed surroundings, of setting a boundary to organic nature. In adopting this definition we have two elements: the subject, and the inorganic nature that is said to enclose it. As immediate, however, the beginning is no such doubling.

In architecture, what is first | is the inorganic element and the forms of it, without reference to a third element; for the first thing is the inorganic

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formation, and of course its external formation. With sculpture too the formation is external; there is an existing material, and the form is indifferent to it. However, in architecture the external element is decisive, in the sense that the content itself is not yet what is itself inward, what is spiritual; instead the content is what is external, so that its distinctions have their unity in a third element, in sheer regularity. The unity is inconsequential to the formal characteristics themselves because these characteristics are the unity only in virtue of what is other to them, for they subsist by themselves apart from their unity. The form is accordingly that which is itself external. The form of the human being is not external to it, for instead the human form exists only in virtue of its content.

In architecture we have three kinds of forms: the symbolic, the classical, and the romantic or Gothic. All the particular arts involve these distinctions. But with architecture these distinctions are more thoroughgoing; the other arts embody a more specific purpose; they embody a more specific shape. Architecture, however, has in itself no set principle.

First of all we have to distinguish two directions architecture takes, namely, to distinguish between symbolic [195] structural art, which is independent, and the classical kind, which has its purpose in something other. There is nevertheless a further distinction that corresponds to this one. In fact a controversy recently arose anew as to whether the architectural work of art is the kind that originated from the wooden building or from the stone building. Privy Councillor Hirt has written a work about structural art according to the principles of the ancients, and more recently has written a history of structural art. He started with the wooden building and took as his standard Vitruvius, who develops all the characteristics more or less from the wooden house. Hirt has been attacked quite severely for this.<sup>1</sup> We of course see that what can be constructed out of wood can just as well be made from stone, whereas much can be made of stone that one cannot make out of wood. Wood is limited to the house; stone construction opens up a greater prospect. The whole antithesis is of limited scope. It recurs to an extent within the distinctions we will draw.

1. Hegel is referring to Alois Ludwig Hirt (1795–1839), author of *Die Baukunst nach den Grundsätzen der Alten*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1809). Marcus Vitruvius Pollio was a Roman military engineer in the time of emperor Augustus, and author of *De architectura*, the only surviving Roman writing on the topic. Hirt draws especially upon book two, chapter one, of *Vitruvii de architectura libri decem*, which was first printed in 1487, and translated into German in 1514; this part treats the forms of prehistoric construction. See *Vitruvius: De Architectura*, trans. Frank Granger, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1931, 1934; repr. 1970).

## B. INDEPENDENT OR SYMBOLIC ARCHITECTURE

This is where there is not yet the division into an enclosing work and a subjective construct; instead the entire purpose resides within the architectural work. Such a work is in part symbolic and is superbly a blending of sculpture and architecture. It is inorganic sculpture. It is still both arts in one. Nevertheless the architecture must repress its sculptural aspect and must make itself into the receptacle for sculpture's constructs. For this distinction is essential, and each of the distinct elements must elaborate itself on its own.

## 1. Indeterminate Representation

To make a more specific beginning, then, the first need of art is for a thought to be made representational, [196] to be posited. In language this takes place only via a sign, an arbitrary externality. Art portrays representation not via a sign but in a sensuous way. So the content is said in one respect to be present, in another respect present in such a way that we recognize that the content is not the actual thing but instead is the content of the representation. When we see the living lion we have the same mental image as that of a painted lion, although a painted lion shows us that we are dealing with the human spirit's representation of a lion. The painted lion gives us the representation of the representation. Such a work is a focal point uniting human beings. The work belongs to the human being; in the simulated lion, the human being exists for other human beings. But, in the third place, the content must then be originally the kind of content that involves an objective, general interest. Originally there was no need for a lion or a tree to be portrayed. What inherently unites human beings, what has to be portrayed, is instead something sacred. Goethe says that the 'sacred' is what binds human beings to one another. So the content is such a sacred thing.<sup>2</sup>

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The work of architecture that is independent on its own should give rise to thinking by itself; it should awaken general representations by its expression, ones that otherwise can in this case still be wholly indeterminate. Yet if some sort of universality in keeping with the content should reside in these architectonic portrayals, that universality also has to exhibit itself by the

2. A slightly altered marginal notation at this point cites Goethe's 'Vier Jahreszeiten. Herbst.', nos. 68-9, first published in *Goethe's Neue Schriften*, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1800); *Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Ernst Beutler, 18 vols. (Zürich, 1950; 3rd edn. 1979), I:263. The text Hotho reproduces here from Goethe reads: '69. What is sacred? It is what binds many souls together, even though it just binds lightly, like the strands of a garland. 70. What is most sacred? It is what, today and forever, spirits feel more and more deeply, ever making [them] more united.'

form in the material. Nevertheless the form may not be reduced to a mere sign. Monuments such as crosses set up for the deceased, and cairns piled up to commemorate battles and other sorts of events, are also suited to awakening representations; yet this material can just as well call to mind many other things, and the cairn or the cross as such does not by itself point to the representation that is its purpose to evoke. On the other hand, a form that fully and concretely expresses the meaning is a shape that can [197] only be the human figure, and the architectonic work of art has then advanced to being sculpture. So, independent architecture—in keeping with its concept—  
 212 will vacillate between the purely | architectonic and sculpture. This symbolic architecture has no formal goal, so in this case we are not to speak of something complete and derived from one specific principle. We must call to mind a series of works.

## 2. The Tower of Babel

The first configuration in this series that we encounter in history and that has for its content something universal, something uniting, is the Tower of Babel. In the plain of the Euphrates River people erected a gigantic work of sculpture.<sup>3</sup> They built it by working together, and so this communal feature of its construction became at the same time a uniting into a state. This union is no longer patriarchal. That is precisely because the patriarchal condition has been annulled and the becoming-objective (*das Objektiv-Werden*) of this annulment, the self-realization of their communal status, is this structure rising up to the clouds. All of the peoples at that time labored on it; and the way they all united to accomplish the one work was the bond that linked them to one another in the way that the laws do so for us.

Herodotus speaks of a Temple of Bel; we leave aside discussing how this temple relates to the biblical tower. Herodotus describes the Temple of Bel as follows.<sup>4</sup> The perimeter of the entire temple precincts was such that each of its sides amounted to two stadia. Within these precincts the tower rose up in a quadrangular form, thick, massive, not hollow. This dispels the supposition that it could have been a house of assembly. The horizontal width of the tower measured one stadium; the height was the same dimension. Seven cubical shapes towered up, one on top of another, and structures were placed

3. See Genesis 11:1–9.

4. Herodotus describes the temple in detail in 1.181–3; *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago and London, 1987), pp. 115–16. As an ancient Greek unit, a stadium (or stade) ranged in value between 607 and 738 feet. Herodotus says there is a great covered bed in the temple (rather than seats), and that the lone woman who sleeps there is someone chosen by the god, and she has no intercourse with men.

on the highest level, the eighth level. Beneath these structures was a golden [198] table with cushioned seats | around it. A stairway wound around the entire tower. There was no temple image. One woman is said to have spent the night on the tower. The Chaldeans said the god rests, reclining on the cushions. 213

So the entire tower is no abstract point of unity but instead is a concrete point of unity for the religion. The number seven is noteworthy as symbolic in the tower's construction. This number is also prominent in Egypt with express reference to the planets and their course. Many cities also are built as symbolic works of architecture. Creuzer calls them symbolic cities.<sup>5</sup> Thus Ecbatana was enclosed within seven circular walls, painted in seven colors. These circles surrounded the king's Palace of the Sun. So these constructions are no mere signs but are meaningful by themselves, are purpose in themselves and are not reduced to mere means. The cubical form too is noteworthy here.

### 3. Representations of Procreation

A second configuration pertinent here relates to the following. In India, as also in Egypt, they revered natural beings in their immediacy as divine. In the same way they revered nature's universal power of life. This reverence also spread to Phrygia or Syria, under the image of the great goddess, the fructifying mother. Greece too adopted this representation. The animalistic organs of procreation, male and female, were then also images of this universal energy, and its reverence was known under the name of the worship of the phallus and the lingam. The innermost part of the temple contained such images, erected as huge pillars. These pillars were at first ends in themselves, having meaning in themselves; only later were they engraved and used as surroundings for the divine image. Thus we still today know of the herm images in Greece, and in Plato's *Symposium*

5. These remarks refer to Friedrich Creuzer's *Idee und Probe alter Symbolik*, published in *Studien*, ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer (Frankfurt and Heidelberg, 1806), 1:686-7. Creuzer describes Ecbatana in connection with his treatment of Persian and Median architecture, in citing Herodotus, *The History* 1.98-9 (Greene, pp. 80-1). In Creuzer's words: 'Ecbatana . . . built by Deioces, [was] a royal city built on a hill, in terrace form, with seven walls, each higher than the other, distinguished from one another by different colored paint, doubtless in connection with the seven planets, which are depicted here within the sphere of ancient, naïve, sensible imagery.' Herodotus says five of the walls were painted, and the innermost two were covered in silver and gold respectively.

Alcibiades [199] compares Socrates with a herm.<sup>6</sup> People even maintain that Indian pagodas have taken their origin from them. Pagodas are slender, tall and pyramid-like, and derive from the dimensions of columns. The representation of Mount Meru also comes from this representation of universal procreation. Herodotus even mentions Indian columns and ascribes them to the expedition of Sesostris. He also claims to have seen such things in Asia Minor, | some representing the masculine member for procreation, some the feminine one.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4. Egypt: Memnon Figures and Obelisks

The third kinds of shapes are the Egyptian Memnon figures and the obelisks. Memnons are figures that have no surrounding building; they are massive and inorganic in virtue of their great size. Memnon, the son of Aurora, is the same one as Ozymandias, and the ancients tell that the Egyptians and the Ethiopians made offerings to him when the first rays of the rising sun caused their stone sides to resonate. So at one time Memnon had a connection with the sun, then a second connection with sound, with speech as such.<sup>8</sup> These columns, some of which are still standing, are of such a colossal nature that they approach the inorganic domain; the big toe of such a figure surpasses the height of a man. In one respect these figures are of course sculptural images, although they not only portray a meaning, for they are of interest in virtue of their natural being, their vital meaning; when illuminated by the sun, they resonate. Englishmen and Frenchmen have heard the resonance, although heretofore people took this to be a symbolic account. So the resonance is no fable and rests upon the fact that the damp stone, warmed by the sun, begins to expand and so gives rise to the sound. So the pillars of Memnon, because of proximity to the inorganic, fall under architecture.

The obelisks are closely connected with the Memnon pillars; they are entire constructs without human shape. [200] Pliny tells the following about

6. See *Symposium* 215a–b, 221d–e, where Alcibiades in fact compares Socrates to a Silenus (a woodland deity, a companion of Dionysus), or to the satyr Marsyas. See *Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), pp. 215–18, 238–9. [Tr.] A herm, or herma, is a statue consisting of a square pillar with a head or a bust atop it; the earliest ones were busts of Hermes, hence the name.

7. See Herodotus' report about the expedition of the Egyptian king Sesostris to conquer the Thracians and the Scythians in western Asia (*The History* 2.102–6; Grene, pp. 172–5). [Tr.] Herodotus says Sesostris saw such columns in the lands of these peoples, not the Indians.

8. Presumably this report, misspelling 'Ozymandias' in the German, refers to Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 6 vols. (2nd printing, Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–22), 1:452 and 458. [Tr.] English readers of course know Ozymandias from the famous sonnet by Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822).



their origins.<sup>9</sup> Mithras, a Persian or a Mede residing in the Egyptian city of the sun (Heliopolis), was exhorted in a dream to erect obelisks (rays of the sun) and to inscribe characters on them. Thus we have the sun and speech expressly posited here, something already implicit in the Memnon pillars. The obelisk was supposed to be a materialization of the sun's rays. At the same time the obelisks also established sites and surfaces for the inscribed characters. The hieroglyphs themselves are symbolic writing. So people did not stick with the natural meaning of immediate objects; instead they designated the spiritual via the objects. Thus the obelisks, | because of 215 the hieroglyphs, have the meaning explicit in them.

### 5. Egypt: Temples, Labyrinths, and Tombs

The Egyptian temple appears as a fourth independent architectonic configuration. When we speak of a temple we directly envisage the representation of an enclosed building provided with a roof. But here we have to put such a representation aside, and we may only just take it up again in the case of the Greek temples. The Egyptian temples are precincts enclosed by walls; inside are pagodas and the dwellings of the priests and maidens who are trained there. Then we see numerous bulls and elephants; the bull, sacred to Shiva, is connected with the lingam. Strabo states that in some temples there are images of bulls, in some there are none.<sup>10</sup> The temples had neither the sole purpose of serving as a dwelling place, nor the purpose of serving as the place of assembly. Architecture and sculpture blend together; the largest part is sculptural labor that itself, however, retains in turn the architectonic mode. For we see such a multitude of sphinxes, of pagodas, of gods, Memnons, and animal images, that they themselves revert to what is inorganic and become mere arrangements of columns. [201] Accordingly they no

9. This report is in 36.14–15 of the *Natural History* of Pliny the Elder; see *Natural History*, vol. 10, trans. D. E. Eichholz (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1962; repr. 1971), pp. 50–9. Presumably Hegel is not drawing upon Pliny directly, but instead upon Creuzer's account in *Symbolik und Mythologie*, 1:469, which summarizes Pliny, 36.14, by stating: 'So the Ethiopian son of Aurora the Mede built the planetary city. Mithras, the Mede or the Persian, ruled in the solar city of Egypt (at On-Heliopolis), and there by a dream was admonished to construct obelisks, so-called sun rays in stone, and to inscribe characters on them, those one calls Egyptian characters.'

10. Again Hegel bases himself on Creuzer, who draws upon Strabo's *Geography* in his treatment of Egyptian deities as well as the animal worship. Creuzer utilizes the edition *Strabonis Rerum geographicarum libri XVII*, from the best Greek manuscripts together with the Latin translation by G. Xylander (1571), ed. Johann Philip Siebenkees et al., 7 vols. (Leipzig, 1796–1818). See Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:322, cf. 481, 507. [Tr.] Mention of pagodas and of Shiva here does not fit with the discussion of Egyptian temples.

longer have any character within themselves, but only serve as arrangements of columns. It is curious that the many Memnons (which are surely emptied of their colossal grandeur in this setting) as well as the images of Aphros (Aphrodite), of Isis and others, are employed as bas-reliefs of enormous construction. So these temples are not enclosures for images of the gods.

216 We can remark in addition that this independent architecture as such, in its grandest style, is at home in Egypt. The works are of a magnitude and beauty of execution compared to which the French, who beheld them, found all that is Greek to be minuscule and insignificant. The temples are the main thing. In addition to them there are also structures that are not temples as enclosures for a god or for a place of assembly. | The temple is the main feature of these structures with their double rows of sphinxes facing one another, in ruins or still erect—rows twenty to forty feet high, reaching the height of six to eight men. So such sphinxes are important not as individuals but only as a group, up to ninety or a hundred of them. Next is a gateway structure, called a pylon, with walls on both sides, magnificent rock faces that incline inward as they ascend. These magnificent rock faces are sometimes decorated by colossal bas-reliefs with portrayals of battles, of events, of portrayals from the mythology. Memnons and otherwise great figures also stand before them, and there are hieroglyphs on the rock faces. Inside the gateway is an undecorated, roofless space surrounded by a colonnade. The columns are again Memnons or other figures. Such spaces can in turn have rows of sphinxes and can be intersected by transverse walls. Then follows a covered space filled with colonnades that support rectangular stones. Then in turn can follow open passageways, decorated with hieroglyphs. Like our books, such walls serve as [202] means of instruction. At last then comes a building proper, in which stands an animal image. However, this building is an adjunct compared to the entirety of such a construct; there is no communal place within it; indeed it [can] even lack an animal image. There are also little houses just constructed out of a single stone.

217 So, the purpose of these temples is not the enclosure; instead it is the arousing of the soul, the inciting of astonishment, the awakening of a world of representations. Much in the layout of such construction is then also expressly symbolic. With flights of stairs, with steps, how many there are is determined by some important number or other that relates either to the number of feet the Nile rises when it fruitfully overflows, or | to the number of planets, and so forth. Numbers that refer to the courses of the moon and the sun are utilized too. Such constructs have at the same time an astronomical purpose. The labyrinths in particular are structures with such a purpose, for instance, exhibiting the paths of the heavenly

bodies. The labyrinths pose a puzzle, but not the mundane puzzle of being able to find one's way out, for the twists and turns relate to the courses of the planets. The works above ground in Egypt are astounding, and those underground are more astounding. There are caves here that serve the need for dwellings. But the Egyptian constructs underground are not attributable to need, for the general purpose is instead that of religious spaces.

If we ask whether the cave or the wooden house came first, then of course the cave is prior, for the art of building begins with giving form to what is inorganic and doing so in a meaningful way. In this case it certainly seems natural that people would have begun earlier on to excavate rather than erecting free-standing structures. [203] That is because in subterranean construction the principal terrain is left just as it is, and so there is no work standing by itself as there is in a structure above ground. These subterranean constructions in Egypt are configured like those above ground; they are full of colonnades with sphinxes and all the other shapes we have described; they are replete with hieroglyphs. What is above ground seems rather to have been an imitation of what is subterranean.

Above all in the Egyptian case, this subterranean construction maintains the specific feature of being posited in connection with the dead. It is significant as a realm of the dead. In India, building construction does not have this connection, for the Indians commit their dead to the flames and the Persians leave them to decompose. With the Egyptian realm of the dead we see the figure of sculpture setting itself apart from the surrounding inorganic structures. Here there are now specific edifices as the tombs of kings. These tombs are works of the nation, are its practical cultus. Like the bees, the principal nature of the Egyptians is an instinctive laboring.<sup>11</sup> We can look upon the Egyptians as the people in which what is spiritual separates itself from what is bodily. Inward negativity begins with them; a distinct spirit becomes fixed over against what is bodily. They are the first to say that the soul is immortal, that it separates itself from the physical body. They characterize this separation even more specifically by the circumstances of the architecture, which now becomes the body for that immortal soul. The

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11. See *Phenomenology*, § 691; 'Spirit, therefore, here appears, as an *artificer*, and its action whereby it produces itself as object but without having yet grasped the thought of itself is an instinctive-operation, like the building of a honeycomb by bees'; *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford and New York, 1977), p. 421. Hegel has clearly grasped this conception in a more refined way in his discussion with Creuzer, as he presents it in the draft of an 1821 letter to Creuzer; see *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hofmeister (Hamburg, 1952, 3rd edn. 1969), 2:266-7 (no. 389); *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington, Indiana, 1984), pp. 465-7 (which, however, apparently omits the specific passage in question).

tombs comprise this separation; what is architectonic becomes intentionally suited for something meaningful on its own account, for something subjective. The tombs and the pyramids then belong under this heading. They are crystals that shelter a departed spirit within them. They have chambers and passages, a symbolic feature, partly as representation of the paths that the soul has to travel. We can now look upon such tombs in the way we represented temples. Tombs are forever revered as sacred places. [204]

## 6. The Transition to Classical (Beautiful) Architecture

These are then the main shapes of symbolic architecture, and they explicitly mark out its domain. The transition to classical architecture follows from this domain. This transition can be considered in a twofold way. One point of departure can be viewed as the point at which functionality is secondary and the architecture does not serve something other than itself. The other point of departure is the need for the house as such. The house is to be grasped as the dwelling made of wood: walls that support a roof. Such a house is the extreme instance of the construction that we ascribe to independent architecture. | When this independent architecture transitions into architecture proper, it must approach the following other extreme. Beautiful architecture has in fact two characteristics. The first is that of being understandable, being functional; evenness of surfaces, rectangularity—all sheerly understandable forms. Secondly, if these characteristics are to ascend to being what is beautiful, there must be an advance to what is organic, what is rounded. Independent architecture begins in reverse fashion from organic forms that must reduce themselves to what is understandable in order to be able to find a place in the architecture proper. For instance, a pillar is in one aspect perpendicular; in another aspect it has a specific size and terminates at its top and bottom. In comparison to the pillar, organic architecture does not simply terminate, for instead reflection posits the two ends.

In beautiful architecture we find the mean between what is organic and the sheer understandability of need. Having found this mean, we can clearly recognize here the emerging modification of what we previously saw as columns. In independent architecture this modification of columns has just organic forms—human forms, animal forms, or forms adopted from the realm of plants. All these constructs are now reduced to something ancillary, are mere supports. So although the human figure appears here [205] it is not meaningful for its own sake; instead it is converted into a mere means with features not those of the human figure. So this figure now increasingly disappears. A more appropriate mainstay is the tree or the stalk, something

that naturally involves being a support. When classical art adopts images of this sort it then envisages them as natural shapes that nevertheless involve something far broader than the abstract characteristic | of supporting. It does not leave the natural shape as it is but instead gives it a properly artistic character, transforming it in accord with classical art's purposes. So, for example, with the Egyptian edifice we see plant formations turned into columns: compacted layers of roots from which reedy shoots, twisting forth and intertwining, rise up as columns. The tops of its columns are flowerlike images. So all the shapes are turned into works of art. We find something comparable with what are customarily called arabesques: natural formations that architecture utilizes for its own purposes, bringing them into an understandable nexus not belonging to the formations as such. The natural shape as such gets distorted, gets blended with foreign elements, gets altered, and that is why the use of arabesques is often criticized. However, the transition expressly calls for this modification and these distortions are fully justified as artistic constructs, because art is not supposed to leave nature in its immediacy. Classical architecture has precisely this characteristic feature: casting to one side what derives from nature and positing it as subsidiary, so that what is distinctively organic disappears, and only a reminder of it is preserved in the understandable characteristics. But with this, symbolic architecture has disappeared and classical architecture has taken its place. [206]

### C. CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE

#### 1. General Features: Simplicity and Functionality

The general nature of classical architecture (*Baukunst*) is very simple; we cannot venture into the details. It preeminently involves spatial characteristics; there is a 'music' of spatial relationships. Functionality (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) is the governing feature of this art, and so what come into play in place of the organic aspect are understandable lines: straight lines, | regular lines and, as the simplest deviation from them, right-angled lines. Here the beauty consists in the strict functionality. And so, the next issue would be the function or purpose of this art, for the purpose is the definitive, basic model. This is no model borrowed from nature as in the case of sculpture, where the human figure is in itself what is most purposive and is the sole expression of spirit. The model of this architecture belongs purely to the understanding and, as not derived from nature, it seems rather to be assigned to free will. But since the

prototype is itself determined by the purpose for which this art labors, this purpose sets the bounds beyond which art may not go. This art aims at marking off spatial boundaries, at circumscribing space. So the house is its, bare bones form.

We could of course think of still other purposes for marking off spatial boundaries, ones the house would be in no position to fulfill—such things as bridges, bathhouses, and other constructions. Yet the functions of these civilian and military structures are so specific that in these instances art is only able to appear as external decoration, as merely an added flourish. However, the house that classical architecture builds for itself marks off space for something spiritual, something divine that, by harboring it, the architecture seeks to enclose and protect. So the house of the architecture is the house of god, the temple.

Thus the house in general comes to constitute the prototype of the [207] temple. In its three dimensions the temple is a fully enclosed space. There is nothing particularly noteworthy about the length and breadth of the enclosed space, and only the enclosing of the height makes it possible or advantageous for the temple to be a horizontal enclosure. Enclosure of the height is the basis of beautiful architecture.

222     Southerners who have little rain and no gales howling about their dwellings | only need protection from the sun; for them a horizontal roof, as the simplest kind, will suffice. We, in contrast, also want to be sheltered from the rain. But the need for shelter is not the sole purpose of beautiful architecture because, as art, it has a pleasing character. When we see something broad and material, we need to see that there is something supporting it. So, in each architectural group we call for the pyramidal form. It satisfies us; it supports; and what is supported and is no longer able to support posits this inability as culminating in a vertex.

The main feature of the enclosure's physical or mechanical character is that it is both something supporting what projects upward and something unified within itself, something stable and solid. A unified construction that is something concrete has to exhibit this character in itself; and since it appears as something intelligibly fitted together, this character has to give rise to its various features. The supporting by itself gives us the feature of the columns. A solid wall of course supports too, but a wall is not the abstract element of supporting, for at the same time it encloses and connects. The column simply supports something; but since a number of columns support the same thing, what they support—the girder—is at the same time their shared feature, what links them together. These characteristics directly constitute the [208] transition to the wooden building and show it to be

something primary. The house is something put together by a human being. Initially wood serves for its assembly; stone must first be split, shaped, and only then fitted in place. |

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Classical architecture then has this external functionality of the house as its predominant feature. So what stands out here is nothing organic; the organic aspect is just subordinate. Nowhere is the house an end in itself. Also, there is no excessive feature here. The weight is the mistress and must appear as such. Furthermore, the architecture must appear as load-bearing, unyielding, only undergirded at a few points for its support. In contrast, the arabesque style has expansiveness supported by a weaker upright, whereas here the support must be intelligible, proportional, appearing neither too sturdy nor too weak in relation to what is supported. The dominant role of the mechanical aspect must also be evident in the further characteristics. The right angle remains a principal feature. A supporting element is set at a right angle beneath what it supports. The right angle is rationally determined, whereas acute angles and obtuse angles are not; the right angle is utterly determinate. The fact that the material aspect predominates also appears in the relationship of the width to the length. The square would be too regular and becomes unsuitable. The measure of the height is determined by the measure of the weight as such. A structure with its height less than its width is more readily expanded. The more ancient columns, the Doric columns, are shorter and wide, the Ionic columns are more elongated, and the Corinthian columns are even more elevated.

The more detailed aspects result on the whole [209] from what we have stated. The temple is a building with supporting columns that | are linked together. All the different features must appear separately for their own sake. The supporting element in rows of columns must be there for its own sake. The columns form halls or are placed in scattered groups, interrupting the walls to open up passageways. In contrast to these passageways is the inner [chamber]; enclosed by walls, it is what unites the disparate elements.

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## 2. Details of the Design: Columns

More specific details to be examined include, first of all, the column by itself. The column is distinct from the pillar; the column has a base and a capital. The Tuscan pillar has no base. But such a form is just the beginning of this architecture, and later columns have a definite base and a definite capital. The three purest designs for columns are the Doric, the Ionic, and the

Corinthian.<sup>12</sup> There was no departure from these designs; they are something traditional. Each arrangement has in turn its own distinctiveness; at the same time we must concede that each modification has its own disadvantage. The question, then, is why the column requires a base and a capital. One can say that this follows from an origin in the realm of plants. However, one can say equally well that the column requires them. A post ends at its top and bottom. There is no necessary point at which a book ends, although to make the ending objective one adds to the book the reflection that it is ended. So it is with the column. One wants to say that the column does not end where it does by chance, for it is supposed to end there. What is organic comes to a terminus in a concrete way; its external being is from within. This is the higher need for a self-designating terminus. Columns have bases attached to them for their firm anchorage and then, freely soaring upward, they ascend [210] in keeping with a specific relationship. There is likewise a specific ratio of their height to their width. The ancient Doric design had a height only four times the diameter, the Ionic had a height seven to nine | times the diameter, and the Corinthian rose up still higher. The Doric column had only a minimal capital, the Ionic capital had the scroll shape (*die Polster*), and the Corinthian capital had acanthus leaves. The Greeks have a charming tale about this. An especially beautiful little girl died. The nursemaid put her toy in a little basket and set it on the grave, where an acanthus plant had begun to grow. The leaves then twined about the little basket. The idea for the capital of a column was taken from this story.<sup>13</sup> The capitals of the Egyptian columns are endlessly varied; those of the Lombards are degenerate Greek forms.<sup>14</sup>

Next, atop the columns, is the beam that conjoins them, the architrave or main beam. Just above it is the frieze. In fact when one frames a house of wood, a beam is set atop the vertical supports. The crowns of the beam rest upon the architrave, set apart from one another. Filling the spaces in between them is the frieze. The beams were truncated prismatically, in triglyphs, and the rectangular spaces between them were called the metope. The metope are expressly indicative of a wooden building. Above this frieze there is then another beam that connects the crowns of the crossbeam, and it is the cornice on which the roof rests. The triglyphs and the metope no longer appear in the Ionic and Corinthian columns. The stone structure would have

12. Vitruvius describes the three kinds, in 4.1 (Granger, 1:202–3).

13. This story is found in Vitruvius 4.1.9–10 (Granger, 1:208–9).

14. [Tr.] At this point in the manuscript there is in the margin an ink drawing of three, evidently Doric, columns with simple bases and topped by a depiction of the entablature spanning them, which has layers representing, in ascending order, the architrave, frieze, and cornice.



been able to dispense with these components, which is why many of them dropped out in the Corinthian design. But the stone structure did retain for the most part the principles that it found in place. That is because it is supposed to present something elaborately constructed, something man-made. [211] |

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The beauty consists, then, in the functionality, in the relationships of length and width, in ornamentation that is not allowed to compromise the impression of simplicity, for ornamentation readily detracts from the impression of splendor. A special consideration is that something grand be allowed to appear grand, and this occurs by introducing discontinuity; at the same time this discontinuity is not to be excessive, else the representation of what is grand gets lost. The ancients understood these two factors in a unity. Innovators nevertheless introduced ornamentation everywhere, winding it about the columns, making little flutes, destroying the impression of what is grand. They fluted the columns in order to make them appear grand by causing component parts to appear in them. But these component parts must not be made too minuscule. In Italy we find columns in which a man is configured within the fluting. In general, the main thing is therefore intelligible functionality, mechanical intelligibility.

#### D. GOTHIC OR ROMANTIC ARCHITECTURE

Moorish architecture is also comprised under this heading. In Gothic architecture the predominant feature is its angular character; in Moorish architecture it is the horseshoe shape. Pre-Gothic architecture dealt in circles and arches. In Gothic architecture the independent form unites with the classical form. The framework (*das Haus*) becomes independent. Its principal character is this independence, over and above the aim of serving for human beings; it is upward striving and standing forth for its own sake. There is no longer any merely intelligible relationship or any box-like feature as with our own churches, which only exist to be filled with people and contain nothing but pews that are like stalls. Gothic churches are works | for their own sake; in them human beings, like little dots, get lost. The structure stands forth, firm and everlasting for its own sake. There are no pews, no seats. [212] Within these expanses people wander about like nomads. The prototype of classical architecture is the functionality of the house. This functionality is a secondary matter in the Gothic case.

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For the Gothic, the model is once again the natural form, and here a form of it must be that of solemn surroundings, of composure. The form is the

archway of a forest, something unsettling, inviting our examination. The Gothic or pointed arch that conjoins the columns has this character. Its form is like the way in which tree branches come together and intertwine into arches. It does away with the relationship of the straight line, of the rectangularity that serves for support and stateliness. So in the pointed arch the support is no longer emphasized; support and being supported are no longer featured for their own sake. The sides freely come together in the point. The vault presents the kind of archway that is specifically for inwardness; no longer is there the external aspect of rows of columns for what spreads outward. The vault is austere, self-enclosed, and the ornamentation likewise is determined from within. The portals are constructed with an inward slant and as passageways within pointed arches. The specific character of the facade is expressive of what is within. The external discontinuities have their character determined from what is within. The sides are buttresses striving upward; the uprights themselves, with their upward-aspiring feature, are not circular; instead the uprights begin to part down below and they separately forge their way upwards. Therefore the uprights themselves inherently indicate that all relationships fly upward; their character is not that of | resting, but that of striving-into-the-heights. Because of this overall character, the eye is not calmly directed straight ahead but instead is supposed to look upward. The uprights culminate in spires; the forms [213] give rise to pinnacles. The ornamentation has the character of the veins of leaves, of what is filigreed throughout. This twofold aspect is supposed to elicit contemplation. The upward striving invites us to exaltation. What is immediate is scattered and elaborated in minuscule, in the most uncanny contrast to the whole. The ornamentation is positioned like parasitic plants on the enormous 'tree'.

228 The whole divides specifically into the nave with side aisles. In the Netherlands there are cathedrals with seven adjacent side aisles. Human beings, with their own impulses, lose themselves in this splendor. It portrays in sensible fashion the ephemeral status of the individual, one's own transitoriness. These are structures for Catholic worship. Everywhere there is something different: here a procession, there prayer, over there a sick person brought in. Nothing fills the whole. The community becomes no end in itself, no whole. Beyond the nave and elevated above it is the chancel for the priest; also, there is a vestibule. The dimness is intensified by the colorful glass windows. All is contrasting. The veneer is white and the windows are colorful, or else the window panes are white and the walls darker.

229 We have to be content with these few points, to skip over horticultural art as a digression, and to move on to sculpture. |

## II. SCULPTURE

### *A. PORTRAYAL OF SPIRIT AS MATERIAL, OBJECTIVE INDIVIDUALITY, WITHOUT EXPRESSION OF FEELING*

Architecture proper is the enclosure for the spiritual figure. Subjective, free spirituality emerges in contrast to this externality. The concept in its being-for-self emerges over against inorganic nature and is the focal point of the architectural work. So sculpture has spiritual individuality as its object, and sculpture allows spirit to appear in an immediately material way. Sound, on the contrary, [214] does of course do away with materiality. Sculpture, however, portrays spirit in immediate materiality, in consummate spatiality. So we can say that here spirit becomes portrayed in the way it is. Sculpture is accordingly the most natural form of portrayal.<sup>15</sup> Painting of course has the abstraction of the flat surface. But on closer examination we must say that sculpture has a disadvantage with respect to naturalness, for the naturalness is only that of the outward materiality and is not the nature of spirit as spirit. Spirit in its distinctive mode does not express itself in dense materials. Instead it does so in deeds and in speech. These activities exhibit spirit as it is; they are its true being. For speech alone is able to present spirit's true being. Painting can of course do so incompletely. If sculpture is therefore natural in a material way, it has the disadvantage of not portraying spirit in its own proper element. Sculpture is capable of grasping only one moment, and is indeed to that extent immobile.

One could initially have supposed that sculpture would be able to utilize the advantage of painting, which | can be more precise with regard to color and more specific spiritual expression, and that it would be arbitrary for sculpture to work in abstraction from color, to disregard it; in other words that it is insufficient<sup>16</sup> to utilize in the execution just shadow and light. Sculpture in fact portrays only an abstract aspect of the concrete, human bodily nature. Sculpture's forms are not a diversity of colors and movements, but instead are confined to spatial dimensions. This is no defect, however, but is a characteristic posited by the concept. For art is the work of thinking spirit. Art produces something universal, something abstract. It is the same as in the case of science. Science does not comprise concrete actuality but only

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15. In the margin at this point Hotho inserted, at the third stage of his revisions: 'first chapter, general concept of sculpture; second chapter, content and form of sculpture; third chapter, individual types of sculpture'.

16. After 'insufficient' Hotho added 'skillfulness'.

comprises one particular aspect of it, [215] and not a concrete aspect in the way sensible consciousness does. Art keeps separate what is separate in the concept, even though those elements may of course be together in actuality. Each stage of art holds fast to *one* conceptual distinction.

231 Sculpture's element is the bodily nature of sensible existence. The first mode of the bodily nature is dense spatiality, is materiality. Art at first sticks to this first stage of the concept. Sculpture takes up the material as a geometrical body and is unconcerned with color. Sculpture has general material existence for its element, and so excludes the particular features of the material. Yet the work of art must be for another, and so there begins the particularization of the material. But sculpture can only go as far as visibility in general, with the light that does not yet proceed to the point of color; it can go only as far as general particularity. It is in darkness that light first particularizes itself | into color. So the characteristics of color are excluded. Colorless marble is the most suitable material, as well as metals that of course have color but are just abstract, unalloyed material, are monochrome. The Egyptians utilized kyanite, which is dichromatic when scraped. The grand spirit of the Greeks took up its standpoint in the way the concept set it forth, and they constructed their works purely and simply in conformity with this concept.

In more specific terms, sculpture portrays the marvel in how spirit envisages itself by the material, by the way in which spirit is able to exhibit its presence in that material. We have to consider, then:

1) In what way the spiritual is capable of envisaging itself in this materiality.

2) How these forms of spatiality are to be characterized, the ones with which spirit

makes itself known as beautiful. [216]

In general, therefore, we must look at the comparison of this material aspect with what is abstractly ideal; and look at what sensible, outwardly determinate aspect corresponds to this ideal. That material aspect is the first form of the spirituality that appears based on the inorganic nature juxtaposed to spirituality. As the material, we have the spatiality of the still non-particularized, pure matter. Corresponding to this pure matter as such is the rigid objectivity of the spirit in which the spirituality itself has not yet distinguished itself, as the particular subject, from general subjectivity. Spirit is then subjectivity, certainly, but not subjectivity distinguishing itself from the general being-in-itself of spirit. The matter just *is*, and in it spirit just *is*. The subjectivity that is existent-for-itself introduces, along with itself, mobility

and contingency; it posits itself as something particular and free-willed that passes over into specific deed and action. Insofar as contingency comes into play, contingency appears | as outwardly directed, as involved with what is other to it. This particularity of subjectivity is excluded here in sculpture; so feeling finds no place here. 232

Spirit has to appear without the expression of feeling; the figure shows itself without any *facial expression* (*Miene*) or demeanor. For 'facial expression' means an expression of distinctiveness, of particularity, of personal affect, of the relationship of characteristic features to the universality of spirit. For instance, when I am self-satisfied I can of course behave wholly objectively, can be satisfied with myself because of performing an ethical action. But at the same time I, a single individual, set myself apart from the general public and compare myself with it. Consenting in this comparison is self-satisfaction. Objective spirituality does not yet move on to this particularity, even to *this particularity* of feeling. Pride and conceit are both feelings belonging to *this particularity*. Bravery is a substantial conduct; if it is accompanied by a facial expression, then this conduct involves a subjective feeling, a personal affect, a consciousness of particularity that expresses itself. Human beings are never without feeling: they are self-satisfied, menacing, defiant, embarrassed; that is, they are in some sort of particular relationship. But with sculpture, above all, particular subjectivity is excluded, and excluded along with it is the expression [217] of feeling. There is substantial individuality that is portrayed as existent. When we read someone's biography, about someone's experiences and deeds, then the sequence of various free choices and contingencies is anchored in a portrayal of character that captures the individual in terms of general predicates. Here then we have the substantial strengths of the individual, and the particular features themselves are only the fortuitous appearance of this substantiality. Sculpture portrays such constancy as simply expressing the being. | Sculpture represents 233 general attributes such as goodness and righteousness not figuratively (*allegorisch*) but instead as individuality, as spiritual objectivity. Sculpture is the object as self-enclosed and complete, in independent repose, withdrawn from relation to something other, reposing within itself, blissful within itself.

This independent repose of an objective individuality is divinity, spirit's being-with-self and not venturing out into finitude but just existent, and for that reason eternal and immortal.<sup>17</sup> That is why sculpture, more than every

17. Hotho later added in the margin at this point: 'b) objectivity in the sense of not yet being reflected within itself, apart from the physical nature; c) only to be portrayed as expressible in what is bodily'.

other art, is indicative of the ideal. In keeping with its content, the object too is the ideal, the eternal, pure substantiality, uninvolved in what is temporal and ephemeral. That is why the sculptors of antiquity constitute the major focus of antiquity's art. The whole tenor of plasticity is diffused over all the works of the ancients; the substantial is always foundational and the unemotional always predominates; the thinking, eternal idea is represented, and the caprice or the autonomy of what is contingent is removed. The intuition of plasticity is applicable to all study of all of antiquity's works of art. Even individuals in their action have this character. They are grand and free, independently engendering themselves from themselves, forming themselves into what they were and thus have been seeking to be. Pericles and Sophocles are characters of this sort.

## B. THE HUMAN FIGURE AS THE IDEAL

### 1. Spirit, Soul, and Body; Physiognomy and Spiritual-Bodily Congruence

234 In turning to specifics, the first point we encounter is [218] that the objective foundation is the human figure. The anatomy or framework of architecture was the house. Artists do not devise the prototype; | instead it is a given for them. They did not devise the living figure but instead found it. The living figure belongs to nature, although this feature is expressed in a very nonspecific way. Reason operates in nature, so the natural figure is therefore something engendered by the concept; the soul is the existing concept and engenders for itself the animal body, the model for which is modified in various ways. Yet the model is determined by the concept. Grasping this point, that the bodily figure and the concept are in accord, is the business of philosophy. That the plan of the animal body—with the particular organs or parts into which it is divided—conforms to elements of the concept, and that in this case the characteristics of the soul are bodily, is something to be demonstrated in philosophy. The human figure, then, is the bodily nature not of the soul alone, but of the spirit. Soul and spirit are different. Spirit has to make itself into the soul, for spirit is living, and as it is high above what is merely living, spirit, as soul, makes its own body,<sup>18</sup> and this body is determined only by a concept.<sup>19</sup> As existent-for-itself, spirituality is thinking. Thinking, which realizes itself for itself, constructs scientific knowledge for itself; deciding on immediacy for itself, it forms a living body for itself. The

18. Hotho added: 'commensurate with this high status'.

19. Hotho changed 'a concept' to 'the One Concept'.

living bodily being is therefore determined by the concept; in progressing to spirit, the concept is also bodily being and just modifies it. The human bodily nature is a given for the artist; it is the expression of the concept as such; and beyond this, it is the expression of spirit as the concept existent-for-itself. The human body, then, is not solely body as such, but is also the expression of spirit in what is particular. This too is presupposed. As falling within the natural realm, this congruence of the spiritual with what is bodily belongs rather to | sensibility, and it is not to be traced back to specific thought-determinations. [219] 235

People sought to portray this congruence in scientific terms, and they called it pathognomy and physiognomy. Pathognomy is not pertinent at this point, for it is occupied with how passions and feelings express themselves. Nothing fundamental has been accomplished yet in this field. People say, for instance, that anger has its seat in bile, and courage in the blood. In one's countenance, anger expresses itself differently from satisfaction. Particular passions correspond to activities of particular organs of the body. Anger does not have its seat in bile but instead, becoming bodily, it has a specific organ of the body in which its operation makes its appearance. But emotions also have fleeting expressions. The same organs express anger, joy, distress, and so forth. This pathognomic phenomenon as such—the sympathetic oscillation of the bodily organ that accompanies an agitated, emotional disposition—is not the object of sculpture. It is otherwise with physiognomy. In one respect physiognomy of course also relates to transitory frames of mind. But what is suited for sculpture could only make reference to what is lasting. If a work of sculpture based on the human figure is supposed to show how this figure expresses the divine as such, and one wants to examine this sculpture very specifically, then one has to explain which parts of it, which of its features or configurations, correspond to a specific inwardness. We are led to such a study by the ancient works. We must concede that they express divinity and, furthermore, that they express the particular character of this divinity. To show this, we would have to indicate the features of the particular bodily parts. These features are not arbitrary, for instead their harmony must | exist in-and-for-itself. Each bodily part must be examined from two perspectives: physically, and how it is capable of expressing something spiritual. This would be to consider it the way Gall did, crudely to be sure, using the cranium.<sup>20</sup> [220] So then, in examining the particular formation 236

20. Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) summarized his 'craniology' or 'cranioscopy' (later called 'phrenology') in: *Neue Darstellungen aus der Gallischen Gehirn- und Schedellehre, als Erläuterungen zu der vorgedruckten Verteidigungsschrift des Doktors Gall eingegeben bey der Niederösterreichischen Regierung. Mit einer Abhandlung über den Wahnsinn, die Pädagogik*

with regard to its spiritual expression, the procedure had to have been determining the extent to which these features would be something ideal and expressive of what is spiritual, insofar as the ideal belongs to substantial spirituality.

It is especially interesting, with respect to ideal forms of the work of sculpture, to compare the earlier style with the ideal of classical art. We are indebted to Winckelmann in particular for this comparison.<sup>21</sup> With refined sensibility, Winckelmann highlighted the features that the Greeks characteristically specified for the ideal. Egyptian works of sculpture demonstrate great technical skill; they have excellent features, but the ideal is not yet present in their case. When it comes to the transition to the properly ideal style, we have to remind ourselves that with this transition art undertakes to provide a portrayal that is not the representation of an immediate object but instead is the representation of it that spirit makes for itself. There can be a quite imperfect way of representing an object. In their drawings children render representations quite unskillfully. The initial characterization that representation of an object provides can suffice with very imperfect products, with symbolic products that struggle with the portrayal in only a general way. Piety is satisfied with poor-quality works of art. Piety only wants to be reminded of the object as such. The heart adds the rest, and this inwardness is the decisive thing in piety. | Something portrayed externally is of course satisfying as sheer stimulation. The consummate work of art, however, should be developed to the point of specificity, with the result that the subject beholding it should simply be receptive to it.

## 2. Early Objective Representations; Egyptian Statuary

Making the object's representation objective is therefore the first requisite of the work of art. [221] That is because this representation, as in the

und die Physiologie des Gehirns nach der Gall'schen Theorie, ed. Walther (Munich, 1804). Hegel had already dealt with issues of physiognomy and phrenology, in the *Phenomenology*, §§309–46 (Miller, pp. 185–210).

21. See Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums* (Dresden, 1764); cf. n. 46, p. 257 in this text. In the first part of this treatise, in one aspect Winckelmann considers Greek art in the historical context of art's development since the Egyptians, and in another aspect he proposes an internal differentiation within a people's art at that time and, as an example, distinguishes four stages of Greek art. Section Three of the fourth chapter of Part One (pp. 213–48) is entitled: 'Growth and Fall of Greek Art, in which Four Periods and Four Styles Can Be Established'. The preceding Section Two (pp. 141–212) treats 'The Essentials of Art'. In the edn. by Ludwig Goldscheider (Vienna, 1934; repr. Darmstadt, 1982), these two sections of the work appear on pp. 139–237. (Hereafter the German original is cited according to the 1934 edition's pagination.) The English translation, *History of the Art of Antiquity*, trans. Harry Francis Malgrave (Los Angeles, 2006) has this material on pp. 191–244.



representation of something divine, should be something recognizable to everyone, to an entire people. It will be recognizable in that it undergoes no alteration, for the portrayal always remains the same. Much is conventional in such portrayals. Because of that, at this stage art becomes statuary. And this statuary is then the foremost focus of Egyptian, ancient Greek, and ancient Christian, art. The artist had to stick to specific forms, for those were the requisite models.

With the Egyptians this activity is still associated with the division into castes. The artists belonged to the third caste. The son followed in the father's footsteps, had to learn his art and to execute it entirely as he did. Accordingly, art was not free; the artist is just an artisan. The great transition to the awakening of free art is where the artists depict freely in accord with their own ideas; where the lightning bolt of genius strikes into what is handed down and imparts to it a freshness in the portrayal. Only then does a spiritual tenor pervade the work of art.

Since art is initially produced to meet the need for representation, and a spiritual tenor has not yet gained currency, we notice that this art remains static, with a superficiality and generality of forms, and that in another respect, in their more specific character, these forms stick to ordinary actuality and do not, as a rule, get elaborated to the point of vitality. The forms are then in turn the features of ordinary nature. This is the character of ancient Egyptian and ancient Greek works of art, the art of the Aeginetans, about whom there is controversy as to whether their style is Greek or not.<sup>22</sup>

The Aeginetans | stand out because of their most faithful imitation of nature. This imitation goes so far as reproducing random features of the skin, with no striving for ideality. The portrayal does not want for skill; knowledge of the muscles is evident. [222] A connoisseur says the limbs are astonishingly natural. However, the heads are not natural. In all the actions

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22. Winkelman points to an Aeginetan 'school of art being extant on this island even in very ancient times', as attested to by 'reports of so many ancient statues in Greece fashioned in the Aeginetan style'. In this connection Winkelman refers to an unknown Aeginetan sculptor (*Aeginetae fictoris*) on whom Pliny reports in his *Natural History* 36.4.10, where the term is *Aeginetae pictoris*. See *History of Art*, p. 303; Mallgrave, p. 301. But here Hegel is referring to the pediment sculpture of the Doric Temple of Aphaia at Aegina (ca. 500 BC), the so-called 'Aeginetan', discovered in 1811. Crown Prince Ludwig of Bavaria mounted it and in 1815 brought it from Aegina to Rome. A sculpture of late antiquity, it portrays Athena surrounded by heroes from mythology. Bertel Thorvaldsen (1768–1844) and Johann Martin Wagner (1777–1858) did restoration work on it in Rome during 1815–17. In 1818 it was installed in the Glyptothek Museum in Munich.

the faces have a uniformity and lack naturalness.<sup>23</sup> This feature comes from the artist's compulsion to stick to what is traditional. The postures too are lifeless, cold, and stiff. This is directly noticeable, so that we feel not all the components are equally suited for the expression of what is spiritual. This is so in one respect with the face, in another respect with the rest of the body's posture. The spiritual depicts itself in the individual components of the face; in the feet and arms it does not do so, for in them only a general characterization is producible via the posture. Even the positioning of the head is significant. Age and gender are of course expressible with other bodily members, but they can express what is inward only by the posture. The art work from Aegina reproduces the limbs quite naturally, and yet the posture and the facial expression lack what is spiritual.

As we already stated, we have Winckelmann to thank for the criterion distinguishing the ideal from what is natural.<sup>24</sup> Based on this criterion, we intend to introduce first the general character of Egyptian statuary, and then the character of ideal statuary. Winckelmann<sup>25</sup> says that, as a rule, in the Egyptian style the figure is for the most part constructed wholly in straight lines, and so it lacks gracefulness. The figures have a stiff and unnatural stance, with the feet positioned unnaturally and apart yet parallel, not turned outward. In masculine figures the arms hang straight down at the sides, so the figures have no action. In drawings of Egyptian figures we certainly do see them in motion, although this feature appears in bas-reliefs

23. These remarks presumably refer to Winckelmann, *History of Art*, pp. 115–17, where he attaches to his presentation of the 'first and most ancient Etruscan style' a portrayal of the 'succeeding and second' style that features 'both a palpable indication of the figure and its parts and a forced pose and action, which in some figures was violent and exaggerated. With regard to the first characteristic, the muscles bulge and rise like hills; the bones are sharply drawn and rendered much too prominently, in a way that makes the style hard and awkward' (Mallgrave, pp. 171–2). Compare Winckelmann's account to Hegel's statement about the uniformity of the faces and the positions of the bodies. On the naturalism of this style as 'astonishing', see Johann Martin Wagner, *Bericht über die Äginetischen Bildwerke im Besitz Seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Kronprinzen von Bayern* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1817). This publication also included art-historical notations by F. W. J. Schelling. Schelling's notations were later published separately as part of his *Sämmtliche Werke* 9:111–206.

24. See n. 21 just above.

25. Hegel cites Winckelmann (*History of Art*, pp. 51–3), where we find these statements. 'The general and most prominent characteristic of drawing the nude in this style is the straight line, or the delineation of figures with slightly outwardly swelling and moderately curved lines. We find this style also in their architecture and in their decorations; their figures therefore lack grace... and painterliness, as Strabo says about their buildings.' Winckelmann soon after refers to 'the delineation of forms with nearly straight lines and the minimal indication of bones and muscles...', with portrayal of animals being the exception to this practice (pp. 51–2; Mallgrave, pp. 131–2).

and in painting rather than in works of sculpture. | Daedalus first set the arms apart from the body, [223] as the Greeks tell it.<sup>26</sup> The importance of not overlooking this separation has been correctly noted. Winckelmann says the Egyptians adopted the principle that the hands were immobile. He also remarks that they elaborated the muscles and bones minimally, the veins and nerves not at all; the ankles and knees are shown; the back is not visible, for the bodies are set against a backdrop. The details lack the familiar features that life imparts to figures. The eyes are drawn flat and slanting, not set in but nearly flush with the forehead. The eyebrows are indicated in sharp relief above the eye sockets. This is distinctive; the brows are partially designated by flat streaks that extend to the temples, where they end abruptly. The bridge of the nose resembles its ordinary nature and the cheekbones are high. The chin is small and the lip line extends upward, whereas with Europeans the mouth extends downward. Only a narrow streak separates the lips. The ears are noticeably high. The feet are flat and wide, with toes of equal length and with the little toe not bent inward. The toes, like the fingers, lack joints. The male figure is clothed and the garment of the female is just indicated.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. Greek Sculpture as the Ideal

#### a. *Its Perfection*

The Greek sculptural images are, in contrast, utterly ideal, and we must learn from them what is ideal, for they are unrivalled. They set themselves apart by the freedom of their vitality and posture. They are free conceptions on the part of the artist, not the portrayal of what is traditional. Everything is determined for the sake of vitality; their magic resides in the precision of the detail. [224] The ingenuity they evidence is so refined that it strikes the eye not directly | but only in various lighting and positioning. However, what matters to us in the overall impression is the allure of an animated surface, that all the bodily parts segue into one another in delicate specificity. The characteristic of this vitality is the perfection of all the individual points. Nothing is superficial and nothing lacks connection to anything else.

26. The myth of Daedalus is recounted by Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–93) in his *Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtungen der Alten* (Berlin, Munich, and Vienna, 1795), p. 222. Winckelmann wrote: 'General opinion concedes that Daedalus finally began to carve individual legs in the lower half of these columns. Because no one yet knew how to create a complete human figure from stone, this artist worked in wood, and the first statues were given the name *daedala* after him.' (*History of Art*, pp. 27–8; Mallgrave, p. 112.)

27. Hegel reproduces Winckelmann's description almost word for word, right down to the details about specific parts of the body (*History of Art*, pp. 52–4; Mallgrave, pp. 132–3).

*b. Human and Animal Anatomy Contrasted*

In our detailed examination of these forms, what are most noteworthy are the forms of the face. In this too we follow Winckelmann.<sup>28</sup> The first thing we encounter in this regard is the Greek profile, a specific combination of the nose and the forehead. They connect in a gently concave, nearly straight line, one that has a vertical direction tending toward flatness. We find this alignment determining other features, namely, the line drawn from the top of the bridge of the nose to the ear. Camper,<sup>29</sup> the Dutch physiologist, has defined this line especially in more detail and has shown that, in animals, the line the nose bone forms with a second line descending from the upper mandible, where the teeth are positioned, is an acute angle. In contrast, the Greek profile [i.e., the line from front teeth to nose to ear?] forms a right angle. Camper also often finds this naturally among Caucasians. That such a right angle has ideality is clear if we examine the circumstances more closely.

241 With animals in particular the organ for eating and that for smelling stand out in similar fashion; they extend outward toward the objects. The animal mouth projects forward; the eye seems to serve only for sporting food. In contrast, two focal points are evident in human physiognomy. The entire structure of the animal is understood based on the mouth. [225] The constitution of the teeth shows the constitution of the whole animal. Different teeth call for different | jaws, different forelegs, different claws, different muscles, different vertebrae in the back. The legs and backbones can be known from one tooth.

Significant in the human being, aside from the mouth, are the eye and the reflective forehead.<sup>30</sup> The eye is the organ of a theoretical relationship to things. The mouth is the practical organ. This second or ideal disposition toward objects, the reflective disposition, appears in the upper portion

28. The ensuing remarks about the facial features are based upon Winckelmann's description of the Greek profile as he treats the portrayal of the head in Greek art (*History of Art*, pp. 173–7; Mallgrave, pp. 210–12).

29. The reference is to the treatise by Petrus Campers (Pieter Camper, 1722–89): *Ueber den natürlichen Unterschied der Gesichtszüge in Menschen verschiedener Gegenden und verschiedenen Alters, über das Schöne antiker Bildsäulen und geschnittener Steine, nebst Darstellung einer neuen Art, allerlei Menschköpfe mit Sicherheit zu zeichnen*, ed. Adrian Gilles Camper, trans. S. Th. Soemmering (Berlin, 1792). See also notes 30 and 33 just below.

30. [Tr.] At this point in the margin there is an ink drawing, in profile, which illustrates some of the previous points about the human head.

of the countenance; it faces outward and is the main thing, and it furnishes the ideal character of human physiognomy. The straight line that runs to the back of the animal breaks off in the case of the human being. The human eye looks straight ahead, forming a right angle with the alignment of the body. In a human being the eyes and forehead express the predominance of the theoretical relationship. So the mouth and forehead are the focal points of the physiognomy and are linked by the nose, the olfactory organ.

The nose marks the transition to the forehead; it still pertains to animal needs, yet olfaction is intermediate between the practical and theoretical relationships. If the transition between forehead and nose is interrupted, then this exhibits obstinacy and harshness—a being-for-self on the part of what is reflective—as opposed to what connects one with the external world. A pronounced angle gives the impression of separation. The beautiful harmony between what is reflective-within-itself and the organ of communication resides in the | gentle transition of the reflective forehead to the nose. So this line provides us with this beautiful harmony. This is more than we need to say about the Greek profile. The aged do not have a high forehead, and in youth it is more compact. [226] The hairless, pronounced angle of the forehead appears not in robust youth but only in old age.

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### *c. Other Specific Aspects of Greek Sculpture*

As for the eye itself, sculpture dispenses with the glance or the gaze. We first see a person in the eyes; in how, in shaking hands, we establish a link through the gaze. The gaze is the concentration of inwardness, of perceptible subjectivity. The gaze is what is most soulful. Sculpture dispenses with this most soulful feature, and that can appear to be a deficiency. Frequently the eyes are colored, but the color does not constitute soulfulness; instead the concentration of animation does. In keeping with its character, however, sculpture must dispense with the gaze, for sculpture is not supposed to proceed to the subjectivity that posits itself as subjectivity. Hence it is entirely consistent that sculpture does not seek to include the gaze. Only traditional, ancient temple images have colored eyes. Sculpture does then go so far as indicating the gaze through [the figure's] absorption, although sculpture is supposed to express the spiritual only by circumscribing space, and it involves what is soulful only as the overflow of the spiritual within the spatial framework. The sculptural image is unseeing, is not self-particularizing subjectivity.

In the case of statues we do find that they look toward a specific point, as in the example of the Faun with the young Bacchus.<sup>31</sup> The smile directed at the infant is soulfully expressed but the eye is not beholding the child. The ancients attributed beauty to a large eye. Venus has large eyes, only they are partially closed; the lower eyelids extend upward. The more specific form of the eye is then that the inner angle of | the eye forms a higher arc toward the upper eyelid and is more curved toward the nose, is not a half circle, [227] is not abstractly regular.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the eyes lie deeper than in nature, and that gives more expression to the reflective character of the forehead. The eyebrows are only delicately indicated; the hair as such is plant-like (*Vegetabilisches*), more a weakness of the organism than a sign of strength; the women have thicker hair. Ancient sculptural images indicate the eyebrows by the striking definition of the eye sockets.

Various nuances appear with the *mouth*, which is a principal component of the face. In an animal the lips are insignificant; in the ideal they are most eloquent, which in this case gives prominence to affability. In addition, in ancient statues the mouth is not closed but is instead partly open. The mouth opens when one is reflecting. Being absorbed within oneself is the dominant feature. The jaw projects further down than in nature, and is full. Animals have a more meager chin. Goethe says that a larger chin provides a sign of [inner] activity, whereas the more meager lower jaw of the animal indicates the animal's outward orientation.<sup>33</sup> The *Venus de' Medici* has only part of its

31. This refers to the statue *Faun with Bacchus* that Hegel saw in 1815 in a restored condition in Munich. A photograph of the statue as it appeared at that time is the frontispiece to vol. 1 of the two-volume English translation of the *Aesthetics* by T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1975). It is also in *Hegel in Berlin: Preußische Kulturpolitik und idealistische Ästhetik ...*, the exhibition catalogue (11 Nov. 1981 – 9 Jan. 1982) of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, as well as in the catalogues of subsequent 1982 exhibitions in Düsseldorf and Wiesbaden. Photographs from these recent exhibitions show the statue with the restored parts removed.

32. Winckelmann states that: 'One of the beauties of the eyes is the size, just as a large pupil is more pleasing than a small one' (*History of Art*, p. 175; Mallgrave, p. 210). Also that: 'Venus has a glance yet different from both these goddesses [Juno and Pallas], which is produced in particular by the lower eyelid being somewhat raised, whereby in her gently opened eyes there arises an ogling and languishing air, which the Greeks called *τὸ ὀρῶν* [(running, melting, languishing)]. Still, she is at a far remove from all the salacious gestures of the moderns, because love was regarded by the best artists of antiquity as a companion to wisdom' (p. 163; Mallgrave, pp. 203–4).

33. See n. 29 just above. This statement points to Goethe's review of Camper, to which he refers in his *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, bes. zur Morphologie*, 1 vol. in 4 pts. (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1805), a volume Hegel possessed. From the facial angle (the so-called 'Camper line') formed by the intersection of the straight line extending from the external auditory canal to the projection of the nose, with the straight line between points above and below the nose, Camper deduced the degree of ideality of the profile portrayed. Any facial angle greater than 80 degrees belongs to the ideal profile. In the case of ancient heads this angle rises to the

chin, and yet the chin has been found and thus is restored.<sup>34</sup> The ear is delicately executed, and the hair too; these features are distinctive and often define the deity.

The limbs, as distinct from the head, involve a different arrangement. Spirituality appears via the face. The limbs of the body are active and can be beautiful as active, although what is spiritual does not appear in the limbs themselves, or else it appears only by juxtaposing their movement and the stance in which they are placed. Demeanor as such is not a feature of sculpture proper, | for the stance is more one of a reposeful, calm bearing. [228] Yet the repose must not express an unnatural condition and must not convey a uniformity of legs and arms in the way they are shown in Egyptian images. The limbs by themselves are only capable of sensuous beauty. Together with the limbs we come now to consideration of the clothing.

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The primary reason one needs clothing as such is not a factor for sculpture. Modesty is another reason, and it has its basis in the fact that human beings are aware of their higher vocation, of being spirit; they know this vocation as their essential nature, and so they regard what is merely physical as unsuited to it. Shame is the beginning of displeasure about not being what one ought to be (*ein Nichtseinsollendes*). Shame comes into play for all peoples who begin to reflect. This fact is expressed ingeniously in the story of Adam and Eve.<sup>35</sup> The Greeks clothe themselves and partially clothe their limbs. Yet they think highly of themselves for having been the first people to compete naked. Competing naked is partly ascribable to it being comfortable, and partly to a deficiency of spirit among the Lacedaemonians, who

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maximum ideality of more than 100 degrees. August W. Schlegel too developed this thought in his *Kunstlehre* of 1801–2; ‘Camper sought to determine the distinctiveness of the Greek profile via an anatomical measurement, the correctness of which I leave to the experts to judge, and according to this work the measurement would be a proportion completely exceeding what is natural. Camper sticks to it without deriving such a proportion from its physiognomic significance, which is indeed not ambiguous. In virtue of the larger facial angle, the larger-angle group becomes dominant over the lesser-angle one, and the larger-angle group appears to be the locus of higher mental powers, since greater sensuality resides in the lesser-angle ones. Therefore such a formation discloses the predominance of the purely human over the animal nature.’ See A. W. Schlegel: *Kritische Schriften und Briefe*, II, ed. Edgar Lohner (Stuttgart, 1963), p. 127.

34. Hegel refers to the *Venus of Medici* (in the Uffizi Gallery, in Florence), a copy in marble from the Roman Imperial period, made from a Greek statue from the first century BC. Winckelmann remarks about the dimple in the chin of this statue (*History of Art*, p. 167; Mallgrave, p. 212). This statue did not in fact have its chin restored, but rather the right arm and fingers of the right hand.

35. See Gen. 3:7, 10–11.

were the first to do so. Among the other Greeks, a chief reason for nakedness in art is sensuous beauty, and that is why images were not clothed. But the Greeks did not treat clothing and nakedness promiscuously, for the distinction was essential. Decorum was the governing factor. Amor is unclothed, for he is the unself-consciousness of beauty as appearing. They portrayed other youthful gods and the heroes as naked too; but Venus is the only naked goddess, and her main concept is sensuous physical attractiveness. Juno, Pallas, Ceres, Vesta, and Diana are represented as clothed, and Jupiter most especially so. The specific principle governing beautiful raiment is that the  
 245 clothing not conceal the limbs but instead | show them. What is ancient is accordingly commensurate with the ideal.

Our own clothing of course expresses the working of the limbs, [229] although upon closer examination we find that our clothing falls short of what is artistic. Although it of course lets us see the motion of the limbs, it nevertheless conceals the vitality of their outlines, the undulation and contraction that typifies what is organic. Our clothing conceals this more subtle feature, and what we see is only an external and expedient (*mechanisch*) arrangement—the limbs move in restricted fashion within outer folds that have only an external, expedient character. Our clothing certainly does make the general character of one's organic constitution evident, but it does not allow for seeing distinctively sensuous beauty, and makes it indiscernible. The garment as covering is comparable to the architectonic element [of architecture], except that it provides for individuals moving together with their covering. Being distinct from the body, the garment must appear in this distinctiveness. As in architecture, the material too is something basic, but is the kind that enables free movement, that is, it must hang upon the body and move freely. A free-hanging cloak will therefore be a suitable garment; it just drapes on the limbs and otherwise moves in keeping with its own expedient principle. This is what constitutes the ideal of ancient clothing.

It then follows that this ancient attire wholly facilitates making the stance of the figure visible. And this stance simply expresses spirit. This ancient clothing does not cover up the stance; it conceals detail that is of little import. In this context it is noteworthy that one must not think to incorporate ancient attire in modern statues, which are portraits. We see right away how inappropriate it is for specific persons to be attired in ideal fashion. It  
 246 appears as a direct contradiction. The portrait must appear in its own proper clothing, | for this clothing belongs to the particularity of its subject. Besides, the objects of ancient sculpture come from mythological history. [230] Winckelmann says that no subject is adopted from a time that



preceded the Trojan War.<sup>36</sup> So that time period is nonspecific, is no one time in particular. Modern characters do not have this independence. The independent characters, inwardly free and outwardly unconditioned, are princes and kings, and they can of course also be treated freely within their attendant reality (*Beiwesen*).

Sculpture of course presented still further aspects, ones of a yet more empirical nature. What come next after clothing, and are nevertheless external, are weapons and other objects associated with the figure. They appear directly because sculpture remains wholly general, and so it is necessary to indicate, by associated objects, what is thought fitting for which individual god. We have to point out in this context that now the animal carries no weight in-and-for-itself; instead it just stands alongside the god and serves to indicate the god's personality more specifically. Another point is that what is ideal in general must break down into particular ideals. For the ideal is still linked to what is sensible, and the sensible, unable to coalesce into what is One, can articulate itself only via a circle of gods. This feature introduces the extent to which particularity is expressed without bringing harm<sup>37</sup> to the general ideality. Just as the general ideality expresses itself in specific forms, so too the deity is distinguished from the other deities by specific forms. Winckelmann presents the distinction as specific features being proper to certain deities, just as is the case with the different features of portraits. Juno's mouth was so distinctive to her that one could recognize it every time in her profile. Likewise distinctive is the eye, and the way the hair is entwined.<sup>38</sup>

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Another circumstance is the way in which sculpture descends to portraying the images [231] first of heroes, and then of the sorts of shapes that combine animals and human beings. Myron<sup>39</sup> was renowned for depicting

36. In a different sense, to be sure, Winckelmann links one feature of sculpture with the time prior to the Trojan War. He points to the successive development of sculpture, then painting (after the Trojan War), and then architecture (*History of Art*, p. 137; Mallgrave, p. 190).

37. [Tr.] The German volume has 'harmony' (*Eintracht*) where 'harm' (*Eintrag*) might make sense in this context.

38. Winckelmann (*History of Art*, pp. 157–65; Mallgrave, pp. 224–9) characterizes the norms for female deities and for male deities in Greek art and sculpture. The report in our text about the profile of Juno possibly refers to his description of the norms for the heads of male and female deities on coins (pp. 164–5; Mallgrave, pp. 228–9).

39. Myron (5th century BC), a Greek sculptor and contemporary of Phidias, was renowned in antiquity for various works, such as the *Diskobolos* (*Discus Thrower*), *Boxer*, the grouping of *Athena with Marsyas*, and his portrayal *Cow* (which is no longer extant). Myron is representative of the so-called austere style and marks the close of the early classical period. Numerous copies of his works survive, ones made in bronze or stone during the Roman Empire. See also the following note.

Satyrs and Fauns.<sup>40</sup> We need to call attention in this regard to the delicate sensibility of the ancients. The exalted, austere images are closed up within themselves. What bears upon human needs is relegated to the sphere of Fauns and Satyrs. One interesting topic, for example, is the mother calming her child. Goddesses are always portrayed as childless. A she-goat is given to Jupiter as his wet-nurse; Romulus and Remus are suckled by a female wolf. In contrast, there are many Egyptian and Indian images in which gods are suckled by goddesses. Other light-hearted features of life and pleasures belong to the sphere of the Fauns. Even the depiction of heroes is assigned more to the Centaurs, not to the gods. So the ancients have distinguished these spheres. What is humanly contingent is excluded from the exalted sphere of the gods.

From the individual sculptural images the transition would be to groupings, and to the bas-reliefs. The work of architecture has the characteristic of being the surroundings for the god. But the existing surface areas are to be covered over and filled up. Here sculpture is of more service. The groupings have their place mainly in the faces of the pediments. The bas-relief is specifically for filling in the surfaces, and it forms the proximate transition to painting. |

40. In the following sentences Hegel is referring to Goethe's essay on 'Myron's Cow', which appeared in 1818 in his 'Über Kunst und Altertum' (*Sämtliche Werke* 13:637-47). Goethe writes (pp. 643-4): 'It would have been impossible for a Greek plastic artist to have represented a goddess suckling. . . Subordinate natures, heroines, nymphs, Fauns who are assigned the role of nursemaids, of teachers, may in any event appear as providing care for a boy, then Jupiter himself by a nymph where, not having been nourished by a wet-nurse, other gods and heroes likewise enjoyed a wild upbringing in concealment. . . Plastic and graphic artists have exemplified their great sensibility and taste to the highest degree by taking delight in the action of suckling demigods by animals. This is shown to us in an illuminating example, *Centaur Family*, by Zeuxis. . . 'In the same essay, Goethe writes: 'We cannot fail to mention yet another portrayal, that of the Roman she-wolf. View it as one will, even in the poorest imitation, it always thus excites great pleasure.' One example is the famous bronze statue of the *She-Wolf*, from the mid-5th century BC, which is now in the Museo Capitolino in Rome.

### III. PAINTING

#### A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE PARTICULARITY OF SUBJECTIVITY

We saw that with sculpture the objective substantiality of the object is the reposeful immersion of the character within itself. Sculpture's material is the abstract matter that has no characteristics but those of spatiality. But painting advances to subjectivity, for spirit is essentially subjectivity as existent-for-itself. [232] Through painting, this subjectivity appears in contrast to that substantial art of sculpture, and it embarks upon the particularity of spirituality. In the temple there is the community that is the counterpart to the god and carries the god's substantiality over into itself and particularizes it. This subjectivity is at the same time what unites the two aspects that belong, respectively, to sculpture and to architecture. That is why, in painting, we have the figure and its background. Here inorganic nature surrounds the figure, or else nature is treated by itself. This relationship embodies the specific character of the concept of painting. The sphere of objects is more all-embracing than in the case of sculpture.<sup>41</sup> The abstract characteristic is subjectivity gone within itself, which is subjectivity in the form of abstract being-for-self. In sculpture, individuality is poured out into the shape, although sculpture lacks the gaze of the eye. In contrast, painting has for its main characteristic the subjectivity that is existent-for-itself, which is at the same time formal identity, and by which what is particular becomes free. In sculpture what is particular, what is utterly external, is dominated by the individuality itself. In the principle of painting, to the contrary, what is being-for-self allows the distinctions to become freer, since free subjectivity can delve into all that is particular. This sphere is therefore infinitely expanded.

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All the particularities and transitory features of character have a place in painting. Painting is related to the heart, for painting's objectivity is not the objectivity of substantiality. So instead of locating what is subjective in the objective determinant of spirit,<sup>42</sup> or producing specific intuitions of the divine, painting instead produces less specific representations that have their

41. Added later in the margin, at the third stage: 'First Chapter, general basic principle of painting, 1) breadth of objects as belonging to subjectivity, 2) material'.

42. Hotho changed 'locating what is subjective in the objective determinant of spirit' to 'portraying what is subjective in the objectively determinative mode of sculpture'.

place in feeling. Feeling has something general for its object, and within this object I know myself as what is particular. In order to have objective content, I must forget myself. In painting, subjectivity as feeling becomes free. [233] Therefore painting is related to feeling. So its objects are particular, are contingent, are objects that correspond to me only in a general way. That is because what is contingent does not concern my objectivity, but instead concerns my particular subjectivity. So, since it does not matter what the content is, painting has this broad scope that can take up anything. That makes painting very much more humanized. What is natural finds a place in painting, and since painting produces just a general tenor, the content of the objects is of less consequence.

250 The element<sup>43</sup> of painting, then, is light in the way that, in darkness, light makes itself specific in *color*. In light nature becomes subjective; light is the physical 'I'. Posited as particularity, light is color. Color is the | element of painting. With this, painting relinquishes the objective character of matter, its total spatiality and externality, and is the abstracting from it. Painting is art proceeding from the concept and holding firmly to one stage of the concept. Painting is not the totality of concrete actuality, but instead highlights conceptual distinctions. The specific distinction this involves is that the element of painting holds firmly to subjectivity as opposed to spatial totality. This spatial totality is relinquished, one aspect in it is abolished and, as far as space is concerned, painting retains only an abstraction of space, the surface. This is the necessity of the progression with respect to the negative aspect. The spatial totality flattens itself out. One can dispense with the question as to why painting stays with the surface, by saying that this is a human limitation. However, one often sees as a limitation what is a specific advance in virtue of the concept.

The other aspect of this element of painting involves [234] light, shadow, and color. This aspect introduces in a positive way the fact that painting has to keep to the flat surface. The natural feature of light and shadow, as the distinction of dark and bright, is in fact a consequence of the figure<sup>44</sup> as such or, more specifically, of my position in relation to objects and my distance from them. There is of course also brightness and darkness on their own, but the main way light and shadow appear is principally a function of my position in relation to the lighting. Here in painting, however, light and shadow are simulated by the painting.<sup>45</sup> The contours of the figure ge

43. Hotho added 'sensuous' before 'element'.

44. Hotho changed 'a consequence of the figure' to 'in sculpture a consequence of the spatially concrete figure'.

45. Hotho changed 'simulated by the painting' to 'producing the figure itself'.

expressed by means of light and shadow. They appear as a consequence of that | which is simulated.<sup>46</sup> So here the figure in its own right is superfluous; it need not have three dimensions, for these dimensions are simulated by light and shadow. Furthermore, the aim is the appearance of what has color, as determined by the characteristics of brightness and darkness, and this appearance cannot be left to chance, whereas in nature the appearance of color is contingent, is determined in large part by the other surrounding objects. But since painting has as its aim the appearance of what has color, it cannot relegate this appearance to chance; hence it must firmly establish the brightness and darkness. Because of that the background is necessary, for darkness is needed for the appearance of the figure. Moreover, the picture must have a framework to show where the picture is supposed to end, just as we found an ending shown with the column.

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These are, to begin with, the general characteristics.

The particularity of the painting then has to appear within the painting itself. More than any other art, painting accommodates two extremes: the interests of the object, and those of subjective art. In no art can the [235] two aspects be independent on their own account. In one respect we can be carried away by the object, and it can be portrayed with minimal means; it can be just signified and yet be a consummate ideal. Raphael's preparatory drawings (*Kartone*) are of inestimable value and wholly embody the excellence of their conception.<sup>47</sup> Yet when painting<sup>48</sup> appears | as drawing, it can also be the case that it has not progressed in technique. The Dutch painters have far more skill in coloration than Raphael does. The means of color he employs in his pictures are quite unprepossessing. The other extreme is technical skill in coloration; here the object itself is of less concern. This is the case most especially in the Dutch pictures and also in a few from the Italian school. In them the painter captures fleeting phenomena: the appearance of grapes, of wine, of a smile, of a sunset. Painting pre-eminently allows for this contrast [in styles]. The feature of particularity is what makes it possible too for the various aspects of painting themselves to become free.

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46. Hotho changed 'is simulated' to 'simulates them and are not the presupposition for what is bright and dark, but instead are its product'.

47. In 1515, Pope Leo X commissioned Raphael (Raffaello Santi, or Sanzio, 1483-1520) to draft preparatory drawings for the tapestries for the lower wall areas of the Sistine Chapel. These drawings for seven of the ten tapestries, with themes from the lives of the Apostles Peter and Paul, have been preserved. These templates specifically for use purely in the studio were still to be found in Hampton Court in 1823. Today they are in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London.

48. Hotho added 'in color'.

## B. INWARDNESS AND PAINTING'S OBJECTS

As our third specific concern, we have to speak now about the distinctiveness of the objects. Here too we have to emphasize the ideal. There is little of a general nature to say about painting that would at the same time be specific. In the case of sculpture, we were able to mention the more specific features of its forms; yet in painting all that is particular wins a place, and so the soil for its portraying, and for the manner of its portrayal, is extensive and varied. What comes into play in painting is a distinctiveness that can be specified in endless ways. Each master has his own style when it comes to the objects, to their portrayal in color, and to the creation of the appearance. The portrayal of the different circles and their masters is an empirical matter. [236] Since it is a distinctive feature of painting, the particularity of mastery comes into play and the general features have a lesser role.

The first thing to mention is the character of the objects as such. We said that all kinds of objects could find a place here. But the more specific point to mention is what substantial feature, what authentic characteristic, painting especially could adopt; in other words, what is the character of the ideal that finds a place in painting. Previously we specified in detail this ideal of a distinctive kind as belonging to the romantic sphere. Sculpture cannot  
 253 express this character; instead only | painting can do so. Vice versa, however, painting can indeed include the topics of sculpture.

## 1. Religious Portrayals

Painting's ideal is the romantic ideal, in which the subjectivity that is for itself constitutes the basic characteristic, is spiritual inwardness. This inwardness itself has in turn diverse contents. Substantial inwardness is the inwardness of religiosity. Inwardness of a limited character is the topic too, although substantial inwardness is necessarily the highest object. Substantial inwardness is the soul that is present to itself, that experiences itself. This inwardness is substantial only insofar as it has subdued its own natural subjectivity, has collected itself internally, has risen above the sheer naturalness of subjectivity and, in this elevated state, is universal inwardness, such that the soul that wills itself is another spirit<sup>49</sup> and finds itself in it, surrenders itself to this other spirit. This is the character of love or feeling in its universal substantiality, the love that is free of desire, that is religious love; whereas love coupled with desire is earthly love.

49. Hotho changed 'is another spirit' to 'is in another spirit, as in the particular, subjective [spirit]'.

Religious love has various forms and characteristics. It is devotion, adoration. What is adored has existed visibly, is visibly apparent, and is visibly portrayed by art. One form of this [237] love, the most inwardly subjective form, is the mother love in which the heart has not only gained this oneness but is fundamentally blessed, knowing itself to be one with the other. Mother love is in one respect love free of desire; and as love on the part of the Holy Mother, it is the love that has the divine for its object and is in natural oneness with it. This love has been the focal point for painting insofar as painting has had an eye to its highest purpose. Religious love's objects all relate to this sphere.

Sorrow and negativity have a place here too; as sorrow in which love at the same time | prevails. It is the suffering in beholding the dead Son. This sorrow is wholly different from the sorrow that we find with the ancients. For Niobe, for Laocoon, sorrow is wholly different from sorrow in the romantic sphere.<sup>50</sup> In that sorrow of the ancients the heart's nobility holds itself upright, by not crushing one's inferior and not expressing rage or revenge. Although this sorrow is suffering, nobility is upheld. Yet the nobility and the sorrow are not compensated for. There is only this benumbed presence-to-self, the unfulfilling enduring of fate. In romantic sorrow there is always the return into oneself, the blessed state of inwardness—the looking to heaven and one's own certainty that keep one calm and that resonate throughout the most sorrowful states. The independence of what is substantial resides in untroubled bliss. And in their portrayal the great masters of this circle have especially conveyed this feature of higher satisfaction. We can of course then draw a distinction between the ancients and the early [romantic] masters. The supernatural is missing from the ancients; the lot of such figures is earthly sorrow or earthly satisfaction. There is no looking to earth on the one hand and looking toward heaven on the other hand, no allowing heaven to shine forth from oneself. The latter character is thus the distinctive ideal of painting. [238]

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The church needs such portrayals. It calls for such pictures, and they ought to be revered. But the more exalted the art, all the more are such objects transferred into the present. The painting makes them earthly and contemporary, giving them the fullness of worldly existence and highlighting

50. Normative for Hegel in describing sorrow and its aesthetic significance are: Lessing's *Laocoon* (1766), trans. Ellen Frothingham (New York, 1969) as *Laocoon, An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry*; Herder's essay on 'Plasticity' (written 1768–70); Goethe's contribution to the periodical *Propyläen* of 1798, entitled 'Concerning Laocoon'. The classical works mentioned in our text also form the transition to the characteristics, the typical forms of portrayal, in romantic art, according to A. W. Schlegel's *Kunstlehre* (1801–2) and to Schelling's lectures on aesthetics at Jena in 1802–3 (later also given at Würzburg in 1804–5).

the anthropomorphic aspect, so that the aspect of sensuous existence becomes the main thing and devotion becomes a lesser concern. Art has the task of working out this ideal aspect wholly for the present, | of making sensuously representational what is transposed to the sensible domain, of transferring objects from distant settings into the present and humanizing them. The Mary pictures, for instance, portray her relation to the child as the relation of a natural human mother to a human child. They bring this feature to us in the present and highlight the human relationship. An objective need has become the point of departure in the case of these religious objects. With the portrayal of other objects that are contingent ones, the contingent circumstances of need have their place too.

## 2. Nature and Landscapes

We presented the character of the religious object as being the substantial mode of the soul's presence-to-self, the relationship of love, the presence-to-self of what is natural in its essential being. But inwardness also has a further shape. It can make its appearance with sheerly natural objects. When we contemplate the starry heaven, the moon, sunshine, hills and mountains and valleys, the soul can be inward in the presence of them too if they be grasped according to some sort of need. In their immediacy they are just observed, not felt. Moonlight, the calm sea, or the sea in its [239] passion—when these are felt—have a relationship to the soul. In these things the soul truly apprehends a nature that corresponds to it. The infinite, calm depth of the sea, the possibility of an infinite summoning power, impacts the heart and causes the heartstrings to resonate; just as, conversely, the tempest or the stirred-up sea points sympathetically to the soul's moods. Painting has this inwardness too for its object, and the character of this inwardness also pervades it. Landscape painting grasps nature with soul and spirit, and it structures its images for the purpose of expressing a mood. | In doing so it must not become a mere imitation of nature and remain one. For example, nature calls for the typical design of leaves and branches, and so on; thus landscape painting has to preserve this specific manner of representation, and yet not stick accurately to these characteristics in their rigid specificity. The main thing is just the mood of the whole, and the rest must be subordinated to it. A serene<sup>51</sup> landscape must emphasize its detail in conformity with this mood, but not treat the detail for its own sake like a portrait and let attention be drawn to this detail.

51. 'Serene' (*ruhige*) in the manuscript could perhaps also be deciphered as 'luxuriant' (*reiche*).



## 3. Commonplace Objects

A third kind is the inwardness present with objects that are quite insignificant for their own sake. These objects can appear commonplace to us. The actions portrayed can, by themselves, be of a disagreeable nature, and yet such situations—reveling in life's pleasures, fidelity, forthrightness, attentiveness to a task—can point to finite, hearty inwardness and can show the satisfaction found in such things. So the third kind is inwardness in the immediate present. What a person does in each moment is something particular; and the right thing is to make the most of each occupation and each particular thing, to be actively engaged in it, to be present in it with one's whole spirit. [240] This makes for a hearty, energetic character.<sup>52</sup> This harmony with oneself in the present moment is therefore an inwardness too, and it becomes the object of art. The whole attraction here is in the harmony, not in the object itself. The Dutch painters especially have made this the topic of their portrayal. In their paintings it seems as if the entire individuality is simply there for this particular occupation. The entire countenance, the entire bearing, must be suited to the specific circumstances. For instance, cheerfulness suits certain physiognomies<sup>53</sup> better than others. What is of interest in Correggio's *Repentant Mary* is the total harmony of this figure with this mood of repentance.<sup>54</sup> This oneness of the entire figure with the feeling is what this painting ultimately portrays. Moreover, here art demonstrates its power of being able to capture (*fixieren*) the fleetingness of appearances. | Everything in nature is something transitory. The actor 257 in the theater serves the moment. Art's portrayal captures this fleeting moment, giving it duration. The other aspect is art's power of presenting this fleeting moment in detail. Nature is concrete in all its aspects. By grasping this, art does not stick with what is universal but instead lets this concreteness appear fully individualized in such a way that, in it, the universality still subsists. This is not strict imitation of what is observed, for instead, in its individualizing, art must occupy a higher position than what is immediately present.

52. On this point see Schiller's remarks 'Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung', in *Schiller: Werke*, 20:460–1.

53. Hotho changed 'certain physiognomies' to 'great harmonies'.

54. Hegel means the painting *St. Mary Magdalene Reading*, which in his day was attributed to Correggio (Antonio Allegri da Correggio, ca. 1494–1534). The version in the Gemäldegalerie in Dresden is now regarded as a copy of a 1528 painting. See the illustration of it (plate 97c) in Cecil Gould, *The Paintings of Correggio* (London, 1976).

## C. THE MEANS OF PORTRAYAL

## 1. Figures on a Flat Surface

There is a second aspect with regard to the objects, one with more specific bearing on the discussion of painting. It is that painting portrays its objects on a flat surface. In doing so painting displays its content more fully than does sculpture, which at most just advances to individual groupings. Painting fully displays its object. This advance in display also is a feature of the history of painting. Like sculpture, ancient painting had for its object just individual figures, which then at that time also showed little in the way of movement. [241] The advance in art accordingly gives movement to the figures. Portrayal is more difficult in the case of motion; foreshortening comes into play. What is more, several figures get portrayed in combination, in one action. Art was initially more hesitant in this respect too. Ancient painting still conformed to the regularity of the pyramid shape; it had one Christ on the cross and praying figures facing him. The further advance is the emergence of less regularity, with the figures forming groups and reasonably positioned vis-à-vis one another. Here various planes or dimensions emerge. | Principal figures belong in the foreground, and the light falls upon them.

The motifs also then constitute an aspect that demonstrates the sensibility of the painter. The most pregnant moments must be grasped and must become evident, since what is at hand, what precedes it, and what follows, are portrayed as well, and the sheer surroundings are given significance with reference to the action. One example is a depiction of Achilles in girl's clothing. When Ulysses searches for him, Achilles glimpses his helmet and becomes agitated; and as a result of this agitation his pearls tear apart and a child picks them up.<sup>55</sup> We also see this feature of the surroundings in the visit of the Magi. The child lies in a manger, which is in a shabby condition. In the

55. This episode is not recorded in *The Iliad*, but appears in later stories. Achilles' mother took him to the island of Skyros, disguised as a girl, to keep him from going to Troy. There he lived with the daughters of king Lykomedes, until discovered by Odysseus (Ulysses). The depiction referred to in our text is the one awarded the prize by Goethe at the Weimar competition of 1801, the depiction by Joseph Hofmann (1764–1812) entitled *Achilles among the Daughters of Lykomedes*, or *Achilles at Skyros* (1801), which is in the *Städtische Kunstsammlungen, Weimar*. At the awards ceremony Goethe especially emphasized, as does Hegel, the motif of Achilles' torn string of pearls. Hegel's remark about the pearls being picked up by a child is an embellishment with no counterpart in the portrayal. Cf. 'Goethe's Preisaufgaben für bildende Künstler 1799–1805', ed. Walter Scheidig, Weimar, 1958 (*Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft*, 57), Illustration 15.

background we see, a further structure: an unfinished dome. The run-down stable and the upward-projecting dome have a relation to the action.<sup>56</sup> Often too, with pictures of Mary among the flowers, we see a lily stem painted without anthers, because anthers indicate a sexual relationship; the virginity of Mary is expressed in this way. These are then the more specific circumstances of painting.

## 2. Color

A second major feature of the portrayal is color. The color is what makes it painting. Design and ingenuity are essential, [242] are necessary, and yet the color is supremely the vitality. The color is no mere coloring, for it is at the same time significant expression. The Venetians and the Dutch are especially masters of the shades of color; they live right in the lowlands and the twilight, under cloudy skies. The Italians tend on the whole more to blandness than do the Dutch. The following circumstances are pertinent to color. |

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The first one is the contrast of light and dark with respect to the plasticity of figures and objects. Added to this contrast of light and dark is the natural color that is light and dark too; it gives a different relationship to specific components than they would have in virtue of their shape. The lips have a more pronounced redness than the rest of the facial features. The painter who wants to produce these natural tints faithfully will omit light and dark shading in the curvature of the lips. This harmonizing [of tints] is a second circumstance. A third is that the colors by themselves involve a contrast of dark and light. Yellow is quite light and blue is quite dark; setting them side by side puts blue, because it is dark by itself, into another relationship [with yellow] than it has chiefly in virtue of the spatial relationship. In other words, what is blue on its own, as dark, changes (the 'sense of) spatial

56. This refers to the *Three Kings Altar* (*Columba-Altar*) of Rogier van der Weyden (1400–64), a work ascribed in Hegel's day to Jan van Eyck. Today it is in the Alte Pinakothek, in Munich. Hegel knew this painting from the collection of the Boisserée brothers. Presumably it originated ca. 1455 under the sponsorship of Goedert von den Wasserfass, the burgomaster of Cologne, for the church of St. Columba in Cologne, which he endowed. It formed one of the main works displayed in the Boisserée collection, on which see p. 126 in this text. In Goethe's description of the pictures in the collection of the Boisserée brothers, Hegel finds a normative model for his own interpretation of painting, especially of painting's color and the characterizations it employs (pleasing portraits). See Goethe's 'Kunst und Altertum an Rhein und Main', which first appeared under the title 'Über Kunst und Altertum in den Rhein- und Maingegenden von Goethe' (Stuttgart, 1816); *Goethe: Werke* 12:160–1.

distance. Colors also involve something symbolic.<sup>57</sup> From time immemorial red has counted as a sign of royalty. As opposed to such colors as yellow, red, and blue, the secondary colors are wholly subsidiary, and we see that the famous colorists give primary colors to the principal figures and secondary colors to the subordinate figures. So a harmony is called for with regard to colors. The colors either highlight one another or else they become inconspicuous. Secondary colors [243] side by side are disadvantaged. | The painter must heed what is most advantageous with regard to the harmony of colors.

At certain times artists sought to achieve harmony by toning down the colors. But great art consists in making colors prominent and yet avoiding glare. It is risky to work with glaring colors.

Another circumstance with respect to colors is distance as such, the deep perspective. The more distant the objects are, the more inconspicuous the colors become; they weaken. Hence the colors of the foreground must be the most dazzling and the darkest. Contrast lessens with distance. Still another factor is the specific illumination. All these circumstances make the treatment of colors the most difficult element in painting.

<sup>58</sup>Coloration, then, is what is distinctive about each master; it is an element of the artist's productive power of imagination. What is most difficult in coloration is the color of human flesh, for it constitutes the ideal in coloration. The red in the cheeks of a youthful face is certainly a specific color, but this red by itself is still not the redness of the flesh. All sorts

57. In the margin, at the beginning of this paragraph, Hotho had labeled the discussion of the contrast of light and dark for plastic figures as 1), with a, b, and c subdivisions. Later he added in the margin his numbered headings for the other circumstances that get discussed in the remainder of this section on painting, as: '2) Symbolic feature of colors; 3) Harmony; 4) Deep perspective; 5) Lighting; 6) Skin color; 7) Chief historical distinctions in coloring'.

58. The account that follows obviously points to Diderot's conception of coloration, which Hegel knew about from Goethe's translation and commentary, in 'Diderots Versuch über die Malerei. Übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen begleitet', which was published in *Propyläen*, Vol. One, Part Two, and Vol. Two, Part One (1799); *Goethe: Sämtliche Werke* 13:201–53. Diderot's *Essais sur la peinture* (*Essays on Painting*), written in 1765, had been published in 1795. Another reference is Goethe's *Farbenlehre* (published in 1810), in which Hegel had been interested since the Jena period. On chiaroscuro (light and dark), see *Farbenlehre*, Didactic Part, § 851; on the spatial consequence of color (yellow vs. blue), § 780; on color's symbolic value, § 915; on the harmony of colors and on criticism of harmonizing by toning down as well as for the favoring of clear colors, see §§ 891–5, as well as the essay 'Diderot's Versuch...', p. 240 in the *Sämtliche Werke*; on the 'deeper perspective', see §§ 867–70; on the distinctiveness or individuality of coloring, see 'Diderots Versuch...', pp. 246–8; on flesh color as the acme and most difficult thing in coloring, especially on flesh color as the harmonic combining of primary colors, see 'Diderots Versuch...', pp. 234–8, as well as *Farbenlehre*, §§ 666–72, 876–8.

of colors combine in the skin; bright red, bluishness of the veins, yellowishness of the skin—all are combined, are lusterless, and no one color stands out, for all are wonderfully united. Capturing this feature in painting involves avoiding any monochrome appearance, and means portraying the flesh as something inward within itself. In contrast, when we examine the brightness of the stars and the terrestrial colors, those of flowers or of leaves, then here the colors are endlessly modified but lie, so to speak, on the surface. Yet the colors of an entire woods or of a uniformly appearing bunch of grapes are, to the contrary, a whole, one appearance. Each point appears | as a different point from its neighbors, [244] but there is one overall appearance (*ein Durchscheinendes*). The entire body of an animal has color: its hair, its hide. The hide or the plumage is smooth or uniform (*weich*) like wool, and this uniformity derives from the fact that the color results from an endless number of points and lines. This concerted, overall appearance (*Durch-einander-Scheinen*) exists to the greatest extent in human skin. The skin exhibits the deepest sky blue and other shades. In beautiful flesh tones the color must have the look of an overall appearance; not the look of a simple surface but instead the look of something issuing from within, a diaphanous quality. When we behold a lake in the twilight we see the shapes that it mirrors and the distinctiveness of the water. This distinctiveness is an overall appearance. We can in general view skin color as having this overall, diaphanous quality. How this works is that paler colors are layered over dark colors in such a way that the darker ones appear through the light ones.

We can then call attention to the following principal distinctions with regard to coloration. In its infancy, painting defined figures by their outlines. The colors did not depict the figures, although colors are present; instead the outlines designated them. The consummate art of painting produces the definition of the figure by imperceptible transitions of one coloring into another, in such a way that the outlines are not defining lines and that, although defined, the outlines nevertheless are nowhere emphasized. In paintings by Albrecht Dürer, and those by Raphael, we see the most sublime effects produced by quite simple distinctions.<sup>59</sup> Upon a closer look, the surface appears monochrome, although when standing at the right place

59. Here Hegel obviously points to the pictures of Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), as well as those of Raphael, as being examples of a consummate portrayal of the human being in German art in the one case, in Italian Renaissance painting in the other. Hegel fundamentally prizes Raphael's famous *sfumato* less than he does the way in which the Dutch give predominance to color.

we see how the tints, with their slight differences, produce the most enlivened figures. These grand old masters did not yet advance the art of chiaroscuro as far as did the later masters, who bring together the most pronounced darkness and brightness. [245] Directly evident in this combining is the greatest | mildness and gracefulness. Then later on painting under this aspect deteriorated into the mannerism in which people sought to produce effects through intense lights and shadows, although doing so does not express the beautiful contours, the vitality.

Painting finds the figure necessary, but painting involves the magic of color. The objective aspect is, so to speak, already suspended, and the effect hardly takes place any longer through something material. The art of music emerges wholly on the subjective side.

## IV. MUSIC

### A. FEELING AND ABSTRACT INWARDNESS

Music is on the one hand the art of deepest feeling, and on the other hand the art of strictly dispassionate understanding. More specifically, the element of music situates it in contrast to the plastic and graphic arts. Music abandons spatial externality. The sensible element is no longer provided by the sensibility of the face, but instead by the sensibility of hearing. The sensible element is the suspended appearance, the abstract subjectivity that remains subjective in its expression, with nothing external reposefully remaining; instead, the appearance, as something external, vanishes forthwith. This mode of expression is sound. It is the nature of sound to negate its externality. There is an expression that is immediately subjective, and this is of course abstract expression, sound as sound. What we have to indicate, then, is what sort of inwardness corresponds to this externality.

It is the most abstract inwardness, the wholly objectless objectivity, the wholly subjective objectivity or abstract inwardness. This inwardness is our own wholly empty I; it is selfhood without further content. What music | lays claim to is ultimate inwardness. In view of its effect, music is different in this regard from the other arts. In them we have before us something objective from which the I still differentiates itself; or else, immersing itself in it, the I is still fulfilled by a content external to itself. [246] The fulfillment itself is always still distinct from me. The fulfillment is by its nature external, spatial, and accordingly always still distinct from the inwardness of the I. In music, however, this distinction falls by the wayside. The I is no longer distinct from the sensible aspect itself; the sounds proceed most deeply within me.<sup>60</sup> A claim is made on innermost subjectivity, and it is set in motion. This is then what constitutes the very power of the sounds. The subject as such is within this expression of the sounds' power and does not keep itself apart from it. When we say that 'music enraptures', as the tales of the ancients tell it, that is because the I does not remain on its own 283

60. At this point Hotho later added in the margin an outline of '2) The Particular Characteristics of Music', which has three subdivisions: 'a) the *Ideal aspect*', consisting of 'time as such', 'cadence', and 'rhythm'; 'b) the *Real aspect*', consisting of 'general distinctions' ('instruments', 'the human voice', and 'their unity'), the 'physical particularity of the sounds', and 'harmony'; 'c) *Melody*'.

but instead feels swept away.<sup>61</sup> However, this must not give us an unfavorable opinion of the power of music. Music can enrapture and the subject can be completely aroused by the music. The less specific the content, all the more can people be carried away, for they have fewer representations and thoughts. As the tales have it, only Orpheus was able to sweep people away in this fashion.<sup>62</sup> In our own day music can no longer have this effect, or else it can just do so momentarily and as support for powers that have already otherwise captured the heart. Military regiments have fine music that serves to fire up courage in battle; but this music no longer serves to tumble down the walls of Jericho.<sup>63</sup> It just supports the powers of courage, of duty. Through music, Orpheus is said to have tamed human beings and given them laws.<sup>64</sup> Our own laws are not given musically. Music alone, lacking content on its own account, does not do that in our case; still other factors are involved in our culture. This is the general characterization of the element of the external aspect, and of the inner aspect that corresponds to it. [247].

The next point to enter the picture is that time is a factor in music. The sound, in existing, is not; its physical realization, the way it exists, vanishes. So there is a profusion of sounds in time. This constitutes the aspect of the negative with regard to sound, and the main determinacy in the sound derives from it. The abstract determinacy (the abstract relationships of the

61. At this point Hotho later added in the margin two separate versions of a very detailed outline showing his own organization of the contents of the discussion of music. The two are similar although there are some notable differences between them. The German edition presents the two in parallel columns; the outline on the right side of the page corresponds well with the organization of this part of the published *Aesthetics*, and incorporates a modified version of the outline in note 60 just above. The three main divisions of the outline are: 1) General character of music; 2) Particular characteristics; 3) Relationship to the contents.

62. This is possibly a reference to *Kurzgefaßte Mythologie oder Lehre von den fabelhaften Göttern, Halbgöttern und Helden des Altertums*, by Karl Wilhelm Ramler (Berlin, 3rd edn. 1816); or perhaps to *Orphica*, ed. with prolegomena by Gottfried Hermann (Leipzig, 1805). Original sources on Orpheus include: Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* v. 1629–30 (Grene and Lattimore, 1:88); Euripides, *Fourth Pythian Ode*, v. 560–4; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 10.1–11.66 (Humphries, pp. 234–61); Pindar, *The Maenads*, 176.

63. [Tr.] The biblical account of trumpet blasts tumbling down the walls of Jericho is in chapter six of the Book of Joshua.

64. Pausanias reports about the lawgiving of Orpheus, in *Description of Greece*, 2.30.2, 3.14.5, and 9.30.4–12; trans. W. H. S. Jones, 5 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1918–35; repr. 1977–9), 1:408–9, 2:84–5, 4:300–7. For Hegel's sources, see the preceding note. The brief epic poem *Orpheus Argonautica*, in Hermann's *Orphica*, reports on music's power over nature (v. 515–57).



sounds, which are defined materially in this way) appears in virtue of time. We wish to set this point aside at first, and to indicate what constitutes the more specific determinacy for the inwardness as such.

This abstract inwardness of the self-oriented I has feeling as the particularity proximate to it; this feeling is the more specific inwardness with which music is linked. What music touches is feeling, the initial self-expansion of subjectivity, the I that, in this abstraction, receives specificity. For instance, we speak of sadness, fear, and cheerfulness as feelings. There is a content, and when I have these feelings in relation to my subjectivity, I experience this content. Insofar as in sadness I suffer a loss or bear it as such in subjectivity, the feeling is produced. The feeling is just always what envelops the content insofar as it relates to my subjectivity. And this is the sphere to which music principally lays claim.

It follows directly from this that a musical content must involve feelings. A descriptive | poetry is not capable of being treated musically. An intrinsically high-quality dramatic poetry is poorly suited to musical arrangement; better are superficial works that stick to universal feelings. The initial expression of feeling, the sheerly natural expression, a cry or an exclamation, sighing or sobbing, is nevertheless no music. These expressions are not musical tones, which are signs of representations. But music stays with the expression of feeling and makes this expression [248] its goal. Natural expressions are instead the results of feeling.

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## B. THE MATERIAL ASPECT: THE INSTRUMENTS

In music, inner sensibility becomes aware of itself and cultivates this awareness. This objective mode of the expression of feeling as such isolates the feeling and its expression and develops it. The issue, then, is what enables the musical sound to become developed within itself. In what respect does music have this characteristic of being no sheer outcry of feeling but instead feeling's developed expression? Feeling has a content and music as such does not, so something else that is the determining factor must enter into the sound. This particular factor can be differentiated initially into a material aspect and an ideal aspect. The material aspect depends on the nature of the vibrating body of the musical instrument. That is because the sound as such is the vibration of something bodily, a motion by which that body moves internally without changing place, or else propels itself in such a way that in turn it likewise stops this motion. This feature comes into play above all in time. The material particularity depends on the special character of

the material, which can be air, wood, metal, strings, and so on. The main distinction | is whether there is a column of air, as with the wind instruments, or some other material. These other materials either are in rows or else are flat surfaces, as in the cases of the accordion and the kettle drums respectively. The human voice itself provides the most perfect sound. Just as the skin color moderates all the colors within itself, so the human voice combines the features of the wind instrument and the string instrument. One aspect is free-flowing air and the other is a material that resonates. All the various instruments are just based on these aspects. Each instrument has its own distinctive character, and the main thing to know in composition is how to employ them correctly so that in their totality they present a dramatic picture. [249]

### C. THE IDEAL ASPECT: BEAT, HARMONY, MELODY

The set of the usual instruments is a complete set, and all newly devised instruments will not be suited for it. The more important aspect, then, is the ideal one, which pertains to the inner relationships of the sounds as such. The first thing to deal with in this regard is time. Here we find, in the first place, the beat or musical time, second the harmony, third the melody; the rhythm is the particular relationship of these three aspects. As for musical time as such, the beat is thus the first unity, which is produced within the multiplicity of the sounds. A number of sounds occur in a specific measure of the music. The beat produces equivalent patterns of the sounds, and this unity is an identity of the understanding. Put more specifically, the equivalence acquires its external specificity through the cadence. The beat is necessary. That is because the sounds exist in time, and the regulating factor for musical time is this understandable equality. In music the abstract I itself becomes simply objective. In the multiplicity of sounds, then, the abstract I too as such is supposed to become objective as the one aspect. | In the multiplicity, this abstract I as such becomes objective as abstract identity. This is the equality. It makes the beat objective. In other words, in the multiple resonances in which I am suspended, I, as abstract I, turn back within myself because of the beat. The fact that I find myself within myself takes place because of the beat, because of the equality of the musical measures, because of the audibility of the identity in which I have myself. This is the meaning and the necessity of the beat. This equality, then, must in turn be divisible within itself. This division leads to a manifold inequality, but one subjected to a rule. This rule constitutes the kinds of beat [and is indicated by the time signature].

In  $3/4$  time, for instance, the fundamental division is into three. As an arithmetical relationship, it is equivalent to a  $6/8$  beat, although not rhythmically equivalent, for the primary [250] division, which is foundational for this relationship, is the division into two; the unaccented beat falls on the first eighth note of each half measure. Therefore the equality and how it is subdivided are what to notice with respect to the beat.

After the beat we have harmony, that is, the distinction of the sounds from one another. The rhythm of the beat is basic to the harmony, but need not produce a change in the harmony. The unaccented part of the melody can lie in a preceding beat; and what in the melodic sequence has no unaccented beat can begin with a new beat, just as in the case of the metrics in verse, in which the words are distinct from the segments of the verses' meter.

Harmony itself involves a difference of the sounds. It determines the basic relationships of the musical tones. The governing factor for the beat is length and shortness, or duration. With harmony, a different distinction comes into play. This distinction is also conditioned by numerical relationships. The musical tone is a vibrating motion. In the beat the essential thing is temporal equality; in harmony the essential thing is vibration within the same moment of time. The more | vibrations or the fewer constitute the specific character of the tone. The octave, for instance, vibrates at a multiple of its tonic note. The objective determination of the relationships of the tones to one another therefore rests on numerical relationships. Within these relationships the base tones are indicated, and simple numerical relationships correlate with them. The tonic, the third, and the fifth furnish the harmonic triad. What is harmonic derives from mechanical [i.e., physical] factors. Additional tones are defined by other numerical relationships. These basic relationships constitute the substantial foundation or law of the necessity that must remain the basis.

The melody is, first of all, the poetic element, the soul that indulges in musical sounds, that gushes forth its sorrow, its joy; the melodic element is music's soulful aspect. The melody [251] has what is harmonic for its foundation but it is not restricted to it; and yet the two elements are essentially linked.<sup>65</sup> A superficial melody moves to and fro within simple harmonic relationships, but more fundamental music borders on what is discordant, although in such a way that it can turn back from this violation of harmony. The secret of profound composition lies in the unity of the

65. Hotho later added in the margin an outline of 'melody', subdivided into: 'relation to harmony'; relation 'to feeling'; 'freedom of the melody within these relationships'.

harmony and the melody; it calls forth the most extreme antitheses to harmony and turns back from them. Here we have portrayed, as it were, the struggle between freedom and necessity. The high point is the evoking and the combating of the antithesis.

#### D. THE TRANSITION TO VERBAL ART

270 Music as such is, then, first of all something accompanying.<sup>66</sup> It is present through the medium of sound. This sound by itself is without content. | It receives contents through its relationships. But this content does not satisfy spirit. Just as feeling accompanies spirit's contents, so music, as spirit's expression, is the accompaniment of the signs of representations; it is the accompaniment of words. Speech attaches itself to music, and this is music's original character. Nevertheless music can also be free-standing and, especially in more recent times, it has set up architectonic structures of harmony that satisfy only the specialists. With no other art is it the case that only an intellectual study affords satisfaction. Like architecture, music does not have its contents within itself; and just as architecture calls for a god, so the subjectivity of music calls for a text, for thoughts or representations that, as specific contents, are not in the music itself. Verbal art is then what provides this completeness. The sound links itself with a spiritual content as such. Music that is not free-standing is just accompaniment. The more it becomes free-standing, the more music belongs instead to the understanding and is sheer artistry existing only for the specialist; [252] and it is untrue to the purpose of art.

66. Here, and in several spots in the immediately following text, various forms of *begleiten* (to accompany) could be read instead as forms of *bekleiden* (to clothe, to cover).

## V. POETRY

### A. INTRODUCTION

#### 1. Representation Made External in Speech

Verbal art is accordingly the third kind, after the plastic and graphic arts, and after music. It involves sound, the subjective element, the principle of self-examination. The sculptor does not undertake self-examination. In verbal art, the specificity of the figure in the plastic and graphic arts is conjoined with sound. The content of verbal art—the specific configuration that is transposed into the subjective element—is the representation; the content of verbal art is the entire wealth of representation, the spiritual presence-to-self existing in an element that belongs to spirit itself. Sound receiving such a fulfillment is reduced to a mere means; the sound is only a sign and comes to be in the word, and this expression is therefore distinct from the content itself. The content is the representation, and the representation's externality is the sound as sign. So the sound is mere means. Sound as such, as sensible, is itself no longer the externality of the content, an externality that of course expresses itself but is not immediately present in the sensible element, for this sensible element is downgraded to a sign. So we need to see more specifically what in this case is in fact the externality or the objectivity of the matter.<sup>67</sup> 271

That is why we say that the representation itself is the element or the mode in which the substantial content becomes explicit. The matter or the content is supposed to become objective to spirit. The matter becomes something represented in consciousness. This represented object is the

67. Hotho later added this outline in the margin:

#### Introduction

- 1) Poetry: Totality of the plastic and graphic arts, and music;
- 2) the romantic arts
  - a) difference from painting
  - b) difference from music
  - c) distinctiveness
- 3) Universal art and its content

#### Division

- 1) the poetic *as such*
- 2) the poetic *expression*
- 3) *genres* of poetry

material here, just as previously the material was the marble or the color or the musical sound. So spirit becomes objective to itself on its own distinctive soil; it has its objects before it as representation. Language becomes a mere means, partly the means of communication, partly the medium of the immediate externality, | of the representation. [253] In poetry the matter is no longer immediately external but instead exists in representations; for a work of poetry can be read even if translated into a different language, even with changes in the relationships of the sounds. It is all the same whether we hear a poetic work or read it. The representation is the actual element by which the matter becomes objective for us.

The representation is therefore the wholly universal element in which all the subject matter has its place, in keeping with its most varied development. And the development of the subject matter must take place in time, as a series of portrayals. Spirit's action is the most concrete subject matter, and it has its history, its development. Even the figure of speech has this feature. The representation contains the possibility of portraying the subject matter in its most complete development. Yet this subject matter also has a shortcoming, namely, that it is less specific than is sensible intuition. The representation is spiritual nature and accordingly appears for the sake of the universality that belongs to thinking. Therefore the representation cannot portray the subject matter concretely in one thing, as a sculpture can. This is a shortcoming in one respect just in the sensible aspect, because the sensible aspect renders the manifold as succession and spirit, at one within itself, brings together in one picture what representation or speech renders as sequential. The spiritual aspect cancels out this sequential feature. The question, then, is how poetry distinguishes itself from prosaic representation. This of itself is a very abstract issue. The two so overlap that it is impossible to draw a specific boundary between them. For individual instances no separation is possible. However, the more specific point as to how speech becomes art is as follows.

## 2. How Verbal Representation Becomes Art

273 As a work of art, the representation must first of all be an organic whole; | it must have its own specific purpose or aim. This calls for the spiritual unity of individuality. Everything must relate to a specific purpose. [254] The purpose in *The Iliad*, for example, is the wrath of Achilles.<sup>68</sup>

68. *The Iliad* 1.1–12; *The Iliad of Homer*, trans. Richmond Lattimore, introduction and notes by Richard Martin (Chicago, 1951, 2011), p. 75. See also above, n. 51 (p. 259) and n. 56 (p. 261).

The second point is that this purpose must be an individual purpose. What the individual serves must be no abstract generality, but instead a purpose that belongs to the spirit or the heart of an individual. The wrath of Achilles, the wrath of just this individual, is a purpose of this kind. History, for instance, has of course an aspect that lends itself to art. Art has to take up into the representation the colorful content of the happening and has to create based on this content, has to portray it for representation, to make the connection in such a way that the purpose emerges from this portrayal. We speak of the art of Herodotus,<sup>69</sup> and the like. Yet these portrayals by Herodotus do not belong to free art, for the content is partly something given, and the purpose is the kind that does not emerge from the individual's will but instead appears as established externally. In one respect what takes place is produced from the character of the individual and in another respect contingency plays a role in it. The nature of the content is what makes history into prose. A general purpose is ascribed to the individual. Nevertheless, poetic treatment of history does not make history into poetry. The matter does not proceed from the individual as such. History is not the heroic age, for this heroic age lies on the far side of history and belongs to art. A work of poetry can certainly also have an aim of a wholly universal kind, as in Dante's *Divine Comedy*,<sup>70</sup> which portrays the divine world, what is wholly universal, and the individual's relationship to it. However, in the Christian world the individual as such is infinite purpose, and this universal | purpose is at the same time the individual aspect of the individual. This divine world has to do with the individual. The state exists for its own sake; in the divine world the individual ought not be sacrificed. The individual is an end in itself, in and for itself. This feature [255] excludes history from art, for history involves a purpose that is not posited as individual purpose but is instead independent of individuality as such. 274

The third point is that, as components of what is organic, these components must appear as developed for their own sake. We must linger with what is particular as though each particular is the purpose by itself. The understanding considers all things only in accord with definite purposiveness. To the understanding, what is particular is not free. In art the components must of course appear as members of a whole, yet appear as free within themselves, as subsisting for themselves. To whatever extent they are

69. Herodotus is cited in a number of other footnotes in this volume: n. 15 (p. 191), n. 62 (p. 263), nn. 128–9 (pp. 298–9), n. 144 (p. 304), nn. 175–6 (pp. 316–17), nn. 4–5 (pp. 360–1), n. 7 (p. 362). These passages in Herodotus exemplify his prosaic narration.

70. On Dante, see n. 44, p. 208 above.

therefore connected in virtue of their unity, the connection must to that degree appear as not being foreordained (*absichtlos*). This aspect is then pre-eminently what distinguishes poetry from rhetoric.<sup>71</sup> Rhetoric has a purpose, an individual purpose, and the development of the purpose is something established by spirit; to that extent the purpose is something freely produced. Nevertheless it involves an intent, and all the components of the development have been formed with a specific intent, which is posited in them. Also established are rules, basic principles. The purpose does not take shape freely of itself but is instead subsumed under basic principles that legitimate it. The relationship is a merely understandable one. The whole is intentional, and the intentionality appears in all the components and is a linkage by cause and effect, by ground and consequence—categories of the understanding—or else it rests on an external connection. The particular components do not emerge from the free heart. The content of modern relationships, the portrayal of state officials or ministers, is no poetic content, for the individuals exist within | specified relationships; the sequence of their actions is in part purposive, while a major aspect of their acting rests in part on other factors already strictly determined.

What is particular must therefore be free for its own sake, but must have an inner connection. A vital, soul-imbued unity is called for, not the unity of the abstract understanding. [256]

### 3. How Poetic Expression Differs from Prose

A second feature of poetic expression appears distinctively in poetry. For the main difference from prose concerns the substantial form poetry elucidates. The poetic character of the expression seems to reside in the words, and yet these words are only signs of the representation. The expression, taken apart from its audible aspect, therefore involves the way in which<sup>72</sup> the content in the representation must be fashioned or shaped for it to be poetic. Fashioned expression is the representation fashioned in a particular way. We must distinguish between two things. When we say 'representation', we suppose this to be the content and we distinguish its expression from it. But we have already remarked that the content as such is portrayed in the mode of

71. Hotho later added in the margin:

- a) has a purpose as posited by spirit and in virtue of that is free
- b) practical intent: the components framed commensurate with this purpose
- c) unfree development of the purpose: subsumption under universal principles

72. Hotho added: 'we have to examine how'.



representation. So in this case the representation itself is the mode of the expression, the appearance of the content. In painting, the content is portrayed in colors and in shapes, based on spatial parameters. There can be the same content in poetry, although it is expressed in the representation. Hence in speaking of 'expression', the expression is the same thing as the representation. What therefore matters is whether the content is represented prosaically or poetically.

The representation does not have the sensory specificity of intuition. On the other hand, however, the representation is also not thought as such, for it lies in between intuition and thought; it is pictorial representation. The intelligible nature of prose consists in its abstract mode of comprehension. For example, when we speak about cause and | effect, this is a relationship of the understanding just as are all reflective characterizations. 'In the morning' states a familiar temporal relationship. The poet says 'when Eos (Dawn) rises up with rosy fingers',<sup>73</sup> and this expresses the same thing; yet we do not adopt the abstract representation but instead preserve the pictorial one. Also, when we say 'Alexander [257] has conquered', this is a concrete representation within itself; but expressed as 'conquest', it is concentrated in a single determinacy. It is the same when we speak of joy or pleasure; by and large these are abstractions; they are drab, colorless, vague, and prosaic. Therefore the essential thing in poetic expression resides in the manner of the representation. What makes for poetic expression belongs in this region that constitutes the transition from representing as such, to thinking. We can have something wholly sensuous in the understanding apart from understanding its image.<sup>74</sup> For example, in saying 'the sun', we understand this apart from having the image prior to the representation.<sup>75</sup> Understanding the sun is something different from having the representation

73. This formulation appears as many as fifty times in *The Odyssey*; see, for instance 2.1, 'Now when the young Dawn showed again with her rosy fingers'; *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York, 1965, 1967), p. 39. In *The Iliad* Homer chooses other formulations; see 8.1, 'Dawn, the yellow-robed' (Lattimore, p. 200).

74. Hotho changed 'apart from understanding its image' to 'can understand it, without, in the process, bringing the image of the object before us'.

75. Hotho later added in the margin:

Poetic representation

a) Pictorial as such

β) *pars pro toto* (part for whole) paraphrase, description

γ) Figurative representation

αα) infinite

ββ) metaphor, image, simile

γγ) [left blank]

of it. In general, poetic expression is supposed to bring abstract thought once again to concrete<sup>76</sup> representation. For example, when we read, the letters of the alphabet are the signs of sounds, and by considering the letters we understand directly what is read without giving our attention to the sounds. Unskilled readers must speak the sounds aloud in order to understand what is read. It is the same with [our direct understanding of] what we have in our memory in the mode of thinking; with what we have in our head without at  
 277 the same time needing the representation of | the thing itself.

In order to be poetry, then, the representation must be fashioned in such a way that it is not mere understanding. Therefore the matter must not be in us merely in the mode of the understanding, but instead must come before us pictorially. This includes what we call paraphrase. We look upon many things as paraphrase that, for the poet, are not at all supposed to be paraphrase, and that to us just seem to be paraphrase in comparison to abstract characterizations in which the content is otherwise familiar in the understanding. Thus poetic speech can appear to be something roundabout, an unnecessary superfluity. For instance, we readily understand it when we say 'Alexander marched to Persia'. [258] The poet's concern must be to bring it about that, with the representation, we linger with the image. That is why Homer gives an epithet to each hero, an epithet that directly necessitates us having to envisage something concrete.<sup>77</sup> The epithet paints the picture for us.

We are not ordinarily accustomed to draw a distinction between what is understood and the representation. The fashioned representation therefore makes for what is poetic. There are then of course other forms of expression, ones that give rise to further differentiation. There are proper expressions and figurative expressions. A proper expression just presents the thing; a figurative expression adds a second feature. Metaphor is a kind of figurative expression. With metaphor, a second feature is added to a content, a feature that belongs only to the superfluity of the expression and only can be employed to some extent; a feature that belongs to the initial content only in keeping with a specific aspect of it. An example is when Homer compares Ajax, who will not retreat, to a stubborn donkey.<sup>78</sup> Romantic expression in particular is so magnificent because the romantic element is something

76. Hotho changed 'concrete' to 'concretely pictorial'.

77. Homer calls Achilles 'darkly brilliant' and 'of the swift feet' (1.292, 19.419; Lattimore, pp. 83, 425). Ajax is 'wall [i.e., protector] of the Achaians' (3.229; Lattimore, p. 123); Hector is 'tall Hector of the glancing helm' (7.233; Lattimore, p. 192).

78. *The Iliad* 11.555-61; Lattimore, p. 268.

subjective that indulges in | diverse subject matters that are only accompanying features. These are the main elements of expression. Figurative expression belongs more to romantic expression; Homer, and the ancients in general, always express themselves directly.

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#### 4. Sensible Expression in Verse

In the third place, then, there is still the aspect of versification. Speech is defined as something spoken, although speaking is not essentially required. Versification belongs essentially to poetry. 'Poetic prose' is a hybrid term not suited to poetry's character. Versification is poetry's allure, and essentially is so as the figurative aspect of the expression. [259] Versification lets us recognize at once that we are on a different soil from that of ordinary consciousness. In verse the poet finds at the same time a fetter that necessitates structuring the expression in accord with this sensible aspect, and that requires attention to the structure of the expression insofar as it is representational. This care extends at the same time to the structure of the representation. We can easily suppose that versification is a fetter causing the loss of a host of good thoughts. The poet must give up a great deal, to be sure, but on the other hand versifying also helps; it necessitates casting a wide net and looking at all aspects of the representation.

But this structuring of the sensible element is directly called for on its own account. To begin with, there is no stipulation that the sounds of words involve their essential aspect. Yet in the work of art there ought not be anything lacking structure; the work of art tolerates nothing by chance, and only allows what is configured by spirit. The versification is a sensible aspect and must be suited to the content that is supposed to appear in it. The versification is the outer bloom or the general tone of the whole. Since with this aspect the externality is structured on its own account, versifying also inherently involves a | freeing of the heart from the seriousness of the content, since we have the content before us as something objective. The content is set forth outside us and gives rise to the theoretical attitude.

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There are, then, both the ancient manner of versification and the rhyme. The former is sheerly rhythmic versification that sticks to long and short sounds and takes into account the stimulating effect of the syllables in terms of their duration. The accent of the word is in turn a different matter and relates to the meaning, and it has no connection with the actual length or shortness of the syllables. The second kind of versification does not base itself only on length and shortness of syllables, for rhyme is a material resonance; the sound itself is taken into account. A pleasing sound results

from similarity of resonance. [260] The more specific concern of the meter as such is that with it a beat emerges, one that continually repeats itself and through which the I in turn finds itself in the stimulus it provides. This negates the uncontrolled loss of oneself in the sounds. In merely rhythmic versifying the beat is no such essential law. Hexameter of course has a beat, but not as specific a beat as in the other meters. There is great controversy as to whether there is an actual beat present in ancient meters in the way there is in, for example, our iamb. Voß has maintained that there is.<sup>79</sup> But this view is unwarranted. Because of our own syllabic meter, we are accustomed to the specificity of the beat. The ancient tragedies were usually written in scripts, but few of the scripts consist of nothing but iambs; for the beauty consists precisely in the fact that spondees alternate with iambs, and the fact that the odd-numbered feet—one, three, five—are either spondees or their equivalent. Even our German iambs have spondees; for instance,  
 280 *'Freiheit | und Gleichheit hört man schallen'*.<sup>80</sup> Most trimeters in the ancients begin with a spondee. Goethe too employs very many such spondees.<sup>81</sup> So in the iambic meter itself the ancients have not consistently observed the beat. Our own iambic syllabic meter in strict beat is what is most unbearable.

Each syllabic meter, then, has a particular character, and the poet has to employ each one for a specific sound of the poem. The epic poem is simple meter, and the lyric poem must be varied. Iambic meter is distinct from trochaic meter, which is suited to peaceful contemplation. The main thing in metric verse is the rhyme. Rhyme belongs to romantic poetry alone; what is merely rhythmic belongs to classical poetry. In examining the structure of the language in classical poetry, we see that the conjugation is a principal feature of ancient language. These modifications of roots are made evident through appended [261] syllables that can alter the root syllables in various ways. This modification is done somewhat differently in our own language. We express tenses and, in particular, persons. For example, Latin speakers say *'amaverunt'*. In this case the *'am'* alone is the root syllable and therefore

79. This remark refers to the controversy raised by Johann Heinrich Voß, in his *Zeitmessung der deutschen Sprache* (Königsberg, 1802). Voß called for a German style of versification analogous to that of the Greeks, and the reproduction of the Greek model in constructing verse.

80. [Tr.] The German approximates to the English expression 'Let freedom and equality ring'. The German pronunciation of these key words is pertinent to the point in the following footnote, which is why the German is left in the text.

81. On this point, see Voß, *Zeitmessung*. Goethe employed fewer spondees than he did trochees: metrical feet having one long or accented syllable followed by a short or unaccented syllable. Hegel's quoted example just above in fact involves trochees; *'Freiheit'* and *'Gleichheit'* are pronounced with the first syllable accented, the second one not.

the rest is only added modification. It is likewise in Greek, in 'τύπτειν', where 'τυπ' is the root that is modified in various ways. So we see directly what this classical practice makes possible. The substantial element of the root syllable is not employed by itself, and this allows careful attention to the resonance as such. In such sounds the singing character can more readily be heard for its own sake. In contrast, in our own language the modifications are separate from the base word and consist of individual words: 'I, you, he; to be, to have, to become'. In this way a root word remains intact and does not dilute itself in a multiplicity of sounds, but instead is powerful by itself. The mere modification itself constitutes in turn an individual word. | In this way we are indeed fettered, so to speak, in sticking with the meaning of each word, and we do not have to be occupied with variations in the sound.

The accent is the controlling factor for us, and it attaches itself to the primary meaning. We hear and grasp the long and short syllables in accord with this primary meaning. When, for instance, we say 'sage nicht', 'rede mir', or 'gehet hin', the syllables 'sa', 're', and 'ge' are short in and for themselves but are long owing to the accent. In our case, therefore, the rhythmic aspect has less freedom to launch out on its own. Hence if we are supposed to pay attention to the resonance as such, we must occupy ourselves with the material factor. This material factor affects the rhyme. Rhythm just considers the temporal relationship. Rhyming has to pay attention to the equivalent harmonizing of the sound as such. The power of the language as regards the accent must be offset by a stronger counterweight in the sensible aspect. That is why, in this other respect, rhyme is characteristic of romantic poetry.

There [262] is an intensified self-awareness, highlighted in the consonance of the rhyme, that serves to refer us back to ourselves. The rhyme requires it, and the subjective aspect emerges. The verses are brought closer to what is musical, and this musical factor is a freeing from the subject matter, is something distinctive to romantic poetry. Rhyme has developed as necessary for its own sake. Rhyme is present in the Arabic language. Yet rhyme existed in the West before the West's acquaintance with the Arabs. In Christianity rhyme makes its appearance in the Latin writers, in the hymns St. Ambrose composed in the fourth century.<sup>82</sup> St. Augustine wrote in rhyme too.<sup>83</sup>

82. See *Ambroise de Milan: Hymnes*, trans. and annotated by Jacques Fontaine (Paris, 1992); *Hymni latini antiquissimi*, ed. W. Bulst (Heidelberg, 1956); A. S. Walpole, *Early Latin Hymns* (Hildesheim, 1966). St. Ambrose (ca. 339–97), bishop of Milan, is one of the Latin Doctors of the Church.

83. See *Augustinus: Psalmas contra partem Donati*, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 43 (Paris, 1865), pp. 23–32.

282 We have already said that no simple definition can be given for distinguishing poetry from prose, because poetry is concrete within itself and can seize upon a variety of aspects. | In the case of painting clearer distinctions can be made. Something merely outlined is a sketch; something executed in black and white is an engraving. So poesy can even present the subject matter very poetically, in quite beautiful style, but without it being a work of art, without it being poetry insofar as the substantial content by itself is not of a poetic nature. So too we cannot say that individual phrases are poetic or prosaic, just as there is no inherent criterion for an individual brush stroke belonging to painting.

### 5. Three Forms of the Content

When it comes to classifying poetry, in one respect we consider how the content is represented and in another respect we consider the language or speech, which concerns the representation's outward existence. Since poetry only exists as something human (works of sculpture subsist in virtue of their material character), and poetry's subsistence [263] is the speaking subject, the human being, the second aspect that appears here is the relation of the work of poetry to the way in which it exists. These two aspects must have a necessary connection, just as there is a necessity [in other art forms] as to whether one uses colors or metal.

On the whole, the form of the content can be of three kinds.

The first form is an objective content, a world displayed outwardly, a 'sculptural image' of the representation, in which the matter proceeds freely of its own accord, develops in its own objectivity, and the poet stays in the background.

283 In the second form the content is the subjective mood or the self-realization of the subject, who has the content within and expresses it in the way one knows it internally, expressing one's own inner stirrings. |

The third form is the uniting of the two in such a way that the objective display belongs to the subject.

Accordingly, we have: *epic*, *lyric*, and *dramatic poetry*. In the epic form, an objective world of spirit develops itself in the representation. The lyric form treats the subjectivity as such. The dramatic form is the action of the subject.

The other aspect is the material in which this content is reproduced. It is speech, which has existence owing to the subject. This speech appears as a necessary aspect of the content and determines itself according to this content. Since the epic's topic is an objective world, the subjective aspect is then the language, the existence of the speech, a speech likewise keeping itself outwardly at a distance from the objective portrayal; as it were, a

formal (*mechanische*) speaking. The epics of the ancients were spoken by rhapsodists—professional reciters. This speaking is more formal; [264] it exists as an external recital. The content of lyrical poetic art is 'the self-realization of the subject as such. This is more demanding than a speech just existing outwardly. The singer performs the lyric; its existence is musical. Finally, the content of the drama is a more objective, spiritually concrete objectivity; it is action. | Here a demand is placed on the entire subject to whom the speech must give existence—on the entire role of the performer. The subjective aspect<sup>84</sup> is brought to completion, whereas the first mode is just formal speaking and the second is musical speech. As Plato attests, the rhapsodes were the most uninformed of human beings.<sup>85</sup> In drama the subjective aspect, the speaking itself, must be portrayed objectively. In this case the totality of the portrayal is called for.

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We have to characterize these shapes according to this classification.

## B. THE EPIC

### 1. General Features; Contrast with Drama

The epic expresses what the matter is; it expresses the object as object, the breadth of circumstances, the entire object in its existence. The epic accordingly had its beginning with the epigram, which was a simple inscription on a monument. The epigram states what the matter is. These epigrams are written upon something. However, they call for an independent content, not one externally present. These further contents are apothegms or aphorisms.<sup>86</sup> They exclude emotion and caprice; they express what is

84. Hotho added 'which is requisite to the portrayal'.

85. In *The Republic* 602B Plato says that 'the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates...'; *The Republic*, trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; 1930–35; repr. 1963), 2:446–7. See also Plato's *Ion* 532C.

86. See G. E. Lessing, *Zerstreute Anmerkungen über das Epigramm* (Berlin, 1771). See also J. G. Herder, 'Anmerkungen über die Anthologie der Griechen, bes. über das griechische Epigramm', in *Herder: Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan et al., 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1967–8), 15:205–21; first published in Herder's *Zerstreute Blätter*, first collection (Gotha, 1785), pp. 99–132. Also see Herder's 'Anmerkungen über das griechische Epigramm', in *Sämtliche Werke* 15:337–92; first published in the second collection of *Zerstreute Blätter* (Gotha, 1786), pp. 150–76. Hegel points, as one example among others, to Goethe's and Schiller's *Xenien*, collected by Schiller in the 1797 *Muselalmanach*; *Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Werke*, ed. Erich Trunz, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1948 ff.; Munich, 1981 ff.), 1:208–21, as well as 1:222–34, which lies outside the series of *Xenien*. The aphorism is a form of didactic poem appearing in both verse and prose forms of poetical writing, but Hegel is not more specific about this point.

obligatory, what is ethical. There are also the  $\xi\pi\eta$  or 'golden sayings' of Pythagoras.<sup>87</sup> Just as ethical truth was expressed in epic form, so too ancient philosophy was epic. The [265] fragments of the ancient philosophers were composed with an epic tenor, although then an epic tenor of course directly | intermixed with what is lyrical.<sup>88</sup> These philosophemes certainly express what exists; they have an epic character. Didactic poems such as those of Hesiod take the same approach.<sup>89</sup> There is an epic tenor in all of this. Nevertheless we still do not call these poems 'epic poems'. The difference, however, is not that of the tenor but the difference of the content. For their content nevertheless is not concretely poetic content. Ethical sayings and philosophemes stick to what is universal; still the content is not truly poetic. Poetic content is what is concretely spiritual in individual shape. And since the epic has for its object what exists, it has for its object an action or a happening in its overall development and breadth; it represents the action within its world.

The action is individual, which is why the epic does not have history or the native land for its topic and does not have universal persons or biographies for its content. For in biography there is just the unity of the person and not what is truly objective in the action. So the content of the epic is the entirety of a world in which an individual action takes place. Manifold objects appear in it that belong to the entirety of a world, to a geographic

87. The  $\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$  of Pythagorean teaching were first translated from the Greek into German by Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719–1803), in the *Teutschen Merkur* (May, 1775): 'Die goldnen Sprüche des Pythagoras' (Halberstadt, 1775), and afterwards ed. Glendorf (Leipzig, 1776; Halberstadt, 1786). They can be found in Herman Diels, trans., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. Walter Kranz (Berlin, 1974), 1:462–6; also in G. D. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*..., 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983).

88. Hotho later added the following outline in the margin at this point:

2) particular characteristics

c) unity of the beat

a) totality of what appears in the particular treatment

β) epic display

αα) lingering over the description

ββ) epic motivation

γγ) slowing the action

γ) combination in the totality

89. Presumably Hegel is referring to Hesiod's *Works and Days*, on which, see n. 164, p. 310 above.



locale.<sup>90</sup> Yet these natural | elements are not the main thing; they are instead only subsidiary features. The topic is not only the action as such but also thoughts, the portrayal of its justification: dramatic and lyrical subject matter comes into play. Although belonging to the epic, these aspects must be just elements of it and must not deprive the epic of its epic character. What happens must be done by individuals as [266] well as brought about by circumstances. What the human beings do must itself appear as entangled in the circumstances.<sup>91</sup> For the epic portrays what exists, and so the actions too must have this character. Destiny rules in the epic and not in the drama. In the epic there is an entire world in which the action and the decisions are just individual factors within the whole, a whole belonging just as much to external necessity as to the will.

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This is what establishes the different tenor of drama from that of the epic. In drama the topic is the deed as such, and the character of the human being is established by the deed—by the will. In drama this is the foundation of all that takes place. The situations or circumstances in drama are only what spirit and the heart make of them and how the heart reacts in relation to them. The inner being, the will, is the essential thing.<sup>92</sup> In the epic the circumstances carry weight just as absolutely; what the human being does is just as incidental as are the workings of chance. For instance, bravery is a topic of the epic. But epic bravery is | not dramatic. It belongs to nature and is courage insofar as courage resides in the blood and belongs to it, just as does strength of spirit. Furthermore, epic bravery is also unrelated to the content of the action.<sup>93</sup> In drama the topic is not the natural aspect and the formal character of bravery, but instead the will as justified and unjustified, as knowing its own justification and as willing in accord with it. In the epic, virtue is instead contingent on what is natural. In drama, individuals have to vindicate what they will; what they will and should do and demand rests on their character; and the individual must carry through with this character. But in the [267] epic the conditions or the circumstances carry equal weight. We will find this directly the case in Homer.

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90. Hotho later added in the margin at this point:

αα) totality of objects

ββ) subject matter for its own sake, *within* the particular action. *The Odyssey* the finest

γγ) specific situation as beginning point. *The Iliad* the finest of all

91. Hotho added: 'taking place as such'.

92. Hotho added: 'the decisive thing'.

93. Hotho added: 'is formal'.

288 In the portrayal of Hector, for instance, we see the way in which he takes leave of Andromache; this is epic, not dramatic. Andromache lays out before him the whole state of affairs concerning his children, and Priam. Hector says that he would take all this into account but he would be ashamed before the Trojans and does not wish to appear cowardly; of course the day will come in which Ilium will no longer stand, and so forth.<sup>94</sup> The circumstances are spelled out, and this would not be dramatic. Likewise, when captives tell about their native land they tell of objective circumstances and conditions, and yet this too is not dramatic. Such narrations are emotional stirrings. But aroused emotions produced by the conditions are not dramatic, even though such emotions do appear in more recent dramas. That is because drama may only have its effect through the heart's decision, only through the way in which the heart bears up under the circumstances and maintains its character | in them. In the epic the individual can appear as yielding to circumstances, can appear as the result of the circumstances that are what is powerful. In drama the character has to be what is powerful. In the epic, action and conditions are poised equally. The character and the external necessity are juxtaposed as equally strong. The dramatic individual has<sup>95</sup> to work things out himself. This, in general, is the tenor of the epic.

## 2. Subject Matter of the Epic

The specific subject matter of the epic is always the main thing in each poetic work, and the expression of it may not be separated from the contents themselves. Its more specific features are the following ones.

The subject matter of the epic poem is the entirety of a happening; this entirety must be the [268] world of a people in this world's objective development, in the fullness of its circumstances. An action said to be carried out in it is therefore to be grasped under the particular conditions that make the action necessary. In addition, this action involves a specific, ultimate goal that individuals grasp and set for themselves. This more specific action, under the particular conditions of a people, can be just a state of war. We can also think of the whole of world history being made the topic of an epic poem, with its hero being the human spirit, the *Humanus*.<sup>96</sup>

94. *The Iliad* 6.371-499 (Lattimore, pp. 181-5). [Tr.] Andromache, Hector's wife, urges him to stay within the city walls rather than risking his life by going out into battle.

95. Hotho changed 'has' to 'just has, on the contrary'.

96. Although the formulation points to Goethe's epic *The Secrets* (on which, see n. 38, p. 204 in this text), Hegel is referring in this context to Friedrich Maximilian Klinger (1752-1831), *Fausts Leben, Taten und Höllenfahrt* (Riga, 1791). On this point, see M. Baum and K. R. Meist, 'Hegels "Prometheische Confession". Quellen für vier Jenaer Aphorismen Hegels', *Hegel-Studien* (1973), 8:79-90.

We could have represented the human spirit as the hero who consummates himself in world history; yet this subject matter would be too exalted for art. That is because the universal idea would lie in the background. | For this universal idea is not individual, and art has to provide individual shapes. We could have just represented this epic poetry as able to portray a series of figures similar to Indian incarnations; however, such a mere semblance in fictitious figures pales in the presence of the idea. If they have truth, then the substantial content<sup>97</sup> would fall by the wayside; and the entire picture would become just allegorical if one spirit or one concept governed the whole. In other words, if specific individualities were to come forward in a series, this would appear only as an external sequence having no essential, authentic connection; for this authentic connection is just the idea, and the idea is not the purpose of an individual.

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So a particular condition is to be portrayed. Particular motives and clashes are the occasion for the action. This clashing is different from that of the drama. As a rule, in the epic the clash must be a state of war. In warfare one people opposes another. Bravery is the main concern here, and it is most especially epic bravery, insofar as it has the natural aspect as an ethical element not posited by the will as such. [269] Furthermore, in warfare acts of the will and the working of chance are counterbalanced, whereas drama excludes the sheer happening. One can represent a great many interesting deeds and occurrences, such as conditions of civic unrest and the introduction of political constitutions—conditions where the subjective and objective standpoints are on a par, without their being portrayable by art. | Also, the state of war must be such that enemy peoples battle one another. Wars must be depicted as West against East, Christians against Moors, Greeks against Asians. Hostility of this sort, the fact that it exists as such, is suited to the character of the epic. Different nations have to be opposed to one another. A local war is not a topic for the epic. The tragic poets, in contrast, have chosen subject matter in which one brother wages war against another. In this case the distinctive feature of the hostile relationship is grounded in the particular individuality of the combatants. The one who attacks Thebes is a son of Thebes; his enemy is his brother.<sup>98</sup> The separation is therefore no existent<sup>99</sup> or substantial circumstance; instead it is precisely that the two are as one and only the heart, the supposed

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97. Hotho added 'of art'.

98. See Creon's condemnation of Polyneices, an exile from Thebes who returned to attack it, in *Antigone*, v. 179–229 (Greene and Lattimore, 2:167–8).

99. Hotho replaced 'existent' with 'existent-in-and-for-itself'.

justification, severs their unity. Since such a condition as described above constitutes the epic world, either this condition can just be the background and constitute the soil on which the individual plays his part or else the individual can create the condition himself. The former circumstance is the fitting one for the epic. The condition must already exist, and the way in which the individual determines the condition must be determined by the condition. If the individual stands at the apex, then the determination of what is at hand will fall more under the character of the individual. In *The Iliad*, the Trojan War is a condition that exists on its own account. Agamemnon is the king over the other rulers, | and Achilles is one of them.<sup>100</sup> [270] The whole state of affairs is established in advance (*vorausgesetzt*). It is the same with El Cid, the handsome knight of the romantic world.<sup>101</sup> Christian kings fight against Moorish kings, and El Cid is just one of the vassals. The action takes place in such a way that it seems to be just something that happens, and this is its principal character.

The more specific point, then, is that the time of the occurrence must be the heroic age, in which the ethical life and relationships have developed and been ordained as such, just as are the circumstances in external nature that human beings employ as means. Life must already be developed in these two aspects; but the ethical relationships must not yet have become established in law, and the use of natural things must not yet be customary practice. Although the ethical relationships have taken form, they do not yet have to be duties, do not yet subsist in outwardly established arrangements that also hold good apart from subjective preference. The relationships must have taken outward form, although they have not yet grown to the point of being established; they must still be a matter of individual volition, must still exist as a sense of right and equity, as ethical custom. The relationships must have become evident, although they were not yet also understood to be

100. In *The Iliad* Agamemnon is described as 'king of men' (9.96) and 'shepherd of the people' (10.3); Lattimore, pp. 218, 236.

101. *Der Cid, Geschichte des Don Ruy Diaz, Grafen von Bivar. Nach spanischen Romanzen*, the German rendition of the epic, was best known in Herder's translation, first published in *Adrastea* (1803-4), and then in *Zur schönen Litteratur und Kunst* (Tübingen, 1805); see Herder: *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 3. For his basic text Herder relied on the anonymous compilation in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* (1783), rather than on the *Historia del muy valoroso Cavallero Don Rodrigo di Bivar, el bravo Cid Campeador* (Lisbon, 1665), Juan Escobar's collection, arrangement, and edited version of various sources of the epic cycle about El Cid. A sketchy attempt at a translation, by Karl Sigmund Freiherr von Seckendorff, entitled *Romantische Geschichte des Cid*, had appeared in the *Neuen teutschen Merkur*, 1792 (ed. Christoph Martin Wieland), pt. 1, pp. 199-215. Like Hegel, it emphasizes that this heroic song-cycle, originally from the late medieval period, belongs to the romantic world.

authoritative over against individual sensibilities. By the same token, the fact that natural things were relegated to instrumental use, were reduced to means, does not yet mean they were only able to be lifeless means.

In Homer we see the princes all assembled under the scepter of Agamemnon. He does not dictate to the princes but instead consults with them.<sup>102</sup> He leads them in the expedition by a variety of devices. The princes stand in a comparable relationship | with their people. The people of a prince have followed him of their own free will. There is no law here that compels them to do so. All kings are independent, and their people follow them out of respect, for glory, or else as forced to under duress. Thus the relationships appear as having formed of their own accord. [271] For instance, in *The Iliad* Homer recounts the battle between the Greeks and the Trojans. The Greeks too lost many warriors, though fewer than the Trojans because, as Homer says, the Greeks always thought to defend one another against severe peril.<sup>103</sup> So they aided one another. Homer was the 'Bible' of the Greeks; they took all their morals from Homer. Everything turns out as though it has to be that way. The difference between Turkish power and European power lies in the fact that European soldiers are aware that they are effective only in concert with others. This sticking-together is the essential thing; it is what sets apart the armies of cultured peoples. We see this already in the simple words of Homer. For the barbarians there are only multitudes; the individual cannot rely on the others, for there is no organic whole. However, in Homer the cultural factor exists only as ethical custom.

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The other aspect is constituted in the same way, for it too has not yet become the usual practice. For us everything external is secondary, and so it can only be secondary in the description. Homer goes on at length about scepter and raiment, about Ulysses' bed, and about the door that pivots on hinges.<sup>104</sup> Here in Homer all this still appears as the sort of thing in which human skill finds its glory, as something people thought of as being progress. The hero himself even butchers the ox for the banquet. All these things that have become commonplace for us, a mere means, are in the heroic age things in which human beings still find their glory. | All aspects of human life are still vital for them; there is nothing merely external to them.

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102. *The Iliad* 9.260–307 portrays this deliberation; Lattimore, pp. 223–4.

103. *The Iliad* 17.36 says about the Danaëns, fighting under Achilles, that they 'fought not without bloodletting, but far fewer of them went down, since they ever remembered always to stand amassed and beat sudden death from each other' (Lattimore, p. 385).

104. See *The Odyssey* 23.181–204 (Lattimore, p. 340) on Odysseus' (Ulysses') bedframe, and 6.214–37 (Lattimore, pp. 107–8) on his bathing and his splendid garments.

Since the poet brings such a world of a people before our eyes, the epic poem falls in the first age of a people awakening from its stupor, so that what later becomes law emerges just as sensibility, as ethical custom. [272]

### 3. The Life of a People and the Perspective of the Poet; Original Epics and Later Epics

The naïve consciousness of a people found expression in the epic, and the series of epic poems exhibits to us a gallery of folk-spirits—that is, when the epic is in fact something original and not a later artistic contrivance. The poems come later than the life itself, later than the spirit that is immersed in this action, in this condition. Yet there must still be a close connection between the spirit of the poet and what the poet produces. Otherwise there is a cleavage within the poem. We have already remarked that the portrayal or the expression is just the fashioned representation. It is the element in which the content is grasped. This content is at the same time spiritual nature, as is the manner of the representation. The two have one principle. If the spiritual aspect of the representation is something different from the spiritual aspect of the content, then they are unconnected and we see directly that this is inappropriate. So here we have to distinguish original epics from ones produced later on.

294 This distinction is evident with Homer and Virgil.<sup>105</sup> The framework and the subject matter of the Homeric world are still in beautiful harmony. In the case of Virgil, in each hexameter, we feel that the mode of representation belongs to another time than does the content. This comes out especially in the mythologies of the epic. In Virgil the mythological aspect is purely a poetic invention, and neither the poet nor his audience is serious about it, although the poet dissembles as though he is quite serious about it. In Homer the mythological element hovers between poetry and actuality; the representation of it makes it more accessible to the extent that, while the representation is not, on the whole, the fully specific shape of an actual world, it is, in another respect, also something actual. The gods are linked only to a mode of action that is equally well interpretable based on the character of the human

105. Hegel opposes the lofty appraisal of Virgil in contrast to Homer that one finds, for instance, in Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558; his original name was probably Benedetto Bordone). Virgil was no longer thought comparable to Homer after publication of the treatise by Friedrich August Wolff (1759–1824): *Prolegomena ad Homerum; sive, De operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi*, vol. 1 (Halle, 1795), which was vol. 1 of *Homeri opera omnia*. Hegel knew of it from Herder's essay in *Die Horen* 9.53–88: 'Homer, ein Günstling der Zeit' (*Sämmtliche Werke* 18:420–46).

actor. So the gods' intervention passes over into something intelligible. The gods are only [273] one aspect. Homer is in earnest about them, although at the same time he also treats them ironically. Vulcan hobbles around. The gods even appear in conflict among themselves. Juno strikes Aphrodite on the cheek. Mars is overcome.<sup>106</sup> We believe in them in virtue of the substantial element that underlies them. For instance, Mars is war. Aphrodite is the Trojan spirit, and Apollo is the Greek spirit. The ironic element in this makes for the cheerfulness. Matters are serious, and at the same time this seriousness is accompanied by pleasantry. In Virgil, on the contrary, there is seriousness about the figures themselves, and they are characterized intelligibly as a prosaic world. Aeneas descends to the underworld, which is portrayed specifically just as are other worldly objects.<sup>107</sup> In Homer it is different; the underworld is kept in an obscure haze.<sup>108</sup>

There is this same cleavage in our own epic poems, in Klopstock's *Messias* (*Messiah*).<sup>109</sup> The poem involves on the one hand the story of Christ, and on the other hand the German culture of the eighteenth century, the philosophy of Wolff.<sup>110</sup> And this century is recognizable in every line. The epic is therefore bound to Klopstock's own time. So this is then even the case with the mythological aspect in the *Messiah*. Here there are God, Christ, angels, patriarchs. On the one hand this material is not suited to the caprice of fantasy. On the other hand, particular angels appear, and patriarchs; and saints come forth from their graves. Seen from the aspect of fantasy, these are beautiful pictures, and yet they have no import. The angels are just servants, mere means; they are nothing substantial as to their own content. The

106. These remarks refer to scenes from the theomachy, or battle of the gods, in *The Iliad*. In 21.331–82 (Lattimore, p. 449), Hephaistos (Vulcan) is said to have 'dragging feet'. In 21.479–96 (Lattimore, p. 453), Hera (Juno) 'boxes the ears' of Artemis (not Aphrodite, as our text reads). In 5.846–63 (Lattimore, p. 169), the warrior Diomedes, with the help of Athena, fells Ares (Mars) with a spear thrust to the stomach.

107. This occurs in Book Six of the *Aeneid*; see *Virgil: The Aeneid*, trans. David West, rev. edn. (London and New York, 2003), pp. 90–114.

108. *The Odyssey*, Book Eleven (Lattimore, pp. 168–84).

109. Hegel possessed the *Messias* that Friedrich Gottlob Klopstock (1724–1803) composed between 1748 and 1773, in the four volume edn. (Leipzig, 1819). His remark refers to the first song, verses 1–4; *Klopstock: Sämtliche Werke* (Leipzig, 1823), vol. 3 (which is the first volume of the *Messias*), p. 3.

110. Klopstock's tendencies toward theodicy and physico-theology in the *Messiah* relate to the philosophy of Christian Freiherrn von Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff influenced the development of aesthetics, together with Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (on whom, see n. 18, p. 194 in this text), as well as Johann Christoph Gottsched (see n. 7, p. 188 in this text) and Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693–1750).

patriarchs are likewise just historical persons. Mars and Apollo—war and knowledge—are enduring, essential powers. Therefore in Klopstock mere poetic fictions are taken seriously, although they have no serious import.

Going into more detail about the epic poem would have had to involve us in a discussion of particular epic poems. [274] What is distinctive about the epic poem is the vitality of a people.

There can be epic poems only in a certain time period. Modern times cannot have any. The Orientals are fortunate in having epic poems in all time periods because their world has not yet reached the understandable character (*Verständigkeit*) that ours has; hence it also has not reached that level of culture. So the Indian poems are epic poems. They acquaint us with what India is, just as in Homer we learn what Greece is. Recently people have said that Homer never existed, | that individual rhapsodists have done the composing, and so people pay no attention to the poetry.<sup>111</sup> This is the highest praise. The singer vanishes; we see no particularity of emotion. The setting of the people, the objective mode of a people's intuition, stands forth. However, we also see that the whole is a whole that indeed has an ending. The wrath of Achilles is supposedly recited on its own. Each role seems independent and yet each is but a member of the organic whole. However, it is essential to know that only an individual poeticizes. The people do not do it; only one person does.

Ossian is even more lyrically inclined, although he is an original [epic] poet.<sup>112</sup> The Arabs too have original epic poems. The *Nibelungenlied* is of a more dramatic nature; in it there is a world that to us has nothing national about it.<sup>113</sup> The epic poem of Catholicism is Dante's *Divine Comedy*. He calls it 'Commedia' because it is written in the common or vulgar dialect

111. No specific source is known for this denial that Homer existed.

112. In his essay 'Homer and Ossian' (on which, see n. 78, p. 271 in this text), which Herder published in *Die Horen* (Tübingen, 1795), he characterized Ossian as a 'lyric-epic' poet, as 'pure = subjective', because he composed 'pure, lyrical pieces'; pp. 95–8. Hegel follows this interpretation of Ossian by Herder.

113. On the *Nibelungenlied*, see n. 85, p. 275 above. Hegel's denial that it is a national epic is controversial; see, for instance, Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 6:294–314, esp. 301–2 and 313–14. Hegel is implicitly opposing the treatise by Konrad Friedrich Wilhelm Lachmann (1793–1851), *Über die ursprüngliche gestalt des gedichts von der Nibelungen noth* (Berlin, 1816), as well as the view of Friedrich Heinrich von der Hagen (1780–1856). In 1807, von der Hagen edited this epic in a Modern High German edition. In 1810 he edited an edition of it in Middle High German (on which, see n. 77, p. 271 in this text). See also his *Anmerkungen zu der Nibelungen Noth* (Frankfurt am Main, 1824), and *Die Nibelungen: Ihre Bedeutung für die Gegenwart und für immer* (Breslau, 1819).



of Italian, which at that time was not yet the language of the erudite.<sup>114</sup> A doubling is represented in this poem. There is a condition, and this eternal condition consists of hell, the [275] cleansing fire, and heaven [Dante's *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, *Paradiso*]. This is eternal being as a condition or state. These are set conditions; they are the presuppositions, and within these conditions figures act in keeping with their particular character; or rather, they are immortalized as having done so. The individuals are represented in the way they carry out their own immortalization in themselves, by themselves. Their actions are rigidified in the eternal justice. The immortalization by the poet, and that by the human beings themselves, are portrayed as one.

The epic mode, aside from | large-scale conditions and actions, can also confine itself to a private or personal condition. Then the epic becomes idyllic. Such a condition can be treated lyrically or dramatically as well as epically. Our own *Luise* by Voß, and *Hermann and Dorothea*, belong under this heading.<sup>115</sup> A condition is set forth in advance, and the characters act within it. A larger background is provided in the case of *Hermann and Dorothea*, but it takes a leap to connect this background to the action. The political circumstances of the small town are omitted; we can see that

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114. In a letter, Dante characterized his epic as 'Comedia': see *Dante Alighieri: Das Schreiben an Cangrande della Scala*, trans. Thomas Ricklin, in Latin and German (Hamburg, 1993), pp. 12–13. On his choice of the *volgare illustre* (Italian as the sublime language of the people), see, for instance, *De vulgari eloquentia*, which originally dates about AD 1303–4. The first published edition—from the Italian translation, *De vulgari eloquentia libri duo* by Trissino (Venice, 1529)—appeared in Paris in 1577. In this writing Dante developed his ideal of the *volgare illustre*, of Italian as an artistic and poetic language, which is said to be equal in lineage to the Latin of a Virgil, a Horace, or an Ovid. In Hegel's day the current edition was the three-volume translation by Karl Ludwig Kannegiesser, *Die göttliche Komödie* (Leipzig, 1814–21), the first volume of which, *Die Hölle*, had already appeared separately in Amsterdam in 1809.

115. *Luise. Ein ländliches Gedicht in drei idyllen*, by Johann Heinrich Voß, dates from 1782 to 1794. Originally printed in individual idylls, it first appeared as a whole in a second version (Königsberg, 1795), and then in a final version (Tübingen, 1807). Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* appeared in his *Taschenbuch für 1798* (Berlin, 1797). (See *Goethe: Werke* 2.437–514.) Up until Goethe's death in 1832 this idyll appeared in more than thirty editions. Hegel possessed a *Liebhaber* ('admirer's') edition: *Hermann und Dorothea, der deutsche Text und Übersetzung in lateinische Hexameter von Graf v. Berlichingen* (Jaxthausen, 1825). Hegel's interpretation relates to a review of it: 'A. W. Schlegel: Berlin, b. Vieweg d. alt.: Taschenbuch für 1798. Hermann und Dorothea von J. W. von Goethe. Mit Kupfern. 174 S. ohne den Calendar. Taschenformat', which appeared in issues of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, nos. 393–96 (11–13 December 1797), pp. 641–68. Another reference is W. Von Humboldt, *Ästhetische Versuche*, part one, *Über Göthe's Hermann und Dorothea* (Braunschweig, 1799), chapter 78, pp. 271–3.

the connection is not provided, although, were it interjected, the whole would completely lose its character.

### C. THE LYRIC

The subject expresses itself in the lyric. What the lyric can mirror is not the abundance of a world<sup>116</sup> but instead individual feeling, the singular verdict of the heart. The lyric sets forth the heart as such. The lyric involves the need to express oneself, whereas in the epic the need is to pay attention to the matter at hand. The lyric therefore essentially becomes the structure for the song. Since the content and the way it is treated fall within subjectivity, there can be a variety of contents and of treatments. The heart as such wants to express itself. At first the most insignificant content serves the purpose. But the heart can also go on [276] to extol what is highest, to express what is  
 288 most profound. | Epic content can be taken up too. Here belong the ballad and the romance. The epic of *El Cid* is this kind of epic, treated lyrically. The content in this romance is epic, but it is treated lyrically.<sup>117</sup> It portrays the principal features compactly and in rapid succession. The elegy and the epigram also belong under this heading. The epigram involves a subjective notion when some sort of feeling is bound up with the inscription or when it expresses a wish. Epitaphs can therefore be lyrical too. Because lyrical poems are subjective feelings about some content, most of them are occasional poems. The odes of Horace and the poems of Pindar have their basis in all sorts of occasions—triumphs, banquets.<sup>118</sup> *Lieder* most especially are modern lyric poems. Goethe's *lieder* are the most striking ones because they belong wholly to him and to his own people. They are his very own, and nothing in them is foreign to us.<sup>119</sup>

116. Hotho added 'in its objective existence'.

117. Hegel has in mind Herder's conversion of this epic into unrhymed trochees in tetrameter; see n. 101 just above.

118. These remarks refer to Herder's characterization of the ode as a lied, one based on an occasion and originally also improvised. This interpretation fits Pindar's *Epinikia*, or *Triumphal Odes* (on which, see n. 87, p. 276 in this text). The *Carmina* of Horace include poems with political content, as well as poems involving praise, drinking, and love. See *Horace: Odes and Epodes*, trans. C. E. Bennett (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1946).

119. This remark could refer to the *Sesenheimer Lieder* (a title later given them) which date from 1770-1; many of them were published in J. G. Jacobi's periodical *Iris*, in 1775. It could also refer to later *lieder* such as 'The Elf-king', 'Wanderer's Night', and 'Storm Song'.

## D. DRAMATIC POETRY

## 1. Introduction; General Features

Dramatic poetry can be considered to be the most complete stage of poetry and of art as such. The topic of drama is the action; the subjectivity of the lyrical unites with the action. Drama portrays spirit, what is inward, not merely as a condition, as a mood; instead drama portrays spirit as willing, as essentially self-determining, as positing a purpose for itself and realizing this purpose. Therefore the inwardness of the lyrical is superseded in this case, and inwardness is self-objectifying in keeping with the epic aspect; although here the epic aspect is not just happenstance, for instead | it is a happening brought about by the individual. The action is willing carried out, is something known. The action is, then, at the same time an outward conduct. This aspect does not belong to dramatic speech and therefore it must be added to it.<sup>120</sup> What outwardly comes to pass, one's self-involvement, is [277] not described in the way the epic does it, and so the action must take place over and above the spoken words. Actual human beings have to portray it. The drama does not describe it. The external aspect is added to the words in the form of gesture, as portrayal by human beings. The epic, then, gets performed; drama excludes [just describing] external self-involvement. Here the statues appear animated. The stage setting, like the temple, is the architectonic aspect, the surroundings. The gods appear in motion, speaking. Ancient portrayal is plastic, showing sculptural images in motion but with their stance idealized. We moderns call for specific particularity; to us, changing facial expressions seem a major part of it. The ancients, in contrast, wore masks, and because of them particularity did not show its face. Also, the ancients had the hands inside the robe, so movement was modest. They spoke what was to be spoken; what ought to be expressed was not the demeanor or facial expression but instead the deliberate words. In modern tragedies what is inward often goes unspoken; instead it is supposed to be expressed by the demeanor. *Wallenstein* ends in this way. | When *Wallenstein* is made a prince, the overall reaction Ottavio Piccolomini feels is humiliation.<sup>121</sup> Yet this reaction is unspoken. With the ancients, everything gets spoken; the words are the main thing.

120. Added later above the first line of Hotho's manuscript page, and in his margin: 'and so for us each drama must demonstrate this vital operation of a necessity based in itself, resolving each contradiction. γ) lyric poets. Challenge to them'

121. See *Wallenstein's Death*, the third drama in Schiller's *Wallenstein* trilogy, Act. 5, Scene 12, in particular the stage direction following the concluding verse: 'Ottavio is shocked and, in agony, looks heavenward'; Schiller: *Werke* 8:355. [Tr.] Ottavio Piccolomini was an Italian officer serving under Wallenstein in the Habsburg army during the Thirty Years' War. He was

We know the ancient principle governing action: the unity of action, time, and place. The conditions for contemplating action must be fulfilled in the portrayal of the action. We must not ask too much from the imagination as opposed to sensible intuition, as is indeed the case with Shakespeare. In the representation by itself we can embrace vast expanses of time. This takes place on occasion in *Don Quixote*.<sup>122</sup> In sensible intuition we cannot so quickly leap over a few years. [278] At least the unity of place on its own is easily understandable; any confusion is avoided. One must not demand any overly exact sticking-to-reality, yet one must also not violate reality. Unity of the action, in contrast, is the essential thing. The action must be *one*; the specific purpose must be pursued to the end. An end resolving conflicts can of course lead to other developments, with still other concerns. Trilogies come about from this circumstance. For Sophocles there is | the Theban cycle. The first play involves discovery of the murderer of Laius. The cycle continues with the struggle of the sons, the fate of Antigone, and the death of Oedipus.<sup>123</sup> A specific purpose is carried out in each play. As performed, one such play is divided into segments or time periods. What else takes place externally can be shifted to the intervals between acts. There are three acts or five acts. In the drama two sides are opposed, and the first act thus sets forth the situation and how one of the sides apprehends it. In the second act the other party expresses its claim. The parties can get entangled in the third and fourth acts. In the third act one party is in distress (*Angst*), in the fourth act the other party is. The fifth act is the resolution as such.

Overall, drama divides into tragedy and comedy. The action is the topic in both. In the action a purpose is made apparent, and individualities who carry it out. What is foremost in tragedy is that individuality comes to be destroyed because of the onesided nature of its purpose. The individuality with its purpose meets with ruin. Eternal justice works itself out in the individual and in the purpose. But this must be a substantial purpose. Therefore, in keeping with its substantial character, the purpose is preserved [279] and what gets stripped away is just the onesidedness that the individual embodies. In comedy the purpose is more or less an imagined one, although it can appear to be substantial. In comedy the onesidedness of

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overlooked for advancement whereas Wallenstein was dismissed from his post yet later restored to command of the imperial army. Piccolomini later conspired to assassinate Wallenstein.

122. Hotho later struck out this sentence. Possibly it referred to Don Quixote's speech on the Golden Age made to the goatherds in the eleventh chapter of Part One. See also n. 235, p. 346.

123. Hegel is not referring to the original times of these events, but instead to key events in the three plays of the trilogy, *Oedipus the King* (425 BC), *Antigone* (422 BC), and *Oedipus at Colonus* (after 402 BC). See Grene and Lattimore, 2:1-212.

the purpose meets with ruin through the subject himself, and accordingly the subject preserves himself. In tragedy, what is eternally substantial emerges as victorious; | in comedy, the victor is the subjectivity as such. In the action these two aspects can only stand mutually opposed. Either substantiality or subjectivity gains the victory. Hence in comedy the purpose cannot be any truly substantial purpose. 302

## 2. Classical Tragedy

### a. *Ancient Characters and the Conflict of Powers*

Classical tragedy thus involves the more specific concerns of the tragic. It commences with a situation; individuals are entangled in an offense against a state of affairs, and in this situation they must establish a purpose for themselves. What justifies this purpose is their ethical life as such. There are various ethical powers. In peaceful conditions these powers are in harmony as a circle of gods. But what must also happen is that these powers become offended, and because of that they are summoned to overt activity. Thus individuals appear as the *πᾶθος*, as the actualization, of an ethical power. The king and the sister—Creon and Antigone—appear in this way, as does Orestes, the son of the offended father. The plastic characters are plastic because they are not concrete characters like characters in the epic. Achilles is portrayed in the full range of relationships in which a human being stands. The dramatic character is an abstract character and realizes just one ethical power.

Accordingly we have what is doubled. We have the ethical powers in a peaceful condition, not provoked to hostility. But these ethical powers emerge into actuality; | they do not remain the merely substantial foundation.<sup>124</sup> This doubled relationship is portrayed in such a way that the chorus represents the peaceful condition; the chorus abides in tranquil ethical life and dreads the bifurcation of ethical power; by itself, it remains neutral. [280] The second aspect of the ethical consciousness emerges in a particular 303

124. Later added in the margin:

a) Principle of tragedy, comedy, of drama

α) tragedy; αα) ethical content; ββ) tragic conflict; γγ) resolution

β) comedy

γ) drama

b) Distinction of modern from ancient Greek poetry

c) Concrete development of this distinction

shape and accordingly comes forward as mutual hostility. The chorus is therefore essentially needed in ancient tragedy. Some have sought to reintroduce the chorus in modern drama, saying that it is the peaceful condition, the representative of the public, so that its province is reflection about the whole.<sup>125</sup> This is certainly correct, and yet the chorus is no mere external reflection, for it is the soil of the heroes themselves, the substantial condition—as is the fertile earthly realm in which paintings take shape in flowers and trees. It is what is antecedent. The chorus is unseemly in modern tragedy. There it is just a device, for example when servants make their appearance. The chorus is not suited for intrigue; where it acts for the sake of particular interests it has no standpoint of its own. The chorus can be compared to the spiritual architecture that surrounds the images of the gods, the heroes.

304 The contrast of ancient with modern drama appears in the mode of the topic as such. In ancient drama the conflict is the kind in which both sides are justified. The conflict is produced by the ethical justification of both sides, not by an evil will or any sheer misfortune. Abstract evil is neither authentic nor interesting. However, evil must be no mere intention, | such that one gives the characters an ethical goodness, for instead the justification must be essential. Each side is a specific individuality. These two powers—opposed interests or purposes—have, as their authentic content, ethical vocations that are justified on their own account. Hence these powers are not thus truly many-sided. They can of course particularize themselves in manifold ways, but [281] the main interests, the absolute ones, are the antithesis between the state—the general ethical life in the shape of universality—and ethical life as subjectivity, as family. These aspects are the ones that can come into conflict. Ethical life as natural, and the state as what is spiritual, stand mutually opposed. Consummate ethical life consists in the harmony of the two aspects. These are the authentic aspects of the tragic portrayal.

We find this conflict portrayed in *Antigone*. Antigone honors the family ties, the subterranean deities, and Creon honors Zeus, the power of the state.<sup>126</sup> We find the same conflict between Orestes and Clytemnestra. The right of the sovereign, Agamemnon, who sacrificed his daughter in the

125. This remark refers to Schiller's essay, 'Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie', which he prefaced to the publication of *The Bride of Messina* (Tübingen, 1803); see Schiller: *Werke* 10:7–15. Schiller also developed this same position in letters of 6 February and 10 March 1803 to Körner (*Werke*, 32, letters no. 10 (pp. 8–9) and no. 26 (pp. 19–20)).

126. See Sophocles' *Antigone*, v. 494–502; Grene and Latimore, p. 178. See also n. 55, p. 260 in this text, and Hegel's extended discussion of this issue in *Phenomenology* §§444–76; Miller, pp. 267–89.

interests of the Greek army, stands opposed to the interests of the offended mother, who likewise commits an offense. This conflict exists within Orestes himself. He honors his mother and has to avenge his father.<sup>127</sup> It is the same in *Iphigenia in Aulis*. The state stands opposed to the family. These are the great powers. Other interests are subordinate ones.<sup>128</sup> In *Philoctetes*, the interest of the Greek army is opposed to Philoctetes' enmity toward his offender. In *Ajax*, the honor of Ajax stands opposed to the interests of the army.<sup>129</sup>

One formal interest is the | claim on behalf of consciousness, that only<sup>130</sup> what the individual knows ought to be ascribed to the individual. The claim of finitude stands opposed to it. This opposition comes to the fore in the Oedipus cycle; Oedipus married his mother and so got implicated in the most awful crime. Here appears this antithesis between what consciousness knows and how matters stand. In this case we must set aside erroneous suppositions about guilt and innocence. The heroes are just as guilty as they are innocent. We represent guilt to ourselves as coming into play when an individual has been able to choose, when an individual has decided freely for himself. However, in plastic figures such choice [282] is removed. The individual is what he is, and he acts based on this character, this emotion; and this is his character precisely because it is what he is. This is the strength of the ancient characters, the fact that they do not choose but instead they are what they do. Weakness is when my subjectivity is separated from my will. The greatest weakness is indecisiveness. Deciding must not be capricious; the bond between willing and subjectivity must not be dissoluble. The figures are the way they are, and perpetually so, and this is their greatness. Our own way of representing guilt falls by the wayside. The great character cannot be otherwise; and he is not innocent, for instead what he is and wills is his own deed, his own willing. In the ancient figures the honor of the character is in being guilty. Guilt and innocence are not exhaustive of them.

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127. This refers to the portrayal of the divergent duties in the *Oresteia* trilogy of Aeschylus; see, for instance, Apollo's order to Orestes to avenge his father, Agamemnon, in *The Libation Bearers*, v. 269–305 (Greene and Lattimore, 1:103–4). The conflict between vengeance and honoring his mother is found in v. 306–478 (Greene and Lattimore, 1:104–10). See also Orestes' justification, v. 1027–33, and 1053–4 (Greene and Lattimore, 1:130–1). The consequence of the obligations, namely, the sworn revenge of the Erinyes for the matricide, are in *The Eumenides*, v. 298–339 (Greene and Lattimore, 1:145–7).

128. Euripedes, *Iphigenia in Aulis*; Greene and Lattimore, 4:297–387.

129. *Ajax* is the oldest one of the fully preserved tragedies of Sophocles, dating from 456 B.C. The *Philoctetes* of Sophocles dates from 409 B.C. See Greene and Lattimore, 2:219–74, 407–66. Verses 1409–44 (2:464–5) show the conflict between the interests of Philoctetes and those of the Greeks.

130. Hotho deleted 'only'.

We could not say anything worse about such a hero than that he could have lived innocently. We do not honor the exalted figure by pitying him. Instead we honor simply his firm, strong character; the unity of its subjectivity and substantiality inspires admiration. When the poet | elaborates on the *πάθος*, the language is solemn (*pathetisch*), and it can be so only if there is ethical justification for it. Schiller for the most part has this pathos too. In Goethe there is more compassion, more particularity of interest.

*b. Reconciliation; Guilt and Self-knowledge*

The denouement can only be the annulling of the antitheses, their reconciliation. The ultimate thing must be the satisfaction of spirit, not its misfortune. The way the reconciliation is carried out can be quite varied. But the purpose of tragedy sets itself apart in onesidedness getting stripped away and individuality, which counts only as a pathos, coming to ruin. This can take place by chance and externally, or else in such a way that the individual has in itself the antithetical element in which it [283] is confounded. The latter takes place in *Antigone*, the most consummate work of art. In this drama Creon, the power of the state, is acting against the family. He punishes Antigone and offends against piety. In doing so, he harms himself. His son Haemon, betrothed to Antigone, dies with her. By the harm he inflicts the king therefore harms himself. By the same token Antigone, a citizen of the state, acts against the state, and this offense likewise harms her and brings about her death. The offending aspect is in each of the two sides themselves, and it harms the individuals in themselves. This is the consummate way of ending. As for the ending itself, it must be reconciling, affirmative: ethical equilibrium, the equal validity of the two powers, must come into view. Both sides are in the wrong, and they come to be posited in unity by the fact that they come into harmony. This truly satisfies the heart ethically; the heart is touched by the individuals and reconciled in the matter. This reconciliation is objective when it exists only for us, objectively, and not for the onesided individuals. | There is this kind of reconciliation in *Antigone*. Here the audience has the satisfaction that the resolution has taken place inherently in the matter itself, and so the picture is for the most part one of plastic art. In Antigone herself there is a moment of recognizing the other. For she says: 'Because we suffer we wish to confess our having been in the wrong'.<sup>131</sup> This expresses her reconciliation with her suffering.

131. See *Phenomenology* § 470 (Miller, p. 284) for a citation of this passage. In Grene and Lattimore (2:196) it is verses 982-3, and reads: 'If this proceeding is good in the god's eyes I shall know my sin, once I have suffered.'



In the second place, however, the reconciliation can be a subjective kind, when individuality yields its oneness. Then individuality appears devoid of character. Hence for the ancients this could not be the way it happens. The individual could only have yielded in face of a higher power, and this power is the *deus ex machina*. The knot is cut by the higher power. Heracles appears and commands Philoctetes to let go of his temper.<sup>132</sup> [284] However, the dramas *Philoctetes* and *Ajax* seem to be just works of Sophocles' youth.

The resolution can also come about within and in the subject, as it does, for instance, in *The Eumenides* of Aeschylus.<sup>133</sup> Here we see the true meaning of the gods who come into conflict in tragedy. Here too the individual does not come to ruin. *The Eumenides* ends in such a way that Apollo (the power of the side aligned with the sovereign) brings the matter before the Areopagus. The goddess Athena renders the decision, and her decision is that, just as Apollo is honored, so too the Eumenides should be honored. The reconciliation is that the two powers are to be given equal honor.

In *Oedipus at Colonus* there is a reconciliation that borders on the Christian reconciliation in which God accepts the sinner into grace. Oedipus has slain his father and brought destruction on his mother. But he has a presentiment of his misery; he is the ancient solver of riddles. He solves this puzzle, wresting from it the knowledge as to who he himself is. This is the resolution. He knows that he is the perpetrator. At the same time this knowledge makes him most miserable. He, the seer, blinds himself, for his seeing makes | him miserable.<sup>134</sup> So there is the knowing of good and evil, the knowledge that made Adam and Eve miserable. Oedipus is banned, like Adam is from paradise.<sup>135</sup> In *Colonus*, he represents this fact that the attaining of knowledge, which is both satisfaction and estrangement, gets inverted. Even within itself knowledge becomes the reenactment of the antithesis. In this very knowledge, Oedipus arrives at a transfiguration.

This is the nature of ancient tragedy. In modern tragedy, the reconciliation appears for the most part in the background. Contingency, what<sup>136</sup> we call

132. [Tr.] See *Philoctetes*, v. 1408–44, where Heracles appears, ordering Philoctetes to join the other Greeks in the siege of Troy; Grene and Lattimore, 2:464–5.

133. *The Eumenides* is in Grene and Lattimore, 1:133–71.

134. See Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, the last speeches of Oedipus, v. 1457–1555 (Grene and Lattimore, 2:144–7, lines 1672–1774). Hegel's remarks link the contents of this drama to its predecessor, *Oedipus the King*.

135. Gen. 3:22–4, the expulsion from Eden.

136. Hotho changed 'Contingency, what' to 'The individual in his finitude proves to be perishing. What'

fate or sheer necessity, is not present in ancient tragedies; instead there is rational necessity. The misery or the frailty [285] of individuals comes to the fore in modern tragedies.

### 3. Modern Tragedy; Contingent Individuality

Dramatic art lies in the transition from tragedy to comedy. In tragedy, interests that are essentially justified get set in opposition. [In modern tragedy] these interests must particularize themselves. Love is one example of this particularization. In love, conflict arises when a specific individual bestows his love on another contingent individual subject to someone else's control. Here contingency therefore comes into play. These lesser interests are so constituted that they may claim no legal entitlement; they are said to be wholly bound up with individuality. The individual can relinquish this aim and certainly suffers from doing so, but still remains intact in the process. Whatever the outcome, the dramatic content is of a particular kind and the obstacles then crop up in particular fashion as well; contingency comes into play. This is the nature of modern tragedy, and the reconciliation is that the individuals maintain the formal strength of their character. Oneness with oneself, obtained with difficulty, is the formal feature. In this setting things can easily be turned about and the heart can readily withdraw from its goal. So things can come to pass without the  
 308 downfall of individuals. Whether | they come about happily or unhappily is a contingent affair. This is apparent when [some] modern tragedies are brought to happy endings.

When we see that the fortune or misfortune of a noble individual is a matter of chance, then things have gotten to be shocking. We find such a sequence of events hard to take. In Hamlet's case one must say that the ending is a matter of chance. Contingency can only be of interest insofar as it is congruent with what issues from the heart. Hamlet is without support; the shoal of finitude is insufficient for him. In the background of his heart there lies death.<sup>137</sup> And this [286] inner necessity is worked out by contingent external factors. It is the same in *Romeo and Juliet*. The entire surroundings of Juliet, this delicate flower, are not agreeable to her, and her rapidly

137. For the contingency of the ending, see the fencing scene with Laertes, especially the exchange of rapiers called for in the stage directions, which stands for the contingency. See Act 5, Scene 2, v. 225-360; *Shakespeare: Complete Works*, pp. 710-12. On Hamlet's hesitation or wavering, see: Act 2, Scene 2, v. 558-617; Act 3, Scene 1, v. 55-87, and Scene 3, v. 73-96; Act 4, Scene 4, v. 32-40 (*Complete Works*, pp. 687, 688-9, 690, 699). Also see King Claudius and Polonius speaking about Hamlet's melancholy, in Act 3, Scene 1, v. 166-92 (p. 689).

blossoming heart must soon wither away. We see in her the fate of Achilles. Insofar as a heart so gentle as hers is situated in actuality, we see that it must perish.<sup>138</sup> This inner necessity reconciles us with how things appear outwardly. But it is a sad ending, and on the whole, when it comes to such subordinate purposes, the matter can equally well come out happily or unhappily. Recent dramas involve no major interests, and so it is not worthwhile for individuals to suffer ruin for the sake of those interests. In their outcomes forgiveness then especially comes into play. Strength of spirit cancels out what has taken place. The heart, which pardons itself or else is pardoned, must be depicted in such a way that we see the possibility of forgiveness. The figures must not be scoundrels, like Kotzebue's figures are.<sup>139</sup> The forgiveness must not be merely formal. The beauty of the heart must have preserved itself even in its moral lapses.

#### 4. Comedy as the End Point of Art

Finally we come to the makeup of comedy. We have already remarked that comedy is fundamentally that with which tragedy comes to an end. The cheerful heart is absolutely reconciled within itself—the heart that entangles itself, produces an antithesis, seeks to alleviate the entanglement but is so inept in its measures that it undercuts its own aims by these measures, although in doing so it remains calm and | certain of itself. This is on the whole the concept of classical comedy as we find it in the plays of Aristophanes.<sup>140</sup> With comedy we must discern whether the roles are comical to the participants, or just comical for us. A number of follies [287] are comical only for a third party who is aware of them; they are comical only if they are not serious matters for the individuals themselves, if the individuals themselves are not serious in their own earnestness.

In Molière's plays,<sup>141</sup> and in Spanish plays, we see individuals who have a goal. They pursue their goals in mutual opposition, and undercut them, often independently of one another. This is comical to us, whereas each

138. In referring to the conclusion of *Romeo and Juliet*, brought about by chance, Hegel links it in turn with the character of the individual who acts (as also in the case of *Hamlet*). See *Romeo and Juliet*, Act 5, Scene 3, v. 22–170 (*Complete Works*, pp. 275–7). [Tr.] Achilles too had a vulnerability, in his case his heel.

139. In contrast to the examples previously mentioned, Hegel criticizes the incompatibility of situation and character in Kotzebue's characters, and thereby enlarges upon his previous criticism of Kotzebue; see no. 96, p. 278 in this text.

140. See n. 139, p. 303 in this text, on one of Aristophanes' plays.

141. We cannot see from the lecture transcripts which of the plays mentioned at this point in the published *Aesthetics* Hegel actually was familiar with. Hegel possessed Molière's play *Tartuffe* in the edition *Le Tartuffe, comédie de Molière* (Paris, 1825).

individual is in bitter earnest. Only a few, particularly the servants, are the ones who make fun of the aims of both sides. The servants occupy the audience's perspective; theirs are the humorous roles. But at the same time they are often spiteful. We see very upright people acting disgracefully. Often hostile interests pervade the whole.

Genine comedy, in contrast, is the heart's absolute freedom, and Aristophanes conveys it to us. Those who have not read him cannot know how human beings can bloody well be. His figures are fundamentally on the mark. They are the ones who undermine their own purposes and they are quite content in doing this, so that with this very undermining it comes to light that they are not in earnest about these purposes. We usually see this take place in the lower social classes. The chorus itself appears to take an interest, without wedding itself to the characters. The interests the individuals adopt for themselves can be lofty ones—as with Aristophanes' characters Socrates and Strepsiades, or with the sort of interests where the gods put in an appearance. In these instances the interests, which are inherently lofty ones, find their place in the sort of individualities in which they can only be putative interests. Strepsiades' wisdom is in such a deplorable condition that he twists it all around. And with Socrates wisdom even becomes foolishness, because he | goes along with Strepsiades. The subjective morality of Socrates has the precise shortcoming that it can be employed as a means.<sup>142</sup> [288] Therefore what is ridiculed is not absolute interest or the divine as such, but rather the way in which interest exists in such a consciousness. In his day Aristophanes had good subject matter in the Greek gods, who in their anthropomorphic shapes provided easy targets for his ridicule, which exaggerated something in the particularity of the divinity that then appeared to be most contradictory. An example is *Frogs*, in which Aristophanes ridicules the gods.<sup>143</sup> He also ridicules the republic, in part its government, in part its actions: war and peace.<sup>144</sup> Aristophanes especially held the Athenian people itself up to ridicule. The foolishness of the people

142. The reference is to Aristophanes' *Clouds* (423 BC), first performed in the Dionysia festival. See Moses Hadas, *The Complete Plays of Aristophanes* (New York, 1992), pp. 101–41. [Tr.] In *Clouds*, Socrates runs a logic school in which Strepsiades enrolls his spoiled son, to improve him. One research project in the school is to learn how many lengths of its own foot a flea can jump. The research method is to fit the flea with a tiny slipper, and then to measure and express the distance of the jump in terms of the number of slipper lengths it equals.

143. Aristophanes ridicules the gods in *Frogs*, v. 1–673 (*Complete Plays*, pp. 367–90; see also n. 139, p. 303 in this text), and emphatically so in *Birds*, v. 1195–265 and 1494–692 (pp. 271–2, 280–4).

144. [Tr.] Aristophanes ridicules the government in *Ecclesiazusae* (*Women in the Assembly*); see *Complete Plays*, pp. 417–62.

and its statesmen are the special topics of Aristophanes' comedies, in which he proves to be the best of citizens because this was not merely a joking matter for him. He portrays, in their foolishness, the deeds of the statesmen who establish a purpose but undermine it in carrying it out. He has therefore made the roles inherently comical, so that the characters are fools from the outset. Here therefore we see a completely self-assured subjectivity that, in the foundering of its aims, always remains what it is. This is as far as the reconciliation goes, the reconciliation with which subjectivity struggles.

Art has its end point in what is comical. We began from symbolic art. The subject makes itself objective to itself in plasticity [i.e., sculpture], setting up the individual as divine, as standing beyond particular subjectivity. The antithesis to this objectivity is the subjectivity that is satisfied with, and takes comfort in, itself and only toys with objectivity. Objectivity negates itself in this subjectivity, and in comedy it becomes the knowledge of this negation. [289]

Now we have covered the range of art. For us, art in its seriousness is something bygone. We need other forms to make the divine into an object for us. | We require thinking. Yet art is an essential mode for portraying the divine, and we must understand this form. The object of art is not what is pleasing, nor is it subjective skill. Philosophy has to examine what is truthful in art.

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## APPENDIXES





## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TEXT IN THE GERMAN EDITION, AND IN THIS ENGLISH EDITION

The initial pages of the appendix in the German edition include protocols it follows for presenting the Hotho manuscript, in showing emphasis on individual words, handling the abbreviations used in the manuscript, and showing how its handwritten abbreviations are deciphered. Someone who wishes to examine Hotho's handwritten transcript itself should consult the German edition for this information. The German edition indicates the pagination of Hotho's manuscript at the tops of the pages, with vertical lines entered into the text where new pages begin. This English edition instead indicates a manuscript page at its approximate beginning (given the limits of rendition into fluent English), by the manuscript page number placed in square brackets within the text.

### *1. DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT*

The transcript of Hegel's 1823 Berlin lectures on the philosophy of art, by Heinrich Gustav Hotho, is the property of the Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum.

The transcript is the only surviving complete record of the 1823 lecture series. A formulation made subsequently by Kromayer combines information from the 1823 and 1826 series that he took from the direct transcripts of other students; but the Kromayer manuscript documents only the first part of the lectures. In constituting its text, the German edition does not draw upon this indirect source from Kromayer, since it contains no information about the 1823 lectures that goes beyond what Hotho's transcript provides;

that is, its additional information stems from the 1826 series, in which Hegel made essential modifications.

In addition to the title page, the Hotho manuscript consists of 289 yellowed, white octavo pages with writing by a firm hand. Some of the pages are slightly worn at the edges, some are darkened, and a few are slightly damaged. Hotho's transcription utilizes 38 printer's sheets, some of which consist of only four pages. In a few instances (such as sheets 35-8) the numbering has been lost because of the binding. The page numbers of the manuscript were added subsequently by a different hand. The first part of the manuscript is written in a dark, blackish-brown ink that appears lighter when a thicker pen point is used. About the middle of the manuscript Hotho switches sometimes to a lighter brownish ink, and this ink is used predominantly toward the end. Marginalia are written in brownish ink, and the notations Hotho added later on, along the sides of the manuscript pages, are written in a quite different black ink.

Subsequently the manuscript was bound in a sturdy, reddish-brown, pasteboard binder with a dark brown cloth backing. This binder bears the inscription: 'Hegel/The Philosophy of Art.' Following a cover sheet that is part of the binding, there is a cover sheet for the transcript itself, of somewhat thicker paper than the transcript paper as such (but only slightly so). Then the first page of the first printer's sheet of the transcript is the title page, with this wording:

'The Philosophy of Art. /According to the Lectures of H. Prof. Hegel. / In Summer, 1823. Berlin'

Appearing on the right-hand side, on the lower third of the title page, is: 'H. Hotho'.

The back side of the title page is blank. The text of the 1823 lectures begins on the following, right-hand page. The first two leaves of the eleventh printer's sheet became stuck together because, while writing, Hotho apparently turned over two pages at the same time. The text itself reads continuously. The transcript ends with a horizontal, concluding line on the inside of the last sheet, so that an empty page precedes the back cover sheet. Here there are no decorative or dividing lines of the sort occasionally found within the transcript at the conclusion of a chapter or a paragraph.

Prior to their use in transcribing, all the sheets were folded so as to create a margin about a quarter of the page in width. Since other transcripts show signs of similar folding, possibly the paper was sold in this form. In the present manuscript the text stays to the left side of each page, with the lines of writing continuing up to the mark provided by the fold, and with the

ending of the last word of a line more often than not extending to the right beyond the fold. The margin created by the fold Hotho utilized for detailed marginalia.

The body of the manuscript was obviously written out hastily in German handwriting, but it is well-thought-out strategically. This text contains numerous shorthand symbols and abbreviations, often in combination, and it also conjoins various shorthand symbols to represent longer words. Almost everywhere the vowels are omitted or else they are indicated only when falling between two consonants. These omissions came about in the course of intense transcribing; the German edition silently corrects them, where omissions are customary or are unmistakable (for instance, changing *Aegpter* to *Ägypter*, *ud* to *und*). Other kinds of shorthand symbols and abbreviations that the printed text fills out without further ado are indicated in the first part of this appendix (in the German edition only). In the body of the manuscript there are astonishingly few deletions, additions above the line, or marks referring to remarks in the margins, and in the marginalia there are hardly any additions or deletions at all. The transcript itself does not typically provide paragraph indentations or indications of organizational points.

The text of the transcript shows signs of three different stages of work. The German edition distinguishes these materials by different typefaces.

The first of these stages is obviously the direct transcript that Hotho made of the lectures. This text, found to the inside part of the manuscript pages, is the fundamental, controlling text.

Right after the lectures but clearly not during the process of transcribing them, Hotho undertook a detailed revision of the text by inserting a considerable number of corrections and alterations, and he added quite a few marginalia on the folded edges, marginalia that organize the text and in part briefly summarize the contents.

The darker brownish ink of the marginalia is, as a rule, distinct throughout from the ink of the body of the text. The ink of the marginalia corresponds more or less to the brownish ink used for the direct transcript, so that, judging from the consistency of the color and the firmness of the pen strokes, the difference of the marginalia is due to a more leisurely writing pace. Occasionally the color of the ink is the same for both, but the hypothesis that these marginalia were composed while the lectures were in progress cannot be verified. The body of the text and the remarks in the margins differ as to the script and to the frequency of abbreviations. Despite the modest space provided for adding the marginalia, the notations along the edge in fact clearly contain fewer abbreviations than does the text of the verbatim

transcript. However, here too Hotho follows the same principles for abbreviations.

For other transcripts, the hypothesis that the text of a direct transcript and its marginalia were created simultaneously is convincing. In contrast, in Hotho's case we sometimes find in the marginal notations corrected literary citations standing alongside erroneous ones in the text, and these citations in the margins have almost always (except in a few cases) been carefully underlined. Only in a few instances have the marginalia clearly been inserted during the verbatim transcribing itself. The latter instances involve points of organization that Hegel himself mentioned in giving an overview of the lectures' progression. Occasionally too, additions above the line in the text have been made subsequently, in the course of drafting the marginal notations; in these cases the addition is a repetition of the marginal point, and the German edition typically does not include them.

As a rule, what the marginal remarks formulate in thesis fashion is a detailed organization of a portion of the text and its most important thought—frequently in a complete sentence that also partly extends over several successive notations. By this practice of Hotho's, the marginalia serve as testimony to his appropriation of the lectures and his repeated reflection on them, except that—as in the following revealing example—his appropriation points beyond the makeup of the text itself. (This example occurs on Ms. p. 189.) The lecture transcript refers to the content of romantic art as in fact 'universal humanity, the human heart in its fullness, its truth', whereas the remark in the margin places the accent on the definition of art according to its concept 'as the unity... of absolute spirit and its sensuous reality', and thus puts forward Hotho's definition of the ideal, inserted into the published *Aesthetics*, as the 'sensible appearance of the idea'. Another example occurs on Ms. p. 17. See the discussion of this point in n. 92, p. 92 in this text.

The conclusion we draw from the close similarity of the marginal notations to the text of the direct transcript is that the marginalia result from Hotho's reviewing the transcript.

In addition to the text of the direct transcript and these marginalia or subsequent corrections, we also find a further stage of work on Hotho's transcript. These remarks that are entered along the edges of the pages are no longer written in the brownish ink used for the transcript itself. Hotho instead uses an obviously darker color (blackish) ink, and his handwriting has become more distinctive. Comparing it with later samples of Hotho's handwriting nevertheless allows the unambiguous conclusion that these remarks are traceable to Hotho himself, although they clearly originated later than the direct transcript and its earlier marginalia.

In this latter stage of work, along the edges of the pages, we find, first of all, a few additional marginalia and notations. This additional work generates further organizational frameworks, ones that, as a rule, depart from the organization Hotho inserted in the margins in the second stage of his work. In its contents, the new organization goes beyond the contents of the 1823 direct transcript and possibly points to Hotho's comparing it with other sources for Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, namely, with other transcripts and with Hegel's own manuscript, sources available to Hotho in his editing of the aesthetics for publication. Both this greater similarity of the new organizational frameworks to the published aesthetics, and the fact that many pages of the transcript have been crossed out diagonally with blacker ink, attest to this last stage of work originating in the process of bringing the aesthetics to publication.

We find these diagonal cross-outs of whole pages by blacker ink on manuscript pages 100–4, and then throughout pages 146–237. Toward the end, pages are crossed out only sporadically: thus the lower third of 240, all of 241–3, the first half of 244, and only the middle part of 248. In a few spots Hotho crossed out text line by line (thus 212, 213 down to the lower third, 220 in the lower half, and several lines beginning the lower half of 225). Toward the end of the manuscript a vertical stroke along the fold mark replaces the cross-outs (on left-hand pages before the lines begin, on right-hand pages after the lines end). We find this kind of marking on pages 238–40 (except for the bottom quarter of 240), on 245 (except for the top quarter), on 246, and on 247 (the bottom part of the page), and then inclusively up to page 288. There is no such marking on the last page (289).

These cross-outs are apparently Hotho's memory aids for his compilation of the different sources as he prepared for the published version. The increase in new organizational features in the margins toward the end of the transcript also confirms that this third stage of his work originated in the period between 1832 and 1834. These interventions presumably derive from the fact that, in distinction from his own direct transcript, Hotho made the three-part arrangement of the final lecture series the foundation for the published version of the aesthetics.

Since it is clear from the handwriting and the ink that these remarks in the margins involve a third stage of work on the text, one originating considerably later than the direct transcript and the other marginalia, the German edition of the 1823 transcript does not consider them to be part of the text itself. For the same reason it disregards the cross-outs and does include these passages in the text of the transcript.

## 2. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE TEXT

Thus the German edition presents the direct transcript as the body of its text. The marginalia of the next stage of Hotho's work, and his corrections, it documents in footnotes to the text, at the bottoms of the pages. The detailed topical organization (from the third stage) along the edges, which does not venture beyond the contents of the text, the German edition presents in marginalia to the lecture text, just as it stands in the transcript itself; in most instances the first line of a marginal notation is aligned with the line of text beside which it begins in the manuscript. In a few spots these locations are displaced because of vagaries in how the text proceeds. To distinguish these marginalia from the lecture text, the German edition sets them in sans serif type, and it locates corrections made to this kind of marginalia in footnotes at the bottoms of the pages, also in sans serif type. Those corrections that Hotho made in the text of his direct transcript concurrently with creating the second stage marginalia were not, as a rule, taken over into the text presented here. That is because, while they do indeed smooth out the original formulations of the text, they partly distort its material sense and, by doing so, make it appear less understandable. For that reason they are documented in textual footnotes that contain the name 'Hotho:'. Only in instances of corrections of the transcribing made directly, or made for the sake of material accuracy or grammatical reasons, are these corrections either adopted silently or else, following the usual practice, indicated in footnotes, beginning with 'Hotho', at the bottoms of the pertinent pages.

This English edition presents, in a single footnote series at the bottoms of its pages, both the kind of footnotes that, in the German edition, indicate Hotho's textual corrections, and the informative footnotes about the contents of the lectures that are found at the back of the German volume; it also includes some additional footnotes of the latter kind composed by the translator for this volume as an aid to the English reader, footnotes that begin with, or contain, the designation '[Tr.]'. To further assist the reader, this edition also inserts additional background information within some of the German edition's own footnotes that concern the material contents; it was not always practical to identify these additions by '[Tr.]', since they are often brief and closely interwoven with the wording translated from the German.

This English edition does not, however, present, in the same way as the German edition, the marginal notations from the third stage of Hotho's work that the German edition has typeset alongside the transcript text. That is for two practical reasons. First, there are hundreds of these third-

stage marginal entries in the German edition, and they require indentation of the lines of adjacent text to accommodate them—an arrangement very difficult and expensive to copy in producing this volume. Second, many of them are of little consequence in the particular sense that they simply repeat, word-for-word or nearly so, phrases and sentences from the adjacent text itself. As a compromise, this English edition creates an additional appendix reproducing the more important of these marginal notations, keyed to the bracketed transcript pages in this volume where they would appear—a listing that at least shows the larger scale organization Hotho later imposed on his transcript, in preparation for publication of the *Aesthetics*. Scholars who want to see the full array of these notations and their precise placement should consult the German edition, and those with interests so specialized should be consulting it in any event.

Many of the corrections or changes made by Hotho at stages one or two of his work (and indicated above the line of the manuscript, or at its margins) are of little or no consequence for the meaning of the text or for its rendering in English. In this English edition, minor changes of this kind are either omitted from mention in the footnotes or else adopted silently into the translation (especially where they would clearly be needed to improve the readability of the text). The footnotes to this English edition do include other changes made by Hotho that are, in the judgment of its editor, of obvious interest, or that are consequential because they materially affect the meaning of the text.

The goal of the German edition is to establish a readable text that faithfully renders the contents of Hotho's transcript. It retains as much as possible the character of the direct transcript and the initial revisions made in the marginalia. For this reason it smoothes over the numerous stylistic defects only when they interfere with understanding the text; in particular, the unusual positioning of a phrase or sentence, or something going uncorrected in the context of the transcribing. It brings the orthography and punctuation into line with today's style.

The textual apparatus in the German edition contains all the departures from the manuscript. No special notice is taken of erroneous repetitions of words or phrases, obvious slips of the pen and, as a rule, deletions. In the process of writing the marginalia, Hotho himself made a series of corrections in the text of the transcript. As noted above, these comprised corrections of illegible words and incomplete sentences but not, in any event, the simple rewriting of poorly written words or slips of the pen. Cross-outs in the text are indicated only when they are major and pertain to a disjointed thought. In these instances the text crossed out is provided in a footnote.

Corrections and cross-outs that Hotho made (in blacker ink) during the final stage of work on the manuscript are treated in the German edition like those of the second stage, except for cross-outs of whole pages, which do not get identified as such. Gaps that originated from erasures or damage in the manuscript are not identified if they do not impair our understanding of it.

Partial words, as well as missing letters or numbers in indicating subdivisions of topics, are completed in square brackets, without further comment in footnotes.

In places where the text is not made directly understandable by augmentation of it in square brackets, aids for the reader appear in the footnotes, introduced by 'perhaps:'. In similar fashion the footnotes indicate dubious readings by 'approximately:' or '[perhaps also to read: . . .]'.

As a rule, Hotho remedies incomplete sentences in the revision process himself, with these additions provided in the footnotes of the German edition. Statements that obviously are materially false are corrected in the text (with an identifying footnote), but erroneous citations and references are set right only in the editorial footnotes that deal with the subject matter.

The organization of the direct transcript itself was filled out in a few places such as in the subheadings in square brackets in the table of contents for the German volume. The organization has also been presented in detail in Hotho's marginal remarks, where the organizational statements are aligned with the text. The organizational statements, even within continuous text, are retained, but they are introduced in a partial departure from the manuscript, as follows: a. becomes a), 1. becomes 1), and so on. Sometimes periods at the ends of organizational statements are removed without comment. Of course the remaining continuous sentences of the organizational statements in the marginalia, and spanning several marginal notations, retain their punctuation (which sometimes differs from the manuscript itself).

No account is taken of ornamental pen strokes in headings and as paragraph divisions; nor of the underlining for emphasis of organizational points. Emphasis in marginalia is generally indicated only by typeface. No distinction is made between underlined marginalia and those not underlined, and the few marginalia not underlined are not identified as such.

Numbers from 1 to 12, as well as ordinal numbers generally, are as a rule spelled out in continuous text. Occasionally mixed forms crop up in the organization (such as 1st), and these are standardized to the organizational numbers.

The original manuscript's underlined words are given in italics. Words only partially underlined are wholly in italics, without comment in a



footnote. Greek words appear with the Greek letters employed in the manuscript, and are corrected or completed, as need be, without comment. Lower case is used for Latin words, and without any inflection.

In standardizing the language, the German edition in a few cases retains the older forms of spelling or expression (and it gives examples of the practices it follows). Also, it sometimes departs from the manuscript in the presentation of hyphenated words or expressions. Capitalization of adjectives and of adjectives used as nouns follows the practice for category designations in the *Science of Logic*. Vowels missing in the manuscript are supplied. Other incidental practices in treating the German manuscript need not be mentioned here.

### 3. EDITORIAL PRACTICES

Individual names (Plato, Goethe, etc.) are usually standardized according to their modern spelling. Exceptions include certain ancient names that appear in both Greek (Odysseus) and Latin (Ulysses) forms; both the German edition and this English edition retain whichever form of these and other names appears at a particular place in the text.

Punctuation is standardized in the text according to today's norms, except for a few spots where keeping the original punctuation makes the meaning clearer. The punctuation in the marginal notations is modified without comment, so that organizational points are concluded without punctuation, except for whole sentences that span several issues.

The German edition places footnotes concerning the wording of the text and the marginalia at the bottom of the page. Its footnotes concerning content issues are marked by asterisks in the margins and are placed in an appendix, where they are keyed to page and line number. This English edition, in keeping with the practice in other volumes of this *Hegel Lectures* series, places all footnotes of both kinds in a single series appearing at the bottoms of the pages and keyed to footnote numbers set in the text above.

The footnotes of the German edition indicate all interventions in the text except for the standardization procedures mentioned above, and for modifications involving colons, semicolons, commas, dashes, missing periods, and occasionally the location of numbers associated with organizational points.

Some principal ways in which this English edition departs from the presentation of the text in the German edition (aside from those departures already indicated) are as follows. In order to reduce greatly the number of

(less important) textual footnotes, this English edition omits many footnotes of the following kinds. First, notes indicating a change Hotho made in the punctuation (unless the change affects a material issue). Second, Hotho's substitution of one word for another, or the German editor's indication of a possible alternate reading of the transcript, in instances where the two German words or phrases are so close in meaning (in effect, synonymous) that in any event both German versions would likely be rendered best by the same English translation. Third, other instances of substitution of phrases for other phrases in the original transcript where the substitution makes no material difference for the meaning of the text, although the two may differ slightly. (Judgment obviously comes into play here, and the English editor's judgment is of course fallible.) Also omitted are footnotes indicating minor corrections of word endings, of verbs from singular to plural or vice versa, and the like.

This English edition introduces many more subheadings than the German edition adds to the transcript. It also introduces paragraph divisions not present in the transcript, to break up long discussions into more readable units and so that the reader can more easily spot shifts in the topics discussed. It occasionally adds, within square brackets, words or phrases that enhance the readability or clarity of the text. The German edition also occasionally has bracketed additions for the same purpose. In this English edition such additions appear without brackets except when they involve a material addition to the meaning that enhances the clarity of the text, because extensive bracketing is often an unnecessary obstacle to the reader. Also, it sometimes varies the punctuation, and breaks up long sentences or combines several of them, all in the interest of a more fluent or appropriate English translation. Practices involving capitalization or emphasis of words follow protocols adopted for other volumes in this English language series.

Clearly a scholar who wants to study the Hotho transcript in its smallest details should consult the German edition for this purpose (if not the manuscript itself). The purpose of this English edition is to make its contents, and the introductory essay by Gethmann-Siefert, readily accessible to the English reader.

#### 4. REMARKS ON STYLE

Readers of either the German edition or this English edition need to keep in mind that we have here a transcript, not an author's own manuscript. Features of punctuation and paragraphing reflect decisions made by the

transcriber and are not necessarily those of the speaker. The short, staccato sentences that sometimes appear in succession may be artifacts of Hotho's hasty note-taking rather than of Hegel's own delivery. They are not typically a feature of Hegel's own manuscripts on various topics. On the other hand, some of the very long sentences divided into subunits by semicolons could have been delivered with significant pauses, as in effect separate sentences. The style of transcript itself is that of class notes and falls short of the elaboration of a fair copy (although that is partially remedied by some corrections later made in the margins). None of this suggests, however, that Hotho's own impact on the style of the transcript diminishes in any way its accurate transmittal of the content of Hegel's thought. But it does mean that editorial interventions to improve readability, to add subject headings, and the like, may in fact bring it closer to Hegel's intentions and delivery, rather than further from them.

## 5. THE PROVENANCE OF THE GERMAN EDITION

The transcript Heinrich Gustav Hotho made of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics in Berlin, in summer 1823, was conveyed to the Hegel-Archiv in 1972 by Professor Fritz Marti. Professor Otto Pöggeler, the director of the Hegel-Archiv at that time, assigned to Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert the task of editing the transcript, which she subsequently published as a volume in the Felix Meiner Verlag's series of *Hegel Vorlesungen*, together with her encyclopedic introductory essay on the transcript and a host of related issues concerning the understanding and treatment of Hegel's aesthetics.

The German editor is indebted to a number of people for their assistance and collaboration in her research on this topic or in the production of the published volume. While grateful to many, her special thanks go to Dr. Bernadette Collenberg-Plotnikov, Ms. Jeong-Im Kwon, M. A., and Mr. Bernd Peter Aust, M. A., for their collaboration on the content footnotes. Special thanks also go to Ms. Anja Exner and Mr. Adolf Beland. Mr. Beland patiently, and with constructive criticism, oversaw the production of the German volume right up to its completion. As librarian of the Hegel-Archiv, Ms. Exner, by her tireless and longstanding support, facilitated and advanced not only the work on the German edition of this transcript of the aesthetics, but also work on many other research projects and publications.

## HOTHO'S OUTLINE ORGANIZING THE CONTENTS OF HIS TRANSCRIPT

As explained above (in 'The Constitution of the Text in the German Edition, and in this English Edition'), as a third stage of his work on his transcript Hotho entered in the margins, partially in outline form, his own topical organization of his transcript's contents. The German edition presents all of these third-stage additions in the margins of its printed pages, in a distinctive sans serif type, set adjacent to the correlative transcript passages. In its front matter the German edition presents the essence of this third-stage organization as in effect a table of contents as Hotho himself might have constructed it. ('The essence', because this table of contents includes many, but not all, of Hotho's marginal outline points, and also omits his numerous other third-stage notations, ones that mainly just repeat or highlight individual sentences or phrases as they appear in the transcript.) This table of contents occasionally abbreviates an outline point rather than giving it in full. It follows each point by the page number of the printed German volume on which it appears. Also, it adds to Hotho's own points a few items, placed in brackets, for the sake of completeness.

It should be noted that Hotho's third-stage marginalia do not constitute a single outline for the whole, with subheadings presented in a consistent format. It is rather a sequence of partial outlines, in variable formats. That is why the German edition's table of contents for it has the somewhat odd appearance that it does. Hotho had also constructed, at the second stage of his work on the transcript, a number of other outlines for various segments or topics, often in greater detail. These second-stage outline fragments in the margins are presented in the footnotes of the German edition and in those of this English edition.

For reasons explained above, this English edition does not include, adjacent to the transcript, these third-stage marginalia, outlines or otherwise.

But because Hotho's third-stage outline is of interest and importance (for he made it to use in preparing the transcript to be one of his sources for the *Aesthetics*), it is included here in the following translation of the aforementioned Hotho table of contents in the German volume. One difference is that the page numbers indicated in brackets here are instead the pages of Hotho's manuscript sheets themselves, just as this English volume presents them within brackets and set within the transcript text itself. The other difference is that, in the few instances where the German edition abbreviates an outline point, the English translation presents it completely.

### HOTHO'S OUTLINE

Introduction [page in the transcript]

Customary representations that art cannot be an object for scientific examination [1]

- a) as belonging to free fantasy [1]
- b) as merely contingent [1]
- c) as having its actuality solely in appearance [1]

Closer examination of these categories [2]

- a) of appearance [2]
  - α) as such [2]
  - β) in art [2]
- b) The worthiness of art for scientific treatment [4]

We therefore have at first only a general representation of art [6]

- 1) The fact that the work of art is no natural product, but instead is produced by human beings [6]
  - a) That is why one must establish rules for this production, rules according to which each work of art can be produced [7]
  - b) Hence people fell into believing the opposite, that the production clearly belongs to a specific talent that does not have to stick to any objective factor [8]
  - c) As a human work, the art product takes a back seat to the natural product [10]
  - d) The question is why the human being as such produces works of art [11]
- 2) The work of art is made for human beings and specifically for human beings' senses [12]

Earlier views [12]

- a) .... [12]
    - α) The work of art is produced in order to arouse pleasant feelings, that is, feelings suited to the nature of feeling as such [12]
    - β) More specifically, the work of art is supposed to arouse the feeling of the beautiful [14]
  - b) The work of art is not to be judged superficially, according to feeling, but instead according to its specific aspects; connoisseurship [14–15]
  - c) Relations of the sensuous in the way it appears in the work of art [15]
    - α) with respect to the work of art as objective [15]
    - β) with respect to the subjective activity of the artist [18]
    - γ) with respect to the work of art as such [20]
  - 3) The work of art has a purpose it brings about [21]
    - a) The purpose as the imitation of nature, as demonstration of human skill [21]
    - b) The purpose as the portrayal of all that is present in the human breast [22]
    - c) Art must essentially have a highest final purpose, and this purpose is the moderation of barbarity as well as the general dissemination of morality [22]
- General concept of art [27]
- Division of our science [29]
- 1) The General Part [29]
    - a) Striving for absolute unity, or symbolic art [29]
    - b) Absolute unity of content and form, or classical art [31]
    - c) Loosening of this absolute unity, or romantic art [31]
  - 2) The Particular Part [32]
    - a) Examination of these distinctions in an abstract way [32]
      - α) Architecture [32]
      - β) Sculpture [33]
      - γ) The romantic arts [33]
    - b) More concrete examination [34]
      - α) Architecture [34]
      - β) Sculpture [35]
      - γ) The romantic arts [36]

- A) Painting [37]
- B) Music [38]
- C) Poetry [39]
- c) Examination according to the abstractly sensible aspects of space and time [40]
  - a) Architecture takes three-dimensional space for its material existence [40]
  - β) Sculpture utilizes the three dimensions in an organic figuration that it defines, one indwelt by a soul [40]
  - γ) The romantic arts [40]
    - A) Painting makes use of abstract space, of the flat surface and its figurations [40]
    - B) The musical art of abstractly negative space, of time [40]
    - C) The poetry of the absolute negativity of space and time [40]

Relation of the general art forms to the particular arts [40]

- a) Symbolic art finds its greatest application in architecture [40]
- b) Classical art finds it in sculpture [41]
- c) Painting and music belong to romantic art [41]
- [d] Poetry pervades all the art forms [41]

### THE GENERAL PART [41]

I) The idea of what is beautiful [41]

*First division:* 1) The beautiful as such [41]

- a) The concept as such is the abstractly ideal unity of what is distinct within itself [42]
- b) The reality is the immediate existence of the abstractly ideal elements in the concept [43]
- c) These existences of the conceptual elements are taken back into the unity of the concept in their reality too, and thus exist as members of a whole [44]
  - a) The first necessary unity exists for us in the *customary character* of the members' coexistence [50]
  - β) The further progression of the customary character consists in the fact that a specific attribute becomes controlling for the necessity of the members' connection [50]
  - γ) The sensible intuition [52]

- A) The abstract form [56]
  - a) Regularity as the abstract recurrence of the same configuration [56]
  - b) Symmetry as the abstract recurrence of dissimilar configurations [56]
  - c) Lawlikeness as abstract inner connection [60]
- B) The abstract content, or matter as the unity of what is itself the same [63]

The deficiency of the beauty of what is only a living thing [64]

- a) with respect to the living thing as organism [66]
- b) with respect to the living thing as immediately individual, whereby it appears outwardly in natural dependence, inwardly or spiritually in dependence on other individuals or on higher stages of spirit [68]
- c) with respect to the fact that the individual living thing, as individual, is particularized and limited within itself [69]

*Second Division:* Artistic beauty, or the ideal as such [70]

*Third Division:* Existence of the ideal, or the actuality of artistic beauty [73]

- 1) The external world as the general condition in which the individual ideal realizes itself [74]
- 2) The situation [79]
  - a) Static situation, devoid of process; ancient temple figures [80]
  - b) Situation as movement: mechanical movement or expression of need [80]
  - c) The situation as action [81]
- 3) Reaction of the substantial condition against its own particular situation, as action and reaction of this situation against the condition [82]
  - a) The substantial, which is activated by the situation [85–6]
  - b) Concrete human individuality as the realization of the substantiality of the action [91]
- 4) The whole external specificity in the actualization of the ideal [93–4]
  - a) This congruence consists, first of all, in the accord of the subject with the surrounding, inorganic nature [96]
  - b) The second congruence is that which human beings bring about by satisfying themselves in nature [96]
    - a) theoretical satisfaction: adornment [96]
    - β) practical relationship of satisfaction [97]
  - c) Congruence with regard to practices [99]



[II] The general art forms [106]

*First division:* The symbolic art form [107]

First chapter: The symbol as such [107]

- 1) The content can be the general representation of a natural object [115–16]
- 2) The configuration of this content in what is symbolic is imperfect because the content itself is not yet free spirituality [117]

The Egyptian symbol constitutes the transition to the beautiful, or to classical art, indeed in virtue of the fact that, as symbol, it: [124]

- 1) constitutes a whole of symbols, such that one instance that was meaning becomes expression, and vice versa [124]
- 2) or [such that in another aspect] the representation enters into a realm of the dead apart from the realm of what is living [126]

Second chapter: Separation of the immediate unity of the symbolic: the poetry of sublimity, or sacred poetry [128]

Third chapter: Return from the separation of the meaning from the configuration, into the unity: the simile [130]

- 1) Aesop's fables [131]

- a) Riddle [133]
- b) Parable [133]
- c) Apologue [134]

- 2) Allegory [134]

- 3) Metaphor [135]

- [4) Comparison] [135]

- a) Comparisons can present themselves in one way when the agitated heart expresses its content not in its immediacy but instead in a different, self-created, configuration, if it in fact still suppresses the content and has it in still another form [138]

- β) The other aspect is when the heart frees itself from its content by relating itself to it as something other—expressing it as a comparison [139]

*Second division:* The classical art form as such [140]

The material for this appearance of the single individual is provided by [158]

- 1) Symbolic art as the presupposition of classical art [158]
- 2) The historical traditions of ancient kings and heroes furnish a further subject matter [160]

- 3) A third source is the fantasy of the poet, which interprets particular occurrences of immediate actuality as brought about by gods [160]

*Third division:* The romantic art form [165]

- 1) The religious sphere [170]
  - a) The process of divine reconciliation with itself [172]
  - b) Portrayal of this process in other individuals, by the positing of naturalness as negative—via oneself, or via the suffering inflicted on others: martyrs, penitents [173]
  - c) Portrayal of the divine process in the inwardness of the heart [175]
- 2) The worldly sphere [176]
  - a) Honor [177]
  - b) Love [178]
  - c) Fidelity [179]
- 3) Formal subjectivity [180]

### THE PARTICULAR PART [190]

*First division:* The plastic and graphic arts [192]

First chapter: A) Architecture [192]

- 1) Independent or symbolic architecture [194]
- 2) Classical architecture [206]

Thus the elements of the house are: [208]

- a) The supports: columns, wall, beams [208]
- b) What is supported [208]

Thus the elements of the temple are: [209]

- a) The supports [209]
  - α) Columns in rows and groups [209]
  - β) The inner chamber enclosed by solid walls [209]
  - γ) The linkage of the columns [209]
- b) What is supported is the roof [210]

- 3) Romantic architecture [211]

Second chapter: B) Sculpture [213]

Third chapter: C) Painting [231]

*Second division:* The art of sound, or music [245]

*Third division:* Verbal art, or poetry [252]

First division [of poetry]: The epic [264]

History of the epic [274]

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APPENDIXES

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- 1) Oriental epic poems; symbolic [274]
- 2) Classical: Homer, Virgil [274]
- 3) Romantic: Ossian, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Ariosto, Tasso, and so forth [274]

Second division [of poetry]: The lyrical poem [275]

Third division [of poetry]: Drama [276]

Classical tragedy [279]

- 1) The chorus as the universal powers in peaceful unity [279]
- 2) The second aspect of tragedy constitutes the conflict of the peaceful condition, since the ethical powers mutually individualize themselves [280]
- 3) However, precisely these plastic strengths allow the individuals to destroy themselves, to strip away their onesidedness, and to reinstate the substantial unity [283]
  - a) The individual can be lost in such a way that one has one's other externally over against oneself and then, in opposition, surrenders oneself; Ajax, Philoctetes [282]
  - b) Or else the individual has its other in itself, and in injuring the other it injures itself: Antigone [283]
  - c) A third reconciliation is that which takes place in the subject itself and becomes something conscious for it, in that the subject unites itself with its other and becomes like it [284]

[Modern tragedy] [284]

[Comedy] [286]

## GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. It has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom has required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first. 'Cf.' indicates related but distinguished German terms, which often are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings.

<i>German</i>	<i>English</i>
Abendland	the West, the Occident
absolut	absolute
Absolute	the absolute
allgemein	universal, general
Allgemeine	the universal
Anderssein	other-being, otherness
anerkennen	recognize, acknowledge (cf. 'erkennen')
Anerkenntnis	recognition (cf. 'Erkenntnis')
anschauen	intuit, envisage
Anschauung	intuition, contemplation, envisagement (cf. 'Wahrnehmung')
an sich	in itself, implicit (cf. 'in sich')
Ansich	in-itself, implicit being
Ansichsein	being-in-self
Anundfürsichsein	being-in-and-for-self
Arbeit	labor (cf. 'Werk')
auffassen	comprehend, grasp (cf. 'begreifen', 'fassen')
Auffassung	comprehension

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# GLOSSARY

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aufheben	sublate, suspend, supersede, annul
Aufhebung	sublation, suspension, supersession, annulment
auflösen	resolve, dissolve
Auflösung	resolution, dissolution, dissolving
Bedeutung	meaning, significance
Befriedigung	satisfaction, gratification
Begebenheit	event, happening, occurrence
Begierde	(sensuous) desire, appetite
begreifen	conceive
Begriff	concept
behandeln	treat, deal with
beherrschen	govern
bei sich	with self, present to self, at home
Beisichsein	presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self
beobachten	observe
Beobachtung	observation (cf. 'Betrachtung')
berechtigen	justify
Berechtigung	justification, rights, privilege
Beschäftigung	occupation, concern
besonder	particular (cf. 'partikulär')
Besonderheit	particularity
bestehen	subsist, endure, consist
Bestehen	subsistence
bestimmen	determine, define, characterize, specify
bestimmt	determinate, definite, specific
Bestimmtheit	determinateness, determinacy
Bestimmung	determination, definition, character(istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification, attribute
betrachten	consider, treat, deal with
Betrachtung	consideration, contemplation, reflection, inquiry (cf. 'Beobachtung')
Bewußtsein	consciousness, awareness
beziehen	relate, connect, refer to
Beziehung	relation, connection, reference (cf. 'Verhältnis', 'Zusammenhang')
Bild	image
bildlich	imaginative, figurative

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GLOSSARY

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Bildung	culture, formation, cultural formation, cultivation, education (cf. 'Kultur')
bloß	mere, simple, sheer
Boden	ground, soil, land
Böse	(moral) evil (cf. 'Übel')
darstellen	present, portray, set forth
Darstellung	presentation, portrayal, depiction, exposition (cf. 'Vorstellung')
Dasein	existence, determinate being, existent being (cf. 'Existenz', 'Sein')
denken	think
Denken	thinking, thought (cf. 'Gedanke')
denkend	thinking, thoughtful, reflective
deutsch	German (cf. 'germanisch')
eigentümlich	characteristic (adj.), proper
Einbildung	imagination (cf. 'Phantasie')
Eine	the One, the one
einfach	simple
Einsicht(en)	insight, discernment, judgment; (pl.) views, opinion
Einzelheit	singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. 'Individuum')
einzel	single, singular
Einzelne	single individual (cf. 'Individuum')
Element	element (cf. 'Moment')
empfinden	sense
Empfindung	sensibility, sensation, feeling, emotion (cf. 'Gefühl')
Endzweck	final end, final purpose (cf. 'Zweck')
Entfremdung	estrangement, alienation
Entgegensetzung	opposition
Entstehung	emergence, rise, origin, genesis
Entwicklung	development
erfassen	apprehend, grasp (cf. 'auffassen', 'fassen')
erheben	elevate, raise up
Erhebung	elevation, rising up
Erinnerung	recollection (cf. 'Gedächtnis')
erkennen	know, cognize, recognize, learn, discern (cf. 'anerkennen', 'kennen', 'wissen')
Erkenntnis	cognition, knowledge, cognitive knowledge (cf. 'Anerkenntnis', 'Kenntnis', 'Wissen')

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GLOSSARY

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erscheinen	appear (cf. 'scheinen')
Erscheinung	appearance, phenomenon
Erziehung	education
evangelisch	Protestant, evangelical
Existenz	existence (cf. 'Dasein')
existieren	exist (cf. 'sein')
fassen	grasp, apprehend
Form	form (cf. 'Gestalt')
Fortgang	progress, process, advance
Fortschritt	progress, progression
frei	free
Freie	the free
Freiheit	freedom
für sich	for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit
Fürsich	for-itself
Gattung	species, type
Gebiet	field, realm, territory
Gedächtnis	memory (cf. 'Erinnerung')
Gedanke	thought, conception (cf. 'Denken')
Gefühl	feeling (cf. 'Empfindung')
Gegensatz	antithesis, contrast, opposition
Gegenstand	object, topic, what-stands-over-against (cf. 'Objekt')
Gegenwart	presence, present (time)
Gehalt	substance, content, import
Geist	spirit
gelten	count, be valid, hold good
Geltung	value, worth, validity, consequence, importance
Gemeinde	community
Gemüt	mind, heart, disposition
Genuß	enjoyment, pleasure, communion
geoffenbart	revealed (cf. 'offenbar')
Gericht	judgment, court of justice (cf. 'Recht')
Germanen	Germanic peoples
germanisch	Germanic (cf. 'deutsch')
Geschehene	event, occurrence
Geschichte	history, historical narrative, story (cf. 'Historie')
geschichtlich	historical (cf. 'historisch')
Geschichtsschreiber	historian, historiographer
Geschlecht	kind, species, lineage, race

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GLOSSARY

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Gesetz	law
Gesetzmäßigkeit	legality
Gesinnung	conviction, disposition
Gestalt	shape, figure (cf. 'Form')
Gestaltung	configuration, construction, formation
Gewalt	authority, dominion, force, power, violence (cf. 'Macht')
Gewissen	conscience
Gewohnheit	habit, custom, practice
Glauben	faith, belief
Gleichgültigkeit	indifference, unconcern
Gliederung	articulation
Glück	happiness, fortune
glücklich	happy, fortunate
Glückseligkeit	bliss, happiness
Grund	ground, reasons, basis
Handlung	action
herleiten	derive
Herr	master, lord, ruler, sovereign, nobleman
Herrschaft	dominion, power, rule, authority, command
hervortreten	emerge, come forward, step forth
hinausgehen	overpass, go beyond
Historie	history, historical record (cf. 'Geschichte')
Historiker	historian (cf. 'Geschichtsschreiber')
historisch	historical, historical study (cf. 'geschichtlich')
ideal	ideal (speculative reference)
Idealität	ideality
Idee	idea
ideell	ideal (empirical reference)
Individualität	individuality, individualism, individual
Individuum	individual (cf. 'Einzelne')
jenseitig	otherworldly
Jenseits	the beyond, the other world
kennen	know (cf. 'wissen')
Kenntnis	information, acquaintance (cf. 'Erkenntnis', 'Wissen')
Königreich	kingdom (cf. 'Reich')
Königtum	kingship
Kraft	force, strength, energy (cf. 'Macht')
Kultur	culture, cultivation (cf. 'Bildung')



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GLOSSARY

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Kultus	cultus, worship
Land	land, country
Leidenschaft	passion
Macht	power, authority, might, strength (cf. 'Gewalt', 'Kraft')
Mannigfaltigkeit	manifold(ness), multiplicity, diversity
Meinung	opinion, intention
Mensch	human being (sometimes 'person' or 'one')
Menschheit	humanity
mit sich	with self, integral
Mittelpunkt	center, focal point, focus
Moment	moment, element (cf. 'Element')
Moralische	moral sphere (cf. 'Sittliche')
Moralität	morality (cf. 'Sittlichkeit')
Morgenland	the East, the Orient
Nachdenken	meditation, meditative thinking
Nation	nation (cf. 'Staat', 'Volk')
Natur	nature
Natürlichkeit	natural life, natural state, naturalness, simplicity, unaffectedness
Objekt	object, topic (cf. 'Gegenstand')
offenbar	revelatory, manifest (cf. 'geoffenbart')
Offenbarung	revelation
partikulär	private, personal (cf. 'besonder')
Pflicht	duty, obligation
Phantasie	fantasy, fanciful imagination (cf. 'Einbildung')
Positive	the positive, positivity
Privateigentum	private property, privilege
Privatrecht	civil law, private right (cf. 'Staatsrecht')
privatrechtlich	under civil law, private legality, private rights
Räsonnement	argumentation, reasoning.
real	real (speculative reference)
realisieren	realize (cf. 'verwirklichen')
Realität	reality (cf. 'Wirklichkeit')
Recht	right, law, justice, prerogative, privilege (cf. 'Gericht', 'Gesetz')
Rechtschaffenheit	righteousness, rectitude
reell	real (empirical reference)
reflektierend	reflective

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GLOSSARY

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reflektiert	reflected
Reflexion	reflection, reflective power
regieren	rule
Reich	realm, empire, kingdom (cf. 'Königreich', 'Königtum')
Religiosität	religiosity, religious piety
Sache	thing (that is at work, that something is about), (subject) matter, fact, case
Schauspiel	spectacle, drama
Schein	semblance, show
scheinbar	seeming
scheinen	seem
Schicksal	destiny, fate
schlechthinig	utter, simple (cf. 'absolut')
Schmerz	anguish, sorrow, pain
Schuld	guilt, responsibility, culpability
Seele	soul
seiend	having being, subsisting, actual
Seiende(s)	actual being, entity, subsisting being
sein (verb)	is, exists, occurs
Sein (noun)	being
Seite	side, aspect
Selbstgefühl	sense of self, self-reliance
sinnlich	sensible, sentient, sensuous
Sinnlichkeit	sensuousness, sensible nature
Sitte	custom, ethical practice, ethical custom
sittlich	ethical
Sittliche	ethical sphere (cf. 'Moralische')
Sittlichkeit	ethics, ethical life, ethicality (cf. 'Moralität')
Spekulative	the speculative, speculation
Staat	(political) state
Staatsrecht	constitutional law (cf. 'Privatrecht')
Stamm	clan, tribe
Stand(e)	class, condition, standing; (pl.) estates
Stoff	material
Stufe	stage, step, level
Subjekt	subject
Subjektivität	subjectivity
Tat	act, action, deed
Tätigkeit	activity

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GLOSSARY

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Trieb	drive, impulse, instinct
Übel	evil (cf. 'Böse'), calamity; (pl.) ills
Überbildung	over-refinement
Übergang	transition, passing over
übergehen	pass over
übergreifen	overreach
überhaupt	generally, on the whole, as such, altogether, after all, in fact, etc.
Überzeugung	conviction
unangemessen	incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate
unbefangen	naive, natural, unaffected, ingenuous
Unglück	misery, unhappiness
unmittelbar	immediate
Unmittelbarkeit	immediacy
Untergang	decline, downfall, destruction
unterscheiden	distinguish, differentiate
Unterscheidung	differentiation, distinction (cf. 'Verschiedenheit')
Unterschied	distinction
unterschieden	distinguished, differentiated, distinct, different (cf. 'verschieden')
Veränderung	alteration, change (cf. 'Wechsel')
Verbildung	decline, degeneration
Vereinigung	unification, association, union
Vereinzelung	singularization, individualization
Verfassung	(political) constitution, political institution, system of government
Verhalten	attitude, comportment, behavior
Verhältnis	relationship, condition (cf. 'Beziehung', 'Zusammenhang')
Verhältnisse (pl.)	conditions, circumstances, state of affairs
Vermittlung	mediation
Vernunft	reason (cf. 'Verstand')
vernünftig	rational
verschieden	different, distinct, diverse (cf. 'unterschieden')
Verschiedenheit	difference, diversity, disparity (cf. 'Unterscheidung')
Versöhnung	reconciliation
Verstand	understanding (cf. 'Vernunft')

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GLOSSARY

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Verwaltung	administration
verwirklichen	actualize (cf. 'realisieren')
Verwirklichung	actualization (cf. 'Wirklichkeit')
Volk	people, tribe (cf. 'Nation')
Völkerschaft	tribe, people
Volksgeist	spirit of a people, folk spirit
vollendet	consummate, perfect, complete, final
Vollendung	consummation
vorhanden	present, at hand, extant
vorhanden sein	be present, be at hand, exist
Vorsehung	providence
vorstellen	represent, imagine
vorstellend	representational, representative
Vorstellung	representation, impression, indication, notion, view
wahr	true
Wahre	the true
wahrhaft(ig)	true, genuine, authentic, truthful
Wahrhafte	the true, the genuine
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrnehmung	(sense) perception (cf. 'Anschauung')
Wechsel	change (cf. 'Veränderung')
Weltgeist	world spirit, spirit of the world
weltlich	secular, profane, worldly
Weltlichkeit	secularity, worldliness
Weltteil	continent
Werk	work (cf. 'Arbeit')
Wesen	essence, being, essential being
Willkür	free will, caprice, arbitrariness
wirken	effect, do, work, operate
wirklich	actual
Wirklichkeit	actuality (cf. 'Realität')
Wirksamkeit	efficacy
wissen	know (cf. 'kennen', 'erkennen')
Wissen	knowledge, knowing (cf. 'Erkenntnis', 'Kenntnis')
Wissenschaft	science, discipline, scientific knowledge
Zeugnis	witness, testimony
Zufall	chance
Zufälligkeit	contingency

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## GLOSSARY

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Zusammenhang	connection, interrelationship, nexus, matrix, coherence (cf. 'Beziehung', 'Verhältnis')
Zustand	condition, state (of affairs)
Zweck	purpose, aim, end
zweckmässig	purposeful, expedient, useful
Zweckmässigkeit	purposiveness, expediency, utility

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This bibliography is in four parts: Works by Hegel (German); Works by Hegel (English); Works by Hotho; Works by Others. To the extent possible, it has an entry for each writing cited with publication information in the footnotes for both the Gethmann-Siefert introductory essay and the Hotho transcript. It also contains a few other entries of special interest for which publication information is not provided. But as a rule the novels, plays, poems, and other written works of art mentioned by name in the text or notes without publication information are not included, although they do appear in the second index to this volume.

For the most part, publications are listed in alphabetical order by title (or the first key word in the title) after the author's name. Publications with multiple authors or editors appear only in the alphabetical listing after the first author's name. Exceptions to the general rule are that editions of collected works by an author precede the entries for individual works by that author, and translations appear directly after the entries for the individual works of which they are translations. When an individual work is noted as included in a collection that is also listed in this bibliography, that information is provided at the end of the entry, usually in a suitably abbreviated form. Sometimes the supplementary information originally attached to a title is given here in English (as it is in the footnotes) rather than in the original language, especially where that would be helpful to the English reader. Also, occasionally very long titles are abbreviated, with less essential information omitted.

The German edition does not have a full bibliography as such, but only a brief section with bibliographical detail about editions of collected works of selected major figures. Its notes often cite just the relevant pages of a work and do not indicate the full range of pages comprising it in that particular

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# INDEXES TO THE HOTHOTH TRANSCRIPT

The page numbers in these indexes are page numbers of the German edition, not page numbers of the original Hothoth transcript sheets themselves. In this English edition they are page numbers that appear in the right and left margins of the Hothoth text, not page numbers of the volume itself.

The German edition indexes only the text of the Hothoth transcript. It does not index the footnotes to the transcript, nor does it index the Gethmann-Siefert introductory essay. This English edition follows the same procedure and has three similar indexes: a subject index, which includes place names; an index of artists with their works of art; an index of figures in mythology, religion, and works of art. One difference is that this English edition's subject index also includes the names of persons mentioned or alluded to in the transcript who are not artists.

A second and major difference concerns the number of entries in the subject index. The German subject index includes very full page citations for most of the nouns or nominative forms occurring in the transcript, making it encyclopedic in this regard. To keep the English edition's subject index to more manageable (albeit still quite considerable) size, it omits a number of terms with general or multiple meanings that occur a great many times throughout the transcript ('expression', 'image', 'portrayal', 'representation', 'shape', 'spirit', and others). Also, it limits references for some other frequently occurring topics to passages that contain substantive points about them.

All names are in the form in which they appear in this translation of the Hothoth transcript. Hence some are according to their customary form in English, whereas less familiar ones appear in the original languages.

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